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This dissertation examines the thousands of Anglo-Americans who immigrated to Mexican Texas during the
years following its independence from Spain. Long assumed to be the forbears of Manifest Destiny, it argues
instead that these immigrants demonstrated a sincere desire to become Mexican citizens, that they were
attracted to that country as much for its political promise as for its natural resources, and that they in fact
shared more with their northern Mexican neighbors than with their compatriots in the northeastern United
States.
Drawing chiefly from the personal papers, diplomatic correspondence, and newspapers of Anglo settlers and
their Mexican allies, this dissertation exposes a political irony at the heart of the United States’ imperial rise -
that it had to do with that country’s early political weakness, rather than Mexico’s, and that the people most
responsible for it were in fact trying to escape US dominion, not perpetuate it. It argues that Mexico offered a
viable and attractive alternative to the US. Rather than seeing Mexico’s commitment to regional sovereignty
and local autonomy as its chief failure, this project argues that it was precisely what attracted these immigrants
to Mexico and formed the basis of their loyalty.
Yet, if Mexico’s weak central government was its strength in the 1820’s, it would be the source of conflict and
secession by the 1830’s and 1840’s. But Mexico was not unique in this regard. Indeed, this project recasts the
US Civil War as part of a longer and more expansive experiment in extreme federalism by arguing that Texans
seceded from Mexico for many of the same reasons that they and the rest of the South would ultimately secede
from the United States. Thus, throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, the dominant geopolitical
arrangement of the northwestern hemisphere was not primarily national. Rather, the southern United States
and northern Mexico formed a semi-autonomous region united by its inhabitants’ shared commitment to
regional sovereignty, martial citizenship, forced labor, and free trade; and one that presented the possibility of
a geopolitical arrangement very different from that which ultimately emerged.
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
“CHILDREN OF THE GREAT MEXICAN FAMILY” 
ANGLO-AMERICAN IMMIGRATION TO TEXAS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1820-1861 
Sarah KM Rodríguez 
Stephanie McCurry 
This dissertation examines the thousands of Anglo-Americans who immigrated to 
Mexican Texas during the years following its independence from Spain.  Long assumed 
to be the forbears of Manifest Destiny, it argues instead that these immigrants 
demonstrated a sincere desire to become Mexican citizens, that they were attracted to that 
country as much for its political promise as for its natural resources, and that they in fact 
shared more with their northern Mexican neighbors than with their compatriots in the 
northeastern United States.  
Drawing chiefly from the personal papers, diplomatic correspondence, and 
newspapers of Anglo settlers and their Mexican allies, this dissertation exposes a political 
irony at the heart of the United States’ imperial rise - that it had to do with that country’s 
early political weakness, rather than Mexico’s, and that the people most responsible for it 
were in fact trying to escape US dominion, not perpetuate it.  It argues that Mexico 
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offered a viable and attractive alternative to the US.  Rather than seeing Mexico’s 
commitment to regional sovereignty and local autonomy as its chief failure, this project 
argues that it was precisely what attracted US immigrants to Mexico and formed the basis 
of their loyalty to that country.   
Yet, if Mexico’s weak central government was its strength in the 1820’s, it would 
be the source of conflict and secession by the 1830’s and 1840’s.  But Mexico was not 
unique in this regard. Indeed, this project recasts the US Civil War as part of a longer and 
more expansive experiment in extreme federalism by arguing that Texans seceded from 
Mexico for many of the same reasons that they and the rest of the South would ultimately 
secede from the United States.  Thus, throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, 
the dominant geopolitical arrangement of the northwestern hemisphere was not primarily 
national.  Rather, the southern United States and northern Mexico formed a semi-
autonomous region united by its inhabitants’ shared commitment to regional sovereignty, 
martial citizenship, forced labor, and free trade; and one that presented the possibility of a 
geopolitical arrangement very different from that which ultimately emerged.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Just after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, an acquisition which effectively 
doubled the United States’ national territory, John Quincy Adams wrote that “The whole 
continent of North America appears destined by Divine Providence to be peopled by one 
nation.”   After the United States acquired Florida from Spain in 1819, he wrote that the 
world must be “familiarized with the idea of considering our proper dominion to be the 
continent of North America.  From the time when we became an independent people,” 
Adams wrote, “it was as much a law of nature that this should become our pretension as 
that the Mississippi should flow to the sea.” 1 Central to the imperial vision of Adams and 
others like him were Anglo-American settlers themselves, especially small landholders, 
whose rights and privileges were at the core of United States political tradition, and who, 
many believed, would help pave the way for US continental domination.2   
 Not long after Adams wrote his second correspondence, US citizens would, in 
fact, begin slowly trickling across the eastern Louisiana border with New Spain, to settle 
its far northern province of Téjas.  Between 1820 and 1836, this region, nestled between 
the Rio Grande and Sabine Rivers, attracted thousands of norteamericanos, most from 
southern states like Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama.  This, as 
well as its geographic placement, rich natural resources, and seemingly sparse population, 
convinced many US leaders that Texas would serve as the United States’ gateway to the 
                                                          
1 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1874-77), vol. 
4, p. 439; Adams quoted in D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical perspective on 500 
Years of History Vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19913), 211. 
2 Reginald Horseman, Race and American Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-
Saxonism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 81, 86-87.  
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rest of the continent, and that those Americans settling there would act as its primary 
ambassadors.3  Yet, while national elites may have envisioned US expansion through 
population dispersal, most of those who were actually settling the region had no such 
intent.  Their aim was to escape US dominion, not perpetuate it. 
 
The United States has long been a destination for immigrants, especially from 
Mexico and other parts of Latin America.  It is hard, then, to imagine US citizens seeking 
new lives south of the border.  But in the years following Mexican independence, this 
was precisely the case.  Traditionally, historians have interpreted their decision as 
strategic not sincere.4  How could it be otherwise? Mexico was still a monarchy when 
these immigrants first set their sights on it. 
                                                          
3 Mattie Austin Hatcher, “The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801-1822”, University of Texas 
Bulletin, No. 2714: April 8, 1927 (Austin, University of Texas), 277. 
4 This is the view of most traditionalist scholars including Eugene C. Barker, “Mexico and Texas: A 
Collision of Two Cultures” (Dallas: P.L. Turner, 1928), 1-5, 143-146.  See also The Life of Steven F. 
Austin, Founder of Texas (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1925), Chapter 16; T.R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A 
History of Texas and the Texans, (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2000), Chapter 8; Laura Lyons McLemore offers 
an excellent synthesis of this first and earliest group of Texas historians who cited Mexican political, 
cultural and moral inferiority as the primary cause for the Texas Revolution in Inventing Texas: Early 
Historians of the Lone star State(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), Chapter 2.  They 
included such nineteenth-century amateur historians as Mary Austin Holley, Chester Newell and Frederic 
LeClerc.  This view was then extended into academic and popular knowledge by professional twentieth-
century scholars such as George P. Garrison, Walter Prescott Webb, J. Frank Dobie, Charles W, Ramsdell, 
and Eugene C. Baker.  
Many revisionist historians, however, have also failed to take seriously Anglo settlers’ declarations of 
loyalty and in so doing have largely reinforced the notion of an inevitable incompatibility between Anglo-
American immigrants and Mexico.   See Robert A. Calvert and Arnoldo de León ,eds. The History of Texas 
(Harlan Davidson: Arlington Heights, 1990), Chapter 3 and 4; Arnoldo de León, They Called Them 
Greasers: Anglo Attitudes Towards Mexicans in Texas, 1821—1900, (Austin: University of Texas, 1983); 
David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico.  
For an synthesis and critique of Texas historiography until 1991 see  Walter Buenger and Robert A. 
Calvert’s Introduction to Texas Through Time: Evolving Interpretations (College Station: Texas A&M 
Press, 1991), ix-xxxv.  
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Borderlands scholars have done much to advance our understanding of these early 
immigrants to Mexican Texas.  Rather than merely dismissing their Mexican nationalism, 
scholars like Andrés Reséndez, Greg Cantrell and Andrew Cayton argue that these 
settlers demonstrated a flexible and pragmatic nationalism, and insist that the story of 
early Texas is essentially one of shifting allegiances at a time of national weakness for 
both Mexico and the United States.   But they stop short of acknowledging the full power 
and appeal of the early Mexican political system to many Anglo southern frontiersmen, 
nor the extent to which they participated in the early Mexican nation building project.  
Eric Slereth’s recently argued that early settlers drew on the notion of “expatriation” or “a 
natural right under international law to unilaterally exchange citizenship in one country 
for that of another.”  Although compelling, this interpretation fails to address the question 
of “why Mexico?” 5   Was there anything about that nation specifically that attracted 
thousands of US immigrants other than the fact that it happened to be just across the 
border?  This dissertation insists that there was.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 For examples of works that point to the inherent flexibility of early national identities along the US-
Mexico border see David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under 
Mexico. Andrés Reséndez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-
1850 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Greg Cantrell, Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of 
Texas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). For an synthesis and critique of Texas historiography 
until 1991 see  Walter Buenger and Robert A. Calvert’s Introduction to Texas Through Time: Evolving 
Interpretations (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1991), ix-xxxv;  Andrew R.L. Cayton, “Continental 
Politics: Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Appeal of Texas in the 1820s” in Beyond the Founders: New 
Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic, ed. by Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. 
Robertson and David Waldstreicher (Chapell Hil: University of North Carolina press, 2004. Eric R. Slereth, 
“Privileges of Locomotion: Expatriation and Politics of the Southwestern Border Crossing,” Journal of 
American History, (March 2014), 995-1020, quote p. 997. 
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More recently, in their efforts to answer the question of just how the United States 
came to replace Mexico as the geopolitically dominant nation in the Northwestern 
Hemisphere, scholars of the US empire have pointed to non-state forces such as cotton 
and powerful Native American groups who paved the way for US westward expansion by 
compromising Mexico’s efforts at national consolidation, social cohesion and inter-ethnic 
peace.    Yet these histories, however illuminating, do little to challenge the long-standing 
assumption of Mexican political weakness and incompetence.  In fact, in many ways they 
reinforce it.6    Yet, in failing to sufficiently interrogate the long-standing assumption of 
Mexican political weakness and ineffectuality, scholars have missed a profound irony at 
the heart of this particular stage of American expansion – that the United States’ rise to 
continental dominance had more to do with that nation’s early political weakness, rather 
than Mexico’s, and that the people most credited with perpetuating US dominion were in 
fact trying to escape it. 
Indeed, for some, especially those living on the frontier, Mexico appeared even 
more politically viable than the United States.  Just as the latter was falling under the 
sway of an increasingly centralized government, seemingly committed to pursuing the 
aims of a capitalist elite, the newly fledged nation to its south promised immigrants a 
                                                          
6 For the role of cotton in fueling US westward expansion see Andrew Torget, Cotton Empire: Slavery and 
the Texas Borderlands, 1820-1837 (PhD. Diss. University of Virginia, 2009) and Walter Johnson, River of 
Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom.  For Native American power in the Mexican 
North and its role in facilitating US westward expansion see specifically Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand 
Deserts: Indian Raids and the US-Mexico War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), Chapter 8; 
Pekka Hamalainen, Comanche Empire (New have: Yale University Press, 2008), “Introduction” and 
Chapter 4.  
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system more firmly grounded in the traditional republican principles they held most dear.   
While there is no question that these immigrants played a crucial role in Texas’ secession 
from Mexico, and that country’s subsequent loss of half its national territory to the 
United States, neither such a result nor the settlers’ part in it were as predictable as many 
have assumed.    Indeed, it could be said that at the time of Mexico’s independence, that 
country, not the United States, appeared poised to dominate the continent. 
This, of course, has significant implications for how we understand the United 
States and Mexico, and their relationship with each other during this period.   The case of 
thousands of disillusioned Americans renouncing their homeland for its neighbor to the 
south shows that the Jacksonian US was no stronger or more unified than Mexico.7  Both 
republics would, throughout the early nineteenth century, struggle with questions 
surrounding national cohesion, citizenship, regional sovereignty, states’ rights, and, of 
course, slavery.  And both nations would be torn asunder, with the United States facing 
one of the bloodiest civil wars of modern history – a war ignited by many of the very 
same impulses that had attracted so many Americans to Mexico in the first place.   
Indeed, as frontier southerners, Anglo-American immigrants and their northern 
Mexican neighbors shared more in common with each other than they did with the 
                                                          
7 Most histories of Jacksonian America see it as the high point of American nationalism and cohesion.  See 
Sean Willenz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-
1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian 
America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); William Appleman Williams, The Roots 
of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a 
Marketplace Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), Chapter 2 and 3. 
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economic and political elites of their respective countries.  This included a commitment 
to regional sovereignty, local autonomy, and martial citizenship; an embrace of various 
forms of forced labor; engagement in a lucrative transnational economy; and an 
increasingly strained relationship with their respective central governments.  In other 
words, the American South and Mexican North formed a more or less politically, 
economically and culturally coherent unit distinct from the emerging centers of national 
power in both the northeastern United States and Mexico City, and one that presented the 
possibility of a third geopolitical arrangement very different from that which exists now.  
United States hemispheric domination was hardly a foregone conclusion. 
*** 
 Even as historians have by now long rejected the notion of inevitability, many 
entrenched assumptions about the course of US westward expansion remain.  Chief 
among them is the tendency to see Anglo colonists, wherever they may settle, as effective 
ambassadors of Anglo culture, values and institutions.  Recent scholarship on settler 
colonialism has argued that the nineteenth century saw the “rise of the Anglo world,” 
with settlers from the United States to Australia effectively reproducing their own 
societies abroad, and thereby paving the way for British and US imperial dominance.8   
The thought that white American men would choose to live under a Mexican 
monarchy rather than a US republic may seem peculiar to some, but this was in fact the 
                                                          
8 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.  D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America. While Meinig rejects 
the notion of inevitability in theory, he too, largely accepts that US immigrants to Texas helped to 
unilaterally facilitate US expansion, 39-41. 
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case.  Indeed, this dissertation challenges the scholarly and popular assumption that US 
republican democracy was always a preferred form of government to European-style 
monarchy.  In fact, this was not even the case for some white, property-owning men, the 
very people we would assume to be the most fervent defenders of US republicanism.  By 
focusing on prominent figures like Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, both of whom 
articulated a faith in the superiority of their nation and a desire to either transport its 
model abroad or adopt a policy of aggressive national expansion in its name, studies of 
the early republic have tended to take US political superiority and appeal for granted.9   
Likewise, studies of early Mexico have tended to see that nation’s post-
independence era as a time of disintegration and national humiliation.   However, I would 
argue that Mexico’s chief political characteristic - its provincialism – should be seen as a 
source of viability, rather than weakness.10  Indeed, this work argues that what we term 
“strong” versus “weak” states is ultimately historically contingent and culturally 
constructed.11  
                                                          
9 For a discussion of Jeffersonian imperial ideology see Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language 
of American Nationhood (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000) and for the most 
comprehensive study of Jackson see Robert V. Ramini, The Life of Andrew Jackson: The Course of 
American Empire, 1767-1821 (New York: Harper and Row, 1988). 
10 For examples of scholarship that significantly reconsiders early Mexican politics and nationhood see 
Timothy E. Anna, Forging Mexico, 1821-1835 ( Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 
“Introduction” and Chapter 1; Jaime E. Rodríguez O., ed., The Independence of Spanish America (New 
York: Cambridge, 1996), Chapter 3 and 5; Eric Van Young, Writing Mexican History  (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012), Chapter 3. 
11 For works on the supposed “strength” of the early US republic in terms of its martial and economic 
presence, especially in the West, see Bergman, William H. The American National State and the Early 
West (London: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  For work on the limitations and popular criticism of 
the early state’s centralizing tendency see Saul Carnell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the 
Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill, University North Carolina Press, 1999); Steven 
Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay 
8 
 
 
 
Indeed, many frontier Americans saw in the United States a nation that had 
betrayed many of its founding principles.  And those who immigrated to Mexico admired 
that country, first as a monarchy and later as a confederate republic, precisely for its firm 
commitment to weak central government, regional sovereignty, and local autonomy. For 
many in both Mexico and the United States, these principles constituted the lynchpin of 
democracy.12  At a time when the United States was rapidly centralizing in an attempt to 
modernize and reform its economy and infrastructure, Mexico was founded on a 
federalist promise at least as fervent as that which existed in the US.   
For example, post-independence Mexico’s renewed commitment to the militia, 
considered to be one of the primary bulwarks against political tyranny, particularly 
appealed to US citizens who, by the 1820’s, were seeing their federal government slowly 
move away from locally organized militias in favor of a professional army. Anglo-
Texans embraced the Mexican militia, which relied on the leadership, authority and skill 
of the local community, as not only a way to protect and ensure their rights in their 
adopted nation, but as a means of demonstrating their loyalty to it. 
Additionally, Anglo settlers, most of whom were from the South, felt at home in a 
region whose inhabitants shared their commitment to a compulsive labor system – much 
of it racialized.  Whether it be chattel slavery or debt peonage, both American southerners 
and their tejano neighbors saw forced labor as perhaps the only means to develop and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996).  For a reconsideration of the supposed “weakness” of 
the early Mexican political systems see Anna, Forging Mexico, “Preface” and Chapter 1. 
12 Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 
(University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
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enrich Texas, and they worked together to convince reluctant Mexican leaders to allow 
settlers to admit their slaves as debt peons.  This arrangement worked for some time until 
slaves themselves managed to take advantage of their new status to have their contracts 
manumitted under Mexican federal law.   
Rather than seeing these settlers’ “southerness” as the root of their hostility 
towards Mexico, this dissertation argues that it was precisely what attracted them and 
facilitated their cooperation with tejanos.  United States settlers were indeed invited to the 
region to mitigate Indian attacks on Mexicans and introduce a southern-style cotton 
economy replete with its slave labor force.  Counter to how many American imperialists 
assumed Anglo settler colonialism would work - and to how many scholars since have 
assumed it did -  American immigrants to Mexico demonstrated a flexibility and 
willingness to conform to Mexican law and culture. When racial antagonism did 
ultimately emerge between Anglos and Mexicans, it was the result not the cause of 
conflicts like the Texas Revolution and US-Mexico War.   
Far from feeling a tension between their American identity and Mexican 
nationality, many immigrants believed that Mexico was in fact the only place where they 
could truly be American.  Time and again, they expressed the notion that only in Mexico 
could they enjoy the kind of republican autonomy and independence that their 
grandfathers had fought for in the American Revolution.  Far from an imposition or 
hindrance, they viewed the Mexican state as guarantor and protector. 
10 
 
 
 
Furthermore, they were deeply invested in the Mexican nation-building project in 
a way that historians have not fully acknowledged.   Texans certainly did not want to 
evade the state, nor did they necessarily find it an imposition. 13   In fact, they strove to 
make Mexico a more viable and lucrative republic by forging a vital transnational 
network that linked the rugged deserts of the Mexican North with the lush plantations of 
the US South and thriving metropolises of the Caribbean.  And they saw their efforts as 
in service of the Mexican state, not in contradiction to it.  Yet, as much as they wanted to 
help Mexico flourish, they wanted it on their terms.  They decried Mexican efforts at 
taxation and other kinds of regulation they saw as a hindrance, while at the same time 
calling for increased infrastructure to enable foreign and domestic trade.  They 
proclaimed a commitment to Mexican industry, but continued to rely on the US for most 
necessaries like food and clothing.   While their claims may seem contradictory or even 
hypocritical to a twenty-first century reader, the question of what exactly a republic was, 
how it functioned, and its citizens’ rights and responsibilities within it were still yet to be 
determined in the early nineteenth century.  What may appear as hypocrisy was, perhaps 
more accurately, the birth pangs of modern nation building.   Ultimately, however, these 
immigrants’ actions would undermine the national sovereignty and nation-building 
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of influential borderlands scholarship on early Texas see Andrés Reséndez Changing National Identities at 
the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Greg 
Cantrell, Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of Texas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 
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efforts of both Mexico and the United States by posing a geopolitical alternative that 
threatened the dominance of both nations.   
 Indeed, Mexico’s strength was its greatest weakness and, as the 1830’s 
progressed, Mexican leaders experienced increasing difficulty holding their nation 
together while honoring its federalist impulse.  This resulted in a significant generational 
shift in settler attitudes towards and relationship with Mexico, with those arriving after 
the country’s move towards centralism demonstrating a more tentative loyalty than those 
who came earlier.   Americans who immigrated after 1830 would enter a nation that no 
longer appeared the federalist Promised Land that earlier immigrants saw it as.  While 
members of the earlier generation held out hope that Mexico would one day return to the 
principles that had attracted them, those who only knew it to be plagued by political 
turmoil, violence and conflict, seemed more dubious.  
It was members of this latter group that, in 1835, would push for independence 
when it looked like Mexican federalism was finally dead.  This was the year that Antonio 
López de Antonio Santa Anna, in an attempt to save his country from political chaos, 
instituted a sweeping set of administrative changes designed to centralize authority and 
strengthen the executive.  Yet independence was still not a desirable option for most 
Texans.  Instead, they joined with their Mexican compatriots in a nation-wide effort to 
reinstate the beloved Constitution of 1824, to which they had pledged their loyalty when 
they first immigrated.  When this failed, after Santa Anna crushed the last federalist 
stronghold in Zacatecas, Texans began a slow, reluctant and ultimately incomplete 
12 
 
 
 
embrace of independence.  Their move was brought on by the rapidly changing 
demographics of wartime Texas, which saw a dramatic increase of recruits from the US 
who, tempted by promises of cheap land, joined the fight aginst Santa Anna.  For most of 
these men, Mexican federalism meant little.  Unlike earlier immigrants, they had no real 
desire to leave the United States, a nation that under the leadership of Andrew Jackson 
was beginning to return to its federalist origins, and they had no prior connection with 
Mexico.   Their only impressions of the country and its people had been formed in a time 
of war.   
Texan independence, rather than a momentary blip in the United States’ otherwise 
uninterrupted westward march, ushered in a period of geopolitical experimentation, 
whereby Texans entertained a variety of possibilities.  These included joining the United 
States, remaining independent, and even returning to Mexico.  Although Texans would 
ultimately annex themselves to the US, they would remain a part of that country for a 
mere fifteen years before seceding for many of the same reasons they had seceded from 
Mexico.   
   The United States, in fact, would face the very same set of geopolitical 
challenges that Mexico had and, at least momentarily, it would meet the same fate.  Just 
after acquiring massive territory territory from its supposedly weaker neighbor, the 
United States fell apart in 1861.14  In many ways, the Civil War and the issues that 
prompted it, extend far beyond the chronological and geographic boundaries that 
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historians have traditionally awarded it.  Furthermore, as the only southern state with a 
history of secession, Texas would hold a special place in the Confederacy’s historic 
imagination.      
 Indeed, this project points to the inherent southern character and history of the 
American Southwest, challenging the longstanding assumption that the West was 
somehow separate from the rest of the country.15   Yet, while most studies of the 
“Southern Empire” focus on elites, this one highlights the contributions of less 
prosperous, sometimes wayward, southerners who turned their backs on the US much 
earlier than their elite counterparts did, and who were far more interested in starting new 
lives beyond the confines of their native country than in extending slavery or rectifying a 
sectional power imbalance.16    It is perhaps more helpful to imagine Texas as the nexus 
of a region distinct from the American  northeast and Mexico City, both of which, despite 
their undeniable economic and political power, remained largely peripheral to the 
imagined world of most inhabitants of the Northwestern hemisphere.  
Yet, just as Texas occupied a central place in the hearts and minds of those who 
lived there, it deserves to be at the center of the larger national history and historiography 
of both the United States and Mexico.   As Walter Buenger observes, Texas and US 
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16 Robert E. May, The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861, (Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, 2002); Matthew Pratt Guterl, American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of 
Emancipation, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Gerald Horne, The Deepest South: The 
United States, Brazil, and the African Slave Trade, (New York: University Press, 2007); Michael O’Brien, 
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history have long constituted a kind of “dual provincialism,”17 which is peculiar 
considering how crucial Texas was to the larger story of US nation building and 
westward expansion.   Yet historians of Texas have nonetheless resisted integrating their 
story into the larger national narrative, while historians of the United States have returned 
the favor by mostly ignoring Texas. This dissertation, however, places Texas where it 
should be - at the epicenter of the United States’ imperial rise.   
This story begins in the early 1800’s with the first Anglo-American settlers in 
northern New Spain and ends in 1861 with Texans’ decision to secede from the United 
States and the onset of the American Civil War. Most of the sources are family and 
personal papers belonging to US settlers in northern Mexico.   These documents provide 
the best insight into these immigrants’ politics, society and changing relationships with 
each other and national officials.  It also relies on the collected and personal papers of 
northern Mexicans – principally tejanos - to understand their relationship with Anglo 
settlers and their own central government in Mexico City, their reasons for inviting these 
settlers into their country, and for joining the Texas Revolution and later the Civil War.   
Newspapers, particularly in the later chapters, track how political opinion developed in 
Texas as its status and demographics changed.  Finally, municipal records, such as the 
Béxar Archives, explain how Anglo institutions took shape on the frontier, and how 
Texans’ relationship with both Mexican and US authorities changed as a result.   
                                                          
17 Walter L. Buenger and Robert A. Calvert, “Introduction” to Texas Trough Times: Evolving 
Interpretations, Buenger and Calvert eds., (Texas A&M University Press: College Station, 1991), ix-xxxv. 
15 
 
 
 
Being that this is a national story of the US, Mexico and Texas, I also consult the 
collected papers and diaries of US and Mexican national leaders like Andrew Jackson 
and General Manuel Mier y Terán, as well as state documents and correspondence.   
These documents reveal how national leaders understood and reacted to the events 
surrounding Texas independence and annexation, and the national and international 
debates surrounding these and other events.    
The dissertation proceeds chronologically with the first chapter exploring US 
immigrants’ perceptions of Mexico and particular political philosophy, one grounded in a 
commitment to local autonomy and small federal government.  I argue that this was 
central to both their alienation from the US and their loyalty to Mexico.  Chapter 2 
explores the conditions they encountered in Mexican Texas, the lengths they went to 
defend their adopted nation’s sovereignty in suppressing the Fredonian Rebellion, and 
their relationship with the local tejano community.  Chapter 3 explores how immigrants 
reconciled themselves with Mexican laws regarding established religion and labor, often 
adopting Catholicism and admitting their slaves as indentured servants.  It also explores 
how former slaves used this change in their status to pursue their freedom under Mexican 
federal law and how this complicated the relationship between Mexican northerners, both 
Anglo and tejano, and national leaders in Mexico City.  Chapter 4 explores the vital 
transnational economy that emerged in Mexican Texas - one that, although declared in 
the service of Mexico, actually drew the region ever closer to the US, undermining both 
Mexican and US leaders’ efforts to build cohesive nation-states.  Chapters 5 and 6 offer a 
16 
 
 
 
retelling of the oft recounted Texas Revolution and the Republic of Texas that it created, 
arguing that the conflict started as an effort to re-instate the federalist Mexican 
Constitution of 1824, not separate from Mexico, and that Texans embraced secession 
late, reluctantly, and mostly as a means of attracting US support.   Many in the United 
States of the North, however, interpreted these events differently, contributing to the 
notion that the United States was deservedly destined to dominate the rest of the 
continent, a vision eventually consummated with the US invasion of Mexico and the 
subsequent Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.   Yet, as I point out in Chapter 7, US 
continental domination was still far from a forgone conclusion, as that country would 
soon face the same fate that Mexico did when Texans, along with the rest of the slave 
south, seceded from the United States.  I conclude by arguing that popular 
misunderstandings of US immigration to Texas, and the events that resulted from it, have 
perhaps wrongly convinced that country of its own political strength and superiority over 
other nations – an assumption that has informed US foreign policy well into the twenty-
first century.  
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CHAPTER 1 
“The Greatest Nation on Earth” 
The Politics and Nationalism of the First Anglo-American Immigrants to Mexican 
Texas 
1820-1824 
 
“[W]e may from this instant consider North America, with the exception of 
Canada, as divided into two grand and important commonwealths,” wrote James Smith 
Wilcocks on the occasion of Mexico’s independence from Spain in October 1821.  The 
soon-to-be US consul to Mexico went on to praise that young nation’s revolutionaries for 
their “brotherly love, patriotism, disinterestedness, truth, and good fait[h],” and compared 
their leader, General Augustín de Iturbide, to George Washington.  Assuring his 
correspondent, John Quincy Adams that the new Mexican monarchy was “established on 
a sure and solid foundation,” Wilcocks predicted that the two young nations would 
cooperate to “give the law to the opposite continent.”18   
Yet not all United States leaders were as excited about the prospect of sharing 
control of the continent with their newly independent southern neighbor.  In fact, as early 
as 1786, when the United States was still just a decade old and did not yet extend past the 
Appalachian Mountains, Thomas Jefferson wrote that “our Confederacy must be viewed 
as the nest from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled.”19  Indeed, 
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Americans leaders not only specifically looked to the expansive northern frontier of New 
Spain as ripe for conquest, they identified US settlers as its primary agents.  Jefferson 
wrote that he looked forward to a time “when our rapid multiplication will expand itself” 
to “cover the whole northern, if not the southern continent, with a people speaking the 
same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws.”20   
This determination to populate and control the rest of the continent, if not 
hemisphere, persisted well into the nineteenth century, gaining confirmation with the 
Louisiana Purchase, which effectively doubled the United States’ national territory.  It 
was confirmed again with the Adams-Onís Treaty in 1819, which transferred Florida 
from Spain to the United States.  Still not satisfied, US leaders began to set their sights on 
the Spanish province of Téjas - a vast, fertile region that, many believed, could serve as 
their nation’s gateway to the rest of the continent.  Criticizing the “imbecility and 
malignity” of Spain for not surrendering the region to the United States as it had Florida, 
Jefferson expressed little doubt that Texas would inevitably fall into US hands, making it 
“the richest state of our Union.”21   
 News that the Spanish Empire might be on its last legs only heightened 
expansionist interest.  Six months before Wilcocks penned his correspondence to Adams, 
Henry Clay spoke of the need to populate the newly independent nation’s northern 
frontier with Anglo-American settlers: 
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The question was by what race shall Texas be peopled?  In our hands it will be 
peopled by freemen and the sons of freemen carrying with them our language, our 
laws, and our liberties; establishing on the prairies of Texas, temples dedicated to 
the simple and devout worship of God, incident to our religion, and temples 
dedicated to the freedom which we adore next to Him.  In the hands of others it 
may become the habitation of despotism and of slaves, subject to the vile 
dominion of the inquisition and of superstition.22 
    
 
Expressing none of the admiration that Wilcocks did, Clay’s words demonstrate his belief 
that few US leaders had any intent of sharing control of the continent with their newly 
independent neighbor.   Clay not only believed in the inherent superiority of Anglo-
American society, especially when compared to that of the Catholic world, but he 
expressed a firm conviction that US citizens themselves would pave the way for their 
nation’s expansion by importing Anglo-American culture, laws, and institutions. 
 But men like Clay were wrong.  Those who immigrated to Texas had little 
intention of serving as the forbears of Manifest Destiny, nor was it evident to them that 
the United States would emerge as the most geopolitically dominant nation in the 
Northwestern Hemisphere.  Indeed, for several centuries, while the US had remained a 
marginal outpost of the British Empire, New Spain had enjoyed virtual unrivaled control 
of the continent.  The United States may have doubled its size a quarter of a century after 
independence and gained control of the continent’s most important river network and 
port, but the newly independent Mexican Empire remained the second largest nation in 
the Western Hemisphere, encompassing two million square miles and spanning from 
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present-day Costa Rica to Northern California.  Strategically nestled between the Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts, it possessed all manner of climate and topography, rich in natural 
resources and with a population three times larger than that of the US.23  Furthermore, it 
had inherited a long tradition of provincial autonomy from Spain, meaning that as a 
republic it possessed an unrivaled commitment to federalism and state sovereignty.   
Historians and contemporaries alike have long considered Mexico’s commitment 
to a weak central government to be its fatal flaw, the political characteristic most 
responsible for compromising its political viability, territorial integrity, and national 
cohesion.  But for many norteamericanos, this was its most attractive feature, especially 
for those in the country’s southwestern frontier, from which the vast majority of Texas 
settlers came.  In addition to being highly mobile, many of these early settlers had lived 
under Spanish jurisdiction in Missouri or Louisiana, and had long benefitted from the 
open, porous boundaries and inter-ethnic exchange that characterized the late eighteenth-
century borderlands.  They therefore demonstrated a flexible and contingent nationalism, 
often more influenced by pragmatics than ideology.  But if they shared one thing in 
common with their northern Mexican counterparts, it was a strong localist tradition that, 
by the nineteenth century, rendered a complicated and often fraught relationship with 
their respective federal governments.  Many of these people saw in Mexico not just a 
chance to start over in a nation blessed with fertile land and rich natural resources, but a 
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nation that held as much political promise as economic.  These immigrants did not so 
much hope to see Texas absorbed by the US, as they aimed to contribute to the birth of 
perhaps an even greater nation – larger, wealthier, and more politically viable.  For many 
of these people, especially Stephen Austin and his small cohort of several hundred 
families who first settled the area, it was Mexico that appeared poised to become “the 
greatest nation on earth.”24 
*** 
“In contrast to the congratulatory nature of most writing on the emergence of the 
United States, historians appear diffident, almost embarrassed about the birth of Mexico,” 
writes Jaime E. Rodríguez O.  Commonly referred to as the result of an “unfortunate 
revolution,” Mexico’s independence from Spain was long assumed to have ushered in a 
period of economic decline, social conflict and political chaos that lasted for at least the 
next four decades.  “[I]nstead of interpreting the country’s political history as a process of 
evolutionary change, as is the case in the United States,” writes Rodríguez, “historians of 
Mexico often dismiss the nation’s first political structures and institutions as irrelevant, 
while seeking ‘revolutionary’ transformations that presumably advanced the country’s 
political development.”25  The fact that Mexico ended up inheriting its earliest 
institutions from Spain meant that the new nation was virtually doomed to fail.  Such a 
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conclusion, of course, assumes a universal preference for those institutions most 
commonly associated with republicanism and overlooks the extent to which the United 
States did not also inherit from Britain. 
In fact, Moses Austin specifically cited the Spanish political system as the reason 
for his decision to relocate to Texas in December 1820, when he was summoned before 
Colonel Don Antonio Martínez, the Governor of the Province of Coahuila y Téjas, “in 
order to obtain detailed information about the condition of affairs and movements on the 
frontier of the United States.”26  According to Martínez’s report, Austin claimed that he 
“came to this province for the purpose of applying to the Government for authorization to 
settle himself in it with his family.”  When asked why he had not applied sooner for 
settlement in New Spain, since he had obtained a Spanish passport in 1797, Moses 
answered 
 
[T]hat, since the year above mentioned, he went to reside at Saint Louis 
(Missouri) which territory belonged, then to Spain; he had there lead mines, the 
produce of which he exported to Havana, until the year 1800, when the American 
Government having prohibited the working of mines by private enterprise, he lost 
all the benefit of his labor. 
 
 
Austin’s testimony points to several factors informing his and others’ decision to 
emigrate to Mexico.  Not only did he have experience living under the Spanish Empire, 
but he specifically cited the Spanish political system as the primary impulse behind his 
decision to immigrate.  “[B]ut now, in view of the new system of Government adopted by 
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Spain,” Moses continued, “he resolved upon applying for authorization to settle this 
province.”27  This remained the case after Mexican independence as that nation decided 
to preserve, rather than discard, most of its colonial institutions. 
But what system of government was this and why did some frontier Anglo-
Americans prefer it to that of the United States?  Earlier to 1812, the Spanish Monarchy 
had been composed of a series of kingdoms and provinces united only in their direct 
relationship with the king.  The Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century reinforced 
provincial identity among creole elites by giving each province its own administrative 
government, thus permitting “the reinforcement of regional societies, by sponsoring local 
economic development and the appearance of strong regional oligarchies opposed to 
Mexico City.”28  
This long tradition of provincial power and autonomy explains the Spanish 
reaction to the event that set the American independence movements in motion - 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1808 peninsular invasion and capture of the Spanish King 
Fernando VII.  In accordance with Spanish law, which stipulated that in the absence of 
the monarch, political power transferred to the people in the form of their corporate 
entities, provinces throughout Spain independently began forming their own governing 
juntas.  Each province then elected deputies to represent them in a newly formed Cortes 
that met in the southern Spanish town of Cádiz.  In an act which elevated Spanish 
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Americans to an almost equal status with their peninsular counterparts, the Cortes then 
invited each of the American provinces to elect their own deputies to the Central Junta 
based on a ratio of one deputy per 100 white male inhabitants.29   
  The process of forming a new government based on the rule of the people 
prompted a number of questions regarding Spain’s relationship with the Americas, not 
least of which was popular sovereignty.  On December 16, 1810, the day after the Cortes 
opened, the American deputies presented a program of eleven reforms.  These included 
stipulations that the American provinces have twice the number of deputies to match 
those of the peninsula; that natives, mestizos and Africans be included in representations; 
and that free commerce be permitted throughout the colonies.  The most noted advocate  
of these reforms and the man perhaps most credited with leading the way towards greater 
representation and enhanced local autonomy throughout the empire  was none other than 
the representative from the Eastern Interior Provinces, a recently designated 
administrative department that included Coahuila, Nuevo León, Nuevo Santander, and, 
Téjas.  Indeed, as the sole representative of a region that had long suffered under 
administrative neglect, incompetence and over-consolidation, Dr. Miguel Ramos de 
Arizpe - native of Coahuila, cleric, and graduate of the University of Mexico - eloquently 
expressed the longstanding creole desire for greater representation and local autonomy.  
As a result of their relative remoteness “from the center of higher government,” Arispe 
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complained that the interior provinces suffered from an “absence . . . of governing bodies 
engaged in the administration of justice and the supervision of the political economy.”    
Instead, they were controlled by “arbitrary” governors – many of them military men - 
who enjoyed protection “from any responsibility whatever for their actions.”  Such a 
system, Arizpe insisted, fostered “despotism” and violated the empire’s principles of 
limited and constitutional monarchy.  As a remedy, Arizpe called for the establishment in 
each province of “an executive council or a provincial deputation to have charge of the 
government of its community.”  These deputations would be composed of men elected 
from the community itself and each body would enjoy a direct relationship with the 
monarch.  This, Arizpe insisted, was consistent with the principles of the monarchy and 
indeed formed the very basis of the Cortes themselves: “When the orphan state of the 
nation caused by the shameful imprisonment of our beloved King Ferdinand VII was 
hardly known and the horrible plot of Napoleon to enslave us was still imperfectly seen, 
the provinces, having determined to defend the national liberty and to rescue their king, 
renounced the old government and established governing juntas.”   
At the core of this system of government rested the principles of local autonomy 
and popular democracy then sweeping the Atlantic.  “Each community is an association 
of freemen who are united[,] not to be despotically commanded by the strongest,” 
declared Arizpe, “but by one or more prudent men, capable of being fathers of the 
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republic.”30  Here we see evidence of New Spain’s gradual and complex transition from 
monarchy to republic.  Rather than a dramatic break with its imperial past, Mexicans 
looked to its legacy as they moved towards independence, first as an imperial monarchy 
and later as a republic.  
American demands resulted in a fundamental restructuring of the Spanish Empire 
and contributed significantly to a new constitution - the Constitution of 1812 - established 
on the principles of regional sovereignty, representative government and free enterprise.   
It limited the monarchy, abolished viceroyalties and extended citizenship to all men - 
except those of African descent.  Finally, the Constitution of 1812 dramatically 
decentralized power by creating provincial deputations consisting of locally elected 
members.   According to Rodríguez, “large numbers of people were incorporated into the 
political process” for the first time in the empire’ history as part of a system that “appears 
to have been more popular and democratic than those of most insurgent governments 
then vying for power in the New World.”31   
Indeed, while historians have long argued that the impulse towards popular and 
regional sovereignty that emerged in Spanish America in the years leading up to 
independence came from France or the Anglo world, more recent studies argue that it 
derived from a specifically Hispanic political tradition.    Mexico’s “impulse to 
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provincehood,” as historian Timothy Anna has termed it, was perhaps its most marked 
feature, and one borrowed directly from its colonial past.32   
*** 
A similar political impulse had been finding expression in the United States for 
decades.  Anti-Federalists may have technically lost many of their nation’s early 
constitutional debates, but they would continue to influence its political discourse well 
into the nineteenth century.  As with Spanish liberals like Arizpe, the most definitive 
aspect of their philosophy was their commitment to localism and suspicion of centralized 
authority.  Elements of the Anti-Federalists critique, according to historian Saul Cornell, 
included the need for a Bill of Rights, the charge of “aristocracy” and exclusion among 
the nation’s leaders, concerns about taxation, and anxiety over a standing army.  But the 
federal government’s underlying flaw, they contended, was its “consolidationist 
tendency.”  Anti-Federalists believed that “civil rights and states’ rights were one in the 
same” and the states should operate as “the primary units of political organization and 
contain the bulk of political authority.” These elements would not only serve as the 
primary inspiration for American politics for generations to come,33 but coincided with 
many of the Spanish reforms of 1812.  Central to both critiques was a desire to 
decentralize power and enhance local authority.     
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Perhaps no part of the United States better illustrated both the promise and perils 
of a centralizing US government than the Kentucky-Missouri frontier from which the 
majority of early US immigrants to Mexico came.  Beginning in the 1790’s, Federalists 
under the leadership of Alexander Hamilton unleashed an aggressive economic agenda 
“designed to place the new government on a solid economic basis and forge strong ties 
between the new government and financial interests.”34  Part of his plan involved the 
establishment of a national bank which promised to stabilize the new economy, attract the 
support of wealthy creditors, and stimulate economic growth through lending.  The First 
Bank of the United States, however, received heavy criticism from Jefferson and the 
Anti-Federalists who accused it of usurping the power of the states in claiming banking 
as the exclusive right of the national government.35 Anti-Federalists like John Taylor 
criticized what he deemed an unholy alliance between the legislature and a “powerful 
faction” of banking interests, whom he claimed “have no interest and feel but little 
concern, in all those questions of fiscal policy which particularly affect the land-holder, 
the merchant and the artist.”  Instead, this group had redirected the government towards 
“principles dangerous to the rights and interests of the community” and designed to serve 
their own interests.  According to Taylor, a group of “monarchic speculators,” had seized 
upon the government’s legislative functions and “by virtue of this combination [of 
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governing and banking interests] all regard for their constituents has been abandoned” so 
that “the public can neither count upon the independence or integrity of the legislature.”36  
The Bank’s relationship with the citizenry was slightly more complicated, 
especially in the West, where it facilitated land purchases among the less wealthy while 
simultaneously opening the door to speculation.  Even as it paved the way for greater 
land ownership, the federal government failed to regulate purchases or adjudicate 
competing land claims, sometimes permitting a single individual to purchase and hold a 
large tract of land without living there, thereby depriving other less wealthy settlers.  
Such practices were especially prevalent in places like Kentucky and Tennessee.  By the 
1790’s half of Kentucky householders were landless and the rest held only tenuous 
claims to their property. 37   
It was during this time that Anglo-Americans first began immigrating to Spanish-
controlled Louisiana and Missouri in the hopes of finding “a less complicated and more 
democratic legal system.”  Historian Andrew McMichael explains that, unlike their US 
counterparts, “the Spaniards were fairly rigorous about their policy of not creating a class 
of large-scale landholders.”  In fact, the Spanish land policy operated under the dual 
assumption that every man deserved enough land to sustain his family, and that the best 
way to govern and protect the frontier was to populate it.  While all one needed to do to 
apply for a grant was swear allegiance to the Crown, an applicant had to inhabit and 
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cultivate the land for at least four years before he could receive title to it.  Plot sizes were 
determined by family size so that recipients did not acquire more land than they could 
realistically manage, and squatters who occupied and improved land for at least ten years 
were permitted to purchase their plots outright.   As McMichael explains, such a system 
had two results: First, it guarded against rampant land speculation like that seen in 
Virginia and Kentucky.   Second, it promoted, indeed necessitated, actual settlement 
since the landholder had to live on and work the land.38 
  Thus throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Lower 
Mississippi Valley, where the Austin’s resided for nearly twenty-five years before 
immigrating to Texas, was characterized by fluid borders, “multiple frontiers,” and 
overlapping colonial systems as some frontier Americans who experienced a complex 
and strained relationship with their central government opted to live under Spanish 
jurisdiction.39   “At one time or another and sometimes at the same time in the last half of 
the eighteenth century [the region] played host to each of North America’s major colonial 
powers: France, Spain, England and the United States,” writes Stephen Aron.40 Some of 
these jurisdictions offered significantly different political and economic systems, 
especially when it came to distributing land grants.  Borderlands residents could take 
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advantage of imperial competition and the need to populate and settle vulnerable regions 
to secure optimal conditions for themselves.   
Scholars have observed that many US borderlands residents demonstrated a 
pragmatic and flexible nationalism, motivated above all by an enduring desire to remain 
economically self-sufficient.  Aron explains that the independence that mattered most to 
them came in the form of property ownership.   For this reason the Spanish Empire 
remained a periodically appealing alternative to the United States.  When the Spanish 
decided to close the Mississippi River to American navigation in 1784, leaders in 
Tennessee and Kentucky entertained the possibility of seceding from the United States 
and aligning themselves with Spain in exchange for access to the river and its outlet at 
New Orleans. While the “Spanish Conspiracy” never materialized, the fact that it was 
considered at all reveals not only the surprising political contingency of this time and 
place, but a history of negotiation and cooperation with the Spanish while that empire 
controlled much of the Louisiana Territory.41 
Before settling in Texas, the Austins established a mining operation at Mine à 
Breton on the western side of the Missouri.  There Moses and Stephen enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly on the lead mining industry during the brief time that the Spanish held claim to 
                                                          
41 Aron, American Confluence, 71; McMichael makes a similar argument that Anglo-American loyalty to 
Spain was motivated above all by economics.  He writes that “As long as the Spanish Crown could 
guarantee easy access to cheap land and a relatively stable regime, local residents willingly lived under 
Spanish rule and swore allegiance to the king.  When those guarantees failed, so did local loyalty.  In that 
sense West Floridians had little real political and national loyalty to Spain; what passed for allegiance to the 
Spanish Crown was instead only the exercise of individualistic pursuits that for most of the period from 
1785 to 1810 occurred within the context of allegiance to the Spanish Crown,” 4;  For more on the Spanish 
Conspiracy see Aron, How the West Was Lost, 17-19, American Confluence, 78-9. 
32 
 
 
 
the territory.  In the first decade of the nineteenth century, however, the Spanish 
transferred jurisdiction to the French who ultimately transferred it to the United States.  
During this time the British and Spanish influence in the Missouri Territory all but 
disappeared in the face of an onslaught of US settlers - many of them fleeing the 
worsening situation in Kentucky – whose sudden presence threatened to disrupt the pre-
existing social hierarchy.  Initially, the US government proved reluctant to shift its 
military and administrative presence to the western theater, prompting frequent 
complaints about the republic’s indifference and incompetence.  However, by the end of 
the decade, this had changed, although not necessarily to the benefit of pre-existing 
settlers like the Austins.42 
Historians are now beginning to acknowledge the role that federal intervention 
played in developing the trans-Appalachian West, and not just in terms of supplying 
loans for land purchases.  William Bergman has observed that the federal government 
proved essential to protecting settlers and fueling local infrastructure: “Since 1789, the 
federal government had deployed fiscal and military powers granted to it  . . .  to 
transform the early western economy through land acquisitions, infrastructure, 
commerce, and communication,”  thereby  expanding “its bureaucratic institutions into 
the West, bridging geographic and political obstacles.” 43  
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But for pre-existing settler populations – not to mention Indians - the state’s 
growing presence could prove more problematic than its absence.  In an attempt to make 
way for a flood of US citizens then heading into Missouri, the Federal Land Claims 
Commission decided not to honor the majority of Spanish land grants.  While the Austins 
managed to hold onto their property, others were not so lucky.  Established settlers and 
Indians now found themselves overwhelmed by the torrent of settlers backed by a federal 
government that refused to honor their land rights.  Furthermore, government failure to 
regulate land speculation allowed for precisely the same circumstances that had occurred 
in Kentucky - corrupt lawyers and legislators purchased large parcels of land on which 
squatters had settled and then bid up the price.44 
The federal government’s increased presence in the west was accompanied by a 
series of reforms designed to develop, modernize and integrate its economy.  Many of 
these reforms came at the behest of western elites eager to benefit from integration with 
the eastern market.  Arguing that nothing hampered Kentucky trade more than its 
underdeveloped infrastructure, none other than Henry Clay became the champion of 
federally funded canals, roads, and mines. Convinced by his time in the Kentucky House 
of Representatives that federal funding was necessary for such large scale projects, Clay 
advocated a modern, industrialized political economy in the name of agrarianism.45  
                                                          
44 Aron, American Confluence, 158-69, quote pg. 68. 
45 Aron, How the West Was Lost, Chapter 4, quote on page  
34 
 
 
 
  But while the increasing presence of the US government certainly had its 
benefits, it did not come without formidable costs.  For one, the new system clearly 
deviated from the principles of agrarianism and localism that had characterized the region 
for decades, and pre-existing settlers such as the Austins no longer enjoyed the privilege 
they had under earlier jurisdictions.46  Indeed, throughout the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, localism and federal intervention existed in an uneasy marriage on the 
frontier.  While federal backing for agriculture and industry certainly aided and insulated 
merchants, manufacturers, and settlers, and helped bring intra-regional trade and 
commerce to the west, it also fueled the very kinds of speculation that westerners had 
complained about for decades and introduced federal intervention into areas of the 
economy that had once been locally controlled. Federal incorporation, of which Austin 
specifically complained in his testimony before Gov. Martínez, was one of the most 
controversial of the Hamiltonian reforms. While it gave people the opportunity to invest 
in risky enterprises without the threat of considerable loss, skeptics argued that the 
system favored insiders and was prone to corruption.47  
Predictably, the situation fueled the longstanding tension between federalist and 
anti- federalist impulses. The central government’s increasing reach into commerce, 
trade, law and infrastructure prompted fears that such measures “would stimulate 
commercial interests unduly, undermine agriculture, centralize power, and violate the 
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Constitution.” Many even feared that it would destroy state and local authority all 
together.48 Nothing, however, ignited criticism of the Federalist reforms more than the 
collapse of the federal banking system in 1819.  Rather than regulating the lending 
practices of  its state branches as the First Bank had done, the Second Bank of the United 
States followed their example by over lending in paper money and then permitting the 
notes of state banks to circulate as specie, rather than insisting that they be returned to the 
bank for payment.  By 1818 the bank had recognizing the recklessness of its lending 
policies as well as the significant specie drain it caused in the east and began calling on 
state banks to repay their debts.  This, of course, forced many who had previously 
enjoyed a policy of near unlimited lending, into bankruptcy and foreclosure.49   
The contraction was worse in the west where lending had been the most liberal.  
There, the Panic took hold earlier, lasted longer and hurt more than anywhere else in the 
country. As one legislator put it, “All the flourishing cities of the West are mortgaged to 
this money power . . . They are in the jaws of the monster! A lump of butter in the mouth 
of a dog! One gulp, one swallow, and all is gone!”50  The unfortunate turn of events 
reinforced the sense that monied elites had effectively usurped, centralized and corrupted 
the federal government, and that the poorest and furthest from the seats of economic and 
federal power were the losers.  Their sense of betrayal was palpable.  By 1824, men like 
John C. Calhoun warned of a “general mass of disaffection to the government, not 
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concentrated in any particular direction, but ready to seize upon any event and looking 
out anywhere for a leader.”51  Attempts by state banks to tax the central bank for its 
failure to regulate or recall loans, failed.  The landmark McCulloch v. Maryland 
effectively shielded the central bank from state demands for monetary reparation and 
“declared that national law superseded state law whenever the two conflicted.52  
 The Austins experienced the devastating effects of the Panic first hand. By 
March 1819, the Bank of St. Louis, which Stephen had helped establish, filed a credit 
claim for $9,000, most likely in response to the sudden demand for payment by the Bank 
of the United States.   Moses assumed responsibility for the debt, but no sooner had he 
done so than the struggling bank demanded he repay $15,000 that he had borrowed 
earlier against the Mine à Breton property.  By now, the only thing that kept the Austin 
family from complete financial ruin was a $9,000 investment in Arkansas that Stephen 
had made entirely on credit, making himself even more vulnerable to the pending 
national economic collapse.  When the Panic finally reached Missouri by the fall of 1819, 
Moses and his son became the target of numerous creditors who had won civil judgments 
in Missouri and began losing property to foreclosure.  What is more, Moses struggled to 
sell the Mine à Breton property which he had mortgaged to the now-insolvent Bank of St. 
Louis.53   
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 Despite the fact that the events of 1819 and 1820 were in many ways the result of 
deregulation rather than over-centralization, they contributed to a renewed skepticism 
regarding the power and influence of the federal government.  Many, especially in the 
west, began to express the belief that the central government’s growing influence, 
especially in economic matters, had wrought more devastation than gain.  The Panic, 
however complicated its causes, lent credibility to the earlier claim that the bank and 
other such reforms threatened the political rights of the community as well as its 
economic wellbeing.   Not only had it concentrated wealth in the hands of a few distant 
lenders rather than harmonizing and increasing the wealth of the entire community, but it 
replaced the locally oriented public sphere with a powerful central government that held 
economic sway over its citizens, thereby undermining popular democracy itself.  54  
While for most Americans, the events of 1819 and 1820 would reignite an 
agrarian anti-federalism coalesced around the philosophy of states’ rights, for still others 
the transformation called into question the very viability of their young republic.    
“When our rights are invaded it is of no consequence to the Citizen or Subject whether it 
comes by the hand of an Emperor King or Demon in office under Republic. [T]hey are 
alike destructive of all security to person and property.”  This is what Moses Austin 
declared in his formal address to the citizens of Jefferson County issued shortly after the 
County Sheriff had besieged his home in pursuance of a debt.55 Many men like Moses 
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believed they could no longer rely on their government’s guarantee of “civil and religious 
liberties,” nor on the political autonomy and protection of local authority.  Austin 
perceived what many Anti-Federalists had warned would happen - government 
corruption so entrenched and pervasive that it extended all the way to the sheriff’s office. 
So disillusioned was Austin with the turn of events in the United States, that he was 
prepared to renounce the country of his birth:  “[A]s I am, ruined in this [country], I 
found nothing I could do would bring back my property again, and to remain in a 
Country where I had enjoyed welth in a state of poverty I could not submit.” 56  
But he might not have been so willing to do so had things not looked more 
promising further west. Like many living on the frontier, Moses had followed the events 
surrounding the Mexican independence movement since its inception in 1810.  According 
to Stephen, Moses first proposed the idea of forming a colony in Texas in 1813, 
following the signing of the Adams-Onís Treaty which confirmed Spain’s possession of 
Texas and helped pave the way for the authorization of Spanish land grants in the 
region.57  In February 1820, nearly a year after first proposing the project to his son, 
Moses requested a copy of the passport that Spanish authorities had issued him in 1797.  
With passport in hand, the fifty-eight-year-old Moses set off for Texas with nothing more 
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than fifty dollars, a horse, a mule and a slave named Richmond.  They were all 
borrowed.58  
As for the younger Austin, he had little intention of joining his father in Texas.  
Instead, Stephen fled to New Orleans and tried to rebuild his fortune there. But in the 
summer of 1821, Stephen received news that his father had passed away shortly after 
returning from a brief trip to Texas.  During the trip, however, Moses had managed to 
secure a land grant to settle three hundred US families along the Brazos and his last wish 
was that his son Stephen “go on in the business in the same way he would have done had 
not sickness and oh dreadful to think of perhaps death not prevented him from 
accomplishing.”59  Stephen could not ignore his father’s dying wish, and that fall he 
departed for Natchitoches to take claim of the lands that Moses had applied for and 
received from the Spanish Government.   Determined to fulfill his father’s request, 
Stephen quickly began recruiting colonists. 60    
Despite his initial reluctance to emigrate, Stephen appeared pleasantly surprised 
by what he encountered in Texas where a less imposing and restrictive government meant 
greater economic prosperity and promise for ambitious immigrants such as themselves.  
In a letter to prospective settlers intended for publication in the Arkansas Gazette, he 
explained that  
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The Constitution of Spain is in full operation at those provinces and recent 
accounts state that the beneficial effects of it are already perceptible. The gold and 
silver mines are getting into more extensive operation than they have for many 
years. Money is becoming more abundant, a free trade is permitted, and the 
restrictive system heretofore pursued in regard to foreigners has been superceded 
by the most liberal encouragement.61 
  
 
Indeed, Stephen envisioned Texas as a place where not just he, but thousands of 
disillusioned American agrarians like himself could start over. “Should you yet meet with 
any Farmers of good character or mechanics, who wish to emigrate to this fine country 
and participate in the advantages secured to my father by this grant you will oblige 
them,”62 he wrote to his cousin James.  New Spain not only promised rich resources, but 
made it possible for immigrants to benefit from them, to start their lives over again, in a 
country where they would not be harassed or disadvantaged by a system that seemed 
committed to serving the interests of a few at the expense of the many.  
*** 
What the Austins never acknowledged in their writings, but what they may have 
been aware of in 1820 was that the Spanish Empire was in fact on its last legs.  The 
formation of local governing juntas in the Americas paved the way for increased 
democratization and, eventually, independence.   The creation of provincial deputations 
in accordance with the 1812 Constitution, consummated a pre-existing “sense of 
provincehood.” According to Timothy Anna, “the provincial deputations made more 
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explicit the preexisting tendencies of self-government.”63  But many conservatives and 
royalists feared what this “urge to provincehood” might render if carried to its logical 
conclusion as had nearly occurred in 1810.   
Originating in northern Mexico, a seedbed of radical provincialism, the Hidalgo 
Revolt began as a call for greater provincial autonomy and quickly turned into a violent 
demand for independence by the lower classes that carried echoes of the Haitian 
Revolution.  The rebellion was crushed with the aid of Spanish reinforcements, but the 
autonomist spirit that sparked it was not.  In fact, “By interrupting a political restructuring 
that seemed to be moving toward a federated Monarchy, the royalists created the 
condition that would ultimately destroy the Spanish Monarchy.” 64  
When Fernando VII returned to the throne in 1820, many hoped for an 
accommodationist arrangement that would entail greater political representation while 
still honoring the legitimacy of the Crown.  But this was not to be.  Instead, Fernando 
attempted to turn back the clock on Spanish political reform by re-implementing 
monarchical absolutism.  Not only did he abolish the beloved 1812 Constitution, but he 
vigorously prosecuted liberal constitutionalists throughout the empire, brought back the 
Inquisition, and appeared to make every effort to reverse the reforms made during his 
absence. Many in Spain and the Americas struggled with how to go about restoring a 
constitutional government under the new Monarchy.  Northern New Spain again became 
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a revolutionary flashpoint when a group of Spanish liberals, aided by a handful of creole, 
British and US supporters, attempted to stage a constitutionalist insurrection there that 
they hoped would extend throughout the rest of the empire.  The expedition failed and its 
leaders were eventually executed, but the constitutionalist impulse did not die.  In the 
words of one historian, “Regionalism succeeded where armed insurrection failed,” as the 
provinces took advantage of such unrest “to restore the home rule granted them by the 
Constitution of 1812.” 65 
By 1820 there was a renewed desire for autonomy.  This was particularly the case 
in New Spain which had long been the site of some of the most vehement autonomist 
sentiment and activism.  Cities like Mérida and Veracruz were among the first to reinstate 
the Constitution and call for elections.  Rodríguez observes that political activity was the 
most “intense” in North America where nearly all adult males were eligible to vote 
regardless of literacy or property-owning status.    Elections for virtually every type of 
municipal, provincial and imperial post throughout New Spain were held in late autumn 
and winter of 1820 as Moses Austin was applying for land grants in Texas.  Rodríguez 
estimates that over 1,000 elections for ayuntamientos - or town councils - occurred during 
this time.66 
Similar activity occurred in other parts of the empire, but to a far lesser degree 
because of ongoing social violence, so that when the Cortes convened in mid-1820, the 
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North American contingents dominated.  They dutifully pushed the “American 
Question,” demanding that provincial deputations be established in every intendancy in 
the New World in an attempt to equalize representation for the Americans.  The Mexican 
deputies also proposed the creation of three separate American monarchies – in Mexico 
City, Bogotá, and Lima – each with its own prince appointed directly by Ferdinand 
himself.  But the Cortes never took any further action and the proposal lay dormant.67 
Sensing that the degree of autonomy to which it aspired might not be possible 
under the current regime, the independence movement back in New Spain began to pick 
up steam again.  In February 1821, a former royalist officer, Colonel Augustín de Iturbide 
drafted a proposal that combined New Spain’s desire for an autonomous regency with the 
Constitution of 1812.  Although the Plan de Iguala was intended as a compromise that 
left open the possibility of reconciliation with the Crown, the cause of independence was 
rapidly gaining support, even among disillusioned royalist American officers including 
Anastacio Bustamante and Antonio López de Santa Ana, both of whom would later serve 
as president of Mexico. 68  
Eventually Iturbide drafted the Plan de Iguala which declared New Spain to be “a 
sovereign and independent nation” with a representative constitutional monarchy.  
Scholars have observed that the Plan’s success rested chiefly in its conservatism.  As one 
noted historian writes, “Eleven years of rural insurrection and guerrilla warfare were 
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preempted by a movement created and led by urban creoles and Spanish elites that, 
though not a counterrevolution, represented nonetheless a distinct moderation of the goals 
of the revolution.”  The Plan protected the peninsulares and royalists from reprisals, 
affirmed the primacy of the Church and military, and declared Roman Catholicism the 
new nation’s official religion.  In so doing, it was able to accomplish what earlier revolts 
like Hidalgo had not - unite Mexicans of vastly different interests behind independence.69 
 But, as Anna argues, the real key to the Plan’s success was its affirmation of 
regional autonomy.  Unlike the United States, Mexico entered independence as a 
collection of provinces.  Thus, Mexicans’ provincial identity preempted their national 
one.  Herein lies the explanation for why Mexicans opted for the term empire rather than 
nation.  Rather than a singular union, the new state was “an aggregation of provinces, 
some central and well integrated, some peripheral and scarcely populated,” and all of 
which had the right to join and leave the empire of their own volition.  In this sense, 
Spanish Americans rejected the French idea of nation and instead embraced a 
“contractual conception of sovereignty that was fundamentally different form the 
emerging European idea of sovereignty based on nationhood.”   Mexico’s independence, 
therefore, not only represented a far less dramatic break with Spain, but also rendered far 
less internal violence and class conflict as the pre-existing institutions, interests and 
social order were preserved.  Even the “impulse to provincehood” was an affirmation of 
Spanish imperial constitutionalism.  As Anna puts it, “Iguala and Córdoba, represented a 
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remarkably tolerant, even magnanimous foundation for a break with the mother country, 
serving as they did the interests of Mexicans (although not evenly) while firmly but 
almost politely closing the door on the Old Regime.”70  
 Mexico’s independence movement must have also felt conservative to many in 
the United States, where citizens had opted for a far more dramatic break with their 
mother country.  Regardless, as news of the events just across the border swept the 
frontier, newspapers in places like Arkansas and St. Louis expressed awe and admiration 
for Mexico’s ability to achieve independence without considerable conflict or bloodshed.   
“Not a man has suffered persecution or privation of property in this revolution,” reported 
the Arkansas Gazette, “and the traveler now passes in perfect security thro’ all parts of 
the country under the authority of the patriot government.”71  Welcoming Mexico to the 
“great family of the new world” the Gazette termed Mexico’s a “most extraordinary 
revolution, affected without bloodshed.”72  The paper praised its founders for managing 
to achieve “equality of rights for all persons, Indians, Mulattos, and Negroes, as well as 
whites,” celebrating their remarkable ability to accomplish a revolution that “united all 
interests, and promised to all; to the soldiery promotion, to the priests their authority over 
souls, to the titles their titled, to the merchants commerce to the planter commerce, and to 
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the various classes of laborers, liberty, all were consulted and, named and respected, and 
all interests were reconciled.”73 
 Regarding the form of government that such conciliation had rendered, the St. 
Louis Enquirer lamented that “the condition of the country, and the inhabitants is 
probably such, as to have rendered it expedient to adopt a monarchical form of 
government.”  However, the paper warned its audience of the dangers that too rapid a 
transition to a republic could entail, reminding them of what happened when “a more 
enlightened people” - the French – “ran in their rapid transition from despotism to a 
republic, and the short duration of their licentious freedom.”  The paper praised Mexico’s 
“gradual regeneration” as evidence of “a cautious and enlightened policy” informed more 
by a fear of “aiming at too much to defeat all, than any hostility to a republican form of 
government.”  The Enquirer concluded by suggesting that Mexico might look to its 
northern neighbor as an example to which to aspire in the future: “Let us hope that, a 
more unrestrained intercourse with our citizens, a nearer view of the perfections of our 
institutions, may lead to such changes in the political condition of these our north 
American brethren, as may assimilate more nearly to our own.” Such condescension 
informed more than a few reports on Mexico’s decision to opt for monarchy.  “I do not 
think a milder government would suit this people,” admitted an editor of The Nashville 
Whig, “I, alas, cannot conceal from myself that they are not fit for the enjoyment of a free 
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and liberal government.”74  As for Iturbide himself, whom Congress later claimed to have 
reluctantly elected president after a series of raucous street protests by enlisted army 
men,75 the new leader garnered mostly effusive praise from frontier newspapers, many of 
which were published in places that had once been a part of the Spanish Empire.  
Claiming to rely on a source who knew Iturbide personally, the St. Louis Enquirer 
declared him to be “of the highest encomium,” possessing “moderation, 
disinterestedness, and heroism.”76 
Austin himself remained undeterred by his adopted country’s chosen form of 
government.   In reference to it he wrote to his cousin that “you must not be frightened at 
the name of the Imperial Government, you like myself have lived under a Monarchy, 
when Louisiana belonged to Spain and I think we lived as happy then as under the 
government of the United States.”  This is not to say that Stephen viewed imperial 
monarchy as a superior form of government. He simply saw it as the best form of 
government for Mexico at that time and one that he himself could live under quite 
happily. What he could not live under was the system of government that had recently 
emerged in the United States of the North.  “A Central Republic is the worst Gov’t in the 
world,” Stephen wrote, “for all the power will be in the hands of a few men in Mexico 
and instead of a Republic it will in effect be an aristocracy which is worse than a 
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monarchy, for in it we shall have 100 Tyrants instead of one.”77  Here we see perhaps the 
strongest evidence of Austin’s hostility to a centralized form of government, which no 
doubt informed his preference for Mexico over the United States.  For Austin and others 
like him, the newly independent Mexico offered an appealing alternative to the United 
States of the 1820’s.  Although a monarchy, Mexico was a nation founded on the very 
principles of decentralized authority with no central banking system and a land grant 
system that all but prohibited speculation. 
Yet, while Austin may not have minded monarchy and adamantly opposed a 
“Central Republic,” his clear preference was for a very particular form of republicanism.  
“I do not wish to take an active part in politics,” he wrote, “but if I can do anything in 
favor of the confederate system I will do so with pleasure.”78  Despite his attested support 
for the Spanish and later Mexican Empire, the most ideal form of government in Austin’s 
eyes was one established on the principles of local autonomy and regional sovereignty.   
That said, Austin was fully prepared to accept Mexico as it was and content to stand on 
the sidelines while its leaders worked out the kinks of their new nation.   
Indeed, Austin did not have to look far to find thousands of willing immigrants 
among disillusioned and beleaguered rural Americans, especially those from the south 
and west.  “There are hundreds on the way and thousands ready to go if one word of 
encouragement could now be had from you,” wrote James Hawkins, Austin’s friend and 
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former business partner from New Orleans, just months after Mexico had gained its 
independence from Spain.  Many of the people to whom Hawkins referred had by now 
lost almost all interest, let alone hope, in the nation of their birth.  In their minds, the 
answers to their woes did not lie in Washington D.C. or Philadelphia and they certainly 
did not lie in the chambers of Congress or the White House, but rather, in Stephen F. 
Austin and his tiny settlement in Texas. “You and your Colony excite more interest than 
the assembled sages of the nation,” wrote Hawkins.79 
 These people did not speak from ignorance.  Many had first-hand knowledge of 
life under the Spanish Crown and, given the present state of circumstances, did not mind 
returning to a similar system.  “It has become a subject of considerable interest in this 
section of Missouri,” wrote Daniel Draper of Lincoln, Missouri in December 1821.  “All 
those who once experienced the gratuity of the Spanish Government (a thing I never have 
done) speaks, generally, in favor of it with a few exceptions of social inconveniences.”80  
Indeed, the Austin family had little reason to doubt that their colony would soon be full 
of former US citizens, grateful and loyal to a country that had saved them from poverty 
and ruin. “I can assure you that a great Number of Families will move from this State, 
and from other States,” wrote Austin’s brother-in-law, James Bryan,  “I have no doubt 
that the Colony will be filled up in twelve months.”81 
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Immigrants who planned to settle permanently expressed a greater interest in the 
political climate of the country.   “If you have found a good Constitution and the 
Government is settled I am clearly of the Opinion that no section of Territory has ever 
settled so rapidly as the Texas Colony, or the Austin Colony,” Austin’s cousin wrote in 
April 1822.82   Most American immigrants seem to have shared Austin’s opinion 
regarding the Mexican political system.  While perhaps not ideal, it was not bad either, 
and certainly an improvement over what many perceived as the failed republic of the 
North.  “[Y]es I am not pleased with the form of government, it is a limited monarchy; 
but as Mexico has not bought her independence at the expense of much blood, it is 
perhaps better that the change should be gradual.”  This is what William Walker of 
Mississippi wrote his father in August of 1822. “I think the policy of Mexico at this time, 
is practically good.”83  American-style democracy, after all, was still being tested and did 
not look very appealing to those furthest from the center of political and economic power.  
Above all, Mexico had promise.   “The nation possesses great resources, and its vast and 
successful effort for independence combined with the general harmony which at this time 
prevails, furnish, I think, sure pledges of future greatness and prosperity,”84 wrote Austin.  
Indeed, news of Mexico’s natural wealth, impressive topography and remarkable 
beauty filled western newspapers as much as reports on the recent revolution.  In words 
seemingly intended to attract farmers, the Arkansas Gazette reported that “The fertility of 
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[Mexican] soil is astonishing, and the fields are covered with harvests which exceed in 
their produce, by twenty fold, the corn fields of Europe.”  The paper claimed that Mexico 
produced twice the wheat of the US and “in any actual dearth” could feed the whole 
population of Great Britain.85  Yet it was not just Mexico’s natural wealth that American 
newspapers remarked on.  “The capital of the Spanish dominions in North America is one 
of the finest cities built by Europeans in either hemisphere,” wrote the St. Louis Enquirer 
of Mexico City.  “There does not exist a city equal to Mexico for the elegance, regularity 
and breadth of the streets.”  Its market presented “a plane of immense commerce, and the 
shops display a profusion of gold, and silver, and jewels.”  Travelers to Lima, 
Philadelphia, Rome, Paris and Naples, claimed that Mexico’s “majesty” surpassed them 
all.  Such praise was not unmerited.  The three-hundred-year old capital had been built on 
top of the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán, established two hundred years earlier, and was 
home to 120,000 inhabitants.   It had served as the political, commercial and 
administrative center of the Spanish empire and capital of New Spain.  It was impressive 
not only for its wide, brilliantly illuminated streets and remarkable architecture - perhaps 
best exemplified by its imposing presidential palace - but also for its strategic placement 
on an isthmus with ready access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  All of this 
seemed to make it “destined to possess a powerful influence over the events which agitate 
the two continents.” 86  
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Those who immigrated to Austin’s colony expressed a similar vision.  “It seems 
as if province designs this world to outshine the balance of the earth, in every respect,” 
wrote William Walker of Mississippi, “Her streams, her mountains, her soil, her men, her 
politics, all, allure on great scales – nothing small or contracted on her whole 
construction.” Indeed, it was not just Mexico’s geography and resources that made it 
destined for greatness.  What nationalists like Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams 
saw in the United States these men saw in Mexico – the promise of a natural and political 
utopia that could inspire the rest of the world. “[T]he spire of [Mexico’s] political fabric,” 
predicted Walker, “will be seen as a mirror to the civilized world.”  Mexico did not just 
promise a fresh start for beleaguered US citizens, it offered a fresh start for democracy as 
well.  “With these and a thousand other advantages I repeat that Mexico cannot fail, 
under the influence of a wise and liberal government, to become the greatest nation on 
earth.” 87 
No matter what political course Mexico took, it offered a special appeal to the 
thousands of struggling agrarians in the United States. “The prospects of the farmer and 
planter, were nevermore promising in any country, than in this, at the present time,” 
Austin wrote.   “[W]hatever be the collision arising from difference in opinion as to the 
course this government should pursue it is gradually gaining strength, and will, I trust, 
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ultimately secure the end of all government, the happiness of the people.”88  Such 
happiness, these immigrants understood, was ultimately no more dependent on their 
country’s rejection of monarchy than it was guaranteed by it.  And for many, Mexico’s 
promise, yet still unrealized, was enough to prompt them to forsake all that they had left 
behind in the North.  Yet, even as immigrants expressed their admiration for their new 
country’s natural and political virtues, things were about to get even better.   
*** 
From its inception there had been little consensus regarding the actual structure 
and form of Mexico’s new government.  While local elites seized on the opportunity that 
independence wrought to establish their own governing entities and advance their 
longstanding aspirations to home rule, Iturbide fostered the notion that, as the leader of 
the independence movement and recently appointed head of state, his power was 
supreme.  This brought him into direct conflict with the provinces and their representative 
body, which Iturbide attempted to dissolve in late 1822.  Believing their new leader to be 
in direct violation of the very principles that had sparked their independence movement 
in the first place – that of provincial self-determination and supremacy - the provinces 
rebelled a few months later. Rebel leaders under the command of a young ambitious 
captain named Antonio López de Santa Ana, drafted the Plan de Casa Mata, which 
granted greater local authority to provincial deputations and called for the election of a 
new congress.  Sensing his own defeat, Iturbide eventually abdicated in March of 1823.  
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A Constituent Congress formed of appointees of the former emperor and rebel leaders 
from the provinces, declared itself in session ten days later.  One of its first acts was to 
declare the legislature – not the executive – supreme. 89    
Other than the primacy of Congress, however, national leaders struggled to agree 
on much else.  Just as in the United States, a political fissure emerged between those who 
wanted to enhance provincial power (federalists) and those who wished the provinces to 
operate more like administrative units as they had done during the colonial era 
(centralists).90 Mexico entered a phase of intense political activity as the two factions 
debated the virtues of their respective visions.  According to Rodríguez, the 
“ayuntamientos became the most active political bodies in the nation” as the provinces 
themselves began to determine the future course of their young nation.  In May the 
province of Guadalajara dissolved its “social pact” with the central Mexican government.  
The Guadalajara declaration went on to state that it was time for the provinces to declare 
“their natural rights” as free, sovereign and independent entities, “without there being 
between them, one and another, the slightest inequality.” 91  Before long, seven other 
provinces followed Guadalajara’s example including Yucatán, Oaxaca, Coahuila, Nuevo 
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León, Nuevo Santander, and Téjas.  Some adjoining states expressed the intention of 
forming confederations.92     
Yet, it cannot be emphasized enough that they made no attempt to secede.   What 
they were terminating was a connection with the current government of Mexico, not 
Mexico itself.   Anna argues that this came from an understanding that the provinces 
lacked the infrastructural development and political organization to function as fully 
independent nations.  Thus  
 
when the states called themselves ‘sovereign’ the meaning was that each state was 
independent from each other and from Mexico City in all matters involving 
internal government, but also that each of them recognized the national 
sovereignty of the republic, that is, that each surrendered to the republic or 
endowed the national state with certain powers, primarily to conduct interstate or 
foreign affairs. 
 
 
This was born out by the fact that local bodies kept the secretary of internal affairs 
abreast of their actions, even as they moved forward without the central government’s 
approval, thereby confirming their commitment to the empire while asserting their right 
to govern internal matters.93  Yet in so doing, the provinces also asserted their own 
political supremacy.  The government’s legitimacy was entirely dependent on the consent 
of the provinces.94 
                                                          
92 Anna, 120-1. 
93 Rodríguez, “Federal Republic,” 318; Rodríguez, “Constitution of 1824,”81; Mecham, 170-71; Anna, 
127-8. 
94 Anna, 131. 
56 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, leaders in Mexico City began to express the fear that their country 
was on the verge of disintegration.  Civil War appeared imminent by late July when the 
Supreme Executive Authority dispatched troops to Guadalajara and Zacatecas.  
Eventually, the standoff ended and a new congress was finally elected and convened in 
November.  It was more representative of the provinces, and while the delegates agreed 
that Mexico was to be a republic, they could not agree on what kind.  Heading the 
federalist contingent were Lorenzo de Zavala, Valentín Gómez Farías and Miguel Ramos 
Arizpe.  The first two were great admirers of the United States, had lived or travelled 
there extensively, and wished to see Mexico adopt a similar form of government.  
Heading the centralists were Carlos María Bustamante and Father Servando Teresa de 
Mier, perhaps the most eloquent member of the convention.95  Under pressure to draft a 
constitution that the provinces would approve before the nation deteriorated, Arizpe, the 
representative from Coahuila who had played an active role in creating the Spanish 
Constitution of 1812, composed an outline known as the Acta Constitutiva, and proposed 
that it be distributed to the provinces for a vote.  The first article of the document 
declared that “The Mexican nation is composed of the provinces.” In other words, the 
provinces were the preeminent governing bodies of the land.  Yet, it also confirmed the 
sovereignty of the nation and claimed for it the right to adopt whichever form of 
government appeared “most conducive to its conservation and greatest prosperity.”  
Finally, Articles 5 and 6 declared that Mexico be led by a “representative, popular, 
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federal” government, composed of “free, sovereign, and independent” provinces, each 
possessing their own exclusive “administrative and interior government.” 96  
Indeed, as it became increasingly clear that federalism was the only form of 
government that the majority of Mexicans would accept, centralist delegates launched an 
intense interrogation of a system they claimed was not suited for a nation as vast and 
diverse as Mexico.  The most eloquent voice for this position came from Father Mier, 
who insisted that, while federalism might work for the United States, Mexico’s expansive 
territory, coupled with its long history of revolution and relative lack of experience as a 
unified republic, meant that a federalist system would only enhance division and lead to 
the nation’s disintegration.  Furthermore, Mier insisted that federalism was foreign to 
Mexico, imported from the United States by power-hungry provincial “demagogues.”  
But proponents of the article countered by insisting that federalism was, in fact, 
the only system suited for a nation like Mexico.  Centralism, they warned, would unfairly 
subject the remote regions, such as Texas, to the same kind of marginalization and 
neglect that they had suffered under the Crown.  In this respect, federalism was Mexico’s 
salvation, not its doom.  Besides, as Gómez Farías pointed out, it was what the majority 
of Mexicans had called for.  The provinces, he insisted, were already “separate and were 
going to unite, and not the contrary, because there is not union without a fundamental 
pact.”97   This was the essence of Mexican federalism: Nationhood was a voluntary social 
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compact among the provinces, not one imposed upon them by a central authority - therein 
lay its legitimacy.  As their political precedent, Mexican federalists pointed to the 
Spanish imperial model and the crisis of 1808 in which the king’s absence had 
necessitated that the provinces form their own, new social compact.  The same was true 
now with Iturbide’s abdication, they insisted.  The responsibility for forming a new 
government once again rested with the provinces and they had chosen federalism.98  
In this regard, the contest between Mexican federalists and centralists in 1823 and 
1824 mirrored that which had been unfolding in the United States since that nation’s 
founding.  Just as Anti-Federalists had in the United States, Federalists in Mexico 
believed that greater representative authority ought to be awarded to community leaders.  
Meanwhile, Mexican centralists and their counterparts in the US (confusingly referred to 
as Federalists, although their views conflicted with Mexican federalists) embraced the 
view that representatives ought to be distanced from their locales.99   
The compromise was Article 3 which declared that, with the establishment of a 
new central government, only that body had the authority to determine which form of 
government Mexico would adopt in the future.  In essence, the central government could 
abolish federalism if and when it saw fit.   “Sovereignty resides radically and essentially 
in the nation,” it stated, to which “exclusively belongs the right to adopt and establish by 
means of its representatives, the form of government and other fundamental laws.”   
                                                          
98 Valentín Gómez Farías in La Aguila, 15 December 1823; Also discussed in Anna, 144-147. 
99 Cornell, 152-3. 
59 
 
 
 
Although it represented a compromise between federalist and centralist impulses, 
the Acta, which ultimately passed 70 to 10, nonetheless represented a profound 
accomplishment, culminating fourteen years of political change that started with a call for 
provincial home rule and ended with an independent republic.100  Furthermore, scholars 
by now agree that the real origins and “spirit” of the Acta lie in the Spanish Constitution 
of 1812.101  This is most clear in the very first article of the Acta: “The Mexican nation is 
composed of the provinces.”  Herein lies the distinctly Mexican notion of “shared” or 
“duel” sovereignty, – the nation was a union of sovereign provinces “reciprocally joined 
into a federation of equals.”  Each state was independent of the others and Mexico City 
when it came to internal affairs such as taxation, and they “endowed” the national state 
with power over affairs that transcended states, except of course, for determining the 
future form of government.   Indeed, the Mexican Constitution exceeded that of the 
United States in its privileging of regional sovereignty. In fact, the only other constitution 
that would come close to Mexico’s in this regard was that of the Confederate States of 
America established nearly four decades later.102 
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Yet, despite its accomplishment, the Constitution of 1824 did not resolve the 
underlying conflict between federalist and centralist impulses that had dominated the 
political atmosphere of Mexico’s first few years of independence, just as it had done in 
the United States. “In short, the great issues at stake in creating the new nation were not 
laid to rest but continued to be the focus of profound conflict throughout the lifetime of 
the first federal republic and throughout most of nineteenth-century Mexican history,” 
writes Anna.  “Indeed, it can be said that the most profound issues a society can face 
were only beginning to be formulated.”103 This was as true for Mexico as it was for its 
neighbor to the north. 
*** 
“Was it probable, was it possible,” John Adams later wrote, “that such a plan . . . 
of a free government, and a confederation of free governments should be introduced and 
established among such a people, over that vast continent, or any part of it?”  Such a 
possibility appeared to him “as absurd as similar plans would be to establish democracies 
among the birds, beasts, and fishes?”104  Yet, for other norteamericanos, especially those 
living on the frontier where newspapers had closely tracked events in Mexico for some 
time, the news was far less surprising, although no less pleasing.  In June of 1823, the St. 
Louis Enquirer reported, in reference to the overthrow of Iturbide, that “Days of 
Prosperity, of liberty, and concord” had replaced “usurpation and despotism.  Honour and 
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praise to the valiant soldiers of the country!”105  When the nation decided to embrace a 
federal form of government the following year, the paper applauded the decision, 
reporting that there manifested “the best feeling between the ‘Sovereign Congress’ and 
the Congresses of the States,” and referred to “the excellent example” supplied by the 
United States.106  Several months later it reported that “every part of the new political 
system was in regular and successful operation in Mexico.”107  The Arkansas Gazette 
referred to Iturbide’s execution at the end of that year as evidence of “how far the spirit 
of Republicanism has taken root [in Mexico],” and declared that “Crowned heads may 
maintain themselves in Europe by means of bayonets, but here in the New World they are 
justly consigned to the worms.”108 
 Frontier Americans were particularly excited by the prospect of freer international 
commerce and trade with their new “sister republic,” with whom they envisioned sharing 
the role of moral and political steward to the rest of the continent.  “The use of an 
unmolested passage between Mexico and the United States is a necessary in a political as 
in a commercial point of view,” declared the Louisiana State Gazette.  The US and 
Mexico were not only “neighboring powers, inhabitants of the same continent, their 
territories contiguous, and their settlements approximating to each other,” they were now 
“two chief powers of the new world, and standing at the head of a cordon of Republics, 
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which, stretching from pole to pole across the two Americas, are destined to make the last 
stand in defense of human liberty.”109 
   As for Stephen Austin, he could not have been more thrilled with the direction 
of Mexican national politics which, more than anything before it, solidified his and the 
other immigrants’ loyalty to their adopted country.  In a formal proclamation issued to 
the “Fellow Citizens” of his colony on May 1, 1825, Austin declared, “I am convinced 
that there is not a breast amongst you that will not palpitate with exultation and delight at 
the prospects of Freedom, Happiness, and Prosperity which the Federal Republican 
System of Government presents to you.”  He went on to express full faith in every 
immigrant’s ability to see their dreams realized if they only remained true and patient 
citizens of Mexico.   “[N]o difficulty or embarrassment can or ever will arise unless 
produced by your own impatience or imprudence.”110 
Indeed, in their embrace of extreme federalism, Mexican leaders skillfully 
combated precisely the fear that the Austins and so many other disillusioned Americans 
like them had expressed – an overly robust central government controlled by political and 
economic elites.  Now, of course, Mexico had adopted what many of them considered the 
ideal form of government – a confederate republic.    
Convincing Mexico of their fidelity, however, was no easy task for the thousands 
of US immigrants who sought Mexican citizenship during these years, especially in light 
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of US leaders’ very public interest in acquiring Texas.  But these immigrants both 
actively demonstrated their loyalty to their adopted country and asserted their rights 
within it in the same way that their fathers and grandfathers had done for the United 
States - through armed defense of their nation.    
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CHAPTER 2 
“Children of the Great Mexican Family” 
 Citizenship, Identity, and Rebellion on Mexico’s Far Northern Frontier 
 1824-1827 
 
On May 25th, 1822 Stephen F. Austin penned a letter to the recently appointed 
Emperor Augustín de Iturbide of Mexico. “I make a tender of my services, my loyalty, 
my fidelity,” Austin wrote, “This solemn act cuts me off from all protection or 
dependence on my former government – my property, my prospects, my future hopes of 
happiness, for myself and family, and for the families I have brought with me, are 
centered here – This is our adopted Nation.”   Two years earlier, Austin’s father Moses 
had applied for and received an empresario contract from the Spanish government.  
Designed to facilitate the development and security of New Spain’s Far North, the 
empresaio program granted land to small communities of foreign settlers if they promised 
to become Spanish subjects, convert to Catholicism, and develop and defend the region.   
By the time he penned his letter to Iturbide, Austin had managed to recruit and settle 
several hundred US colonists in a small tract on the Brazos River.    He now sought to 
convince the nation’s new leader to honor the contract he had made with his 
predecessors, the Spanish.  “I therefore supplicate that his imperial majesty will have the 
goodness to take the settlement I have formed under his protection, and that we may be 
received as children of the great Mexican family.”111  
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Historians have long greeted Austin’s supplications with skepticism. 112   But it is 
perhaps more helpful to see them as evidence of the complicated identity that he and 
other colonists fostered as Anglo immigrants to Mexico. These men consistently referred 
to Mexico as their “adopted nation,” rather than their “mother country” and continued to 
identify as American.  Yet Austin and others like him consistently declared and enacted 
their Mexican loyalty.   Not only were the two reconcilable, they were interdependent.  
Mexico, as we shall see, was the only place where many believed they could truly be 
American. 
Meanwhile, Mexican leaders from Iturbide to Bustamante had a good motivation 
to believe such appeals and to facilitate Anglo settlement of the Far North.  For over a 
decade Mexico had been struggling to secure its northern border from Indians who 
targeted Mexican settlements and missions.  Indeed, by 1820, the Comanche appeared to 
be the most dominant imperial force in the Mexican North.  But it was also during this 
time that Spanish officials and their Mexican successors finally began heeding local 
leaders’ appeals to allow settlers, specifically those from the United States, to acquire and 
settle land.  Thousands responded to the new policy and, by 1827, Texas was home to 
nearly 27,000 Anglo immigrants and their slaves. 
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Many described their relationship to their adopted country in terms similar to 
Austin.  As Lynn Hunt has notably written “most Europeans in the eighteenth century 
thought of their rulers as fathers and of their nations as families writ large.”113  What is 
surprising is that the language of paternity was employed so late, long after citizens of the 
United States and France had abandoned it for and begin to describe their relationship to 
the state in more egalitarian terms.  Yet, for Austin submission to a patriarchal authority 
such as Iturbide was a form of free will.    
Yet, for others, loyalty did not come so readily, especially when they sensed that 
Mexico failed to live up to their expectations.  When a group of disgruntled settlers and 
squatters attempted to form their own nation and secede from Mexico, it provided Austin 
and other loyalists with the opportunity to prove their loyalty to their adopted nation 
rather than merely declare it. While the Fredonian Rebellion ultimately enjoyed only 
limited support before being suppressed by the Anglo militia, it revealed a latent tension 
between some settlers’ loyalty to their adopted family and loyalty to their nuclear family.  
This, in fact, was characteristic of many nations transitioning to republicanism at this 
time.  As Jennifer Heuer has observed of France, “From the birth of the Revolution in 
1789 to the consolidation of a new monarchy, family and citizenship rights were thus 
both deeply intertwined and frequently opposed.”114  Perhaps nowhere was this tension 
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more evident than in the Mexican North, where personal and national security sometimes 
coincided and other times clashed.   
*** 
 
For centuries Texas’ immense size and relative lack of navigable waterways hindered 
Spanish efforts to settle and develop the region.  It was not until the eighteenth century, in 
the face of increasing French encroachment in the Lower Mississippi Valley, that the 
Spanish began establishing a series of missions and presidios with the aim of winning the 
loyalty of local Indians.115  But unlike the New Mexican Pueblo, the nomadic eastern 
plains tribes, in the words of one official, “refused to submit to the merciful yoke of the 
Church.”  Having established close commercial ties with the French from whom they 
obtained muskets and ammunition, southern plains tribes ignored Spanish appeals to halt 
trade with the French and, at least according to one report, even “presumed to threaten 
with death” anyone who prohibited such activity.  “All the Nations are prepared to take 
up arms against the Spanish,” wrote one official, “declaring that they will receive in their 
territory none other but the French, who supply them their necessaries.”116   
Foreign trade allowed Indian groups like the Lipan Apache, the Karankawa and 
others to remain independent of the Spanish. But perhaps no group proved better able to 
bend the European presence to their own ends than the Comanche.   Arriving in the 
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southern plains in the early eighteenth century, the Comanche proved able “to harness the 
empowering potential of the new technology more fully than their Native rivals,” 
according to Pekka Hamaleinen.  Horses, guns and ammunition permitted them not only 
to adopt mounted Bison hunting, but to replenish their livestock, ammunition and even 
their own population by raiding other Indians and Spanish settlements.  It is fair to say 
that by the mid-eighteenth century the Comanche, more than any European power, 
dominated the Mexican north. 117 Having colonized most of the grassy plains of the 
Arkansas Basin, in the late 1760’s the Comanche attempted to expand westward into the 
Rockies and southward into Texas, a region previously controlled by the Lipan.  Rather 
than expanding their territory, the Comanche sought “a vigorous diplomatic and 
commercial expansion,” aligning themselves with neighboring tribes such as the Wichita 
in order to conduct raids on San Antonio and its surrounding environs.118 
However, by the 1770’s, France transferred its North American territories to the 
Spanish, effectively ending the two empires’ American rivalry  and inspiring Charles III 
to unleash a series of administrative reforms designed to integrate, modernize and secure 
Spanish dominance on the continent. This meant a renewed effort to secure Spain’s 
northern frontier.  In 1771, New Spain’s Minister of the Indies, José de Gálvez, called for 
a series of reforms based on his six-year inspection of central and northern New Spain.  
Concerned primarily with the British and Russian imperial threats, Gálvez and other 
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officials believed they could subdue native groups and harness them to Spanish imperial 
aims.  In 1776, he ordered the establishment of the Commandancy General of the Interior 
Provinces and appointed Teodorode Croix to its head. Unlike his superior, Croix 
recognized the primary threat to Spanish imperial sovereignty to be the marauding tribes 
of the central and southern plains.   Since the Spanish had failed to subdue the southern 
plains Indians through conversion, Croix called for adoption of the “French approach” - 
trade and gift-giving would replace the sword and the cross.119  
The need to gain the loyalty of the northern Indians became even more urgent with 
the birth of a new and territorially aggressive neighbor to the west.  Although Spain had 
formally supported United States independence, the new nation’s own imperial ambitions 
were not lost on Spanish officials who hoped that through an alliance with the Comanche, 
they might secure their eastern border from US encroachment.120 
While the Spanish were able to achieve a lasting peace with the western Comanche, 
preserving it in the east proved more difficult.  “Unlike in New Mexico,” explains 
Hamaleinen, “Spanish officials in Texas had only sporadic interactions with and limited 
knowledge of the top-level Comanche leadership.”  But before long the recuperation of 
the Lipan forced an alliance between Texans, Comanche, and Wichita in which the 
Spanish supplied guns, ammunition and uniforms to their Indian allies in exchange for 
their loyalty and cooperation. Thus, by the 1790’s, northern New Spain appeared to have 
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entered a new era characterized by trade, military cooperation and peace.121  Yet, the 
practice was less successful in Texas where officials had  access to fewer resources than 
their counterparts in New Mexico and “operated in a more complicated geopolitical 
setting,” with more than thirty-three Indian nations soliciting trade from them.122 
Starting in the 1780’s, US traders began venturing into Texas, some of whom had 
ties to known filibusters in the North.123  In an attempt to crack down on such individuals, 
Spanish officials in 1795 decreed “that the utmost vigilance shall be exercised over the 
persons who introduce themselves in our Provinces from the United States of America, 
there being serious grounds to suspect that emissaries are being sent to arouse our people 
to rebellion.”  The Lieutenant Governor of the Town of Nacogdoches, which rested on 
the border with Louisiana and had long been a hotbed of foreign trade and other illicit 
activity, was instructed to “have arrested any foreigners existing, or who may hereafter 
introduce themselves among our friendly Indian Nations inducing our Chiefs to lend their 
assistance for this object.”124  Thus, the Spaniards’ efforts to hold onto Indian allegiance 
was proving increasingly difficult in the face of foreign traders, especially from the 
United States.125  The Comanche, for their part, continued to ignore Spanish orders to 
trade with or harbor foreign interlopers as they began to shift their allegiances to the 
United States.  Governor Antonio Martínez reported that “the traffic between the 
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Comanches and the traders from the interior continues without interruption, and that 
arms, munitions, and other war supplies are being brought in.”126 
  Spanish anxieties were heightened when Louisiana came under the control of the 
United States in 1804.  Now, the Spanish were confronted with the most territorially 
aggressive nation on the continent abutting one of the most vulnerable and least 
populated parts of their empire. Meanwhile, French aggression was about to revisit Spain, 
this time on the other side of the Atlantic with the Napoleonic invasion and capture of 
Fernando VII. 
  As the sole representative of the Eastern Interior Provinces of the Kingdom of 
Mexico to the Spanish Cortes in 1810, Miguel Ramos Arizpe took it upon himself to 
enlighten the Cortes to the centuries of imperial neglect and mismanagement that had 
been visited upon Coahuila and its surrounding provinces.  “At the present,” Arizpe 
declared, “[Texas,]after so many years of abandonment, contains in all its vast territory 
only three towns, which are most commonly known by the names of presidios, and five 
missions of native Indians of the region.” Indeed, the non-Indian population at that point 
did not exceed 3,000 inhabitants, according to Arizpe, most of whom struggled under 
administrative neglect and the constant threat of Indian raids and foreign filibustering. 
Arizpe spoke specifically of the Comanche, whom he termed the most “warlike” of the 
local tribes.  Despite “Poverty, wars, and epidemics of smallpox,” he claimed they “can 
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in a few days assemble many thousands of Gandules, that is, men from eighteen to fifty 
years of age, who are very skillful with the arrow, the spear, and the gun, which they all 
have of an excellent quality.”  
Texas’ resultant lack of development was especially unfortunate considering how 
much natural wealth and economic promise it offered.  Not a little regional pride factored 
into Arizpe’s characterization of the interior provinces: “Their vast extent, their location, 
their climate, so varied and healthful in the larger part, and their most abundant and 
varied native products make them worthy of constituting by themselves one of the most 
extensive and richest empires of the universe.” 127 
Indeed, Arizpe’s remarks gestured towards a distinctive norteno identity among the 
region’s Hispanic inhabitants, characterized by a rugged agrarianism, martial lifestyle and 
close economic and cultural ties to Indians and foreigners, especially those from the 
United States.  Andrés Reséndez has written that over the course of the early nineteenth-
century “Pueblo Indians, Anglo-American colonists, tejanos, and nuevomexicanos 
became linked together through several institutional networks revolving around land, 
commerce, politics, and religion, forging impressive multiethnic local and regional 
alliances.” Thus, while Spanish officials feared and attempted to prevent Anglo 
encroachment on the frontier, the region’s inhabitants welcomed, and often formed close 
personal connections with norteamericanos who offered goods, skills and connections 
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that they needed to thrive and, as the century progressed, began to look to Anglo-
Americans as the answer to develop, enrich and protect their struggling province.128 
Meanwhile, tejano relations with the rest of the empire had become increasingly 
strained due to generations of administrative neglect and incompetence.  For example, in 
1787 citizens of the Villa of San Fernando and the neighboring presidio of San Antonio 
issued a formal complaint to Governor Rafael Martínez Pacheco regarding the 
Commandant-General’s practice of seizing thousands of supposedly wild horses and 
cattle.  Based on “the royal authority granted to us by our Lord, the king,” the petitioners 
requested “a remedy” to the tribunal orders issued from the commandant-general of these 
Eastern Interior Provinces of New Spain.  They claimed an “undeniable, indisputable, 
and legal right” to the horses and cattle based on the belief that they were descended from 
stock that had belonged to their fathers and grandfathers, those “honored first settlers” of 
the far north.  They explained that their forbears had “been obliged to abandon” their 
cattle and horses during the previous wars with the Apache, which had “caused the 
Indians to steal the greater part of the stock they chanced to find unguarded.”   Now, 
having finally reestablished themselves, they faced “a still more dangerous enemy” in the 
Governor “so that if our situation was most miserable during the whole time of the war, it 
was much worse when peace began.”  The petition concluded: “[W]e could use our 
forefinger’s length of paper and still not tell all the miseries we have endured.” Although 
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“the king had ordered that we be protected and encouraged, [the governor] destroyed and 
annihilated us.  He seized our patrimony, he took our heritage.”129   
Fully conscious of the increased regional alienation of the provinces, especially 
Texas, Arizpe called for greater integration, representation and infrastructure to facilitate 
“reciprocal trade among their inhabitants” and “draw them into every kind of 
relationship,” thereby contributing “to greater uniformity of habits and customs and make 
their people well adapted to living together under the same internal centralized 
government.”130 
But the one policy that Arizpe seemed to suggest was most necessary to the 
development, adhesion and security of the northern provinces – especially Texas - was 
increased population: 
 
[T]he eastern internal provinces’ size, their climate, their products, their excellent 
seaports, invite millions of men to enrich themselves; but never has the 
government put into practice effective measures for leading men there.  This idea 
has never attained more than the projected stage  . . . Perhaps all the advantages of 
this or similar measures has not been recognized, nor has an attempt been made to 
show the Spaniards that it was aimed at making them quickly and permanently 
rich and prosperous.   
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To these ends Arizpe recommended a project designed to enhance Texas’ population, 
“not withstanding the circumstances in which the nation finds itself,” and insisted that 
such a policy constituted “the principle road to national prosperity.”131   
Arizpe’s remarks did not go unheeded.  The imperial government soon commenced a 
sustained effort to encourage settlers from the North who declared their loyalty to Spain.  
Initially, authorities admitted only Spanish vassals from Louisiana wanting to escape the 
“harsh” rule of the United States.  But before long, many Anglo-Americans were 
expressing their interest in immigrating as well.  Spanish officials at first refused, but 
local leaders argued that they needed the additional population and resources to secure 
the region.132   
Indeed, it was in 1809, when exclusion policies reached their zenith in response to 
rumored territorial aggression on the part of the United States and Napoleon, that Texan 
officials had first argued that increased settlement and a strong militia were required to 
establish territorial integrity.  “[A]ll indicates a very considerable upturning if this 
Province is not attended to, from which it would be difficult to dislodge the American if 
he succeeds in occupying it,” wrote Nemesio Salcedo in June of 1812.  “[H]ow the cares 
and troubles of this Province daily increase,” he bemoaned, predicting “that their 
continued succession will alone show the evidence of their reality.”133  Increased 
population, he and others insisted, was the only remedy.  “[T]his place seems to me 
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suitable for Your Lordship to found a new settlement and doubtless it would be most 
beneficial to these Provinces,” wrote the Senior Commandant General at Nacogdoches, “I 
am certain that settlers of means will settle there for the advantage of finding a good sale 
for their produce and grains, provided they find themselves protected properly.”  But 
settlement was not possible, he insisted, without an aggressive and relentless war against 
hostile Indians, “Your Lordship must not believe that [the Indians] become more 
peaceable . . . for their happiness they find it in robbing, their valor, in killing the 
unfortunate being even when they find them in the greatest misery, hungry and naked.” 
Such traits made them “incapable of being attracted to the Christian Religion.”134  Local 
leaders objected to the imperial practice of attempting to curry favour with and eventually 
Hispanicize the Indians, and in this way corresponded more to the attitudes of Anglo-
Americans, especially frontiersmen, than they did with Mexican federal leaders, many of 
whom decoupled race from citizenship, tending to see Native Americans as Spanish 
subjects who should be “civilized” not exterminated.   For the next decade, frontier 
leaders would skirt Spanish restrictions by permitting foreigners, many of whom they had 
come to know and trust over extended commercial and personal interaction, to establish 
themselves illegally along the western frontier, and would continue to carry on a 
clandestine trade with Louisiana as well. 135 
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 Such was the status quo until the Fall of 1820 when revolution in Spain necessitated 
the reestablishment of the Cortes which, among other things, called for local leaders to 
issue a report on vacant lands and their ideas about how best to distribute them to needy 
and loyal citizens.  On September 28, 1820, in response to the demands of local leaders, 
the new government overturned the long established prohibition by offering asylum to all 
foreigners, whether legally or illegally residing in parish dominions, if they promised to 
respect the new constitution and laws. The new government also adopted a more liberal 
immigration policy that invited foreigners to settle in small communities along the 
northern frontier if they promised to help develop the region and contribute to the 
government’s efforts to combat Indian hostilities.   This emprasario system is precisely 
what allowed the Austins to establish their colony of 300 families along the Brazos. 136    
*** 
Stephen Austin arrived in Natchitoches by steamboat on 26th June 1821.  There he 
met a group of Spanish officials headed by Erasmo Seguín, the recently elected alcalde 
of San Antonio, assigned to deliver the confirmation of Austin’s grant and accompany 
him into Texas.  Seguín was among that class of men who, according to historian Jesús 
de la Teja, “had navigated the treacherous waters of the Mexican War of Independence, 
had advocated the development of the province their grandparents and great grandparents 
had settled for a century, and [later] welcomed and formed alliances with the recently 
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arrived Anglo-American settlers.”    His forebears, many of them soldiers who had been 
stationed at the presidio of San Antonio beginning in the early 1700’s, were among the 
town’s founders and some of its most prominent citizens. His paternal grandfather, 
Bartolomé Seguín had been a well-respected carpenter and landowner who was also 
active in San Antonio politics and society, and had served on several town councils.  
Erasmo’s father, Santiago, quickly became one of San Antonio’s most successful cattle 
exporters and also served on the ayuntamiento in 1784 and 1787.  He was a militant 
advocate for local interests and his name is found on the 1787 appeal to Governor 
Martínez.137 
  The third of Santiago’s seven children, Erasmo himself followed the path of his 
father and grandfather into civic politics.  He was appointed postmaster in 1807, a 
position that he would hold for almost three decades.  During Mexico’s war for 
independence, Erasmo remained ostensibly a royalist, he was accused of treason after 
agreeing to carry a letter on behalf of the revolutionaries during his return from a 
business trip to Louisiana.  Although he insisted he was coerced into the task, the royalist 
governor nonetheless branded him a traitor, had him arrested, and his property 
confiscated. Having cleared himself of charges by 1818, the government eventually 
returned his ranch and he began rebuilding his fortune.138   
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Accompanying Seguín was another San Antonio merchant, stock raiser, and 
councilman, Juan Martín de Verramendi. Verramendi was at least in part selected for his 
thorough knowledge of the roads between Nacogdoches and San Antonio.  As a wool 
trader, he had travelled them extensively.  He had also most likely come into repeated 
contact with Anglo traders from Louisiana, and had very likely engaged in contraband 
trade with them, as he was in fact accused of doing on at least one occasion.  In exchange 
for wool, cattle and mules, Louisiana traders often supplied items like tobacco and cloth, 
both popular in San Antonio and extremely difficult to come by.  As prominent stock 
raisers, businessmen, and civic leaders, these men saw in Anglo-American colonization 
the potential to develop and enrich Texas through increased trade, security, infrastructure, 
and economic development.  As de la Teja writes, men like Seguín and Verramendi saw 
in Austin and the Anglo-American colonists “an unprecedented opportunity for Texas to 
rise from the depths of the poverty and backwardness from which the Mexican War of 
Independence had left the province.”139   
As the men travelled west toward San Antonio, Austin observed that Texas’ “red 
land is very productive and is covered with the most luxuriant growth of Gras I ever 
beheld in any country.”  He recorded in his journal that the landscape was “gently 
rolling” like the “Barrens of Kentucky” and appeared “tolerably well watered” with 
“numerous” creeks of “pure and limpid” water.  He designated the country along the 
                                                          
139 David R. McDonald, “Juan Martín de Veramendi: Tejano Political and Business Leader“ in Jesús de la 
Teja ed., Tejano Leadership, 29-31;Jesús de la Teja, “The Making of a Tejano,” 7. 
80 
 
 
 
Guadalupe River “the most beautiful I ever saw” with “rolling Prairies” and “soil very 
deep and rich.”  On July 26th the men learned of a likely Indian attack along the 
Comanche trail on which they were travelling.  They also received information that an 
unspecified group of Indians had recently ridden “into the very town of San Antonio and 
killed men and stole horses and mules, and that the people were in a very distressed 
situation.”  On August 12th they received more cheerful news - Mexico had gained 
independence from Spain.  Austin reported that his travel companions “hailed this news 
with acclamations of ‘viva Independencia’ and every other demonstration of joy,” and 
that “Erasmo invited us to breakfast with him on various Spanish dishes sent out by their 
wives.”140 
Along the way Austin also encountered the “head chief” of the Tankawas, Gacoso.  
As the two men smoked together, Austin wrote in his journal that he “informed [Gacoso] 
of my settlement which pleased him” and he said he would “inform his nation who we 
were and our objects.”  His impressions of the Tankawa differed markedly from those of 
Karankawa, whom he met later.  This tribe, according to Austin, were “the universal 
enemy of man” who “killed of all nations that came in their power, and frequently feast 
on the bodies of their victims.”  
The men finally arrived in San Antonio on August 26th. Austin observed the town “in 
a state of ruin” as a result of the recent revolution and “subsequent Indian depredations.”  
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Although the inhabitants appeared to have “but few cattle and horses and raise some 
corn,” they nonetheless enjoyed a “very considerable trade” with western Louisiana “and 
money is tolerably plenty.”  Of San Antonio’s residents, Austin only observed that they 
“live poorly, have but little furniture or rather none at all in their houses – no knives, eat 
with forks and spoons and their fingers.”141 
 In San Antonio, Austin met the man who had been perhaps the most pivotal in 
achieving his colonization grant – Philip Hendrik Nering Bogel, also known as the Baron 
de Bastrop.  The Baron and Austin’s father, Moses, first met in New Orleans nearly 
twenty years earlier.  Born of a prominent Dutch family in Guiana, Bastrop had been 
accused of tax embezzlement in the Netherlands, prompting him to flee to Spanish 
Louisiana where he re-invented himself as a Baron and gained a colonization contract to 
settle a group of Europeans in the Ouachita Valley. The United States failed to recognize 
his contract after the Louisiana Purchase and Bastrop eventually ended up settling in San 
Antonio in 1805, where he became a well-respected member of the community.  It was 
Bastrop who had helped Moses convince Governor Martínez to allow him to settle three 
hundred American families on the Colorado River.  Previously suspicious, Martínez 
eventually concluded that Austin “was a man of honesty and formality, and that the 
proposal he is making is, in my opinion, the only which is bound to provide for the 
increase and prosperity of this province.”142   
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While Spanish authorities ultimately granted their approval, many remained 
suspicious of the immigrants and the issue remained contested well past independence, 
often pitting local leaders such as Seguín, Verramendi, and Bastrop against government 
officials.  As the level of interest among prospective settlers in the US surprised even 
Austin, who soon requested another contract, debates ensued over the location of 
settlements, how seriously immigrants took their Catholic faith, and whether or not they 
were bothering to learn Spanish.  For example, Anastacio Bustamante, the Commandant 
General of the Internal Provinces suggested that the immigrants should establish 
themselves closer to Béxar so as to remain “under the protection and observation of our 
government subject of course to our laws, and under terms that we prescribe.”  Permitting 
them to settle too far from the center of governmental power might compromise the 
security of the young empire “facilitating a free pass to the ambitions of the United 
States” thereby “paving the way for invasion.”143 
The provincial deputation allayed his fears, assuring Bustamante that, in addition to 
being “convenient,” the immigrants would all be Catholics of good character, “giving 
their obedience to the Government.”  They would cultivate cotton, sugar, and corn and 
take up arms in defense of the empire or against “the barbarous Indians.”  One local 
official compared the Port of Veracruz to Boston in its promise.  If allowed to settle 
closer to the coast, the immigrants could secure the “auxiliary provinces.”  He suggested 
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that the government take certain precautions while also sweetening the deal for the 
settlers.  The government could prohibit immigrants from holding office for a specified 
length of time, while also exempting them from paying taxes for ten years and allowing 
them to bring their slaves. 
Austin quickly filled his initial colonization grant for three hundred families.  As 
news of his colony swept through Louisiana and Missouri, interest grew, and by May 
1822, only about six months after he had established his first colony and less than a year 
after he had arrived in Texas, Austin made a formal request for permission to settle eight 
hundred more families. He couched his words in effusive praise for the empire and its 
leader.  “[P]articipating in the sentiments of joy  manifested by the nation at the recent 
political change, I respectfully approach his Imperial majesty, and offer my 
congratulations on the happy consummation of the independence of Mexico, by the 
election of the Hero of Iguala, the Liberator of his Country to the Imperial throne,” 
Austin began.  He went on to assure the Emperor that the his colonists  
 
[L]ook to the Sovereign Congress as the pure fountain from whence those blessings 
are to flow which will diffuse peace, industry, improvement, intelligence, and 
happiness over this new born Nation. We raise our eyes to him, whose virtues have 
elevated him to the station he merited, as the Father, who is to distribute those 
blessings to his People, with a firm, impartial, and benevolent hand.   
 
And he expressed the hope that his settlement and the request to bring still more families 
would “be deemed a sufficient proof that I come to this Empire in good faith, and with a 
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firm determination to be obedient to the established authorities of the Government, and a 
wish to be useful to the nation so far as I am able.”144 
Yet, despite Austin’s declaration of loyalty and promises to serve the new empire, 
Bustamante remained skeptical and initially suggested that the proposal be suspended.145  
Austin himself acknowledged that a lack of administrative presence was a severe problem 
in some parts of Texas, threatening the “social pact that should unite us” among some 
settlers.  “[T]he laws and regulations that should rule and govern, do not exist here, and 
this fault of great consideration has caused disorder and confusion,” he wrote to Iturbide 
in a separate letter.  “[T]he most industrious and dignified settlers will abandon the 
country and retire to Louisiana [without] laws that protect industry and punish crime.” He 
warned that “anarchy and disorder” would visit the region, just as it did “for any country 
that lacks fundamental policy and laws that are the fundamental basis of the happiness of 
the people.”146 
But Austin continued to assure federal leaders of the purity of his and others’ 
intentions. In a letter to Lucas Alamán, he informed the famous centralist that his father’s 
relationship with “the Spanish nation” dated back to 1798 when he became a citizen of 
Louisiana “and enjoyed the confidence and protection of that Government until the 
cession of that province to the United States.”  Even as he complained of the lack of 
judicial presence on the frontier, he requested an extension of citizenship to himself and 
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his colonists, assuring Alamán that they wished to render “advantages and riches of this 
heretofore deserted and uninhabited portion of the great Mexican Nation.”147 
 With Austin’s urging, and no doubt to allay some of their own concerns, national 
leaders decided they needed to draft an imperial colonization law, which was finally 
issued on January 4, 1823. Bustamante played an active part in its drafting.  Article 1 
stipulated that “The government of the Mexican nation will protect the liberty, property 
and civil rights, of all foreigners, who profess the Roman Catholic apostolic religion, the 
established religion of the empire.”  The document then went on to stipulate clear terms 
on which land was to be distributed and maintained.  Empresarios (or those who 
introduce at least two hundred families) were to inform the executive “what branch of 
industry they proposed to follow, the property or resources they intend to introduce” and 
any other “particulars they may deem necessary.”  Immigrants were expected to 
immediately introduce themselves to the ayuntamientos of the towns in which they 
intended to settle “in conformity with the instructions of the executive,” so that local 
officials “may designate the lands corresponding to them.”  The amount of land 
distributed was to be highly regulated depending on the stated occupation of each 
colonist, usually either farming or stock raising. Settlers should be permitted to select 
plots in the order in which they arrived in the country with natives of Mexico getting the 
first pick - a stipulation that was no doubt designed to encourage the settlement of 
Mexicans.  If emresparios failed to “populate and cultivate” the lands contracted to them 
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within twelve years, then they would lose title and if a colonist failed to cultivate his land 
after two years, it would be presumed that he had renounced his right to it, and the 
ayuntamiento could grant it to someone else.  Such stipulations guarded against 
speculation and ensured the primary aim of the colonization program – to populate and 
develop the region.   Colonists were exempt from all taxation of their products for six 
years, and would be subjected to only “half tithes” for the six years following that.148   
 The National Colonization Law issued on April 18, 1824 retained most of the 
stipulations of its imperial predecessor except that it left to state legislatures the right to 
form their own colonization laws so long as they did not conflict with the national law.  
Accordingly, the State of Coahuila y Téjas issued its colonization law the following year.  
It extended the length of time that foreigners were exempt from taxation to ten years after 
their arrival, forbid settlement within twenty leagues of the United States, and awarded 
twice the amount of land to foreigners who married Mexicans.149   
By the middle of 1825, Austin had successfully filled 297 land grants from the 
Mexican government.  Most members of this group of settlers – commonly referred to as 
the “Old Three Hundred” - were men like himself who had fallen on hard times and were 
disillusioned with the nation of their birth.  They came overwhelmingly from the Trans-
Appalachian South – states like Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana.  
They were also highly mobile, often having lived in two or more states before finally 
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settling in Texas, so that many of those who were not from southern states originally, 
lived there at least briefly before settling in Mexico. 150    
Later immigrants were somewhat more regionally diverse, but not considerably 
so. Of those who arrived after July 1825, approximately seventy percent came from the 
South and nearly half came from the border areas of Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, 
Louisiana and Arkansas Territory.  The rest came from other parts of the United States 
(chiefly New York and the western regions of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois), from Europe 
(mainly Germany), and other parts of Mexico itself.  And as with the Old Three Hundred, 
these immigrants were overwhelmingly agrarians looking for their own land and a fresh 
start.   Despite commonly held assumptions that most of the immigrants were fugitives or 
vagabonds, it appears the typical Anglo-American immigrant to Texas in the 1820’s was 
a married man in his early thirties from a frontier southern state who worked as either a 
farmer or stock raiser.151  
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In March of 1825, a year that saw an explosion of immigration, Bastrop, the sole 
representative from Texas, convinced the Coahuila state legislature to turn the 
empresario system into state law.  “Application is made to me daily to receive and settle 
more families, as colonists, some of which have already arrived here, others are on the 
road and have written to me,” Austin informed Texas Governor Rafael González. 152     
The state government was happy to comply.  In fact, it granted a total of twenty-five such 
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contracts that year, although the majority never came to fruition.  But a few recipients did 
manage to establish a permanent residence with sizeable communities in areas 
surrounding Austin’s colony.  The most determined and successful empresarios tended to 
be other norteamericanos, among them Robert Leftwich, Frost Thorn, Green De Witt and 
Haden Edwards.153  
After some congressional debate over whether or not it should be an independent 
state, Texas became a department of Coahuila that year.  Together the two provinces 
composed the State of Coahuila y Téjas, with a political chief – a kind of subgovernor – 
who resided at Béxar.  Coahuila y Téjas was divided into a series of municipalities ruled 
by governing councils or ayuntamientos, each one headed by an alcalde who operated as 
a kind of mayor, judge, and sheriff.    Federal and state officials, distracted with the 
numerous responsibilities of establishing a new republic, were happy to allow the 
colonies a significant degree of self-government and in fact requested that empresarios 
take care of whatever problems might arise under their jurisdiction themselves so as not 
to burden the authorities.  Austin took these words to heart.154   
In addition to the stipulations outlined in the Colonization Law, immigrants were 
also expected to form militias.  Militia service was expected of all able-bodied men 
throughout the republic, but it was deemed particularly crucial in the Eastern Interior 
Provinces where Indian raids and foreign incursions remained a reality. One of the 
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Mexican government’s chief motives for recruiting these settlers, after all, had been to 
gain their help in subduing or defeating Indian marauders. Establishing militias to this 
end was one of the immigrants’ first lines of business, right after taking an oath of 
allegiance.  And Stephen Austin wasted no time.  On June 24, 1824 he issued his first 
formal battalion orders “In conformity with the decree of the Superior Government of the 
Mexican Nation.”155 
*** 
The militia’s significance to Anglo-American political tradition dates at least as far 
back as the seventeenth century.  During the early republic it acquired particular 
significance as a bulwark against political tyranny.  Edmund Morgan has written that the 
notion of popular sovereignty rested on “the righteousness, independence, and military 
might of the yeoman farmer, the man who owned his own land, made his living from it 
and stood ready to defend it and his country by force of arms.”  Most believed there was 
no better defense for a society than the armed strength of its independent, property-
owning male citizens, and no better guarantor of democracy.156     
However, from the US nation’s inception, federalist leaders pointed to the militia’s 
inherent inefficiency and unreliability in making the case for a regular army.   As one 
historian explains, central to the “competing visions of the military was the tension 
between those individuals who espoused a parochial republicanism and sought to restore 
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virtue and unity to American society,” and “an increasing number of individuals who 
were willing to embrace a vision of society and politics similar to that of James 
Madison.”  One of the most vocal proponents of the standing army was Alexander 
Hamilton, whose followers were among the first to advance the notion that a national 
army, not the militia, was in fact a modern republic’s best form of defense.  They argued 
that a standing army would be more effective for frontier defense, which required more 
or less constant deployment.  They also pointed out that it would facilitate the new 
nation’s commercial development by allowing citizens to focus on production 
uninterrupted by military obligation.  Finally, they combated concerns regarding the 
threat of   political corruption by arguing that there would remain a partial and still 
operative militia that could effectively check the attempts of a despotic leader to 
monopolize violence.  However, between the ratification of the Constitution and the War 
of 1812, Federalists’ demand for militarily effective institutions confronted concerns 
about the sanctity of the constitutional order. 157 
 Opponents feared that it would aggrandize the executive, and that only the 
independent, yeoman soldier could effectively defend the republic. Even as the notion of 
the militia as the chief source of military might was losing ground on the federal stage, a 
vibrant popular effort to preserve it - principally through military academies and other 
                                                          
157 Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 
1812, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982) quote on page xiii.   
92 
 
 
 
privately funded institutions - emerged.158  As Amery Ellen Rowe explains, the militia 
was understood as “an extension of the community from which it came and had to be 
recognized as such by that community.”  It required a community “that respected higher 
authority, yet demanded the right to control its own affairs, and had the necessary 
consensus, manpower and resources to do so.”  Whether or not the militia decided to 
respond to a government call ultimately depended on “the community’s assessment of the 
crisis.” 159  Thus, the militia served as a powerful reminder of a community’s ultimate 
right to self-government.  
As Kentuckians sprinkled into Missouri after the War of 1812, they modeled their 
new militia companies after those of their home state.  Many of these militias were so 
localized that they were more often used in personal rather than national conflicts.  The 
Austins themselves were hardly strangers to the tendency of local leaders to employ their 
own militia.  When Thomas Jefferson appointed Major Seth Hunt commandant of St. 
Genevieve District in 1804 as part of the president’s attempt to form “a strong centralized 
militia organization that would serve as the arm of federal authority while inculcating 
loyalty to the United States and its institutions,” Hunt was immediately drawn into a 
bitter territorial dispute between Moses Austin, who in fact maintained his own personal 
militia during this time, and his primary mining competitor, John Smith T.  On July 4, 
1806, the latter launched a full scale assault on Austin’s forces at Mine à Breton in an 
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attempt to steal his cannon.  When local observers ruled the fight a draw, the men were 
compelled to turn to the courts to resolve their dispute, but the fact that the “mineral 
wars” took place at all, without any official interference or discipline, illustrate the power 
and independence of local militias in the face of federal centralization efforts.160  
Historians have long assumed that only in the Anglo world did the militia carry such 
a close association with republican values. “Though the citizen soldier was never a 
uniquely American figure,” writes Rowe, “in the British North American colonies he 
came to represent a powerful set of ideas, drawn from the British tradition but enhanced 
and elaborated in America.”  The militia constituted “the supreme expression of civic 
values in a traditional, communal and agrarian civil society.”161 
Recently, however, historians of Spanish America have identified militia as a 
component of Hispanic republican democracy as significant as suffrage. Hilda Sabato 
writes that  “The conviction that citizens should be in charge of the defense of the 
republic both from internal and external enemies, and that leaving it in the hands of a 
professional army opened doors to corruption goes back to classical times.”  
Unsurprisingly the militia was one of the cornerstones of the 1812 Constitution, which 
deemed it the most effective defense against monarchical absolutism.  The new republics 
of Spanish America therefore attempted to reestablish the institution in connection with 
the new definition of the body politic. In Mexico, founders debated abolishing the army 
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all together due to its poor state and the young nation’s general lack of funds.  But 
proponents of a national army insisted that it was necessary in light of threats of foreign 
invasion and the constant wars with northern Indians. Legislators finally decided to 
implement an army of 20,000 men in addition to a well-organized militia.  As in the 
Anglo-American case, militias in Mexico were seen as one of the primary guarantors of 
democracy where “the use of force was considered legitimate against a government that 
abused power.”  And, as Manuel Chust points out, “With the establishment of the federal 
republic, the civic militia would be configured as an armed civic battalion of the states 
against the centralist or conservative tendencies of the executive branch and some of its 
officers.”  But because of Mexico’s particularly precarious international position, faced 
with threats of invasion from both Spain and the United States, the militia served “a 
double role, as a national force against potential invaders, especially Spaniards, and, 
within its boundaries, as an armed political force capable of defending liberal 
principles.”162   
Perhaps nowhere else in Spanish America was the militia tradition as strong as it was 
in the Mexican North.  Beginning as early as 1713 and as part of the empire’s efforts to 
secure the region, the Viceroy ordered landowners to form their own militias to help 
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defend the region against Indian and foreign incursions.163  In 1772 the commandant 
general of the region ordered that they receive formal military training from professional 
soldiers stationed at nearby presidios. Despite irregular pay and constant lack of supplies, 
the companía volante (volunteer company) enjoyed a special prestige on the frontier, and 
many settlers preferred that it, rather than the regular army, defend their municipality.164    
As nearby presidio soldiers integrated into neighboring communities, the militaristic 
culture of the region intensified, and a distinct regional identity began to emerge, one that 
Arizpe himself spoke of in his remarks to the Cortes in which he described a population 
of men who “being obliged to serve not only as militiamen but even as common soldiers” 
demonstrated “an extremely commendable character of integrity, honor, and 
subordination.”  He went on to describe how Texans had, on at least one occasion, been 
“forced to subsist on snakes, rats, and even the leather of their saddles” while fighting 
foreign intruders along their empire’s border with the United States.  Despite such 
hardships, there were “no other desertions than that of the cook of the second in 
command, who in reality was not a son of those provinces.”165 
Thus both the United States and Mexico experimented with a kind of dual military 
force that involved both a standing army and a militia.  Yet, while some national leaders 
in the US began calling for replacing the militia with a standing army due to the former’s 
supposed inefficiency and unreliability, in Mexico, the militia held a far more essential 
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role when it came to the preservation of the republic.  This was especially the case on the 
frontier where, in 1826, the federal government required state and local governments to 
recruit local citizens to replace the traditional presidial cavalry companies as they were 
being disbanded.  Citizen were ordered to form militia companies of their own to operate 
under local command and for local service, completely distinct from the regular army.166   
Austin himself received permission to “create a solid base of authority in his 
colonies” so long as he agreed to organize his colonists into a national militia force.  He 
was appointed lieutenant colonel and granted full responsibility for maintaining “the 
good order[,] prosperity and defense” of his colonies.167  In December, 1823, Austin 
began formally organizing the militia.168  His colonists elected Robert Kuykendall as 
their captain.  The Kuykendalls were like many members of the original three hundred 
families who settled in Austin’s colony – frontier southerners, who had not only fought in 
some of the most significant battles of the Revolutionary War and War of 1812, but who 
lived their lives in an almost constant state of warfare, whether it be with the British or 
their Indian allies along the US frontier.169     
While there are few families that could match the Kuykendalls’ militia experience 
and prowess, many of the early Anglo-American immigrants to Mexico came from a long 
martial tradition that had, at varying times, brought them into conflict with the British, 
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the Indians, and ultimately the US federal government as it sought to relocate displaced 
Indian groups such as the Choctaw onto lands claimed by Anglo settlers.170    Yet militia 
service was not merely a way of life for such people, it was how they defined, achieved, 
and secured their relationship to the state.  It also embodied the principles of extreme 
local autonomy that many believed were the cornerstone of republican democracy.  This 
was no truer than on a hostile frontier where waiting for orders from a superior could be 
deadly. The task of defending settlements against Indian incursions fell squarely on the 
shoulders of frontier residents, whether Anglo or tejano and frequent appeals for federal 
troops were denied.  Understandably, many tejanos saw in their Anglo-American 
neighbors skilled and experienced allies against the powerful Indian tribes like the 
Comanche.  
  Yet, while Austin and his militia captains were ready and eager to organize local 
companies, they were slower to place them under national authority.  As one historian of 
early Texas points out, Anglo settlers only “haltingly achieved their mandatory quotas of 
militia squadrons” after “repeated threats” by Governor José María Viesca.  Even then 
“the new militia organization existed only “on paper,” and “the governor had to remind 
them of their duty to comply with the law.”171 While this might suggest a tenuous sense 
of loyalty to Mexico and Mexican authorities, Austin’s behavior was in fact not so 
different from what occurred in Missouri twenty years prior when the Jefferson 
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administration attempted to consolidate its power over frontier militias.  These men were 
more than willing to form local militias to defend and protect their country, they were 
reluctant to relinquish control over them to the federal government – whether it be 
Mexico or the United States. 
The tension between these men’s individual interests and those of their nation, 
between local authority and federal, was ever present in Mexico just as it had been in the 
North.  In both instances, the decision to form a militia in defense of the country rested 
on the consensus of the community and was issued on a case by case basis.   Austin was 
ever mindful of this in his early writings to government officials who consistently urged 
him to form militias promptly and declare war on local Indians immediately. As much as 
Austin wanted to serve his adopted nation, he also knew he must honor the localistic 
spirit of the militia tradition.  More importantly, however, he did not wish to threaten 
colonists’ delicate position by inciting Indian recrimination.  Observers noted that the 
Indians did not seem to target Anglos the way that they did Mexicans.  It’s possible that 
Anglo settlers, even as they declared loyalty to Mexico, wished to perpetuate the notion 
that they were a separate people, unaligned with Mexico so as not to invite the 
aggressions of the Karankawa or the Comanche.   In his “Referendum on Indian 
Relations,” Austin promised, if again ordered to declare war on the Indians, to “lay the 
subject before the inhabitants of each militia district for their consideration, opinion and 
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advice, the course determined on by the majority shall be adopted.”172  Thus Austin was 
faced with the dual task of serving and appeasing his adopted country as well as honoring 
the tradition of community consent and decision-making in militia activities.  While some 
might see this as nothing more than Austin speaking out of both sides of his mouth or 
attempting to compensate for a lack of commitment from his settlers, he was in fact 
honoring the very republican principles that had attracted him and other norteamericanos 
to Mexico in the first place.    
*** 
 
 
 While it certainly had its benefits, the empresario program aggravated a set of 
long-standing administrative challenges for the new republican government.  Obviously, 
if Mexico was going to expect these men to pledge allegiance and risk their lives for their 
adopted country, it had to deliver on its end of the bargain.  Yet, as more and more 
immigrants flooded across the Sabine, keeping track of them and making sure they both 
adhered to the duties and received the benefits of Mexican citizenship, proved 
increasingly difficult in a region that had always suffered from limited administrative 
presence.  
Land grant disputes between older more established settlers and new arrivals were 
common.  In April 1825, Green DeWitt, another immigrant from Missouri, received a 
land grant for 400 families to settle just south of Austin’s colony.  But when they were 
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forced to move further down the coast after an Indian attack in the middle of 1826, it 
brought them into conflict with Martín de León, who had mistakenly been granted land 
that overlapped with Dewitt’s.  As a native Mexican, De León received preferential 
treatment and the Dewitt colony was forced to return to its original site just west of the 
Colorado.173 
In February of 1824, another such dispute arose involving Edmund Quirk, himself 
a United States immigrant who had gained admittance about a decade prior when the 
Spanish Empire briefly relaxed its immigration policy.  Quirk accused a group of more 
recent immigrants of encroaching on his land along the Trinity.  They responded by 
lodging a formal complaint against him and requested that the state government reclaim 
his land and grant it to them.  Quirk was an absentee landowner, they insisted, of the very 
kind that the Spanish and subsequent Mexican government had hoped to guard against.  
While holding land, he had done little to improve it, and was now attempting to evict 
those who had.  “[C]ountries where a few persons are allowed to monopolize large 
quantities of lands are more liable to feel those evils,” they argued, referring to their very 
motivation for coming to Mexico.    “An exclusive right to the possession of the soil and 
its productions is the only agent that aids universally and constantly upon men and 
prompts human industry.”  A system that awarded land ownership to he who developed 
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and improved it – “so that one may work for himself and not for another” - was, they 
claimed, the chief aim of any democratic republic.174  
The lack of governmental presence in the Far North, therefore, was as much a 
problem for recent immigrants as it was for the Mexican government itself.   The petition 
went on to insist that immigrants wanted from “lack of any government” and that, as a 
result, “almost all this time they have been very unhappy not knowing their obligations as 
citizens of this government, and conversely those of the government towards its 
subjects.”  Far from wishing to evade the Mexican state, as some officials suspected,   
they pressed their eagerness “to conform in everything with the constitution of this 
government” including forming a militia “for the defense of the Province in case of any 
invasion.”  They concluded by insisting that “We, as subjects, take a particular, personal 
interest in the prosperity of the Mexican Government and “respectfully request Your 
Excellency to please command that the mail (if it is possible) pass as far as this District 
by which means we should be entirely able to cooperate with your wise vigilance.”175  
 The government’s immediate response to virtually all of these complaints was to 
advise colonists to be patient and obedient, assuring them that it would “watch over your 
interests and protect your rights” and that “If the government of the nation is not yet fully 
and finally organized, the causes which have produced the delay are well known.”  José 
Antonio Saucedo advised the petitioners in the meantime to listen with full “attention and 
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confidence” to Colonel Austin “whose authority is from the supreme powers of the nation 
to which you now voluntarily belong.”176  
Not all the colonies expressed their frustrations as civilly as those on the Trinity, 
however.  The region in and around Nacogdoches had long menaced Spanish authorities, 
and it would do the same to their Mexican successors.  Situated on the border with 
Louisiana, it had been the site of illicit trade and settlement for decades by men who 
appeared more interested in evading US authorities than declaring loyalty to Mexico.  
Residing there were a diverse group of settlers – some legal, some illegal – that included 
Anglo-Americans, French, Spanish, and a large number of Native Americans, namely a 
group of Cherokee recently displaced from the North.  In 1825, Haden Edwards received 
a contract to settle 800 families in the region.  When he arrived there in September, he 
demanded that the pre-established settlers produce titles to their land or face eviction in 
order to make way for his own colonists.   In reference to the Edwards colony, however, 
Saucedo insisted that they had “arbitrarily established themselves . . . with the damage to 
the owners and old residents.”  He further warned that “if they wish to appropriate them 
by force they defame themselves entirely and lose the concept of being able to be 
admitted by the Mexican Government.”177 
On November 13, 1826 the commanding officer of the Nacogdoches militia, José 
Antonio Sepulveda, wrote to the political chief of Texas informing him of the Edwards 
                                                          
176 Jose Antonio Saucedo to Colonists, date known, Ibid.  
177 Jose Antonio Saucedo to Don Juan Seguin, July 21, 1826, Nacogdoches Archives, Asbury Papers, 
Folder 229. 
103 
 
 
 
rebellion.  He warned that “the Province of Texas would be lost to the country if the 
Almighty did not open the eyes of the Superior Government, and induce them to send 
troops for its protection.”  He claimed that the “rebellious American rogues,” aimed to 
ally themselves with local Indians “to ensure their assistance in overthrowing the 
authorities of our government.” 178 
Such news renewed Mexican leaders’ long-established doubts regarding the intent 
of many Anglo-American immigrants, especially those who settled closest to the border.   
J.E.B. Austin, Stephen’s cousin then residing in Béxar, reported that regional leaders 
“treated [the petition] with much contempt.”179  Many accused them of having settled 
arbitrarily, and insisted that it would serve Mexican interests better if they moved closer 
to the interior.  Bastrop confirmed these sentiments and warned Austin of the impression 
that his fellow empresarios were forming in the minds of Mexican leaders, specifically 
the fear that they might “one day attempt to separate and unite with their native land.”  
Such apprehensions, according to the Baron, had “made quite a sensation in Mexico.”180 
But letters from some of the settlers of that region reveal a highly factionalized group 
whose grievances primarily rested with local leaders charged with administering the 
government’s laws and regulations.   
Austin began receiving letters from Anglo-American settlers complaining chiefly 
of an alcalde named James Gaines who, they claimed, was responsible for preventing the 
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formalization of their land grants, excessive taxation, and other offenses.  Gaines, they 
insisted, “if suffered to pursue with impunity, the course which he has adopted,” would 
ultimately “render the Americans in this section of country odious to the Mexican 
nation.”  In other words, it was not Mexico they had a problem with. “The people are 
willing and ancious to obey the law properly administered,” assured one settler by the 
name of John A Williams, “But it is mortifying to the feeling of an American to stoop to 
arbetrary sway.”  Williams insisted that “I attribute none of our present difficulties to any 
person but James Gaines and his understrapers.”  Tellingly, he asked Austin to appeal on 
his and other settlers’ behalf to the Mexican authorities in order to rectify the situation. “I 
hope sir that you will have the goodness to inquire into our condition minutely; and make 
such statements to the proper authority” as to “afford us the protection of person, 
property, and civil rights, which the Mexican Nation has promised.”181 
 The government’s response, however, was not what they hoped for.  Article 7 of 
the national Colonization law declared unlawful any settlement of foreigners less than 
twenty leagues from the US border.  By then, however, hundreds of immigrants were 
firmly established as was the cotton economy they had introduced to the region, drawing 
them ever closer to the United States.  They were joined by the Cherokee who had 
opposed Article 1 of the 1825 state colonization law stipulating that all immigrants 
convert to Catholicism.182   
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Tensions reached a climax during the elections for alcalde, when battle lines were 
drawn between the older settlers who supported Samuel Norris, and the disgruntled group 
of Anglo-Americans who supported Edwards’ son-in-law Chinchester Chaplin.  When 
Norris’ supporters declared Chaplin’s election fraudulent on grounds that most of his 
votes came from non-citizens, he ignored their protests, seizing the archives and 
assuming his duties as alcalde.  When Saucedo declared the election in favor of Norris 
and ordered Chaplin to step down, Chaplin declared that he only took orders from the 
state capital in Saltillo, dismissing Saucedo’s authority as a local leader without access to 
regular troops.  He then threatened that “oceans of blood will be spilled” if he failed to 
send in the regular army.  Edwards’ taunt not only revealed his disregard for the jefe’s 
authority as a regional official, but also his ironic disregard for the power of the militia 
who would eventually be his downfall.   
In July, Benjamin Edwards, Haden’s brother, wrote that he “found everything in 
disorder and confusion in this section of the Province.”  Each day seemed to produce 
“new excitements against the civil authority here, in consequence of proceedings and 
decisions, believed to be incompatible with a republican government, and contrary to the 
fundamental principles of the constitution of the country.”  Edwards seemed to suggest 
that his brother was the victim of arbitrary censure “without any inquiry into the truth or 
falsehood of the accusations” against him.  “It cannot be,” continued Edwards, “that the 
fundamental principles of a free constitution, cemented by the blood of thousands is thus 
early trampled under foot, and its most sacred principles violated in the persons of 
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Americans.”183  Gaines himself did not elaborate on the sources of confusion in his own 
letter to Austin, but he did report the degree of discontent and what it might mean: “I am 
led to believe something like a revolution has been aimed at and probably yet on foot.”  
Refusing to surrender, on November 22 the Edwards brothers and their allies 
seized Norris and Texas Militia Captain José Antonio Sepulveda and tried them for 
oppression and corruption in office.  They accused the men of “Misrepresenting to the 
Governor of this State the conduct and character of the American Emigrants,” and 
“painting them in colors most calculated to rouse the jealousy and resentment of the 
Spanish Government.” They stated that they had been “induced by the promises of the 
Mexican government, as well as by the beauty and fertility of the soil, to emigrate from 
their native land, the birthplace of freedom,” and that all they were guilty of was 
practicing “the republican ideas which have been instilled into them by their fathers in 
their own native country.”184 
But Norris offered a very different account in his letter to the Political Chief.  He 
claimed that he and Captain Sepulveda had been arrested and imprisoned by a group of 
“American ruffians,” some of whom were not even Mexican, but resided “on the other 
side of the Sabine.”  However, they were released once the rebels heard that “Lieutenant 
Manuel Santos had assembled twenty four citizens and a few Indians.”  They nonetheless 
informed the men that they “should no longer hold any office here,” seized the local 
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archives, and appointed one of their own, Joseph Doste, as alcalde.  Norris declared that 
the event amounted to “a total contempt for the legal authorities” and feared that “a large 
portion of our country is lost to us if some assistance does not arrive shortly.”185 
Indeed, Texas officials arrived shortly thereafter.  They sided unequivocally with 
Norris and the Military Commander of Texas called him a “downright imposture” for 
claiming to have been appointed military commandant by state authorities so that he 
might “commit various excesses which have been reported to the Political Chief of this 
Department by the Alcalde of Nacogdoches.”  Edwards’ actions and the reports they 
received from local leaders like Norris confirmed Mexican leaders’ worst fears about 
Anglo settlers. “This class of men who know no law but their rifle,” declared the 
commander, rule that interior wilderness, still sparsely populated.  They are now 
beginning to insult our public officers with impunity; and I much fear that they will 
endeavor to render themselves independent of Mexico.”186 
 He was right. Later that year, the allied group of Anglo settlers, Cherokees and 
other indigenous groups signed a formal declaration of independence.  They agreed to 
form the Fredonian Republic which would consist of two distinct halves, the northern 
part of Texas for the “Red people” and the southern part for the “White people.”187  At 
this point, they transferred their grievances from their local leaders to the Mexican 
Republic, insisting that “the government of the Mexican United States,” had “by repeated 
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insults, outrages and oppressions reduced the white and red immigrants of the United 
States of the North now settled in the Province of Texas.”  They accused it of having 
lured them there “by promises most solemnly declared, and most vilely inforged,” and 
that they now faced “the disagreeable alternative of either submitting their free persons to 
the yoke of the embecile, faithless, and despotic government, (erroneously called a 
republic) or to take up arms for the defence of their inalienable rights.”188 Reports began 
to flood in of the rebellion as those unsympathetic to it arrived in Austin’s colony.  One 
citizen of Nacogdoches declared in a sworn affidavit to seeing “an assemblage of armed 
men  . . . for the purpose of going to war with Mexico” and “a flying flag in said town of 
Nacogdoches the colors of which were white and red.” The next piece of information 
must have been particularly unnerving for Mexican authorities: “[H]e also stated that the 
rebels were in Expectation of aid and assistance of several hundred men from the U. 
States of the north whose arrival were looked for shortly.”189  A correspondence from the 
rebels themselves confirmed the severity of these reports.  Benjamin Edwards wrote that 
“We have concluded a treaty with the chiefs and representatives of twenty-seven tribes of 
Indians; and if I am not deceived, we will, in six months make this perfidious government 
shake to its centre.”190 
In their attempt to gain support from other Anglo immigrants, the Edwards 
brothers appealed to a common Anglo-American identity.  Rather than speaking of their 
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“adopted nation” as Austin had, Benjamin Edwards reminded the inhabitants of Pecan 
Point outside of Nacogdoches that they were all “children of the same mother country.”  
Characterizing the immigrants as “Americans in a foreign land, groaning under the 
galling yoke of injustice and oppression,” he reminded them that “Our fathers in their 
struggle for liberty contended against the giant of the world.  We have to contend against 
a corrupt and imbecile Government.”191  Benjamin used a similar appeal in his letter to 
Col. James Ross of Austin’s Colony: “You and I sir, are strangers; but you are an 
American, and so am I.  [T]he time has arrived when that proud title, I trust, will be a 
sufficient passport to the bosom of every man, who claims freedom as his birthright.”192  
 Their appeals met with opposition from Austin himself, who suggested that the 
rebels had betrayed both their Mexican and Anglo-American identity.  “I am compelled 
to say with all the frankness of an old friend that you are wrong,” Austin wrote to one 
Buttil Thompson.  “I cannot believe that you have so far lost your senses as to think of 
open opposition to the [Mexican] Government.”  Yet it was not just Mexico these men 
had turned their backs on. “[N]either will I believe that you have so far forgotten the land 
of your birth and the proud name of American as to disgrace that name by associating 
yourself with persons, and advocating a cause unworthy of it.”  For Austin, honoring 
one’s American identity meant remaining obedient to a nation that had demonstrated its 
commitment to the preservation of America’s original promise.   It also meant avoiding 
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an unholy alliance with Native American groups, even one as “civilized” as the 
Cherokee. “Great God, can it be possible that Americans, will so far forget the country of 
their birth, so far forget themselves, as to league with barbarians and join a band of 
savages in a war of murder, massacre and desolation,” he declared.  Austin concluded his 
letter by encouraging the rebels to disband their militia and formally express their “entire 
submission and obedience to the [Mexican] Government.”193  
In another New Years’ letter to a different Nacogdoches leader, Austin reiterated 
the same sentiment:  “As an American I feel a lively and warm interest in everything that 
concerns Americans, and as a Mexican I am bound by my duty, honor and every 
obligation that a man ought to hold sacred, to be faithful to this Government and to the 
true interests of this nation.” 194  For Austin, there was no contradiction between his 
American heritage and his Mexican citizenship.  While the rebels saw themselves as 
Americans in a foreign land, Austin saw himself as an American at home in a land more 
committed to fulfilling American values and ideals than the United States was. While 
granting that the rebels probably did have cause for grievance, he insisted that they had 
“taken the wrong method of seeking redress.”  Furthermore, they were wrong to think 
that they would find any support among the other settlers.  “The people of this colony are 
unanimous,” insisted Austin, “I have not heard of one man who is not opposed to your 
violent measures and there is not one amongst us who will not freely take up arms to 
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oppose you and sustain the Govt.”195  Indeed, in an effort to distance themselves from the 
insurgents, other colonies publicly renounced the rebellion and confirmed their loyalty to 
Mexico.   In a correspondence to Saucedo, Austin expressed sympathy towards the 
insurgents’ original grievances, but renounced their ultimate actions. “From what I could 
learn of that occurrence, it would seem, that the principal cause was the hatred of those 
people toward [G]aines and Norris, and not any ill feelings against the Government.”  
With a more impartial administrator, he assured Saucedo, “no difficulty need be 
apprehended on the part of the inhabitants."196   Accompanying the letter was a formal 
“Resolution of Loyalty” from the inhabitants of his colony who had “no hesitation in 
declaring that they view the attempt of the Nacogdoches party to declare the 
independence of and call in the Aid of Indians to wage war against a peaceful inhabitants 
of Texas with the most decided disapropriation.”  They further declared themselves 
“ready to rally around the standard of the Mexican nation and sustain its Govt and 
Authority by force of arms whenever called upon.” They asserted that “they are satisfied 
with the Govt of their adoption and that they are gratified for the favours they have 
received from it and have full reliance on its justice and Magnanimity.”  As a testament 
to the sincerity of their claims, they promised to “take up arms in its defense whenever 
necessary to do so.”  They concluded by further assuring the Superior Government “of 
                                                          
195 SFA to Buttil J. Thompson, 1 January 1827, AP, Vol. I, Part II, 1556-57. 
196 SFA to Saucedo, 4 December 1826, AP, Vol. Part II, 1528. 
112 
 
 
 
our firmness and patriotism in defense of the liberty honor and Rights of the Mexican 
Nation to which we have the honor to belong.”197   
Similar resolutions came from the District of Bravo which declared that “We are 
Mexicans by adoption and as such are willing to Turn out when called on to quell the 
Enemys of the Government” and offered their “services in support of said Government 
on this or any similar occasion if required.”198 Dewitt’s Colony similarly resolved that 
“[A]s adopted children they have full confidence and faith in the equity, justice and 
liberality in the Federal and State Governments of their new parent” and they hoped that 
Mexico would distinguish “between the honest, industrious and peaceable American 
emigrants, and those of bad character, whom we consider as refugees and fugitives from 
justice.”  Like Austin, they renounced the insurgents’ behavior as un-American and 
looked upon them “with contempt and disgust,” insisting that “they are unworthy the 
character of Americans.”  The inhabitants of Dewitt’s colony concluded by pledging their 
“lives, and our fortunes” to Mexico, “our much beloved and adopted Country.”199 
While Austin may have had a flexible identity, the nation to which he claimed 
loyalty was consistent and absolute.  At the end of the day, he was a Mexican, and it 
appears that other Anglo colonists felt the same.  “I will befriend you all as far as I can 
consistent with my duty to the Government,” he wrote to the rebels, counseling them to 
surrender and humble themselves to the Mexican government, “but I am a Mexican 
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Citizen and officer and I will sacrifice my life before I will violate my duty and oath of 
office.”200 
On December 28th, José Antonio Navarro announced to the citizens of 
Nacogdoches that, in response to their calls, the government would sen troops to maintain 
order.  Mindful of the reaction that this might cause, he assured them that it was not an 
invasion and to dismiss reports to the contrary.201  In fact, colonists appeared to welcome 
Mexican troops and quickly formed a nearly two hundred man volunteer militia to assist 
them in suppressing the rebellion. Even a good number of the restive population proved 
less than fully committed to the cause.  As Peter Ellis Bean reported, “the People is very 
much divided[,] there is not more than 30 [A]mericans of the Rebel Party.”202  One 
resident of Nacogdoches explained in his appeal for amnesty following the rebellion that 
Nacogdoches had “Been Left Intirely to the management of a few Ignorant and 
Designing men . . . who wished to show their power and acted with more Tyranny Then 
Ever was, Exercised under the king of spain.”203 
While Austin’s appeals held sway with most of the Anglo colonists, he failed to 
convince a few of the rebels.  Having attempted conciliation, the Mexican government 
turned to force, dispatching two hundred of its troops to suppress the rebellion.  It also 
called upon the Anglo militia for assistance.  They were more than ready to comply.  Just 
                                                          
200 Ibid. 
201 José Antonio Navarro to inhabitants of Nacogdoches, , 28 December 1826, Spanish Archives 
Transcripts, Blake Papers. 
202 Peter Ellis Bean to SFA, 31 December 1826 AP, Vol. I, Part II, 1553-55. 
203 Buttil J. Thompson to SFA, 17 February 1827, AP, Vol. I, Part II, 1602-04 
114 
 
 
 
as he had done in his appeals to colonists to fight the Indians in the name of Mexico, 
Austin addressed the interdependent relationship between immigrants’ individual self-
interest and that of their adopted country when he appealed to them to help suppress the 
Fredonian Rebellion: 
 
I have made no official call but merely appeal to you as men of honor, as 
Mexicans, and as Americans to do your duty – our interests sometimes conflict 
with our duty, but I am happy to say that in this instance they are the same  - it is 
our duty as Mexicans, to support and defend the government of our adoption, by 
whome we have been received with the kindness and liberality of an indulgent 
parent,- it is our duty as men , to suppress vice anarchy and Indian massacre – and 
it is our duty as Americans to defend that proud name from the infamy which 
[the] Nacogdoches gang must cast upon it if they are suffered to progress  
 
 
Here, Austin appealed not simply to colonists’ dual identity as both norteamericano and 
Mexican, but also to their manhood in his efforts to link their interests as independent 
propertied men to their duty as Mexican citizens.  In so doing, he attempted to remind 
settlers that in Mexico, unlike in the United States, their individual interests and state 
interests were one in the same, “for without regular Government, without law, what 
security have we for our persons, our property, our characters and all that we hold dear 
and sacred?”  The answer was clear.  Devotion to the state was essential to 
republicanism.  The rights and privileges of a republican government could not be 
guaranteed if the integrity of the nation was violated.  If it was, then “we at once embark 
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on the stormy ocean of anarchy, subject to be stripped by every faction that rolls along, 
and must finally sink into the gulf of ruin and infamy.”204 
Tellingly, the commander of the loyalist militia was none other than John A. 
Williams who had earlier petitioned the Mexican government to honor his and other’s 
claims to land settled along the Trinity.  Indeed, the most convincing evidence of settlers’ 
unflagging loyalty to Mexico and lack of support for the rebellion, was their swift and 
organized, although ultimately anticlimactic, suppression of it.  Williams himself wrote 
that “As soon as the inhabitants were generally informed of the measure which had been 
taken to put down the rebellious party, they flocked to us from all quarters in defense of 
their country.”  Their patriotism “far surpassed my most sanguine expectation.” Upon 
learning of the militia’s approach, Edwards evidently fled across the border to the United 
States, at which point, “a party was dispatched in pursuit of them,” but they only caught 
two. “The result of these just measures and fortunate reinforcements from different 
quarters, has, in my opinion, settled the fate of the rebellious party.”  The next day they 
were joined by a detachment under Col Bean and another from Austin’s Colony.  “At this 
time there is every prospect of immediate tranquility in the neighborhood,” Williams 
reported.  One hundred eighty-seven men enrolled as ready for duty and “manifested 
every disposition to serve their country.”205   
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 Fields and one other insurgent leader were killed in the conflict, the rest of the 
accomplices were taken prisoner and eventually expelled from the country.  By the time 
the dust had settled over Nacogdoches, J.E.B. Austin reported that the insurgents were 
“treated with a degree of lenity by the Mexicans they had no right to expect from the 
nature of their crimes” and which “would not have been shewn them in their native 
country.”206  Rather than compromising Anglo immigrants’ relationship with Mexico, the 
event cemented it by both allowing settlers to demonstrate the degree of their loyalty to 
their adopted country and permitting Mexico to prove itself an effective though 
magnanimous parent.  As Stephen Austin himself put it in a letter to his friend Samuel 
May Williams, “the Mexican character stands higher here now than it ever did before.”207 
On February 9th, Samuel Kinney wrote to the Military Commander describing the 
state of affairs in Nacodgoches following the rebellion.  He relayed the request of the 
militia commander that an armed force continue to be kept in that quarter.  “It also seems 
to be a general wish of the inhabitants here, that a portion at least, of the [Mexican] 
Troops should be quartered somewhere in that neighborhood.  He also “delivered” nine 
individuals “charged with having belonged to the late faction” by the militia captain, 
albeit without proof that they “acted as principles in the late affair.”  Regarding the recent 
rebellion, Kinney concluded by stating that he believed it to be “completely suppressed,” 
but warned that “nevertheless as much confusion still exists” and recommended 
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stationing Troops “nearer the frontier than Nacogdoches” to “prevent any irruption from 
designing persons from the U.S. of the North.” He concluded his letter with the 
appropriate “Union and Mexico.”208 
 By April 1827, Bustamante reported that he was glad to hear that “complete 
tranquility” had been restored to the region and that “the honor of our Government and 
the Mexican flag is still unsullied.” He implied that the rebels had “enticed” the Cherokee 
into rebellion and suggested rewarding the loyal Indian tribes by inviting them to settle 
“wherever they may live happy” and directed Saucedo to solicit their future help in “the 
pacification of the Comanche.”209 
*** 
Despite the ready participation of nearly two hundred men armed and prepared to 
suppress the Fredonian rebellion, the historic tension between the obligation to protect 
one’s country and the obligation to protect oneself did emerge, particularly among 
settlers who were living within close proximity to certain Indian groups.   As Thomas M. 
Duke, captain of the Bay Prairie militia wrote: 
 
I was truly distressed at the contents of your letter [informing of the rebellion].  I 
feel as I believe every man in the Prairie does a sincere wish to be of every 
service in our power for the support of the government but situated as we are in 
the Prairie it is not in our power to give much aid to the government at this time.  
[T]he smoke from the Karankawas is seen from my house every day.210   
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When men had to choose between protecting their nation and protecting their property 
and families they almost always chose the latter, a testament to the strength of the very 
impulse that had attracted them to Mexico in the first place – individual and local 
autonomy.   
While Austin understood perfectly the interdependent relationship between 
individual interests and national interests, not all frontiersmen did, a fact about which 
Austin often complained bitterly. “[A]mong the ignorant part of the Americans 
independence means resistance and obstinacy right or wrong - this is particularly the case 
with frontiersmen,” he wrote, in whom “a violent course with such dispositions might 
have kindled a flame that would have destroyed them and the settlement entirely.”211  
While resistance and obstinacy did not necessarily characterize most immigrants’ 
attitudes towards their adopted nation, isolation and a privileging of one’s self-interest 
above all else often did.  This kindled flame would burn consistently for another decade, 
flaring up every time immigrants felt that the federal government threatened local 
autonomy or stood in the way of its citizens’ pursuit of their own interests.  But for now, 
Mexico rested safely under the protection of its armed male citizens.   
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CHAPTER 3 
“Each Citizen a King Like unto Adam”  
Religion and Slavery in Mexican Texas 
 1824-1832 
 
In the summer of 1831 a peculiar scene took place at Abner Kuykendall’s ranch 
about twenty miles north of San Felipe de Austin.  At least one hundred members of 
Stephen Austin’s colony were baptized and re-married as members of the Roman 
Catholic Church in accordance with their new nation’s constitutional stipulation that 
anyone seeking Mexican citizenship formally adopt the Catholic faith.  A colonist who 
helped facilitate the event later described the chaos and comedy of several hundred 
immigrants getting re-baptized and re-married as Catholics: 
 
I immediately issued orders for a general parade.  During this time, however, the 
brides and grooms, being used to married life did not feel that intense interest that 
is common for young expectants, and they had become scattered and separated, so 
that it was with much difficulty they could be paired, and a complete hurly-burly 
commenced. “ ‘Have you seen anything of my wife?’ ‘Have you seen anything of 
Jim?’ ‘I can’t find him.’ ‘Have you seen anything of Polly?”  All was hurry-
scurry, and one hour at least was spent before they were ready to fall into line; 
and even then one poor woman had to march without her husband for find him 
she could not.212 
 
 
 
He claimed he comforted the woman by telling her that if her husband “did not come in 
time, she could certainly have another.” The Mexican federal government assigned 
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Father Michael Muldoon, an Irish priest, to travel to the Anglo colonies and perform the 
necessary sacraments.  The colonists themselves, for the sake of expediency, opted for a 
mass ceremony of sorts.  The site of a Roman Catholic priest, much more the experience 
of being baptized and married by one, must have felt unfamiliar to say the least for these 
lately Protestant Anglo-Americans, born and raised in a society decidedly hostile to 
Catholicism.   Reports concur, however, that Muldoon’s “sage appearance and seemingly 
good manners caused him to be kindly received by the colonists,” as a “necessary evil 
which they could not well avoid.”  With everything arranged, the padre proceeded to 
baptize and then marry the colonists en masse, much the way his Spanish predecessors 
had done to the Indians centuries prior.  The converts then followed the ceremony with a 
“splendid barbeque” and “all the necessary exhilarating libations abundantly provided so 
as to make it a day of felicity.”213  If the new converts were at all resentful of the 
obligation, it was not evident.   
Both traditionalist and revisionist historians have tended to see early nineteenth-
century Anglo and Mexican culture as incompatible and even antagonistic due to 
differences in religion, slavery and racial ideology.   “[I]n the broadest sense the [Texas 
Revolution] resulted from a clash of cultural traditions,” writes Randolph Campbell in his 
pivotal work on early Texas, “Anglo-Americans were simply too different from 
Hispanic-Americans.”  Historians of Mexican Texas such as Arnoldo de León largely 
concur.  De León writes that Anglo settlers’ attitudes towards the Mexicans they 
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encountered “ranged from xenophobia against Catholics and Spaniards to racial prejudice 
against Indians and blacks.”  Mexicans were thus “doubly suspect as heirs to Catholicism 
and as descendants of Spaniards, Indians, and Africans.”  The southern character of most 
Americans who immigrated to Mexico, according to de León, was the primary reason for 
their hostility.   “From the Southern and frontier-oriented culture [these settlers] had 
acquired a certain repulsion for dark-skinned people” that they simply transferred to 
Mexicans, whom they believed “had descended from a tradition of paganism, depravity, 
and primitivism.”214  Historians have consequently tended to see Mexicans, not Anglos, 
as the primary assimilators.215 
But Anglo immigrants, in fact, demonstrated a remarkable willingness to adapt to 
Mexican strictures.  Furthermore, far from being the primary factor contributing to their 
antagonism, it was precisely these early immigrants’ “southerness” that attracted them to 
Mexico and facilitated cooperative and close relationships with the local Mexican 
population.    As it turns out, American southerners and Mexican northerners shared more 
in common with one another than they did with many of their respective compatriots in 
the American northeast and Mexican center.  Both groups came from intensely 
patriarchal agrarian traditions that embraced some type of racialized forced labor. This, of 
course, came at a time when Americans in the northeast were beginning to reject slavery 
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and many Mexican national leaders already had. 216  Similarly, as women in the northern 
United States were beginning to claim their own sphere of domesticity and religion, many 
southerners would have more readily identified with the traditional social order of rural 
Spanish America than that of the American northeast.   
The extent to which Anglo-American immigrants were willing to adapt to 
Mexican laws regarding religion and slavery not only demonstrates their commitment to 
becoming Mexican and appeasing their adopted country, but suggests that Anglo-
Americans and Hispanic-Mexicans were not as rigidly antagonistic as historians have 
assumed.   In fact, they were surprisingly cooperationist.  Finally, it was Anglo-
Americans, not Mexicans, who did most of the cultural adjusting in the years leading up 
to the Texas Revolution, not the other way around.  This changed, however, as Austin 
and his allies began actively recruiting slaveholders in an effort to develop and enrich the 
region.   Such individuals, most of whom arrived in Texas between 1825 and 1834 on the 
guarantee that their human property would remain secure, complicated Texas’ 
relationship with the rest of Mexico and forced Austin and his allies to more seriously 
quarry exactly what type of society they envisioned Texas becoming.   
*** 
Of all aspects of Mexican culture and constitutionalism, there was none so 
seemingly at odds with Anglo-American tradition and sensibility than established 
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religion.   America, of course, was founded on the principles of religious freedom, 
Mexico was not.217  Indeed, the Mexican Federalist Constitution, despite being one of the 
most liberal republican constitutions of its time, stipulated that all citizens declare loyalty 
to the Roman Catholic Church.  Not surprisingly, many prospective immigrants from the 
North met such policies with derision.  “No feature in any government could be more 
abhorrent to men born in the land of liberty, and matured in the arms of universal 
toleration, than religious restraint,” wrote one prospective immigrant.218 Given the 
intense American aversion to established religion, especially Catholicism, such 
reservations are not surprising.  What is surprising is that they were not expressed more 
often and that Austin himself did so little to allay them, much less bring them to the 
attention of Mexican authorities.  Despite Mexico’s strictures on religious expression, 
immigrants continued to come in droves.  Furthermore, hundreds of Anglo-American 
immigrants made the decision to convert to Catholicism as a prerequisite to becoming 
Mexican citizens, in contradiction to their norteamericano heritage.  Howard Miller, one 
of the only scholars who has written on this topic, explains that, unlike their forefathers 
who had “fled religious persecution for a land in which they hoped to find religious 
freedom,” Anglo-American immigrants to Texas left “the ‘land of liberty’ for one 
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dominated by the church most closely associated in the nineteenth-century American 
mind with religious intolerance.”219 
This truth was not lost on many prospective immigrants.  Austin fielded numerous 
letters from Americans eager to come to Mexico but concerned about its religious 
restrictions.  “The most interesting subjects to the people here appear to be that of Slavery 
and Religion” stated one immigrant from Alabama.220  Another from Kentucky inquired 
similarly, “[W]ill the settlers be allowed to worship their god agreeable to the dictates of 
their minds, etc, or will they be compelled to acknowledge the Catholic religion as the 
supreme religion of the land.”221  
Mexico was a Catholic country, but by the 1820’s the Church itself had seen 
better days.  As J. Lloyd Mecham explains, the state of the Catholic Church in Mexico 
during the apex of Mexican federalism – was “politically weak, economically poor and 
dependent on the state.”  Yet the clergy were a formidable constituency within the 
independence movement and one that had to be appeased if the new nation was going to 
enjoy any degree of legitimacy or success.  The Plan de Iguala, which had been drafted 
by both royalist and liberal forces, specifically stated that only the Roman Catholic faith 
would be tolerated, and that all the rights and privileges of the clergy would be protected.   
The Church enjoyed considerable authority and influence under the conservative Iturbide 
regime and, at the time of his abdication, possessed one-quarter of the nation’s wealth.  
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This was largely due to the decline in the number of clergy after independence.  
According to Mecham, “Independence during creole leadership only served to aggrandize 
the Church in wealth and prestige.”  Over the next three decades, its wealth would 
increase until it became the most powerful institution in the country.222 
But the Church’s impact was not the same everywhere.  It was considerably less 
palpable on the frontier where there was a notable lack of clerical presence, sometimes 
contributing to a degree of secularity that scandalized more pious observers.  Indeed, 
when Father Mariano Sosa visited Béxar in 1810, he complained of “numberless evils 
against religion, society, and good order,” reporting that “the generality of [bexarenos] 
are dissolute, without morals nor Christianity,” and a few seemed “to doubt or misbelieve 
the priests and rather follow the fatal precepts of bad men.”  He reported that “much is 
the disregard for the 6th command of God, that fathers and daughters, brothers and sisters 
are living in the most damning intercourse.” Not surprisingly, the padre cited the 
bexarenos’ poverty as the primary reason for their apparent lack of religiosity.  It 
contributed to their inability to construct “proper partitions” between the rooms of 
“parents and children,” he claimed, and to the tendency of married women to “sell their 
bodies.”223     
Yet, despite this evident lack of religiosity in certain aspects of their daily lives, 
historians insist that tejanos did demonstrate a firm commitment to their nation’s 
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established faith, overwhelmingly supporting and accepting the Church’s privileged place 
in Mexican society.  In 1821, Béxar residents joined their compatriots in swearing 
allegiance to their new nation and its Catholic faith in an elaborate ceremony in the town 
plaza.  For tejanos, as was the case with other Mexicans, being Mexican meant being 
Catholic.  But this apparent religiosity was also informed by a regional specificity that 
often meant avoiding certain obligations such as mass and payment of tithes.  However 
frontier Mexicans chose to practice their faith, they had no problem accepting it as their 
country’s established religion. When in 1825 Mexico decided to permit states to write 
their own colonization laws, rather than eliminating religious intolerance so as to attract 
more North Americans, Coahuila y Téjas specifically stated that the rights and property 
of foreigners would only be honored if they became Catholics.  By 1832, state legislators 
were demanding proof of every male immigrant’s formal adoption of Roman 
Catholicism.224   
 This, of course, was easier said than done in a region where there was almost no 
clerical presence.  One immigrant from Texas stated that he saw a Mexican priest only 
once during his time in Mexico – he was observing a cockfight.225  The striking lack of 
clergy created quite a predicament for Austin’s colonists who wished to finalize their 
citizenship by converting to Catholicism.  As one immigrant wrote, “The only legal 
marriage in the colonies was that performed by a priest of the Catholic Church – and 
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there were no priests!”226  One way that colonists dealt with this issue was to engage in 
marriage by bond, in which they registered with the alcalde and then waited to have their 
marriages formalized when a priest came to town which, in some cases, took years. But at 
least some colonists viewed priests in a spiritual as well as administrative capacity.  
Indeed, among the complaints that the Fredonian Rebels lodged against their alcaldes was 
“Endeavoring to suppress the public celebration of religion by refusing to admit a Roman 
Catholic priest to perform public worship.”227  Father Muldoon’s relationship with the 
colonists is difficult to assess, but it appears that he enjoyed a fairly cordial one to say the 
least among the older settlers such as the Kuykendalls and the Austins.  This group often 
referred to themselves as “Muldoon Catholics” expressing a conditional affiliation with 
the Church dependent mostly on their personal relationship with Muldoon.228 
 Regardless, the significance of the Church to their adopted country, namely its 
relationship to the state, and the profound way in which this differed from the church-
state relationship in the US, was not lost on many immigrants, some of whom, unable to 
make the venture to Kuykendall’s farm, were nonetheless eager to be converted.  “I have 
understood that yourself and Padre Muldoon will shortly pay a visit to the Fort Settlement 
where the neighborhood will assemble for the purpose of marriages and christening,” 
wrote one such gentleman.  He explained, however, that he would not be able to attend, 
“Owing to the extreme indisposition of myself and the helpless situation of my family.”  
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He therefore requested that Father Muldoon “call at my home on the way down.”229  To 
say the least, colonists understood and accepted their adopted country’s terms of 
citizenship, as unfamiliar as it must have felt to them, and took an active role in seeing 
that they conformed to it.  This, of course, is not to say that they were enthusiastic or 
even dutiful Catholics, but, then again, nor were many of their tejano neighbors.  
While plenty of prospective immigrants expressed apprehensions at the 
establishment clause, there is virtually no evidence of opposition once they arrived.   “I 
wish to know what the feelings of the Government are at this time upon the subject of 
religion,” wrote one such individual, “Will it wink at liberty of conscience and permit 
good and worthy inhabitants to peaceably assemble and worship their God in the way 
most agreeable to their feelings.”  Yet, immigrants rarely expressed such concerns once 
they arrived.  Perhaps those who had the strongest reservations decided not to emigrate, 
or perhaps most were content to enjoy a kind of de facto freedom of religion in which 
they were willing to conform publicly to Catholicism so long as they could practice their 
own faith in private.   For other immigrants, the concern was as much economic as it was 
spiritual.  “Will Religious toleration be allowed the Emigrants from the United States, so 
far as to be exempted from the payment of tithes to the established Church,” wrote one 
individual, “And to think and act for themselves in matters of conscience?  Provided they 
do not interfere with the Catholic Religion, and with fidelity support the laws of the land, 
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as citizens ought to?”230  They expressed a characteristic desire for autonomy when it 
came to matters of religion, just as they did for almost everything else.  Their desire to be 
left alone to worship as they wished in the privacy of their own homes was part of their 
consistent desire for personal and political autonomy generally. And just as common as 
enquiries about Mexico’s established religion, were those about its climate, geography, 
politics and economy.  All in all, immigrants demonstrated a surprising willingness to 
compromise with their adopted country on this most fundamental of Anglo-American 
principles, agreeing overwhelming to become at least nominally Catholic.  They must 
have figured that the cost was worth it, or perhaps the government guarantee of religious 
freedom was not as fundamental to antebellum Americans as many have assumed.    
Miller argues that, while demonstrating a surprising cultural flexibility, their 
decision was ultimately a pragmatic one.  Preferring religious tolerance, Austin 
strategically avoided the religion issue, for fear that it would compromise his colony’s 
relationship with Mexico, while making sure that his colonists satisfied the state’s 
stipulation that they formally proclaim the Catholic faith.231  Indeed, to the extent that 
Austin himself may have had reservations regarding Mexico’s established Church, he 
almost never expressed them and he was unequivocal about making sure that prospective 
immigrants understood that Mexican citizenship meant at least formal adoption of 
Catholicism.  “I wish the settlers to remember that the Roman catholic is the religion of 
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this nation,” he wrote, “we must all be particular on this subject and respect the Catholic 
religion with all that attention due to its sacredness and to the laws of the land.”232   
But at least some immigrants did not just tepidly accept Mexico’s religious 
strictures.   It appears that at least some actually preferred them, rejecting the notion that 
religious freedom was necessarily preferable.  It was, in fact, their experience of the 
antebellum religious environment that led them to these conclusions.  If there was one 
benefit to established religion, it was that it stifled the religious fanaticism and 
competition that plagued the North, and that Austin himself abhorred.   Austin had been 
educated at Lexington’s Transylvania University, one of the nation’s most liberal 
institutions. Indeed, it had been his father’s wish that he receive such an education “lest 
he become a bigot.”233  In a letter to his sister, Austin expressed his strong distaste for 
religious fanaticism and his own desire to make Texas a haven from it.  He wished to  
 
form a little world of our own where neither the religious, political or money-
making fanaticism, which are throwing the good people of our native country into 
all sorts of convulsions shall ever obtain admission?  Some philosopher, or 
dreamer, has called man a bundle of habits.  I think he would call the North 
American of the present day a bundle of extremes.234 
 
  
Austin’s intolerance for religious “extremes” is particularly evident in his 
descriptions of the few beligerent Methodist colonists who made their way to Texas, 
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continuing to practice their faith despite the religious strictures, and whom he accused of 
poisoning the other immigrants’ relationship with Mexico. 
 
[I[f [the Methodists] are kept out, or would remain quiet if here for a short time  
we shall succeed in getting a free toleration for all Religions, but a few fanatic and 
imprudent preachers at this time would ruin us – we must show the Gov’t  that we 
are ready to submit to their laws and willing to do so, after that we can with more 
certainty of success hope to have our privileges extended. 235  
 
 
Indeed, Austin did hope to one day see Mexico adopt the same commitment to religious 
freedom that the United States had.  But he also sought to spare his adopted country from 
the kind of religious antagonism that plagued the North, something which, according to 
him and some of his fellow immigrants, was potentially even more stifling to liberty than 
an established church.   
 But no one forged a more convincing defense of Mexico’s establishment clause 
than Ira Ingram, another early immigrant and close friend to Austin.  “The Roman 
Catholic is the religion, and the established religion of this government,” wrote Ingram to 
his uncle, a Protestant minister back in the US, “-and every settler in the colonies is 
obliged to take an oath to support the constitution of the Government which protects his 
life, liberty, and property and guarantees to him the right of the pursuit of happiness.”  
For Ingram, established religion, ironically, offered ex-patriated Americans a freedom 
that they could not enjoy in the land of their birth. “[I]t exempts us entirely from the 
shameless strife and animosities, too often the offspring of a well meant zeal for the cause 
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of true religion, and invariably the handmaid of intolerant fanaticism,” wrote Ingram in 
May of 1830, after Austin’s colony had been established for about seven years. “We hear 
no ravings and see no rompings of indecorious and indecent exhibitions under the cloak 
of religious assemblage, either by night or by day; no santuarys or pathetic by unholy 
intention and desires for we have no sanctuaries but private ones, and here all are 
perfectly free to worship as they please.” Far from limiting religious expression, Ingram 
argued that Mexican policy enhanced it by stifling the religious competition and 
animosity of which Austin complained.  “Why, then, it will be natural for you to enquire, 
have an established religion?” Ingram continued, attempting to explain the logic of 
Mexico’s founders.  “The reply to this enquiry, and it is the best of all good reasons, 
because the Mexican Nation, at the adaption of the Constitution of the general 
Governants, knew no religion but the one they adopted.”  Ingram correctly argued that 
there were vocal advocates for freedom of religion in Mexico such as existed in the US, 
“a few really intelligent and liberal minded patriots,” who were “obliged to concede 
something to the physical mass of the nation to secure their political independence.” 
Religion was their compromise - “A nation freed from the bondage of centuries, on the 
cheap condition of being permitted to retain a Name!  Where is the patriotic citizen and 
philanthropist, who does not exclaim, on hearing this, Victory!” 236  In a nation where the 
majority of its citizens were Catholic, extending religious freedom did not feel like 
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liberty.  If anything, it might be interpreted as oppression, especially if it opened the door 
to extremist expression as was occurring in the North.  Thus, in Ingram’s mind, the 
decision to make Catholicism the state religion was not so much an expression of 
disinterest in or opposition to religious freedom by the founders, but motivated by their 
desire to achieve independence and democracy for their country, given the specifics of its 
society and culture.   
 Furthermore, an establishment clause could, and did, serve to unite an otherwise 
extremely ethnically and geographically diverse nation, thereby avoiding something far 
more cataclysmic than the lack of religious freedom.  Given that Catholicism was one of 
the few things uniting Mexico’s population at this time, Ingram insisted that, in order to 
avoid civil war, the legislator must consult at least some of “the prejudices of the people.  
He must moderate, modify, remove, or subdue them.” These prejudices “were so many 
Gordian knots, which must be untied – they cannot be cut.”  While Ingram acknowledged 
a preference for religious freedom from an ideological standpoint, Mexico’s challenge 
was achieving a coherent, unified and peaceful nation.  Otherwise, an attempt “to 
overleap” might end up leading the people “captive to the temple of reform” and bring on 
“the whole apparatus of war.” 237 
Ingram wholeheartedly defended Mexico’s founders, stating that, despite his own 
ideological preference for disestablishmentarianism, he would have made the same 
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decision.  “Yes, - with all my prejudice in favor of religious freedom about me, and with 
all its imperfections clinging to it, I should have voted for the present constitution, 
persuaded that it was the best, all interests reconciled and all predilections surrendered 
that the circumstances of the world permit.”  The Mexican founders’ decision was right 
for their country, and Ingram’s declaration that he would have done the same 
demonstrates not only a strong defense of their decision but a strong personal 
identification with Mexico.  Adopting Catholicism was a small price to pay for the 
privilege of being Mexican.  “[W]e have and daily enjoy more to create our deepest 
gratitude toward the Government of our adopted county, than any other people on earth,” 
he concluded.238  
Yet, Ingram remained fully optimistic that Mexico would, sooner rather than later, 
abolish its establishment clause and embrace religious openness. “From all that I can 
learn, I have but little doubt that “Free Toleration, on the subject of religion, if it has not 
already been adopted by this Government, very soon will be.” But he cautioned against 
embracing the change too quickly, before “the mass of the nation is prepared for its 
adoption,” warning that  
there is some reason to apprehend danger from doing, or attempting to do too 
much.  Perhaps there is more danger of this than that too little will be done.  If the 
majority of the nation are unprepared for so great a change, it may produce a 
violent reaction.  This might be followed by the loss of everything.  But if the 
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mass of the nation is in reality favorable to the change, no great, or general, 
inconvenience can arise.239  
 
If Mexico was going to achieve its democratic promise it had to reflect the wishes of its 
people, rather than imposing change on them.  Perhaps above all, Ingram’s words 
demonstrate a profound cultural and political relativism, crediting Mexico’s leaders for 
their wisdom and prudence: “The wise statesman whilst he is diffusing light, will 
conform his measures to the prejudices, the customs, and even to the whims of the nation, 
whose happiness is committed to his keeping.”  Good leaders, according to Ingram, 
“must prepare innovation at a distance that it may not appear innovation.”  Indeed, such 
accommodation did not negate the possibility of future change, quite the opposite.  “If 
this has been done in Mexico then toleration will succeed,” Ingram assured, “because it 
will receive the popular sanction.  But if it has not, blood will again flow, to atone for the 
rash and premature reform.”240  Ingram remained ever conscious of the challenges that 
Mexican lawmakers faced in uniting such a diverse nation, and insisted that Mexico’s 
unique character should dictate its political course.   His logic is not only surprising for 
an American of his time in its virulent defense of one established faith, but it also 
demonstrates a profound sensitivity to Mexico’s unique historical context, and a nuanced 
understanding of what democracy meant or could mean to different nations and peoples.  
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This was an attitude profoundly different from the unrelenting commitment to Anglo 
notions of freedom and democracy that some of his contemporaries expressed. 
Ingram’s sentiments are nothing short of remarkable, especially considering that 
they came at the very moment when the separation between church and state was 
becoming solidified in the United States of the North.  Indeed, it had been fears of 
Catholic authority and intrusion that prompted many Protestant Americans to embrace 
separation as a respectable American principle and uniquely American right.  This no less 
was a time when Protestant leaders especially began to combine their long-standing 
prejudice toward Catholics with modern fears of ecclesiastical authority and its 
imposition on personal and individual freedom.  Catholicism became linked in the 
nineteenth-century Protestant American mind with all that was un-American.   Most 
specifically, it was the Church’s ability to stifle religious dissent that Americans most 
loathed - something which, by the 1830’s, it did with only a fraction of its former 
vigor.241 But Ingram’s and Austin’s words present a surprising exception to this hostility, 
and what’s more, an acceptance of a system that they had been trained to abhor.  Indeed, 
what their words seem to suggest is that the existence of an established Catholic Church 
in Mexico was precisely what ensured liberty – whether religious or otherwise.   
 Of course, as Ingram observed, Mexican leaders were by no means uniformly 
opposed to disestablishmentarianism, and in fact many preferred religious tolerance.   
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One such individual was Lorenzo de Zavala, the Yucatán native who served as Vice 
President of Mexico under the liberal Vicente Guerrero regime, which replaced Iturbide 
in 1824.   One of the clergy’s most hostile critics, Zavala’s attacks had less to do with any 
commitment to religious or spiritual freedom than with discontent over the clergy’s 
economic domination.   Educated in Europe, Zavala travelled extensively throughout the 
United States of the North.  He proved to be a great admirer of that country’s political 
system, particularly republicanism, and not least of all its commitment to religious 
liberty.  Speaking of American Protestant ceremonies, he wrote, “Compare this religious 
festival to those that we have in the [Mexican] republic, which are more or less like those 
of Spain and all of Italy, an hour or two in the temple, where the people take very little 
part in the religious feelings that should occupy them in those circumstances.”  Catholic 
worship, with its formalized Latin mass, recited “without coherence, without conscience, 
and without divine comfort” lost “all its effect because of the absolute lack of 
communication between the priesthood and the people.”  Zavala particularly disapproved 
of the way the Church both emulated Europe and seemed to perpetuate its elitism.  But he 
saved his most vitriolic criticism for the Church’s evident economic exploitation of the 
Mexican people,  
 
Ah! The pen falls from the hand in order not to expose the civilized world a hoard 
of idolaters who come to deliver into the hands of lazy friars the fruits of their 
year’s work to enrich them, while they, their women and children have no 
clothing, not even a bed.  And the Spaniards, our fathers, have dared call this 
religion!!!   
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Zavala’s criticisms were characteristic of his federalist allies, whose attraction to 
American religious freedom was primarily based on its insurance of political freedom and 
economic liberty.  “The American people are most religious, even to the extent of being 
fanatic in some places and congregations,” he agreed with Austin, “but worship is 
entirely in the hands of the people.  Neither the general government nor that of the states 
intervenes in any manner.”  But it was the democratic spirit of religion that he seemed to 
admire most, “They name their ministers, support them, and exercise over them the 
authority that a company would have that pays their workers.”  In the Catholic system, 
however, “bishops are appointed by the Pope, and the people receive these or not as they 
please.  The Episcopaleans, when they have a vacancy, meet to name their prelates.  For 
Zavala, the way the Church hierarchy functioned and its relationship to the Mexican 
people seemed to contradict the very democracy that he wanted for Mexico.  Thus, he, 
like most Mexican liberals, was less concerned with the limits that an established church 
placed on spiritual freedom - he acknowledged the fanaticism that plagued the United 
States – than he was with the effect it had on the economic and democratic welfare of the 
country. 242    
 In this regard, Zavala shared much in common with men like Austin and Ingram 
with whom he would eventually become quite close - a desire to see the Catholic Church 
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enjoy a circumscribed privilege.  They did not object to it being the only legitimate faith 
in Mexico, so long as it did not interfere with their economic, political and spiritual 
liberties.  It was less the existence of an established religion that these men objected to, as 
it was its impact on the freedoms of Mexico’s people and the ways in which the church’s 
relationship with the state lent itself to the very kind of state privilege that Austin 
criticized among economic elites in the North.  They found their utopia in Texas where 
Catholicism existed as the only publicly recognized faith, but the church’s power itself 
remained severely limited and often completely absent.  This removed existence 
guaranteed the spiritual freedom these men craved while avoiding the political and 
economic injustice they despised. 
As much as Americans like Austin and Ingram accepted and even admired 
Mexico’s religious laws, they remained ultimate defenders of the principle of religious 
freedom.   Austin himself was quick to note the deleterious impact of established religion 
when he travelled to Mexico City, where he suspected the confederate system would be 
opposed “by those miserable drones [who] are the enemies of liberty, of human happiness 
and of the human race.”  Of the Mexicans, he had to admit, “there never was a people so 
dreadfully priest ridden and enslaved by superstition and fanaticism as the great part of 
this nation.”  Yet, like Zavala, his criticism was of the clergy’s corruption more than 
anything - “[They] literally suck the blood of the unfortunate people.”  But, like his friend 
Ingram, he remained optimistic, “will the great god of justice and of truth, will the lights 
of the age, permit such horrible abuses to exist much longer? No – Mexico has recovered 
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her civil liberty - she will soon assume her rights in full, and bursting the chains of 
superstition declare that man has a right to think for himself.”243   
As much as he resented the Catholic and centralist impulses most evident in 
Mexico City, Austin was certain that Mexicans would one day see the light - that the 
inherent superiority of a confederate, secular system of government would triumph and, 
when it did, Texas would be its inspiration.  “The Government is yet unsettled though 
there is now no doubt of its being a federal republic” he wrote,  and “the Roman Catholic 
is the established religion to the absolute exclusion of all others and will so continue for a 
few years, but the natural operation of a Republic will soon change that system.”  But 
until Mexico did embrace religious toleration, Austin felt it his responsibility to see that 
the immigrants under his authority accepted the religious dictates of their adopted 
country.  “[P]rivate worship will never be enquired into, but no public preaching or 
exhorting will on any account be permitted, and I should feel myself compelled to silence 
any preacher or exhorter who would attempt it within my jurisdiction.” 244 
*** 
Historians have disagreed widely over slavery’s place in early Texan society, 
economy and politics.  While Eugene Barker and Lester G. Bugbee have argued that 
slavery was peripheral to the establishment of Texas and that men like Austin only 
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tenuously supported it,245 more recent studies insist that it was as entrenched in Texas as 
it was in any other part of the antebellum South.  Pointing out that on the eve of the Civil 
War the proportion of slaves in Texas was the same as that in Virginia, Randolph P. 
Campbell argues that slavery was as strongly established in “the newest slave state, as it 
was in the oldest slave state in the Union.”246  Others have gone even further to argue that 
slavery was the main impetus for Anglo-American immigration to Texas and its eventual 
secession from Mexico. One such scholar writes that slave-based agriculture “served as 
the foundation for the exodus of Americans into Mexican territory during the 1820s and 
1830s.”247  But such an observation overlooks the complex and winding course that 
slavery took in Texas, especially during the Mexican period.   
Striving for a more nuanced understanding of slavery’s place in Texas history,  
Sean Kelley argues that Texas constituted a “borderland plantations society” in which 
slavery existed in a “statutorily grey area” whereby it was “perpetually contested” and 
“punctuated by clashes, negotiations, and tactical advances and retreats on each side.”  
Kelley points out that, while freedom was technically more attainable for Texas slaves 
than it was for those in the North, the harsh, unfamiliar and even violent environment that 
they encountered rendered, what he calls, a “borderlands paternalism,” whereby slaves 
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and masters developed a codependent relationship and slaves opted to stay with their 
masters rather than escape into the harsh unknown. 248   
While environmental and political stresses no doubt complicated the traditional 
master-slave relationship, I would argue that it also served more as a nexus of 
compatibility, rather than antagonism, between Anglo southern immigrants and their 
adopted country.  The nature and function of chattel slavery certainly changed, but it was 
also confirmed by Mexicans themselves. It is true that the republic formally outlawed 
slavery upon its founding in accordance with a long antislavery tradition dating at least as 
far back as Bartolomé de las Casas.  Yet, it is equally important to note that many 
Mexicans, especially those on the frontier, not only came from slaveholding families 
themselves, but supported and lobbied on behalf of Texas slaveholders, believing as they 
did, that slavery offered the best opportunity for Texas to thrive economically. 
Meanwhile, many Anglo-American immigrants, especially Austin and his earlier cohort, 
demonstrated a profound willingness to work within the Mexican legal system, whether 
to gain slavery’s admission or to abandon it in favor of Mexican forms of compulsive 
labor, namely debt peonage.   Indeed, even when it came to this most southern of 
institutions, many Anglo-American immigrants were willing to adapt to Mexican law and 
tradition.  This meant that, ultimately, it was slaves themselves who would reveal the 
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limits of this compromise and the limits of Anglo immigrants’ willingness to conform to 
the strictures of their adopted nation. 
 
Slavery, in fact, had deep roots on the frontier where New Spain permitted and 
protected the enslavement of people of Indian and African descent beginning in the early 
sixteenth century.   On the farthest margins of the empire, Indian and African slavery 
existed as a form of compensation for those who agreed to settle there and in a form quite 
similar to the kind of chattel slavery found in the American South.  As Ramón Gutiérrez 
explains, the ownership of Indian slaves determined a man’s honor-status and, by the 
nineteenth-century, race became the dominant way of defining social status in the north, 
creating a structure similar to that of the antebellum South: “[M]uch of what it meant to 
be honorable [in nineteenth-century northern New Spain] was a projection of what it 
meant to be a free, landholding citizen of white legitimate ancestry, and by contrast what 
it meant not be a slave, an outcast, or an Indian.”249 Slavery in New Spain, as in the 
American South, was understood and justified in terms of a man’s exclusive right to 
control his dependents.   Eighteenth century laws placed children and servants alike under 
the complete control of their fathers or masters as demonstrated by a 1783 Nacogdoches 
law that prohibited children from renouncing or blaspheming their parents, and placed 
servants “under the economic and civil authority of their masters whom they must respect 
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as they would their parents,” prohibiting them from “leaving or seeking employ from 
another” until their terms of service were up.250    Thus Mexicans were used to a system 
that placed servants under the same kind of absolute submission that children were 
expected to demonstrate toward their parents.  While this was no southern-style chattel 
slavery, to say that northern Mexicans were unfamiliar with compulsive labor would be 
incorrect. 
The patriarchal household gained pre-eminence in 1776 with the Caroline 
Pragmatic, which deprived the Church of its formerly exclusive rights over marriage, 
effectively expanding parental control so that “the patriarchal household became the 
natural and analogical symbol of good government. As a father exercised his authority 
and domination within the household over wife, children, servants, and retainers, so the 
king viewed the state as his private domain.”  The Church and state helped maintain 
patriarchy by supporting this.251   As one historian explains, religious authority within the 
family was a cornerstone of patriarchal control.  Men were often compared to monarchs 
and rulers, and women to subjects.  Furthermore, the latters’ perceived sexual 
vulnerability, something which reflected on men’s honor, dictated that women be 
cloistered within the home.252 The Mexican patriarch was one who “completely 
controlled his wife’s legal acts, property and person, being able to claim her domestic 
services, obedience and sexual fidelity (although the double standard granted him sexual 
                                                          
250 “Criminal Code, Nacogdoches, 1783,” Bexar Archives, University of Texas at Austin. 
251 Gutièrrez, 315-327, quote p. 319. 
252 Richard Griswold del Castillo, La Familia: Chicano Families in the Urban Southwest 1848 to the 
Present, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 26-29; Gutièrrez, 46. 
145 
 
 
 
freedom); he made all important decisions to enforce his will upon its members using 
whatever means he deemed necessary.” 
  Given the preeminence of patriarchy in northern Mexico, it made sense that filial 
and kinship terms used to refer to slaves derived from “authority relationships within the 
household, particularly a father’s right to rule over wife, family, and thralls.”  Indeed, 
Mexican slaveholders, just like their southern counterparts, “often characterized relations 
with slaves as governed by the same rules that governed family” and “A patriarch’s 
natural law authority over his family gave him the right to correct and punish an erring 
wife, child or slave.” 253  
While the urban North was beginning to embrace the notion of separate spheres 
for men and women, the mainly agrarian societies of the American South and Mexico 
continued to see the male-headed household as the central organizing component of 
society.  Women as well as children, slaves and servants where they existed, remained 
firmly under the control of the male household head.  This system acted as an equalizing 
force in the Old South by allowing all white property-owning men the same legal 
protection and privilege.  “Unlike the newly privatized middle-class homes of the urban 
northeast, from which so-called ‘productive’ labor had been largely expelled by the 
1850’s,” writes Stephanie McCurry, “yeoman households were the locus of production as 
well as of reproduction and consumption.”  Anglo Southern settlers encountered and 
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perpetuated this social order in their new home.254  As Lorenzo de Zavala described it, 
Texas was a place where “Each citizen is a king like unto Adam.”255 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that Anglo colonists, just like their tejano 
neighbors, used the language of filial relationship to justify their ownership of other 
human beings. “Those inhabitants respectfully represent to your sovereignty that the 
Slaves introduced into this establishment were not brought here for the purpose of Trade 
or speculation,” Austin wrote in his 1824 Petition Concerning Slavery, “neither are they 
Africans but are the family servants of the emigrants and raised by them as such from 
their infancy.”256   Austin and the other colonists hoped that, like its imperial predecessor, 
the Republic of Mexico would allow Anglo settlers to immigrate with their slaves despite 
the fact that its founders opposed the institution in principle. 
Mexican independence raised questions for slavery primarily because so many 
revolutionaries voiced strong philosophical oppositions to it.  Regardless, a small number 
of modest slaveholders were among the early immigrants to Texas.  Josiah H. Bell 
brought three slaves in addition to his wife and two sons, and Jared E. Groce brought 
ninety bondsmen, allowing him to establish a cotton plantation on the Brazos River, the 
produce of which he sold to customers in the Mexican interior.  On May 13, 1822, Austin 
issued the first of a number of memorials to the Mexican Constituent Congress in which 
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he expressed his and other colonists’ desire to bring their slaves with them and receive 
land for them.  Mexican lawmakers responded by attempting to strike a compromise 
between their desire to develop their northern frontier and their own philosophical 
opposition to slavery. The result of their efforts was Article 30 of the Imperial 
Colonization law which allowed emigrants to bring their human property with them, but 
strictly forbade the purchase or sale of slaves within the empire and stipulated that any 
children of slaves born in Mexico had to be freed when they turned fourteen years old.257     
Austin was pleased with the limited way in which slavery was permitted in Texas and 
was able to use such allowances to reassure prospective colonists – especially those 
moderately wealthy southern agrarians that he most hoped to attract, even if he had to 
censure some of the information he gave them.  “I found it necessary to be extremely 
cautious in writing about your grant or the guarantees you could give settlers as to slavery 
laws, etc. –,” wrote Joseph Hawkins, “My prudence was well timed – If things are as you 
desire, we can now secure a population of a different cast[,] one which would prosper in 
any Country.”258    But Austin knew that such legislation was only a temporary comfort 
and that few slaveholders, no matter how appealing Mexico was, would feel confident 
leaving a country where their right to human property was specifically protected for one 
where it was so precarious.   Austin set to work trying to negotiate for more favorable 
legislation.  “The principle difficulty is slavery,” he wrote to one prospective immigrant, 
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“this they will not admit.”  But Austin hoped to convince the legislature to amend it “so 
as to make them slaves for life and their children free at 21 year.”259  
Things got more complicated with the establishment of the Mexican Republic and 
Federal Executive’s immediate decision to emancipate all slaves.   Austin and his 
colonists reacted by issuing a swift petition reminding the Executive that the slaves 
introduced “were intended to aid in clearing the land and establishing their farms which 
these Colonists could not have affected without them,” given the shortage of labor on the 
frontier.  They insisted that slaves had been brought there “As a necessary part of the 
Capital required by the desert state of the Country to establish their farms and Ranches.” 
Furthermore, they reminded Mexican leaders that many of their “friends and Relations” 
who had visited the country earlier to select land and build their homes were “now on the 
road bringing their slaves with them relying on the Colonization law under which 
Austin’s establishment is formed.  They would “be totally and forever ruined if on their 
arrival here after so much fatigue labor and expense in removing they are to lose their 
slaves.”  They concluded their petition by pleading “that your sovereignty may take their 
Case into Consideration and declare that the slaves and their descendants of the 300 
families who emigrate to the Establishment formed by the Empresario Stephen F Austin 
in this province shall be slaves for Life.”260       
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In their efforts to gain exemption from the federal decree, Austin and other Anglo 
colonists solicited the aid of their tejano neighbors.  Indeed, not a few tejanos owned 
slaves themselves and aggressively supported and assisted Anglo efforts to formally 
legalize the institution in Texas.   Erasmo and Juan Seguín, two of the most noted and 
powerful bexarenos, did not only own slaves, but saw in slaveholding colonists an 
unprecedented opportunity for Texas to escape the poverty and destitution that had 
plagued it since the Mexican War of Independence.  At one point, Seguín even traveled 
to New Orleans to learn about the cotton trade so that he might establish his own in 
Texas.  He, like Austin, was a firm believer in the capacity for a southern style economy, 
replete with chattel slavery, to bring prosperity to Texas.  If permitted in Texas, Seguín 
believed, slavery would attract men of means who could make the region prosper as it 
never had before.261  
There is evidence, specifically from James Austin’s correspondences during his stay 
in San Antonio, that Seguín was not alone among bexarenos in his support of slavery.   “I 
have had much conversation with Saucedo and others on this subject,” wrote James to his 
older brother in reference to the slavery question, “I see no reason why you should 
apprehend the abolition of the Slaves of the 300 families; the thing is decided with regard 
to that point – those slaves are guaranteed to the settlers by the Law of Colonization and 
they cannot be deprived of them – this is the opinion that prevails in this place.”  The 
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Baron de Bastrop, who had helped Austin convince Mexican authorities to grant him a 
colonization contract and Texas’ sole representative in the state legislature, was one of 
the immigrants’ most strident supporters when it came to slavery.  “If a favorable slave 
law is passed it will be attributed in a great measure to the unremitted exertions of the 
Baron” wrote James.262  In another letter he instructed his brother to “Try and keep the 
slaveholders from going until they hear the result of the slave question, - Tell them they 
are safe yet,” he assured him, “- and there is but little doubt but part of the laws will be 
favorable” for “The Ayuntamiento of this place have made as Warm a Representation in 
favor of it as you have.”263  Ultimately, however, everyone knew that the question 
depended on the decision of the Mexican federal government which stood firmly 
committed to abolitionism.264 
What the Constituent Congress ultimately decreed was not general emancipation 
of all slaves, but rather a prohibition of all “Commerce and traffic in slaves proceeding 
from any country and under any flag whatsoever.”  American slaveholders chose to 
interpret this language to mean that they could introduce slaves to Mexico, they just 
could not sell or purchase them as merchandise. For the time being, slavery was safe in 
Texas, or so it seemed.265 
But Mexico’s generally anti-slavery stance made it difficult for Austin to recruit 
the very class of people that he most wanted.  “Nothing appears at present, to prevent a 
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portion of our wealthy planters from emigrating immediately to the province of Texas but 
the uncertainty now prevailing with regard to the subject of slavery,” wrote James H. 
Phelps on January 16th 1825.  He specifically referred to rumors that Mexico forbade the 
introduction of “negro property” and that it subjected “the persons so offending to the 
severest penalties, and also an immediate emancipation of thos[e] slaves now belonging 
to the citizens of the province of Texas.”  Phelps asserted that “If this be a fact, it will 
check the tide of emigrating spirits at once: and indeed it has had its influence already.”  
Phelps concluded by emphasizing the need to check the circulation of such 
misinformation as “That portion of the Mexican Republick is becoming every day more 
and more an object of interest with this portion of the United States,” 266 meaning the 
slave South.  Austin and others had to effectively dissuade prospective immigrants of 
Mexico’s commitment to anti-slavery.   Regardless of their unflagging interest in Mexico, 
many could not convince themselves to immigrate to a country that did not permit them 
to keep their human property.  
On March 31, 1828, Austin came up with a way to get around Mexico’s anti-
slavery laws by requesting that slaves be admitted under the country’s current system of 
debt peonage.  It was approved two months later.  Under this new system, slaveowners 
had to take their slaves before a notary public in the United States and draw up a contract 
stipulating that each bondsman wished to accompany his master to Texas.  Although 
technically not enslaved once he entered Mexico, he owed his master for his value plus 
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the cost of travel which he would theoretically pay for with his own labor.  Within a few 
years, slaveowners began employing indenture contracts to bring in bondsmen.  
Campbell argues that such contracts allowed slaveowners to keep their slaves “as firmly 
in servitude as if they had never left the United States.” For several years debt peonage 
served as the answer to slaveholders’ concerns.267 
Indeed, indentured servitude offered an appealing way to avoid the slavery issue 
altogether and comforted many potential immigrants. “The intelligence I immediately 
made public, and am induced to believe it will be of great service to this Country,” wrote 
a fellow colonist and close associate of Austin’s in reference to the generous state law, “It 
has made a material change in the feelings of many valuable Emigrants.”268 
But in truth, indentured servitude was not as secure as chattel slavery since it 
technically permitted slaves to exercise their legal power.   “The intent to have slaves is 
even more disguised under the manner in which the [Mexican] government guarantees 
the contracts the colonists might have in North America with salaried workers,” observed 
General Manuel Mier y Téran in his 1828 tour of Texas. A close reading of such 
contracts reveals that they were in fact designed to replicate slavery, typically binding 
servants for ninety-nine years of service such as the contract between D. Sancifer and 
“Clarisa a Girl of Color.”  It declared the two “bound to each other” for ninety-nine years 
“if she shall so long live, during said time she obliges herself to serve his successors or 
                                                          
267 Campbell, 23. 
268 Frost Thorn to SFA, 22 July 1828, AP, Vol. II, 74-5.   
153 
 
 
 
assigns as a good, honorable, diligent, and faithful servant . . . hereby denouncing and 
disclaiming all her rights.”  Clarisa’s owner was bound to provide her “with good and 
sufficient meals, board, and lodging and medicine and attention in case of sickness,” and 
if she became disabled, “to support her in a “decent and comfortable manner.”   While 
some contracts stipulated a mutual obligation between owner and servants, others 
portended an instructional purpose.  One such contract bound nine young men of color, 
all of them under twenty years old, to James Morgan “to learn the art and mystery of 
farming and planting,” and seven women “to learn the art and mystery of housekeeping 
and a seamstress.”269 
Whatever their specific terms, servitude contracts, by their very nature were 
riddled with loopholes.   Terán reported that some servants, realizing “that their labor was 
worth more,” sought to have their contracts dissolved upon arrival in Texas.  According 
to him, Mexican courts often sided with the petitioners in such cases, to the alarm and no 
doubt grave disappointment of their masters.270  There are actually only a few cases of 
Mexican courts overturning such contracts, but that was enough to prompt Anglo 
slaveholders to question how safe their property rights were in their adopted country.271  
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In addition, Mexico’s increasingly aggressive anti-slavery federal legislation continued to 
deter prospective immigrants who realized that in the right hands, it could have 
detrimental effects on their right to human property. 
Problems reached a head in the Fall of 1829 when federalist president Vicente 
Guerrero issued a blanket emancipation decree.   Ramón Músquiz, the political chief of 
San Antonio and a pro-slavery advocate, withheld publication of the decree and instead 
wrote a letter to Governor Viesca asking that he appeal for Texas’ exemption.  Músquiz 
pointed out that such a law was unconstitutional because it violated Texan slaveholders’ 
property rights.  Besides, they could not help develop the region “without the aid of the 
robust and indefatigable arms of that race of the human species which is called negroes, 
and who, to their misfortune, suffer slavery.”  Finally, Músquiz argued that to suddenly 
liberate those now in bondage would present a serious threat to public order.  Governor 
Viesca agreed and issued a formal request to President Guerrero for Texas’ exemption, 
something he argued he would have done even without Músquiz’s request because of 
Texas’ special need for slaves.  In addition to this concern, Viesca worried about the 
implication of such a decree on the behavior of slaveowning Texans, since strong feelings 
result when men are “in danger of being ruined, as would happen to many of them whose 
fortune consists entirely of slaves.”272 
Viesca’s fear was warranted.  Before he could obtain the exemption, the decree 
somehow made its way into the hands of the alcalde of Nacogdoches and caused near 
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panic.  But Austin once again counseled calm and insisted that if Músquiz and Viesca 
failed in their efforts, the people should employ the channels of the Mexican political 
system, appealing to their constitutional rights.  “The constitution must be both our 
shield, and our arms, under it, and with it we must constitutionally defend ourselves and 
our property,” he wrote.273  Indeed, Austin consistently expressed full confidence in the 
ability of the Mexican legal system to protect the seemingly unique interests of American 
colonists.  
In the meantime, however, Anglo slaveholders and their tejano allies scrambled to 
prevent news of the decree from circulating, lest it create confusion and concern.  Hence, 
Músquiz’s immediate advice was to suppress publication of the decree “because it may 
alter the tranquility of this population” if they knew that “the President of the Republic 
has just abolished slavery in the whole Nation.”274  Particularly in light of events such as 
the Fredonian Rebellion, it is understandable why Texan leaders would want to prevent 
news of this from spreading to the Anglo slaveholder population. 
As colonists attempted to censure the news and keep calm in the colony, tejano 
leaders set to work trying to convince federal leaders of the destructive potential of their 
recent declaration and attempted to gain exemption from it.  Músquiz agreed with Austin 
regarding the unconstitutionality of the decree and that “it is beyond the extraordinary 
faculties laid out in the Law of the 25th of August, and is most offensive to the 
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sovereignty of the states.”275 Other tejanos agreed.   “From the moment that the Géfe 
político of this place told me about the decree abolishing slavery,” Jose Antonio Padilla 
wrote, “I gave my opinion with the strength and good faith that it merited; that there 
should be no obedience nor compliance, because it is unconstitutional; and directly 
attacks the right of property.”  Padilla gave his word that he would “oppose with all my 
strength the publication and compliance of a law so tyrannical, cruel, illegal and 
monstrous.”276 
Meanwhile, Gov. Viesca addressed a lengthy and formal letter to the Minister of 
Relations reminding him of Texas’ exceptional circumstances and warning him in no 
uncertain terms that such a decree, if put into effect, would surely ruin the state of 
Coahuila y Téjas.  While expressing admiration for the desire to liberate all men from a 
state of bondage, he asked “what is the philanthropy of liberating men whose condition 
will be reduced to one even more obscure and barbaric.”  Even “the most civilized 
nations on the planet have not been able to destroy the institution of slavery.”277 
The news they anticipated arrived not a day too soon.  Terán replied in late 
December, clarifying that Téjas y Coahuila was in fact exempt from said decree “so long 
as there is no more introduction of slaves.”278 Almost as quickly as panic had set in, it 
was allayed.  Austin received a warm congratulations from Músquiz “for this success of 
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such importance for this department particularly and for your colony that was in eminent 
danger of being ruined.”279  
Relieved at the news himself, Austin made haste to express his gratitude to the 
one man whose efforts he did not doubt had caused Texas’ exemption.  “I do not have 
words to express my recognition and gratitude to you for this act to such great importance 
to Texas and for your efforts in making it known,” he wrote to Terán, assuring him that 
its enforcement would have resulted “in the ruination of many people, the loss of 
confidence in the government and the abandonment of this particular part of the republic 
to the barbarians.” Austin concluded his letter with a characteristic guarantee of Texans’ 
faith in their adopted country.  He assured him that “never was there the least threat to 
good order in this colony concerning the September 15 decree because these inhabitants 
rested with the justice and good faith of the government that they have adopted.” He 
insisted that “it never crossed their minds that it was the idea of the government to 
deprive them of any part of their property.”280   
The damage had been done, however, when it came to prospective immigrants.  
Mexico’s inconsistent policies and colonial leaders’ inability to prevent such news from 
reaching Anglo colonists or potential colonists in the North was already having 
deleterious effects on the inflow of slaveholding immigrants.  “[W]e have been led into 
an error by a proclamation of the Mexican president as to the liberation of slaves,” wrote 
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Richard Ellis, a close associate of Austin’s tasked with recruiting colonists. “Perhaps he 
only meant bound servants such as has been by the civil law for 200 years, but you know 
such is the sensitive feelings of the slaveholders on that subject, that the least agitation 
will deter them from emigration, and I really begin to believe with you that it is shortly to 
be a great evil among us.” 281  
The damage had been done when it came to slaves as well.  The federal decree 
not only emboldened slaves by signaling that Mexican authorities supported abolition, it 
provided them with a critical loophole with which to achieve their freedom.  Records 
indicate that by 1830, slaves knew that entering Mexico changed their legal status and at 
least a few of them attempted to take advantage of Mexico’s complicated and ever 
changing legislation to secure their freedom.  Tomás Maque, for example, petitioned on 
behalf of himself and several other slaves, requesting that they be set free because they 
surpassed the maximum age (fifty years) that Mexican law permitted one to be enslaved.  
Evidently having failed, Maque appealed to Mexican courts again two years later in an 
attempt to obtain his freedom. He claimed that his former owner was deceased and, being 
that he was on Mexican soil, this made him a free man.  The courts agreed on the grounds 
that “his master Elias Loyd is dead and died in the prison in Rapid, Louisiana one of the 
Northern states.”   The alcalde of Béxar thus declared Macque “totally free,” that “he 
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may circulate freely outside of the slavery in which he was held” and “enjoy the rights of 
freedom that the State Constitution provides for all Mexicans.”282 
A similar case occurred in April of that same year when Peter, a former slave 
from Austin’s colony escaped to San Antonio with his son in search of freedom.  Peter 
and his son Tom appealed to the alcalde of San Antonio, demanding their “protection” 
and “claiming the laws that favor them.”  According to the alcalde, Peter “demanded that 
he and his son be declared free and that the declaration of freedom be extended to include 
the rest of his family that was still held by his owner.”  The fact that slaves were aware of 
Mexico’s tenuous support of slavery and figured that they could appeal to Mexican 
federal law to obtain their freedom, no matter what the circumstances, must have been 
extremely disconcerting to Texan slaveholders.283   
But what was at least as disconcerting to Mexican authorities was the way in 
which Peter’s master reacted by entering San Antonio and kidnapping the men before the 
courts could determine their status. The offense evidently enraged Músquiz who, despite 
his own support for slavery and personal experience growing up in a household with 
slaves, was incensed at the settlers’ disregard for Mexican authority.  “[S]candalized by 
the audacity with which [B]rown and his criminal companions have violated the law, 
have scoffed at the enforcing authorities, and have grossly sneered at public punishment,” 
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he ordered the immediate pursuit and arrest of the kidnappers.284 Furthermore, Músquiz 
argued that  
 
The crime committed by [Henry] Brown and his accomplice is of such a nature 
and scope that it tramples over the laws of a hospitable country that has received 
them in her bosom regarding them as adoptive sons, and they return the favour by 
making a mockery out of the authorities charged with preserving the security of 
this town and of the entire department.285 
 
  
 Although instances like these were extremely rare, they did illuminate the tension that 
emerged between some immigrants’ status as slaveholders and their Mexican citizenship.    
Perhaps due to this very tension, Austin himself expressed reservations about 
slavery even as he worked tirelessly to guarantee its safe presence in Texas.  His primary 
concern, however, had to do with what slavery might mean for the racial future of the 
region.  “The idea of seeing such a country as this overrun by a slave population almost 
makes me weep –,” he wrote to Richard Ellis, expressing an opposition that had more to 
do with slavery’s deleterious effects on whites.  “It is in vain to tell a North American 
that the white population will be destroyed some fifty or eighty years hence by the 
negroes, and that his daughters will be violated and butchered by them.”   In this regard, 
Austin’s opposition to the institution was far more Jeffersonian than abolitionist.  He 
acknowledged the pragmatic necessity of slavery to establishing the colony.  “[I]n the 
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beginning of this settlement I was compelled to hold out the idea that slavery would be 
tolerated, and I succeeded in getting it tolerated for a while by the Gov’t.”  Yet, he 
clarified that he had done so “to get started for otherwise it would have been next to 
impossible to have started at all.”286  But Austin ultimately feared the consequences that 
it would render, especially as Mexico and its laws emboldened Texan slaves.   
 Austin, however, primarily embraced Mexico’s anti-slavery policy because of 
what it meant for the political future of Texas, which he hoped to maintain as untouched 
by federal authority as possible – especially that of the United States of the North.  
“Slavery is now most positively prohibited by our Constitution and by a number of laws, 
and I do hope it may always be so.”  If slavery is admitted, he argued, “Texas will 
become what all slave countries are and of necessity must be[,] destitute of physical force 
and dependent on some other power even for the preservation of its internal tranquility.”  
Ultimately, Austin knew that admitting slavery would drag it ever closer to the United 
States of the North, where it was, for the time being, constitutionally protected.  Slavery, 
as Austin well knew, could not survive under state exemption alone, it had to have a large 
and strong federal structure to support it, which simply did not exist in Mexico and most 
likely never would.  While slavery would no doubt make Texas economically productive 
and independent within Mexico, he feared that it would draw it ever closer to the political 
and cultural embrace of the North. 
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Things worsened for the prospects of both slavery and immigration in the spring 
of 1830, when the liberal Guerrero regime was overthrown by conservative centrist 
Anastacio Bustamante.  Concerned that the growth of slavery in the north was drawing 
the region closer to the United States, one of Bustamante’s first acts was issuing a decree 
which prohibited further immigration from the United States all together.  Conceding that 
emancipation would not help national security, the decree allowed settlers to keep their 
slaves in bondage but insisted on strict enforcement of rules forbidding their importation.  
Meanwhile, immigrants continued to sprinkle in, some of them bringing slaves with 
them, thereby violating the law twice.287  
 Yet Austin continued to see Texas’ promise resting with Mexico, not the US.  He 
thus continued to insist that all slaves were technically free once they entered Mexico.  In 
a separate letter to Ellis, he wrote, “I am of the opinion that Texas will never become a 
Slave state or country.  I will be candid with you on this point, and say that I hope it 
never may.” While Austin admitted his initial advocacy of slavery, he made clear that he 
looked forward to the day when it was no longer necessary in Texas.  “In the 
commencement of this settlement I was in favour of the limited admission of slaves,” he 
wrote, “My reasons were, the difficulty of procuring hands in the beginning for the 
necessary purposes of farming, and the necessary of holding out inducements that slaves 
might be brought, in order to give the settlement a start, and to draw emigration.”  
However, he insisted that “The reasons for a partial toleration of this evil, have now 
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ceased, and the true prosperity and happiness of Texas require; that an everlasting bar 
should now be interposed [on] the further introduction of slaves.”288 Indeed, as late as 
June of 1830, Austin was still insisting that Texas resist becoming a slave state, 
remaining in accordance with Mexican federal policy.  “Article 13 of the constitution has 
determined the question regarding slaves and there is no doubt that we neither can nor 
should introduce a slave class,” he wrote, although they were permitted to bring in 
“domestic servants and some field workers.”  Those that they introduced, would 
eventually gain emancipation in conformance with the article, he explained.  “Now that I 
better understand the law, it does not appear a bad one,” Austin concluded, “The prospect 
of politics offer hope for peace and union throughout the nation.289  
He expressed satisfaction that Mexico’s debt peonage laws were sufficient to 
meet Texas’ labor needs and, significantly, an element of optimism about what the state’s 
acceptance of such would mean for the overall cohesion of the republic.  After having 
worked to gain Texas an exemption from Mexican federal law so as to continue to attract 
the demographic of settlers that he wanted for the country, Austin would never abandon 
his fundamental aim of seeing Texas remain a country free of slaves.  Slavery had been a 
“necessary” and temporary evil  that he now hoped would be replaced by a system of 
indentured servitude that was not only less severe but more in line with the Mexican 
federal constitution.  Yet even as he called for an end to slavery, Austin made it clear that 
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Texas was to be a white man’s republic.  He was happy to report that “Measures have 
been taken to exclude free negroes and mulattoes” whom he called a “worse nuisance 
than slaves.”  If Texas was prudently managed, he argued, it would “be saved from the 
overwhelming ruin which mathematical demonstration declares must overtake the slave 
state.”  He even predicted that Mexico might serve as a kind of refuge for the white 
population of the North from the demographic effects of slavery, so that white Americans 
might not be “driven to the frozen regions of the north.” 290  If anything, Austin 
envisioned Texas as a haven from slavery, not an extension of it. Fear of the racial 
consequences of slavery loomed large in Austin’s mind as it did for many American 
southerners, especially in light of the Haitian Revolution.  “I sometimes shudder at the 
consequences and think that a large part [of] America will be Santo Domingized in 100, 
or 200 years,” he wrote in a separate letter, “The wishes of my colonists have hurried me 
into this thing – but I am now in for the question and there is no retreat, for my rule is to 
go ahead after once coming to a decisive resolution on a matter of such consequence as 
this.”291  
 However, prospective immigrants, particularly of the type that Austin wished to 
recruit, could not be so easily convinced to abandon the only system of forced labor they 
had ever known and the only one that allowed them the power and control that they felt 
they needed to secure their workforce.  Samuel Rhodes Fisher, who immigrated to Texas 
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in 1830 and eventually settling in Matagorda, stated that he, like Austin, “detest[ed] 
Slavery,” but was nonetheless “firmly persuaded that the free admission of slaves into the 
State of Texas, authorized by act of our legislature, would tend more to the rapid 
introduction of respectable emigrants than any other course which could be pursued.”  
Fisher also seemed less convinced that the kind of southern style agriculture that they 
hoped to introduce to Texas could be as readily accomplished with any other kind of 
compulsive labor. “Our rice and sugar lands require that kind of labour [slavery]” he 
wrote.  Yet even Fisher called for nothing more than “a temporary introduction of 
slaves,” and limiting “the period of admission to 5 years, or to any other number that you 
deem expedient.”292 Indeed it appears that most colonists were slightly less eager to let 
go of slavery than Austin himself was, even if they agreed on its ultimate undesirability.  
“[Th]at you are in favor of a free population is no surprise to me, believing that every 
reflecting man of equal intelligence must be so,” he wrote, “but I was not prepared to 
know that your determination was so decided as you have expressed it at the present 
juncture.”  Fisher, who was from Pennsylvania, reminded Austin that “[M]ost of your 
colonists are from Slave-holding States – they have enrolled themselves in your register 
under the firm conviction that slavery would be tolerated, and that they would be secure 
in the ownership of those brought by them.”  Texas was rapidly becoming 
“southernized,” but it would be hard to achieve a southern economy without southern 
style labor.  “From your approximity to the southern states, and from the favorable 
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feeling already pervading her citizens, Texas may fairly anticipate a population from that 
quarter, more speedy and more numerous than from the northern and Eastern,” Fisher 
wrote, “[D]o you believe that cane and cotton can be grown to advantage by a spare 
white population?” he asked Austin pointedly.  But as far as he knew, “there is no 
country in the world where these articles are grown unless by the assistance of Slaves.”293  
Texas therefore had two options - “we must either abandon the finest portion of 
Texas to its original uselessness or submit to the acknowledged, but lesser evil of 
Slavery.”  Fisher proposed allowing admission of slaves for five years after which point 
“the law of permission be then repealed and one substituted, making their introduction 
under any pretense highly penal.”294 As much as Fisher did not like slavery, he insisted it 
was a temporary evil that Texas had to adopt for at least its first few years.  Indeed, in his 
correspondence with Mexican officials, just as he had in letters to his fellow colonists, 
Austin insisted that Texas ultimately did not need slavery to thrive.  In a December 1830 
letter to Piedras, Austin wrote that “there should be no change in the law nor article 13 of 
the state constitution and slaves should be converted to free persons from the moment 
that they enter the territory . . . it appears to me that all negroes are servants and cannot be 
anything else, and they should be admitted as such.”295  
As Austin continued to declare his commitment to a “free” Texas, Mexican 
officials remained more concerned with the unity and cohesion of their young republic 
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than ensuring slavery remain outlawed.  “[R]egarding the introduction of slaves,” wrote 
Terán, “my opinion is that if they are allowed in Texas they need to be permitted in all 
the states that have coasts and require much labor to cultivate, otherwise it is a privilege.”  
Dismissing the claims that Texans faced inordinate obstacles in the establishment of their 
economy, Terán cautioned patience. “[T]he admission of slavery would undoubtedly 
rapidly augment the production of Mexican coasts,” he admitted.  But it would also 
“bring with it a means of promoting that which no country wants to use the government 
to prevent,” Terán wrote, most likely referring to slave insurrection and the likely need 
for a large central military to suppress it.296 While Terán acknowledged slavery’s 
undeniable benefits to developing the region, he, like Austin, feared its consequences.  
Yet his primary concern remained national cohesion.  “[S]lavery should be permitted in 
all the states along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico; if one is allowed then they all should; 
and vice-versa,” he wrote in 1831, as Mexico was facing serious social and political 
turmoil surrounding the competition between federalists and centralists. “I am persuaded 
that sooner or later slaves will be admitted, for this I am convinced that the coasts of 
Mexico will not prosper without them.”  However, in this time of “political convulsions,” 
Terán believed that “there should be no question of this topic.”297  
Thus, the desires of the early colonists and some national officials in Mexico City 
were by 1831 not so far apart.  Both acknowledged the benefits and risks of slavery, and 
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both parties wanted to, above all, secure and preserve Mexican peace and unity.  While 
pretty much everyone agreed that Mexico needed some form of compulsive labor, they 
could not readily agree on which one, and by the middle of 1831 the question was still 
unresolved.  “Negreos can be brought here under indentures, as servants, but not as 
slaves,” wrote Austin, “This question of slavery is a difficult one to get on with.  It will 
ultimately be admitted, or the free negroes will be formed by law into a separate and 
distinct class – the laboring class.”  Whatever their technical status, he argued, “The law 
must assign their station, fix their rights and their disabilities and obligations – something 
between slavery and freedom, but neither the one nor the other. . . Which is best? Quién 
Sabe? It is a difficult and dark question.”298 
Uncertainty regarding the future of slavery, however, inspired anxiety among 
many prospective immigrants, especially when the state of Coahuila y Téjas issued a 
decree in April 1832 stating that all “servants and day laborers” thereafter introduced by 
foreigners would remain slaves for no more than ten years after their entry.  More than 
established religion, time and again prospective immigrants expressed concern about 
Mexico’s commitment to abolition and what it would mean for prosperity and success in 
their adopted country.  Even as they praised Mexico for its abundance of natural 
resources, economic opportunities, and superior political system, they seemed to believe 
that only slavery could render the fruits of such opportunity. Richard Ellis of Tecumsia, 
Alabama, for example, did not mince words when it came to admiration for Mexico and 
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what it had to offer, from its natural resources to its government.  “[I]ndeed frankness and 
candor impels me not to withhold from you the expressions of the opinions and thoughts 
that have so repeatedly obtruded themselves on my mind,” he wrote, “(that is) that every 
family ought to bless his happy star that conduced him to a country blessed with the 
finest soil in North America, with plenty, health, peace and happiness.”  Ellis expressed 
his certainly that  “if they act wisely (as I hope and trust they will) they will foster and 
cherish the Government they live in, which will be the certain means of preserving their 
estimable rights” and “sure protection of their property.”   Ellis confirmed that conditions 
were every bit as bleak in his part of the United States as they had been when the Austins 
first established themselves in Mexico, “there are hundreds of thousands of families who 
do not own a foot of land nor do they have any hope of ever doing so.”   Yet he believed 
that the success and happiness of these families in Mexico ultimately depended on their 
ability to protect the property they had – especially their property in slaves. 
 
[I]n short time since my arrival at home I have ascertained beyond question that 
40 or 50 families would emigrate with me next fall to your country if they could 
introduce their slaves, many of them are large holders of that description of 
property; and I consider it a duty I owe myself as well as you to assure you that I 
should move to your country next fall if I can with safety bring mine.299  
 
Ellis concluded by assuring Austin that “I feel a deep interest in the prosperity of your 
country.”  For many slaveholders, their decision to immigrate to Mexico was ultimately 
dependent on their ability to bring and keep their human property.  “Our most valuable 
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inhabitants here are our own negroes,” wrote another prospective immigrant from 
Alabama, “They are an important species of property here and our planters are not 
willing to remove without they can first be assured of being secured to them by the laws 
of our Government.”300 Even as they showed some flexibility when it came to religion, 
this was less the case with slavery. “The most interesting subjects to the people here 
[appear] to be that of Slavery and Religion,” wrote another gentleman, “the latter being a 
constitutional matter I have no expectation of as early a change[.]  But would like to 
know what is the present state or prospect relative to the admission of slavery.”301 
Another one of Austin’s associates then in the North wrote,  “Nothing appears at present, 
to prevent apportion of our wealthy planters from emigrating immediately to the province 
of Texas but the uncertainty now prevailing with regard to the subject of slavery.”302  
Yet, despite their uncertainty, settlers continued to come to Texas.  By 1834, on 
the eve of the Texas Revolution, slaves would constitute about 10% of the overall 
population - approximately 2,000 individuals - over four times their number in 1825.  
Almost all of the slaves in Texas were in the Anglo municipalities, although some tejanos 
owned them as well.303  However, throughout the early part of the 1830’s, the fate of 
slavery, and consequently the future of Anglo immigration to Texas, hung in the cross 
hairs.  But slavery was just one issue that Mexican leaders had to grapple with as they 
                                                          
300 Charles Douglas to SFA, 15 February 1825, AP, Vol. II, 1046-49.   
301 Richard R. Royall to SFA, 23 August 1825, AP, Vol. II, 1183-85.   
302 James Phelps to SFA, 16 January 1825, AP, Vol. II, Part II, 1020-21. 
303Juan N. Almonte, “Statistical report on Texas, 1835,” trans. Carlos E Castaneda, Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly, XXVIII (1925), 177-222. 
171 
 
 
 
struggled to integrate and modernize their sprawling young republic, especially their 
sparsely populated and still underdeveloped northern frontier, which it seemed everyday 
was drifting more and more out of its grasp. 
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CHAPTER 4 
“The Strongest Arm of the Mexican Republic” 
 Commerce, Culture and the Challenge of National Consolidation 
 1828-1833 
  
In April 1828 Mexican General Manuel Mier y Terán arrived in San Antonio de 
Béxar as head of a Boundary Commission appointed by the new administration of 
Vicente Guerrero to assess and document conditions in Mexico’s Far North.  Of 
particular concern among Mexico’s leaders was their nation’s security along its border 
with the United States, particularly in light of the growing number of Anglo-American 
settlers and recent efforts by the US to purchase the region.  Among the questions Terán 
was hoping to address: How effective was the empresario program at populating the 
region with loyal and productive Mexican citizens from the North?  How many were 
actually there legally and how many were simply squatting?  Most important, to what 
extent did their presence threaten Mexico’s territorial integrity?  Leaders in Mexico City 
were growing increasingly wary of US territorial encroachment and many believed 
Anglo-American settlers were part of that country’s plan to dominate and eventually 
acquire a significant portion of Mexican territory.  
Their suspicions were understandable.  The United States had just elected a 
president with a demonstrated desire to acquire, as he put it, “all of Spanish North 
America.”  The first sign of this intent had occurred in 1818 when Jackson drove US 
forces into Florida as part of a plan to jumpstart stalled negotiations between that country 
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and Spain over the western boundary of Louisiana.  Emboldened by Jackson, Secretary of 
State John Quincy Adams had briefly attempted to convince the Spanish to surrender the 
entire northwest corner of their empire, thereby permitting the United States to extend its 
reach all the way to the Pacific. Jackson would ultimately surrender his ambitions for the 
guarantee of Florida, which he believed was essential to the protection of his country’s 
new southern boundary, and whose transference might be jeopardized by a push for too 
much.   But he would never forget Texas, and almost as soon as he entered the White 
House, Old Hickory began scheming of ways to regain the territory.  Meanwhile, the 
Spanish and their Mexican successors would never forget General “Andrés” Jackson 
whose recent election had them gravely concerned.  Caught in the middle of the growing 
tension between Mexican and US authorities were Anglo-Texans themselves, whose 
growing presence in Téjas began to look more and more suspicious to men like Terán.304    
Meanwhile, Mexico was entering a fragile political phase as its experiment in 
radical federalism began to falter.    Years after achieving independence, the young 
republic remained bankrupt, and still struggled to restore basic communication and 
transportation.  Travel was slow and cumbersome - roads plagued by bandits and thieves, 
bridges impassible.   Wartime damage throughout the country remained unaddressed.  At 
the heart of Mexico’s turmoil was an intense political struggle between those committed 
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to the realization of its federalist promise and those who insisted that a more centralized 
form of government was necessary to achieve a functional and modern nation state. 305  
The struggle between the centralists and federalists played out in a series of coups 
between 1829 and 1835.  The first of these occurred in January 1829 when Congress 
annulled the election of Gómez Pedrasa and recognized Vicente Guerrero, a federalist.  It 
was Guerrero’s regime that sent Terán north to draw and develop a plan for fortifying the 
boundary line first agreed to under the Adams-Onís Treaty.  Specifically, he was to 
document conditions on the frontier and develop a prescription for bringing the region 
into the national fold. Until this point, leaders in Mexico City had only vague notions of 
the Far North.  Few had ever been there.  In fact, this was Terán’s first time travelling so 
far from his nation’s capital, for the one exception of Europe.306   
What the General encountered in the north was both unfamiliar and unnerving.  
As the Mexican economy worsened after independence, the United States economy had 
flourished, drawing Texans, both Mexican and tejano, into the orbit of its burgeoning 
market revolution, so that by 1826 Texas was importing most of its necessities from the 
United States.   Anglo settlers, and only a handful of tejanos, dominated a trade network 
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that threatened to pull the Mexican frontier ever closer to the US.   Texans, whether 
Mexican or Anglo, relied on the North for nearly everything from food to arms.307   
But this was not the only thing that threatened Mexico’s grasp on the northern 
frontier.  Mexican villages experienced an intensification of Indian raids during this time 
as various nomadic groups began to cash in on the inflow of goods, namely lifestock and 
arms.  Indeed, while Mexican leaders blamed much of this violence on increased trade 
with the US and attempted to regulate and limit it, they came into conflict with local 
leaders who insisted that the inflow of such goods was necessary to both their survival 
and self-defense, thereby fueling the disagreement between the northern states and 
Mexico City over how best to police and protect the border. 308 
Indeed, by 1828 the Mexican North appeared an almost separate nation to an elite 
creole from the nation’s capital. Yet, despite historians’ tendency to echo the views of 
Mexican national leaders in seeing the Anglo presence, and specifically their trade with 
the north, as critically compromising northern Mexico’s relationship with the rest of the 
country, it is important to acknowledge that many Anglos and tejanos themselves 
understood it very differently.  They understood their trade with the north as a critical 
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part of the Mexican nation-building project.  Far from compromising their young 
republic, they believed it would enrich Mexico, fueling its infrastructure and 
strengthening its domestic economy.  Just as historians of the US empire have long 
identified agrarians as the driving force behind antebellum imperialism and 
industrialization, those who immigrated to Texas were often the most vocal advocates for 
Mexican imperialism and development. 309    While they may have continued an almost 
exclusive trade with the United States, they attempted to strengthen their ties with the 
Mexican interior and saw their efforts as complementing Mexican nationalist aims, not 
impeding them.  Far from drawing Texas closer to the US, they aimed to make it a 
continental crossroads, linking the American South with northern Mexico, in a way that 
would make it “the strongest arm of the Mexican republic.”310  
Their actions, however, often had precisely the opposite effect.  As historians 
have observed, the more Texans pushed the commercial confines of their adoptive nation, 
the harder it became to keep them within the nationalist fold, especially at a time when 
Mexico’s central government remained so weak.  And the more the federal government 
attempted to remedy this through importation tariffs and immigration regulation, the 
more they threatened to alienate those colonists even more.   Even as Austin and his allies 
aimed to help federal officials in their efforts to consolidate and control the sprawling 
new republic, they decried the federal government’s efforts to regulate trade and police 
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the frontier as a violation of the very federalist promise that had attracted them in the first 
place.  They wanted Mexico to become stronger, wealthier and more consolidated, but on 
their terms.   
Meanwhile, as more and more US immigrants began flooding into Texas, a 
generational rift emerged among the settlers there.  Whereas earlier settlers such as 
Austin, Kuykendall, Williams and Ingram were primarily drawn to Mexico for its 
political promise, a later generation, most arriving after 1830, entered the nation at a time 
of profound political instability and chaos.  This newer cohort did not know Mexico as 
the federalist Promised Land that their forbears had, nor did they have the same 
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the country, its people and culture.  Therefore, 
they demonstrated far less faith in the Mexican political process, and their political 
purview was far more local and less national.   
Further north, an increasingly territorially aggressive pro-slavery southern 
contingency began to cast their eyes on Texas, seeing its absorption as an appropriate 
extension of their own power. Thus, by 1832, Texas rested strategically, though 
precariously, at the center of a much larger and more or less coherent geo-political unit 
committed to regional sovereignty, small central government, free trade and forced labor 
that struggled, and threatened, to become the most prosperous region in the northwestern 
hemisphere. 
*** 
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There were few men in Mexico more qualified to undertake an administrative tour 
of the Mexican frontier than General Manuel Mier y Terán.  The thirty-six year old was a 
graduate of the National College of Mines, an accomplished mathematician and engineer 
with a strong interest in the natural sciences.  He was a veteran of the war for 
independence and former member of the nation’s first congress before serving as 
Mexico’s Minister of War.   When he was not compiling extensive reports on Texas’ 
natural resources and geography, Terán kept a diary where he documented not only those 
physical aspects of Texas that impressed him, but the culture and habits of the Texans 
themselves.311   
Regarding the tejanos, the General described a group of people whose geographic 
and cultural isolation from the nation’s core kept them in a state of stunted civic 
development, while their exposure to Anglo immigrants rendered them particularly 
vulnerable to the cultural and commercial influence of the North.  “Ciudad de Béxar 
resembles a large village more than the municipal seat of a department,” he wrote, “There 
is no paved street and no public building.”  Meanwhile, trade with the norteamericanos, 
“and the blending in to some degree of their customs” made tejanos “a little different 
from the Mexicans of the interior whom those in Texas call foreigners and whom they 
scarcely like because of the superiority which they recognize in them.”  Tejanos exhibited 
a kind of hybrid culture which extended to food, dress and even behavior.  Terán 
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observed, for example, that “In their gatherings, the women prefer to dress in the style of 
Louisiana, and by so doing they participate both in the customs of their neighboring 
nation and of their own.” Indeed, the prolonged presence of Anglo immigrants in the 
North drew tejanos closer to American culture and customs while placing a strain on 
relations with their compatriots in central Mexico, who often perceived them as poor, 
lazy, and unsophisticated.  The further Terán traveled from the nation’s interior, the less 
Mexican the Mexicans seemed and, at least in his view, the worse for it.  Terán saved his 
most ardent criticisms for those Mexicans near Nacogdoches who, by this time, 
composed an extreme minority – one in ten – and where Mexican influence was “almost 
non-existent.”  He bemoaned that 
the Mexicans of this town consist of what people everywhere call the abject class, 
the poorest and most ignorant.  The North Americans residing in the town run the 
English school and send their children North for their education, the poor 
Mexicans neither have the resources to create schools, nor is there anyone to think 
improving their institutions and their abject conditions.  
 
Particularly discouraging was their lack of work ethic. While he may have saved his most 
extreme criticism for the Nacogdoches Mexicans, Terán observed tejanos generally to be 
“carefree” and “very fond of luxury, and the worst punishment that can be inflicted upon 
them is work.”  He criticized the Mexican women of Texas for their indelicacy, noting 
that “Their very language seems almost to forbid the cultivation of this most beautiful of 
the Graces,” and the men for being “not well formed in feature or person” and “extremely 
ignorant in all the advanced arts of civilization, the majority not being able to read.”  As a 
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result, they were “completely the slaves of Popish superstition and despotism [being] 
distinguished for the knavery and breach of faith.” 312 
 On its surface, Terán’s reaction may appear merely the snobbish impressions of a 
metropole, but the General had practical concerns about what tejanos’ indolence, 
backwardness and lack of integration meant for the wellbeing and integrity of his 
country, especially considering how advanced the Anglo population seemed in 
comparison.  The tejano “agricultural industry,” he wrote, “is so wretched that a 
monopoly over them by the American colonies founded in this department is to be 
feared.”  Tejanos, according to Terán, could not “vie in any respect with those industrious 
colonists, much more hard working than they.”   Upon seeing their agricultural tools, one 
would have believed “oneself to have gone ten centuries backwards in the elementary and 
necessary arts.”313 
Specifically, Terán feared that their inadequacy might be just as evident to Anglo 
settlers, thereby contributing to their lack of respect for the nation as a whole.  “Senor 
President, I must disturb you in the same way I was disturbed to see the foreign colonists’ 
attitude towards our nation,” Terán wrote to President Guerrero, “Most of them, with the 
exception of a few who have travelled to our capital, knowing no Mexicans other than 
those who live here . . . think that Mexico consists of nothing more than blacks and 
Indians, all of them ignorant.”  An educated, cosmopolitan like Terán hardly seemed 
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Mexican at all compared to his northern brethren.  “In some homes, where they have 
done me the favor of considering me an educated man, they have told me to my face that 
it could not be so unless I were French or Spanish.”314 
Such experiences must have been both humiliating and disconcerting for a proud 
Mexican nationalist like Terán.  Not insignificantly, however, he noted one exception: 
“This should not be understood as applying to the colony of Don Estében Austin, the only 
one where they try to understand and obey the laws of the country, and where, as a result 
of the enlightenment and integrity of its empresario, they have a notion of our republic 
and its government.”315  It was in Austin’s colony that Terán was greeted by a woman 
and her daughter who “spoke Spanish well enough to be understood in conversation.”316  
They lived on a farm owned and operated by the woman’s husband, then in the United 
States on business.   Unfortunately for Teràn and others who wished to tighten the federal 
government’s grasp on the frontier and make a more cohesive nation, colonists like these 
were becoming less the norm, overwhelmed by more recent arrivals from the North who 
settled closer to the Sabine, remained unaffiliated with any empresario, and therefore had 
limited formal connection to Mexico. “This country is the asylum for fugitives from the 
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neighboring republic,” complained Terán, “Foreign agriculturalists settle where it suits 
them, and they take over whatever land they desire.”317   
As part of their effort to strengthen their hold on the frontier, Mexican leaders 
hoped to develop the region’s agricultural economy, something that, by Terán’s own 
admission, seemed to require an Anglo presence.  Most Mexicans, at least as far as he 
could tell, seemed loath to become farmers. “More than a century after it was colonized 
the region remains static, and it will never be covered with fields except in more active 
and hard-working hands.  What surer wealth than the products of a flourishing 
agriculture?”318  Terán rarely acknowledged the role that decades of Indian depredations 
surely played in impairing agricultural development, or the fact that even Anglo settlers 
believed it all but impossible to cultivate the land without the aid of slave labor.  
 But what Terán did acknowledge was that his country seemed to face a quandary.  
He and other national leaders wanted to see Mexico’s frontier settled and developed in a 
way that only foreigners seemed capable of.  Yet, no matter how much credit Terán 
seemed willing to give Anglo settlers for their contribution to Mexico’s agro-economy, 
he simply could not take their allegiance to Mexico seriously, especially in light of the 
Fredonian Rebellion. “If it is bad for a nation to have vacant lands and wilderness, it is 
worse without a doubt to have settlers who cannot abide by some of its laws and by the 
restrictions that [the nation] must place on commerce.  They soon become discontented 
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and thus prone to rebellion,” he wrote, seemingly unconvinced that many of these settlers 
had in fact renounced their loyalty to the United States and declared it enthusiastically to 
Mexico.  “[E]verything becomes graver still if those people have strong and indissoluble 
connections with a neighboring government.”319  No matter where they lived or who they 
declared their allegiances to, as far as Terán was concerned, these were norteamericanos 
through and through.  National identity was far more enduring and permanent to Terán 
than to someone like Austin.  In some ways, Terán’s words should be expected from a 
member of the Mexican elite, educated in Europe, who had never ventured so far from 
his country’s interior.  Yet, he believed enough in the imperial capacity of his young 
country to look forward to a day “not far off when the progress of a population such as 
Mexico’s will spread over its empty lands.”  Furthermore, despite all his criticism of 
tejanos and blame he placed on them for their condition, Terán acknowledged that much 
of it had to do with the political incompetence of a past imperial regime, and took 
personal responsibility for  improving his new nation in the future: “By now the Mexican 
settlers of Téjas would have settled a quarter of the wilderness, but their history since the 
time of their first settlements shows that they have suffered numerous misfortunes[,] most 
of which emanated from government mistakes.”320  It was these past mistakes that Terán 
and his allies in Mexico City hoped to remedy, but the task was not an easy one given the 
shifting and often chaotic political climate of the early Mexican Republic.  
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*** 
While the Mexican government was attempting to fortify the Sabine boundary, a 
couple thousand miles to the northeast Andrew Jackson, the newly elected US president, 
and his cabinet were plotting a way to push that boundary further south.  Indeed, Terán’s 
commission was in large part a reaction to the Jackson administration’s recent attempt to 
purchase Texas, an attempt that only succeeded in raising Mexican suspicion and enmity. 
In many ways, Jackson’s election was a response to precisely those impulses that had 
spawned US emigration to Mexico in the first place.  He ran on a platform of “reform 
retrenchment and economy” in which he promised to end corruption and return the 
country to the ideals of the Founding Fathers.  Jackson was also an ardent expansionist.  
Old Hickory had always regarded Texas as part of the Louisiana Purchase and acquiring 
it from Mexico was an early aim of his administration.321   
Jackson rejected the notion of open and fluid borders on which the Texan 
colonists now depended, insisting instead that it was dangerous “to leave a foreign power 
in possession of heads of our leading branches of the great Mississippi.”  Like Henry 
Clay and many frontier leaders before him, Jackson firmly believed that Texas should be 
part of the United States, as such an acquisition was “necessary for the security of the 
great emporium of the west, neworleans.”  Furthermore, “the god of the universe has 
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intended this great valley to belong to one nation,” by which, of course, he meant the 
US.322 
Indeed, for someone like Austin, a man of the West who had long railed against 
eastern elitism and corruption, Jackson’s election was thrilling.  “This day belongs most 
emphatically to the history of North America,” he wrote in a letter to his friend, one of 
the only times he ever mentioned US politics since settling in Mexico.  “I am of opinion 
that his administration will in general be very popular and very advantageous to the 
nation,” he wrote in reference to Jackson’s 1828 tariff that favored western farmers by 
placing heavy duties on imported raw materials.323 The dispute over export tariffs on 
cotton, one that would alienate Jackson’s southern base and lead to the nullification 
crisis, had not yet occurred.  While Austin may have admired Jackson, his words 
represented a rare expression of interest in the political system of his native country.  “I 
have taken no great interest in the election, tho I have no objection to see Jackson 
president – Your government is founded on the popular will,” his use of the pronoun 
revealing that he no longer considered himself a citizen of the North. 324 
Some expatriates had a far more critical view of the new administration.  David 
G. Burnett, a close associate of Austin’s and himself an early settler, called the new 
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president “deplorably incompetent” and said that his cabinet was “the weakest and most 
inefficient that this government has ever seen.”  He predicted that Van Buren and 
Calhoun, “will be like two dogs at the bone, pulling different ways and ever growling at 
each other,” and referred to the president’s “deplorable incompetency.”  Of the others, he 
wrote “Ingham is a second rate man in all things but party zeal, and many believe he has 
an ‘itching palm’  - [B]ranch the North Carolinian is perhaps worthy of his state, famed 
for pitch and sweet potatoes – Eaton is probably the most obnoxious of the whole tribe.”  
However, like Austin, Burnet’s interest in the political state of his native country was 
minimal.  He had renounced it long ago.  “These political notions are not readily my own 
for you will readily imagine that I take little active interest in the strifes of the Country – 
being a Coahuilatexanian.”325  
Furthermore, while Texans may have admired Jackson for his commitment to 
restoring the yeoman’s republic, many were yet unaware of his expansionist designs.  
When they finally did catch wind of them, they expressed anger and frustration.  “They 
speak here of this matter [transference to the US] as one which in no wise concerns the 
present population of that country [Texas],” wrote Ira Ingram to another early immigrant 
during a trip to New Orleans, “– and in fact, as though those now in peaceful occupation 
of the country, have neither rights nor impartialities to be invaded or consulted, and like 
sheep and oxen, perfectly passive.”  Ingram’s words make it clear that those who 
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advocated for US acquisition of Texas were not only profoundly out of step with the 
desires of Texans themselves, but demonstrated the same elitist disregard for popular 
opinion that had compelled so many to leave their country in the first place  “I have 
frequently ralied them on the subject of their national vanity,” Ingram continued, “and 
plainly told them in many instances that, altho’ it might suit them very well to regard the 
population of Texas in no other light than a degraded species of property, nevertheless, 
there are many among us who viewed the subject in a very different light.”  Ingram’s 
words put the lie to this “national vanity” – the assumption that just about all people, but 
certainly former US citizens, would want to live under US dominion.326   
As much as Austin initially relished in Jackson’s victory, he ardently opposed his 
foreign policy and remained as jaded as ever when it came to the ability of that 
government to serve his or other immigrants’ best interests.  He termed transference to 
the US, the “greatest misfortune that could befall Texas” because it would throw 
immigrants “upon the liberality of the Congress of the united states of the north,” making 
theirs “a most forlorn hope.”  Tragically, perhaps, Austin remained woefully unaware 
that the United States was in fact planning such an extension of its territory, having, as he 
put it, “too much confidence in the magnanimity of my native country to suppose that the 
government would resort to that mode of extending its already unwieldy frame over the 
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territory of its friend and sister republic.”327  The notion that the United States would 
have little interest in extending its reach all the way to the Rio Grande for fear of making 
the republic too expansive to sustain was commonly held, especially in the northeast.  
The sectional split over this question was one that even Terán observed.  “[T]he opinions 
of the north and the west of that nation are opposed,” he wrote, “That is, the commercial 
states want the population to be concentrated, limited to the nation’s land and vast 
resources.  The states of the west, that is, the agricultural states, look to expansion into 
new and fertile country as the principal means of [promoting] their influence within the 
entire federation.”328 
  Indeed, in August 1829, only months after the Jackson administration had failed 
to convince the Mexicans to make the Rio Grande their northern boundary, foreign 
minister Joel Poinsett received instruction to propose a purchase of the far northern 
region known as Téjas.  The President, with the help of Vice President Martin Van 
Buren, Henry Clay, and a free-wheeling South Carolina land speculator and former 
Mississippi legislator named Colonel Anthony Butler, hoped to convince them of the 
mutual benefit of a “natural border” between the two countries.  Implicit within this 
proposal were a host of assumptions that ran directly counter to the sentiments that 
immigrants had articulated up to that point.  The men argued that the US acquisition of 
Texas would eliminate “collisions” between two peoples of “conflicting laws, habits, and 
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interests.”  Assuming that the Texans would favour the transfer, they argued that the 
failure of such a sale would encourage Texans to establish independence on their own, 
something that would weaken “the bonds of amity and good understanding” between the 
United States and Mexico.”329  But when Poinsett presented the offer to Mexican officials 
they angrily dismissed him and called for his recall.   
Jackson appointed Anthony Butler in his place, whom he instructed to proceed 
with negotiations for Texas.  “The acquisition of that territory is becoming everyday an 
object of more importance to us,” Jackson wrote, “and if any reliance can be placed on 
the illiberal speculations which they already ascribe to us, in connection with it, a still 
stronger argument, for the cession can be based upon them.”  In reference to the 
perceived Mexican suspicion that the United States already had troops stationed on the 
other side of the Sabine, “watching an opportunity for the conquest of that territory,” he 
wrote, “A conjecture so idle can only emanate from a consciousness of their weakness, 
and inability to assert their power in that province.”  Jackson roundly misinterpreted both 
the Mexican leadership and the colonists themselves.  He greeted Mexican accusations as 
an effort to “create a negotiation by which they hope to affect a transfer of the country, 
before the power of disposing of it, is lost by the course of a revolution.”  In fact, the 
Mexican government neither wished to sell Texas, nor did Texans wish to see it sold. 
Nonetheless, Jackson believed he had devised the perfect plan to seduce Mexican leaders 
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into surrendering the territory.  “I scarsely ever knew a Spaniard who was not the slave of 
avarice,” he told Butler, “and it is not improbable that this weakness may be worth a 
great deal to us, in this case.” 330 
Not surprisingly, the renewed efforts were an abysmal failure.  In addition to 
souring relations between Mexico and the United States, they threatened to sour relations 
between US immigrants and their adopted government.  Despite Austin and other 
colonists renouncing US imperial aims towards Texas, it felt increasingly obvious to 
Mexican leaders that something had to be done to protect their fledgling nation from its 
increasingly aggressive northern neighbor.  This fear was palpable in Terán’s summary 
letters to national leaders following his tour.   “Forgive the amount of reading I have sent 
you,” he wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in July 1828,  “but I wish to inform 
you right away about this country and not wait until the day I present my complete 
observations to the government, because [by then] the time to take corrective action will 
have passed.” Warning that “if timely measures are not taken, Téjas will pull down the 
entire federation,” Terán elaborated on this theory in his letter to the War Department.  
Yet, the primary evidence for his suspicions were not so much based on his observations 
of Texans themselves, as they were of Téjas’ geographic proximity to a nation with its 
own specific history of territorial aggression. “The department of Texas is contiguous to 
the most avid nation in the world,” he wrote,   “The North Americans have conquered 
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whatever territory adjoins them.  In less than half a century they have become masters of 
extensive colonies which formerly belonged to Spain and France and of even more 
spacious territories from which have disappeared the former owners, the Indian tribes.”331  
Yet their ability to do so, according to him, rested precisely in what he termed 
their “silent means,” - their practice of settling  sparsely populated regions belonging to 
other powers, effectively paving the way for eventual acquisition by their own state.   
“Instead of armies, battles, or invasions – which make a great noise and for the most part 
are unsuccessful – these men lay hand on means that, if considered one by one would be 
rejected as slow, ineffective, and at times, palpably absurd.”  Yet, there were “without a 
doubt, some of the most effective means of imperialism.  Beginning with “adventurers 
and empresarios” who “take up their residence in the country, pretending that their 
location has no bearing upon the question of the government’s claim,” they then  
develop an interest which complicates the political administration of the coveted 
territory; complaints, even threats, begin to be heard, working on the loyalty of 
the legitimate settlers, discrediting the efficiency of the existing authority and 
administration; and the matter having arrived at this stage – which is precisely 
that of Texas at this moment – diplomatic maneuvers begin332 
 
Despite all their testaments of loyalty to Mexico, Terán saw the actions of US immigrants 
going hand-in-glove with the efforts of US imperialists. 
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Terán wasted no time in addressing the threat of foreign incursion - misplaced as 
it may have been.  First, he advised greater government authority on the frontier, 
including relocating Col. Bustamante to Téjas “because we need a person whom the 
foreigners respect.” Most controversial, however, was his recommendation that the 
government prohibit any more US immigrants from settling in the region.  He made sure 
to specify, however, that established colonies like Austin’s, “should remain and be 
granted as much freedom as possible in the cultivation of the land, the sale of their 
products, and the importation of those [products] of prime necessity to them, according to 
their uses.”  This should also entail enforcing a consistent and universal policy towards 
slavery. “If [the North Americans] are allowed to introduce slaves, the Mexicans of Téjas 
are also permitted to do so,” he wrote.  Finally, Terán proposed reserving the eastern part 
of the state for settlement by ethnic Mexicans:  “The transfer of five thousands 
Yucatecans, or a thousand families, to the banks of the Trinity River in the course of two 
years is the greatest and most beneficial enterprise for the [Mexican] federation.333  
Something else that the yucatecanos had in common with the Texans was a strained 
relationship with Mexico City.  Indeed, just a decade later, Yucatán would present the 
same threat to Mexico that Téjas did.   Such a recommendation reveals not only how out 
of touch Terán was from those Mexicans beyond his country’s core, but also the extent of 
anti-centralism throughout Mexico in the early nineteenth century and the challenge that 
Mexican national leaders faced in trying to hold their country together. 
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Terán concluded his letter by remarking on the population of Texas, one that had 
consistently impressed him as both distinct and peculiar – “a mixture of such strange and 
incoherent elements that no other like it exists in our entire federation,” among whom 
were “tribes of savages” and colonists who came from “another, more advanced society, 
better educated but also more malicious and mistrustful.”  The foreigners were composed 
of “all kinds: fugitive criminals, honorable farmers, vagabonds, and ne’er do wells, 
laborers, etc.” who “all go about with their constitution in their pocket, demanding their 
rights, and the authorities and functionaries that it provides.”334  
Terán could not help but reflect fondly on the pleasant escapism that Téjas 
afforded.  As he set off on the next leg of his journey, he admitted he felt 
an aversion that must be caused by the dismal situation at the center of my nation.  
It seems that I am seeing for the last time the tranquility hidden in this immense 
wilderness, and that I am denying myself this lone refuge in order to plunge into 
that abyss of passions that causes my country to groan.335   
 
But such tranquility and serenity, of course, was the result of Texas’ profound isolation 
from the country’s chaotic center, an isolation that Terán knew challenged the very 
existence of his beloved country. 
*** 
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While Terán was attempting to fortify Mexico’s political and territorial integrity, 
many northern Mexicans – both tejano and Anglo – were forging a vibrant transnational 
economy that depended on loose and fluid borders and aimed to link the deserts of the 
Mexican north with southern plantations and Caribbean ports.  Terán himself observed 
that inhabitants of Austin’s colony devoted “themselves to raising mules, with the idea of 
shipping them to the French and English Antilles.  They say that Jamaica buys 5,000 
mules a year.”  But this was just the tip of the iceberg. Perhaps no one better articulated 
what Texas promised to contribute to Mexico’s enrichment and development than J. 
Child who had helped Austin establish his colony and before that had participated in 
Mexico’s war for independence.  In 1830, claiming that Texas was “destined to become 
the strongest arm of the Mexican Republic,” Child called for greater government 
infrastructure to make his prediction possible.  He envisioned “A military lookout post at 
Fort Bolívar” and “a trading establishment at the head of the navigation on the Buffalo 
Bayou connecting these establishments with [Austin’s] town on this side[,] and securing 
the trade and attachment of the Indians and whites on the waters of the Trinity.”  Child 
craved greater federal presence, not less.  “With this view,” he continued, “let the 
Mexican government open a land office of San Felipe de Austin with full powers to make 
indefeasible complete grants of land to actual settlers for a price certain for any quantity 
not exceeding 640, or 1,000 acres.”  Child encouraged greater settlement of both ethnic 
Mexicans and immigrants from the North, encouraging the government to “invite the 
Mexican in the interior to come down and settle in texas” and allow more “foreign 
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immigrants of good character and small capital with industrious habits to settle 
permanently among them.”  If the Mexican government did all this, “my word for  in 
three or four years, we will give a spur to commerce and agriculture, greatly enhancing 
the price of lands and creating the present drone like apathy that broods over those 
delightful regions into the busy drum of the beehive come May.”336   
Settlers like Child in no way saw the steady stream of immigrants from the north 
and a growing trade with the United States as compromising their relationship with 
Mexico – quite the opposite.  While historians have correctly observed that Texans 
engaged in a trade network that ultimately had little to do with the Mexican interior, they 
dreamt of one that would stretch from St. Louis to Chihuahua and from Santa Fe to 
Havana, making Texas the nexus of a hemispheric network, and contributing in no small 
part to the Mexican nation-building project.  While Jackson envisioned Texas as a kind of 
frontier buffer for the United States, and Mexican leaders feared the same, Austin and 
other colonists saw it as a potentially integral and productive part of Mexico. 337  
The reality on the ground, however, was something very different.  Throughout 
the late 1820’s, Texans, both Anglos and tejanos relied almost exclusively on trade with 
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the north.  Anglo traders like Samuel May Williams served to benefit, as many tejanos  
came to rely on them for necessities. Williams had been among one of the first US 
immigrants to arrive in Texas in 1822 and by 1831 he owned over 4,800 acres of land.  
He had acquired fluency in Spanish and familiarity with Spanish American politics and 
culture from spending most of the 1810’s in Buenos Aires, working for the city’s 
merchant class.   Williams rose to prominence by acting as one of Texas’ chief traders 
with the North, supplying Texans with goods like food, seed and clothing.  In January 
1830, J.M. Ibarra wrote a letter to Williams requesting seed for his garden for which he 
aimed to acquire “from many places, the best plants and flowers that I could get” and 
hoped that, “through your helpful cooperation, I might be able to get plants and flower 
seeds from Baltimore.”  In concluding his letter, Ibarra requested that Williams “Give my 
regards and appreciation for his personality, to my friend Austin” before making one last 
request for “one pair of half boots of the best quality.”338     
Ethnic Mexicans were not merely the recipients of trade with the north. In San 
Antonio a group of tejano merchants emerged as well.  Chief among them was José 
Casiano.  Born in Genoa in 1791, Casiano established himself as a successful merchant in 
New Orleans before settling in Texas in 1820.  The Casiano Family appear to have 
owned at least a handful of slaves and some members would later serve in the Army of 
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the Confederate States.  José acted as an interpreter and even helped initiate other tejanos 
into the Texas-US trade network.339    
Some less savory characters emerged too.  Col. Monroe Edwards, for example, a 
native of Kentucky, arrived in Texas in 1823. He soon became involved in a scheme to 
purchase slaves in Brazil, take them to Texas and then funnel them to the United States, 
thereby taking advantage of the increase in demands for slave labor caused by the North’s 
recent ban on the Atlantic slave trade.  It was individuals like this that had Mexican – and 
US – leaders concerned, as the two countries quickly began jostling for control of the 
region.340 
 Mexican leaders, however, feared that Texans’ increasing commercial ties to the 
north threatened to draw the region ever closer to the United States’ grasp.   In an effort 
to limit and control this trade, the Mexican government placed an import tariff on most 
goods coming from the north, thus placing a considerable strain on Anglos and tejanos 
alike.  Terán noted bexarenos’ frustration with the tariff on northern flour “because in 
Béxar they eat bread from no other.”  Texans were also prevented from growing tobacco 
for sale to the US. 341  Texan leaders reacted by launching a series of appeals to state and 
federal leaders asking for exemption from the tariff on grounds that it was detrimental to 
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Texan inhabitants who relied on basic items from the north.  Austin insisted that for 
Texas to be “useful and rich by way of agriculture, it needs foreign exportation and 
commerce,” the former being “essential to the stimulation of agriculture.”342 
He was careful, however, to make it clear that trade with the United States in no 
way compromised Texan ties to the rest of Mexico. Indeed, for Austin and other Texans, 
trade with the North coexisted with and in fact facilitated Texas’ integration with the rest 
of Mexico. In a petition to Terán, written June 30, 1828, Austin requested a formal 
exemption from the import tariff until 1835, permission to raise tobacco for export, and 
regulation of the coasting trade to permit Texas products in Mexican ports.343    
While Mexican officials did grant permission for intra-state commerce, they did 
not have the resources to effectively establish and regulate ports like Galveston which 
remained closed for years after its establishment.344   This prompted Austin on July 28, 
1828 to issue yet another petition, this one for relief from the National Government’s 
prohibition against trade with unauthorized ports.  Arguing that lifting restrictions on 
international trade “was to the greater agricultural good of the entire country,” Austin 
insisted that if his request was granted, Texas would surely become “a rich and important 
state for the great Mexican federation.” In one such letter to Anastacio Bustamante, 
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Austin addressed the concerns of Mexican officials by expressing confidence that his 
colonists themselves would be able to guard the Texas coast against invasion.345 
On September 8, 1828 Austin wrote directly to the president of Mexico himself 
for permission to introduce free of duty all articles for the consumption of his colony.  He 
insisted that his suggestions “emanate from an ardent desire to see my country flourish,” 
and proceeded to explain how Texas’ cotton economy would serve Mexican leaders’ 
aims of developing and enriching their new republic, most specifically through the 
development of national infrastructure.   “[T]he improvement of roadways and canals and 
the navigability of the rivers will improve in proportion to the wealth and prosperity of 
the people and the liberty of  the Government of the United states [of Mexico],” he wrote 
in a letter to the Governor of Coahuila y Téjas. Austin dreamed of  Coahuila y Téjas, 
Nueva León, Tamaulipas and other northern states  growing rich on cotton and tobacco 
production facilitated by “a roadway so first class from Saltillo to Béxar” and 
“steamboats” along the Rio Grande “carrying cotton and other products to the port of 
Matamoros.”  Yet it was not just Mexico’s infrastructure that would improve. “[T]o 
promote cotton planting is to give encouragement to all branches of industry, and creates 
an article of exportation that is necessary to all foreign countries without expense.”346   
He suggested that Mexico capitalize on the political troubles in the North, and the 
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growing resentment between Britain and the United States over the 1828 tariff, by 
commencing a trade in cotton with the British.  “In my opinion, cotton should be the 
principal product of exportation from Texas.”347 Texas’ prosperity was intimately linked 
with that of the rest of Mexico.  Cotton was a way to improve not just Texas, but the 
whole country. 
Noting the detrimental effect that the federal trade prohibitions had on Texas, 
Terán wrote that “For all these reasons, the colonies here are considered to be in a state of 
discontent, and the empresarios in one of bankruptcy.”348  Yet, immigrants continued to 
arrive even after the turning of the political tide in 1828.  Furthermore, many of these 
immigrants, just like Austin, sought integration with the larger Mexican economy and 
society and, in at least a few cases, even employment by the Mexican government itself.  
In a letter to Austin written in August of 1828, Samuel Parkman inquired into all aspects 
of Texas geography and accessibility to the interior: “How far is your colony from the 
Gulf Coast? Is the country mountainous or level? How large are the rivers Colorado and 
Brazos? Do they in any considerable degree afford facilities for navigation?” and “What 
time is required to sail from your colony to the port nearest to the city of Mexico?” were 
only a few of his questions.  After asking about the extent of Austin’s grant, Parkman 
then asked if the colony “and the country in general” was explored and surveyed.   He  
volunteered himself as an assist in making a map of the country, stating that he was “a 
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surveyor and in that business would wish to be employed either in Texas or elsewhere in 
the Mexican provinces.”  Just as much as religion or slavery, prospective settlers 
expressed interest in Texas’ geography, navigability and accessibility to the rest of 
Mexico.  “I am aware that the number of my inquiries may intrude upon your leisure,” 
wrote Parkmen, “but you may rest assured that in giving me the desired information you 
will confer a very particular favor and not only on myself but a very considerable number 
of my acquaintances who have the idea of emigrating.”349 
Despite the seemingly constant political chaos emanating from Mexico City, 
something that Terán often agonized over in his writings, it was the political instability 
and oppression that they experienced in the United States to which prospective US 
immigrants constantly referred.  “You are already apprised on the unhappy state into 
which political schism has thrown our republic,” wrote Parkman, “in south Carolina open 
opposition is threatened to the tariff, yet “how far their threat will be carried into effect 
we have no idea.”  As bleak as Mexico’s political prospects looked, to many the United 
States looked far worse. “I cannot but hope there is a redeeming spirit in the land which 
will counteract the effects of military deeds upon the deluded multitude,” Parkman 
wrote.350 
Meanwhile, Austin used the opportunity to promote Texas to southern cotton 
producers.  He may have complained bitterly about the import tariff to Mexican leaders, 
                                                          
349 Samuel Parkman to SFA, 1 August 1828, AP, Vol. II, 85-86. 
350 Ibid.  
202 
 
 
 
but when he wrote to planters in the North who might consider relocating to Texas in 
order to escape the anti-southern tariffs in that country, he presented Mexican policies in 
a very different light. In July 1829, Austin wrote that the tax on imports “causes 
domestics to sell high and as the restrictive system appears to have become a part of the 
national policy, fair prospects may be calculated on for the manufacture of many years to 
come.”351  
Austin also emphasized the superior climate that Texas offered - one that 
particularly lent itself to the production of southern crops.  “It is true that our climate will 
not admit of coffee and cacao and other tropical productions,” he wrote, “[but] we can 
boast of the quality and abundance of our cotton crops and sugar and the other 
productions of Louisiana and Mississippi succeed very well.”  Agriculture was not the 
only industry that Texas offered: “The pasturage or ‘range’ as we term it is certainly 
superior to anything I have ever seen in any country, and the facilities for raising cattle, 
mules, sheep and hogs etc. almost exceeds credibility.”  Just as importantly, Texas’ 
location and terrain meant that growers and ranchers had ready access to Ports in the 
Caribbean, Europe and throughout Latin America, forgetting that many of these ports, 
principally Galveston, remained closed.  “The facilities of interior navigation are 
considerable and susceptible of extensive improvements,” he admitted, but “no country is 
better adapted for the cheap construction of country roads.”  It was true that “our harbors 
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will not admit vessels of the largest class,” but they were “sufficiently cheap for brigs and 
the smaller class of merchant ships.”  Additionally, Texas appeared to be more healthful 
than dank overpopulated port cities like New Orleans.  “The climate of Texas I deem to 
be decidedly superior in point of health and salubrity to the portion of north America at 
the same parallel,” he wrote, “I think that the practical experience of seven years justifies 
me in saying that the rivers of Texas are less liable to diseases than any river of the US 
below latitude 36” 352 
With their superior climate, strategic location and advantageous terrain, Texans 
made no secret of their hopes to replace the South as the leader in cotton trade and 
production in the Western Hemisphere.  And the current political climate in the North 
suggested they might see their dream come true.  “We shall next year be able to export a 
considerable amount of cotton and it is considered by many that if the “Tariff system” is 
continued by the Gov’t of the US a discrimination will be made by Great Britain in the 
article of cotton which will give to that of other countries a decided advantage over the 
United States.”  Furthermore, with Mexico’s liberal land policy and immigrants’ 
exemption from taxation for the first seven years after their immigration, “the means of 
subsistence here can be raised cheaper and no capital of consequence can be required at 
least for several years to procure land.”  Finally, “labor here will produce more than any 
part of the US within my knowledge.” Indeed, Texans relished at the first hint of 
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sectionalism that would eventually rip the United States apart.  As southern planters 
writhed under the tariff, Texan planters basked in the rays of the comparatively liberal 
trade policies of their adopted government. When Austin did mention the state of 
Mexican politics, he remained cautiously optimistic.  “Our government gets on very well, 
all things considered,” he wrote, “The federal system was an experiment and a very 
dangerous one for Mexico because their former habits and ideas as to political subjects.”  
Austin admitted that “there must be some collisions for a while, but good will grow out 
of them.”353    
But the right climate and government were not all that Texas had going for it.  Its 
strategic location, nestled in the northwestern corner of the Gulf of Mexico, accessible 
from both the interior of the US and Mexico, as well as the Caribbean, meant that Texas 
was poised to become the hub of a commercial empire that encompassed the entire 
hemisphere.  This was in fact precisely Austin’s plan. “I have it in contemplation to open 
a road direct from here to Paso del Norte, and Santa Fe, with a view to turn the trade 
which is now carried on to those places from Missouri, to the Port of Galveston,” he 
wrote to his cousin Henry in August 1829. “Should you fit out any exploring or other 
parties to that region I wish you would insert into their instructions to examine whether 
there is a practicle route through the mountains, east of El Paso, to the open prairies at the 
head of the Colorado or Brazos.”  Austin rightly observed Texas’ central location to any 
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trade network that linked the Mexican interior with the US.  “[T]he whole trade of the 
Chihuahua and Sonora and New Mexico regions must ultimately enter on one of the Ports 
of Texas.” In fact, Austin was downright arrogant when it came to his plans to make 
Texas the dominant commercial center of that corner of the globe:  
I am bold to say that, as a country, taken in the general average it is unequaled by 
any portion of North America.  You will recollect that I have had some 
opportunity of forming an opinion of this matter for I have seen this continent 
from Connecticut to the City of Mexico, and have generally been a close observer 
of localities, soil, climate, and etc., part from the peculiar values of the 
Mississippi River and the harbors I deem Texas to be of more intrinsic value as a 
country than all the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and the 
territories of Florida and Arkansas.354 
 
Yet Texans never saw this dream of a transnational economy threatening their 
relationship with the country that had made it all possible.  In fact, Austin took it upon 
himself to make the first official map of Texas, which he promptly sent to the 
Ayuntamiento of Béxar and the President of the Republic.  He did this service, he 
claimed, “for my adopted country in allegiance as a citizen” in order “to contribute to the 
geographical knowledge of Mexican territory, and to present our beloved Texas to the 
Mexicans and the rest of the world.”355   
 Austin then included a lengthy set of explanatory notes to the map which, it soon 
became evident, he hoped would illustrate the very concerns he had expressed to 
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Mexican officials: “We need two customs houses in Texas, one in Galveston and the 
other in Matagorda[,] and a maritime receivership or customshouse on the River Brazos.”  
The lack of such was a considerable problem since the colonies conducted all of their 
“jurisdictional commerce” through that river, their “infant state” requiring trade with 
[New] Orleans.” Austin insisted that “to prohibit or impair this commerce now would be 
most tragic to this region.”  
Yet, he was cautious to make clear that he had no plans whatsoever to see Texas 
separated from Mexico, no matter who came to inhabit it.  “Texas rightly belongs to 
Mexico, and for the naturalness of its geographic location, of its commercial interests, 
and its products,” he wrote.  Furthermore, he insisted that ultimately, though not yet, even 
Texas’ trade with the United States of the North would cease and be replaced by 
exclusive domestic trade with other Mexican states. 
The commerce of Texas will not be nor should it be, with the United States of the 
North but with the neighboring and maritime states of Mexico, and with the 
islands, and Europe, and consequently it is and will be the interest of Texas to 
unite with Mexico whatever might be the origin of its population, as long as they 
are civilized people, illustrious and entrepreneurial.  
 
Significantly, and perhaps surprisingly, Austin saw Texas’ seeming dependence on 
northern trade as temporary, lasting only as long as it would take for Texas and the rest of 
Mexico to develop their own internal economies.  Austin saw Texas’ commercial 
relationship with Mexico as ultimately far more important than its commercial 
207 
 
 
 
relationship with the US.  Conversely, Texas separation from Mexico would result in a 
loss of “the most productive and secure source of their commerce,” as well as their rights 
and privileges, “assuming that the Mexican government establishes itself permanently 
and quietly.”356 
 While Austin looked forward to a time when Texas’s principal trade would be 
with Mexico and not the North, he knew that first Texas had to establish itself. He 
therefore requested a few more years of unimpaired trade with the United States, “so as 
not to impede its progress and speed its development.”  Yet, he envisioned a time when 
all of the northern trade routes would lead to Matagorda or Béxar.  “[I]n a few years the 
commerce of New Mexico, Chihuahua and Sonora that now goes to Missouri should all 
be concentrated in Matagorda or Béxar,” he wrote.  Indeed, Austin aimed to replace 
American ports like St. Louis with Mexican ones.  
One look at the map of Texas shows that the designated port, given the 
geographical arrangement of those regions for their commerce, is Matagorda.  The 
distance of this port to Santa Fe in New Mexico is less than to Saint Louis . . . and 
you can buy goods in Matagroda at less cost than in Missouri because there is only 
one port to the ocean and the other is hundreds of leagues to the interior.   
 
Such a reorientation of the current trade network would, of course, benefit Mexico by 
reducing the cost of transportation since it would be “entirely contained within the 
territory of Mexico and by Mexican citizens.”  In so doing, Austin hoped to rectify 
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Mexico’s current extractive relationship with the United States, “Today the inhabitants of 
Missouri receive all of the benefit, when the origin of the commerce belongs to the 
Mexicans.”357 Texans consistently saw themselves and their commercial enterprise as 
forming a critical part of the Mexican national project.   Not only were they cautious to 
work within the legal confines of their adopted country, but they aimed to make 
themselves an imperative part of it.  
*** 
Yet, the challenge of integration extended well beyond trade and commerce.  As 
migrants flooded into Texas in the late 1820’s, Mexican administrators struggled to keep 
track of them, and even to assure that they intended to become loyal Mexican citizens.  
Many ended up settling along the northern and western border without contracts or 
formal permission from the government.  Regardless, many of them indeed wanted to 
become Mexican citizens and petitioned the government for recognition and integration.  
But while earlier settlers identified Mexico’s political system as their primary motive for 
immigrating, later settlers pointed to more pragmatic factors, such as land and protection 
from Indian raids.   
When Spain invaded Mexico in 1829, a group of Anglo-American squatters along 
the Sabine did not hesitate to defend Mexico, much as their predecessors had done during 
the Fredonian Rebellion.  But their stated reasons for wanting to be a part of that country 
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were somewhat different.  They lauded Mexico’s political system more for its distinction 
from Spain’s, not the United States.’  “The fair Godess of Liberty prescribed and hunted 
down in the old world, has chosen the continent of America as her favorite residence,” 
they wrote, “and when in their turn she penetrated and pervaded the hearts of the 
Mexicans  . . .  we felt the most lively enthusiasm and deepest interest for the successful 
termination of so glorious a conflict.”  Since then “we have with pride and joy seen the 
Mexican politicians and sages forming political institutions, the most enlightened and 
liberal, particularly as regards foreigners.”  After praising Mexico for yielding to “that 
singleness and purity of motive, that devotedness of thought and talent,” they pointed to 
the one thing that they would like in exchange for their service.358  Buried near the end of 
their document they explained that 
We have, sir, most of us, with much expense and trouble, come a great distance 
with our families, and to settle in the country, to obtain lands for our children and 
ourselves, to lay our bones in a soil consecrated by its heroes, and eternalized by 
the wisdom of its statesmen.  We have full confidence that the Commissioner 
mentioned by your excellency and Promised by the Most Excellent President of 
the Republic, will come amongst us, and put us into possession of the lands we 
occupy, agreeable to the laws; we shall rejoice on the day of his arrival. 
 
Does the fact that their demonstrations of loyalty were accompanied by self-interest 
compromise their integrity?  Earlier immigrants had economic motives too, but their 
identity was more specifically Mexican.  This later group seemed to draw on a shared 
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republicanism that cast the Old World monarchies, not the United States, as the opponent. 
Suffice is to say that, unlike the Fredonian rebels or squatter communities more 
generally, these men aspired to national belonging, with all of its attendant benefits and 
obligations.  They wanted the Mexican government to acknowledge and absorb them, and 
in exchange they “organized with arms in our hands, and both now and at all times 
hereafter, tender to Your Excellency,” rendered “our best services in support of the state 
and general government against all enemies whether external or internal.”359 
 Land title was not the only thing fueling immigration during this period.  As 
Indian raids picked up in the late 1820’s and into the 1830’s, it gave many borderland 
residents a new reason to claim Mexican citizenship.  Disappointed by the United States’ 
failure to protect them from hostile Indian tribes - and in many cases propelled into 
conflict with these groups due to the United States’ own Indian removal policies - many 
turned to Mexico.    In 1828 William Rabb petitioned the Governor of Texas for 
increased protection from Indian marauders and US authorities on the western side of the 
Red River.  “The opinion of the most intelligent men in the country is that we are within 
the limits of the province of texas, and a melancholy experience convinces us that we do 
not enjoy the protection of the United States,” he wrote.  Identifying themselves as 
“worthy and industrious inhabitants who have now the misfortune to live under the most 
oppressive and disgraceful circumstances,” Rabb explained that “The opposite bank of 
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the Red River had, heretofore been under the civil Jurisdiction of the United states which 
government has, lately, ceded the territory to the Choctaw Indians.”  Yet the settlers and 
late civil officers still continue to live in said territory, and exercise by force their 
jurisdiction.”   As a result, Rabb explained, “We are compelled to pay the most exorbitant 
taxes” and “we have daily to submit to the most insulting and oppressive abuses.”  He 
complained that the inhabitants of the north bank, “carry on a regular commerce with the 
Comanches, supplying them with arms and ammunition.”  Rabb stated that the 
inhabitants of this “oppressed territory” would “be happy under your protection, and feel 
sorely the absence of laws or regulations by which they may be governed.”360   
 In addition to raiding and lack of title, a general sense of lawlessness seemed to 
pervade especially eastern Texas. In 1829 a group of citizens in Nacogdoches, the region 
that just two years prior was home to the notorious Fredonian Rebellion, issued a formal 
request of the Mexican president.  They informed him that they had “resided in this 
province for several years during which time we have been without Government and 
without a knowledge of what is required of us as citizens of this Republic.”  Feeling 
“sensibly the allegiance due from a citizen of this Government, and the obligation on the 
part of the Government to protect its citizens from Laws” they requested “a publication 
and diffusion of the Laws of the country in the English language.”  The fact that they 
could not read Spanish, of course, illustrated the accuracy of Terán’s claim that Anglos 
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were rapidly outnumbering Mexicans by this time and no longer felt the same 
assimilationist impulses – including language acquisition - an earlier generation of 
settlers had.  But they nonetheless sought greater integration into the Mexican 
administrative fold.    They requested that a court be established “according to the custom 
now prevailing in that section of the country.”  They pointed out “the propriety of 
organizing the Militia for the defense of the Province, in the event of an invasion of this 
country by Old Spain.” Additionally, they expressed the need for the adjustment of their 
land claim, which would “attach the people more firmly to your Government.” Lest one 
suspect that they were only interested in obtaining the benefits of citizenship, they also 
requested greater communication with and access to the seat of national power “so that 
we can have it in our power to act in conformity with the wishes of the Government.”361  
Here we see a set of sentiments very different from what the rumors suggested and 
indeed what most interpretations of early Texas settlers would have us believe.  It was the 
lack of government authority not its excess of which they complained.  These people did 
not seek to avoid the state, as national leaders feared, they craved its embrace.362 
Yet, not all policies designed with the aim of extending Mexico’s administrative 
reach were greeted approvingly.  Austin and some more established settlers often found 
themselves defending local government taxation initiatives from immigrants who insisted 
that the colonization law protected them from such encroachments.  Terming its critics 
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“either ignorant of the law” or “willfully malicious and wish[ing] to create confusion,” 
Austin reminded colonists that they were in fact exempt from most taxes, but not those 
“that are laid generally to repel a foreign invasion,” or taxes “levied by the ayuntamiento 
for municipal purposes.”363 
 When colonists complained about being required to register births and deaths, 
Austin again jumped to the defense of the government, stating that “The law most 
positively requires the ayuntamiento to keep a register of births and deaths in the 
jurisdiction, and to make a return every three months to the chief of the department.” He 
dismissed the colonists’ complaints. “Strange and incredible as it would appear to any 
man who possessed common sense that this measure should create discontent and 
misrepresentation,” Austin insisted that it was in the best interest of every citizen, but 
especially children, for it secured to them “beyond the possibility of a doubt important 
privileges as native born Mexicans that someday or the other may be of the greatest 
advantage to them.” Austin reminded colonists that the benefits of Mexican citizenship 
came with responsibilities too.   He went on to explain that citizens’ failure to comply 
with the law would only create more expense by requiring a sheriff to go house to house 
to collect the information. Of the state vagrancy law he wrote that “All civilized countries 
that I know anything about have a vagrant law – this state has one and it is a very good 
and just and necessary one.”  The “clamour” of discontent compelled the ayuntamiento 
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not to enforce the law, something that enraged Austin who blamed “disorderly and bad 
men” for instigating discontent.  “I regret this state of things exceedingly,” he wrote, “It 
has caused me to doubt that there is either a want of judgment in the mass of the people 
to discriminate between a rigid and just execution of the laws and an abuse of them[,] or 
that there is a great mass of moral depravity which results from restrain or legal 
control.”364   
 Yet, it was becoming increasingly clear, both to Austin and Mexican authorities, 
that integration would not be easy.  “The civil authority must be sustained by public 
confidence,” wrote Austin “and if the people are mere puppets in the hands of artful 
demagogues and clamorous factionists whose interest it is to discredit the civil authorities 
and throw them into ridicule, where is the security of honest men?” In part, he saw this as 
a result of Americans’ lack of familiarity with Mexican law - something that he sought to 
remedy immediately.  But for Austin the problem went even deeper - it was in fact an 
unfortunate cultural characteristic. The people of his colony “lack judgment to 
discriminate between what is the duty of a public officer, and an abuse of his authority,” 
and suffered from “a disposition to be suspicious and jealous of ‘men in power.’”  Rather 
than any sign of incompatibility with Mexico, Austin insisted that “the American people 
of a natural propensity to suspect and to abuse all men who are in office.” 365   
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 Indeed, for Austin, the problem had to do with the particularities of the American 
character.  In another letter to Thomas White written the same month, he blamed such 
lack of national obligation towards and cooperation with the Mexican government on the 
“unbounded republican liberty which is enjoyed by all classes in the United States.”  In 
other words, a “jealousy of those in office, jealousy of undue encroachments of personal 
rights and a general repugnance to everything that bore even the semblance of a stretch of 
power.”  Conceding that such feelings were “correct when properly guided by an 
enlightened judgment, capable of discriminating between a necessary and rigorous 
discharge of an official duty and an abuse of it,” Austin insisted that the American people 
were “somewhat defective” when it came to this ability – “though not more so than the 
mass of the people – most of whom were in the United States.  Thus, there was still hope 
for the colonists who, Austin insisted, owed their loyalty to a Mexican government, 
whose policies were so “liberal and indulgent” that they “caused some to doubt their 
reality.”  Austin concluded his letter by delineating between the political situation in 
Texas versus that unfolding at the country’s center.  “The disturbances in Mexico do not 
affect us here – we have nothing to do with them – all that is necessary here is to keep 
harmony amongst ourselves – and to work hard.”366  Norteamericanos, simply put, were 
difficult people for anyone to govern.   
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Yet, as frontier southerners, it is perhaps just as likely that their behavior was the 
result of their hereunto limited experience with federal authority – an entity that they 
perhaps only understood in the abstract. This later generation of settlers did not 
demonstrate the same political sophistication that those of Austin’s generation did.  There 
were many reasons for this, one being that the Austins were simply more educated and 
worldly than many of the later settlers.  As part of the founding generation of American 
immigrants to Mexico, circumstances had also required a certain level of familiarity with 
and trust of the central government. More to the point, however, ideas about citizenship, 
government, and authority were still nascent in early nineteenth-century Mexico and the 
United States, especially on the frontier where federal authority often remained 
inconspicuous.  While many frontiers people understood that there was a federal 
government somewhere that could grant them rights and privileges in exchange for 
service and loyalty, the precise nature and mechanics of this relationship were still 
unclear, and, they believed, malleable.  This was as true in Mexico as it was in the US 
and was not necessarily a sign of disloyalty.  It was, rather, a sign of the still nebulous 
and changing relationship between citizen and state in these young republics. 
 One remedy might be to better acquaint immigrants with the laws of their adopted 
country.  In October of 1829, Austin decided to translate all legislative decisions and 
have them printed in local newspapers.  “The work is very essential,” he insisted, “and 
there is nothing more necessary and important for the welfare of Texas for reason that 
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more of the inhabitants do not understand a word of Spanish and it is entirely impossible 
to govern a people with laws whose existence the masses ignore absolutely.”  In many 
ways, these problems were the result of the success of his own recruitment efforts.  As 
more and more immigrants from the North flooded into the region, they felt less 
compelled to assimilate or even cooperate with Mexican officials.  Many of Austin’s 
complaints were beginning to mirror those of Terán and other national leaders who called 
for greater governmental presence and authority on the frontier:  “All the difficulties in 
Nacogdoches has come entirely from the lack of troops and persons of law and chiefs in 
order to administrate them.”  But perhaps most worrisome was that so many people were 
ignorant of the very laws and constitution that had attracted the first wave of immigrants. 
“I have not a person of judgment that is well informed about the national and state 
constitution,” Austin wrote.   Yet he claimed to not know of a single person who knew 
them who did not express himself “entirely satisfactory with them and this is enough in 
order to prove the importance of the translation.”367  In addition to greater knowledge of 
the laws and constitution of Mexico, Austin had to make sure that colonists were taking 
oaths of allegiance.368  Only then could they receive formal title to their land.  In this 
way, Austin worked tirelessly to guarantee both Mexico’s national security and the rights 
of its colonists. 
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 Yet, the precise nature of the colonists’ grievances and to whom, exactly, they 
were directed, remained unclear.  A September 1829 letter from Thomas McKinney 
suggested that colonists’ dissatisfaction was limited to local authorities. “I am somewhat 
astonished at the idea of there being in circulation a report that there was brewing in this 
section of country any project against the Government[,] for I do assure you that so far as 
has come under my observation or intelligence there is not such a thing thought of.”  
McKinney clarified that said discontent had more to do with the seemingly arbitrary 
behavior of particular appointees, not the state or federal government.  “As to Col. 
Piedras,” McKinney wrote, “there is the strongest opposition among the people both 
Americans and Mexicans,” who accused him of “being friendly to the Spanish invasion.”  
McKinney insisted that Piedras was “aware of his standing and ready to say as frequently 
as he has done that it is an unfriendly feeling towards the government when in reality it is 
nothing more than a just contempt for his baseness.”369 
Indeed, much suspected discontent towards the Mexican government was most 
likely simply directed at local authorities whom colonists believed to be not just corrupt 
or incompetent, but disloyal to Mexico, and it may even have been a result of the very 
bureaurocracy put in place to combat it.  Far from the center of national power, colonists 
had little communication or interaction with their own national leaders.  As Mexico 
attempted to draw Texas closer to its national fold, it appointed magistrates with little 
                                                          
369 Thomas McKinney to SFA, 9 September 1829, AP., Vol. II, 254-57. 
219 
 
 
 
familiarity or relationship with local communities and who often fell into acrimonious 
relations with them.  When colonists had complaints, they took them to these 
“representatives” who may have very likely misrepresented them to national leaders.  
Isolated on the frontier, often with limited knowledge of Spanish or Mexican law, 
colonists had little recourse under such circumstances. 
*** 
On April 5th 1830, Austin received a disconcerting letter from a Texan trader 
named Edwin I. Petit, then in New Orleans preparing to return.  Petit conveyed rumors, 
then circulating in the North that “[Mexico] is very unsettled,” and “the States of Yucatan 
and Tobasco have determined to split off unless a central Government is Established.” 
Indeed the country was unsettled.  Just a few months prior, Guerrero had been 
overthrown by his own Vice President Anastacio Bustamante.  Petit conveyed 
information based on his own experience at the Port of Vera Cruz. “The present 
administration are taking some high handed measures,” he wrote, “the commandant of 
the Marine has been taken from his station and dismissed [from] the service without even 
the form of a trial.”  Furthermore, trade commissions issued to northern privateers under 
Guerrero had been withdrawn.  But the most disturbing news had to do with a new 
federal law rumored “to stop the Emigration of Americans to Texas.”370   
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Termed the Law of April 6th, 1830, it was issued largely in response to Jackson’s 
recent efforts to purchase Texas from Mexico and based on the recommendations of 
Terán in the aftermath of his tour.   The mastermind was Lucas Alamán, Mexico’s 
secretary of state who, in his complaint to Congress, began by explaining the particular 
style of US territorial advancement and what he believed to be the colonists’ role in it.  
“They commence by introducing themselves into the territory they covet,” he explained.  
Then they “grow, set up right, and bring forward ridiculous pretensions.”  Then come 
explorers and speculators who excite political unrest and then “the diplomatic 
management commences.” 371  
This, Alamán insisted, was precisely what had occurred in Texas where “the 
majority of the population is composed of natives of the United States of the North” who 
“come from all directions to settle upon the fertile lands . . . without previously 
complying with the requisites of our laws, or in violation of our existing contracts.”  
Meanwhile, “The Mexican population is, as it were, stationary,” while the North 
American “is increasing, particularly from the number of slaves introduced by them, and 
whom they retain, without manumitting them, as they should do.”  All of this, Alamán 
claimed, “has given them a preponderance in Texas which now hardly belongs, in fact, to 
the Mexican confederacy.”372 
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 From Alamán’s remarks, one might conclude that the immigration policy had 
accomplished precisely the opposite of what it was intended to.  The remedy, according 
to the secretary, was a bold federal decree that established a series of garrisons, 
particularly along its border with the US, formally terminated further immigration from 
countries “lying adjacent” to Mexico.  Additionally, the Law of April 6th put forth a 
program to encourage the settlement of ethnic Mexican families.  While it exempted 
Anglo colonies “already established,” it did not specify Austin’s. For many national 
leaders who looked warily upon the growing numbers of US immigrants to Mexico, the 
law “provided the opportunity to remedy the infractions and abuses that have been 
observed.”  There seemed little room in the national discourse for opposition.  “[A]ll 
good Mexicans,” as Alamán put it, “should appreciate this law.”373 
But it was not appreciated.  The following month, Thomas Chambers expressed 
grave concern regarding rumors surrounding the new decree. “The ebullition of public 
feeling in our quarter is fearful,” he wrote, since “The most violent and fatal measures are 
takeing both by the states and general governments in relations to the colonies of this 
department.”374 In June, Samuel May Williams received a letter from a prospective 
immigrant in New Orleans.  “We in this country [the United States] have many 
unfavorable reports from Texas,” he wrote, “it is universally urged that your Government 
is too unsettled and Unstable.”  But the rumored prohibition on immigration was the 
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greatest concern.  “[I]t is now reported, and pretty generally believed, that your Congress 
has forbid farther settlement of Americans in texas[,] and that the Mexicans, Themselves 
are quite Ripe for a Revolution among themselves.”  Such rumors stood to forestall a 
great number of immigrants who were otherwise eager to move.  “[I]f Reports from texas 
do not become too alarming you will Receive a Very considerable and Valuable 
population from this Country during the Approaching Winter and Spring,” he assured 
Williams.  But in order for this to happen, prospective immigrants needed some 
assurance of their own. “We however must believe that Texas settled by Americans must 
flourish Under the Mexican Government and at some future time may obtain a 
considerable influence over the General Government.”375 Again, prospective immigrants 
did not just want land, they wanted political influence in Mexico.  However, given the 
current direction of political affairs, this did not look likely. 
Afraid that the new law would sabotage his recruitment efforts, Austin took 
matters into his own hands. In a formal letter addressed to the president himself, he 
pointed out that the object of the law “appears to be the complete destruction of all 
happiness and prosperity of this colony.” He insisted on its unconstitutionality, declaring 
that it was in violation of the pre-existing colonization laws of the republic and the state 
of Coahuila y Téjas “which in direct and positive terms call for and encourage 
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immigration.”376  Austin also wrote a formal letter to Lucas Alamán, hoping to remind 
him of the great benefit that the Mexican nation gained from his empressorship:  
It is doubtless well known to Y.E. that I am the first empresario who undertook to 
form a settlement in the wilderness of Texas, that I have devoted all my time and 
personal attention to this object since the year 1821.  That I have succeeded fully 
in redeeming a considerable portion of this country from a state of nature overrun 
by savages in which I found it, and that I have laid a foundation for the permanent 
advancement and prosperity of Texas by rendering it easy to form new 
settlements in consequence of the resources which may be drawn from my 
colony. 
  
Austin reminded Alamán that his “maxim has always been and now is fidelity and 
gratitude to Mexico.”  He then proceeded to express his confusion at such legislation and 
at the increasing sense of suspicion towards Anglo settlements, seeking to correct them 
and asserting that “the commercial and agricultural interests of Texas, will be more 
effectively promoted by remaining under this government than under any other.” He 
reminded the authorities that the colonists “became Mexicans by choice, they have been 
faithful to this government since they entered this territory, [and] they wish to remain 
Mexicans.”  The Law of April 6th, however, would “have a fatal tendency,” for those 
immigrants already on their way to Mexico, since they “would be totally ruined and the 
odium would of necessity fall on the government that caused their ruin.” Austin 
concluded by assuring Alamán that the immigrants he allowed to enter were “of the very 
best class,” and that “the acquisition of that population would do more towards uniting 
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Texas to Mexico and restoring order and tranquility than any measure that could be 
adopted.”377   
Interestingly, when it came to whom to blame for the unfortunate turn of events, 
Austin pointed to the United States, not Mexico.  “[T]he excessive noise that has been 
made in the US papers about the purchase of Texas seems to have had a much greater 
weight in Mexico than a matter so unimportant ought to have had.”   He even suspected a 
bit of foul play, specifically, that expansionist minded agents in the North might be 
attempting to incite rebellion in Texas, so as to compel a separation. “[A] train seems to 
have been laid by someone, to drive this gov’t to such acts as would be most likely to 
kindle discontent in Texas and at the same time sow the seeds of disgust between the two 
nations.”378 
In his letters to Mexican officials, Austin blamed Jackson’s foreign minister, 
Poinsett, for Mexican confusion and hostility, and did what he could to distance himself 
from the intrigues of the Jackson cabinet. Austin hardly minced words in his accusations. 
“[T]he falicies that have resulted can be attributed to the intrigues of Poinsett!” he wrote 
to Col. Piedras, “For my part, I protest before God almighty that I have never violated the 
interests of Mexico in the slightest, nor have I violated my duty as a Mexican citizen – I 
do not believe that it is in the interest of texas to unite with the North.”  Austin attempted 
to clarify his earlier remarks, insisting that he had called for “greater Governmental 
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regulations at the local level,” the necessity of which was “evident to anyone who knows 
anything about Texas.” Austin was clear that his earlier complaints should not be 
confused with rebelliousness.  “In this colony there is not discontent nor has there ever 
been against the Government, to the contrary all the colonists are satisfied with their 
situation, but it appears that in Mexico there are other ideas.”379  Austin insisted that 
despite his criticisms, he had “entire confidence in the justice and talent of the 
administration” and considered it “the Savior of Mexico from anarchy.”380  
Ultimately, Austin’s colony did receive partial exemption from the law.  The 
government decided to lift the ban on future immigration to his colony only, and 
continued to require that all US traders pay one percent of their profits to the government.  
This did little to allay settlers’ frustration.  Henry Austin wrote that the taxation decree 
was “in direct contravention of the Constitution.” Colonists expressed clear frustration 
with a law that sought to “kill the goose in search of the golden egg.”  Yet, Henry Austin 
agreed with his brother that the settlers, despite their frustrations with the new regime, 
were hardly contemplating turning their backs on Mexico.  Of Terán, he wrote that “he 
has more apprehension of a Grito for centralism in the South and a separation of those 
northern states which are federal, than of the US or Texas where in fact there is nothing 
to fear until outrage shall produce difficulty.”  What’s more, Henry pointed out that “he 
counts upon much support from Texas in such an event.”  In a letter to Lucas Alamán, 
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Austin argued that, given the recent political turmoil in Mexico, colonists had every 
opportunity to rebel.  The fact that they had not was the best proof that they never would.  
“[M]any times have I been without the support of any Government as a result of the 
various changes, revolutions and internal disagreements that have agitated the Mexican 
nation,” he wrote, “Forgive me sir for alluding to them and ask the question, if my 
intentions, or the intentions of my colonists were not sane, quiet and peaceful what more 
favorable opportunity would we have?”381  
Austin immediately set to work on damage control, publishing an editorial in the 
Texas Gazette explaining the law of April 6th and attempting to quell widespread 
discontent.  He pointed out that it allowed Texans “open and unembarrassed” trade with 
Mexican ports –“the best in the world, for the sale of cotton or other woolen goods.”  
Despite his own criticisms, he adamantly defended the Mexican federal government.  “In 
short, all that nature and a liberal and munificent government can do has been done,” he 
insisted, “and nothing is now wanting but capital, enterprise and industry.”  Colonists 
were again reminded that their future prosperity depended on Mexican beneficence.382 
 Austin and Williams took their declarations of loyalty to the press, naming the 
newspaper they founded together the Mexican Citizen.  And when it came to the paper’s 
motto, “Mexico es mi patria, would do better, for it will be as much as to say to people 
abroad ‘we have a country and are proud of it, and we are ready and willing to defend her 
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rights.’”  Furthermore, “it will remind our home folks whom they belong to.”   By the 
beginning of 1831, the men were satisfied with their efforts.  It seemed that they had 
finally convinced Mexico of colonists’ loyalty to it. “Last spring the idea was very 
general in Mexico that Texas was the Botany Bay of the US and the Gov’t of the North 
was secretly encouraging the emigration of bad men and vagabonds, who were destitute 
of principle, for the purpose of enciting them to rebel against the Govt.”  Yet Austin 
believed he had diverted such a crisis.  “This Gov’t now believes that the settlers of my 
colony at least, are men of principle who will respect their oaths of fidelity, and will 
never forget that they have received fortunes from this Govt and favors which no other 
Govt ever extended.”383  
  Despite Mexico’s blatantly anti-American stance, immigrants continued to flood 
into Texas.  In fact, records indicate that immigration from the North actually grew after 
1830.  Whereas between 1822 and 1830, it had continued at a fairly steady stream of 
approximately 1,000 per year, that number increased to nearly 3,000 per year after 1830, 
so that Anglo-Texans would ultimately outnumber the ethnic Mexican population by 10 
to 1.  A temporary lifting of the immigration restriction might have had something to do 
with this, or the decision to continue to allow only certain colonies such as Austin’s to 
admit immigrants may have encouraged prospective immigrants to take advantage of 
such leniencies while they existed.  Whatever the case, unlike the first wave of 
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immigrants, many from this newer generation arrived in the country at a time of profound 
political instability, as Mexico was beginning to move closer to centralism. They also 
tended to be more restive than the prior generation, who exhibited a stronger faith in the 
Mexican political process.  This brought them into conflict not only with the Mexican 
leadership, but with the more established elements of the Anglo-Texan population.  Men 
like Austin and Williams worked tirelessly to encourage immigrants to look to Mexican 
law to address their grievances, but with Mexico’s federalist promise faltering and with 
growing hostility towards Anglo-Americans, this proved a difficult task among a group 
of people who showed increasingly less loyalty to both Austin and the country he had 
sworn to protect.384 
*** 
Meanwhile, Terán had diligently set to work carrying out his new orders 
stipulated under the decree.  He established military forts at Nacogdoches, Béxar and San 
Felipe, and one at the mouth of the Brazos he called Velasco.  He assigned Col. David 
Bradburn, himself a Kentucky immigrant, as overseer.  Terán also established custom 
houses at Matamoros and Galveston where he appointed George Fisher, another US 
immigrant, as customs officer.  As the seven years during which immigrants were exempt 
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from taxation began to expire, he ordered the collection of taxes on virtually all goods 
from the North.385 
 While the federal government was attempting to extend its authority into the 
frontier, the state of Coahila y Téjas, in response to a petition from Austin and seventy-
five other men from his colony, had appointed a land commissioner named Francisco 
Madero to assign formal grants to immigrants who had not yet received them.  When 
Madero arrived in Texas, he established the town of Liberty, began distributing land 
grants, and commenced elections for alcalde and members of the ayuntamiento.  When 
Terán caught wind of these activities, he ordered Bradburn to arrest Madero and halt 
elections, which Bradburn promptly did to the ire of almost everyone in Texas.   Madero 
reacted by accusing Bradburn of disobeying his “immediate chief” and committing an 
“infraction of the constitution.”386 Terán, however, sided with his subordinate, insisting 
that the new decree froze the issuance of more land grants to Anglo-American colonists 
and that Bradburn was therefore fully within his bounds to imprison him. 
 Tensions simmered until early 1832 when, shortly after establishing a new custom 
house at Anáhuac, Fisher demanded that all ships ported in Galveston clear their papers 
with him in Anáhuac before being permitted to leave port.  Conditions worsened when 
Bradburn commenced to close all of the ports except Galveston.  The order came on the 
heels of a series of contraband seizures, and it was the last straw. In an angry letter to 
                                                          
385 Rowe, 270. 
386 Ibid., 271; J. Francisco Madero to Samuel May Williams, 15 March 1831, SMWP. 
230 
 
 
 
Bradburn, Austin called such regulations “utterly impracticable” and their execution  
practically impossible.  You   know your native countrymen,” he continued “and you also 
know that at this time the people have just causes and very many of them to complain.”  
Austin warned that unless a more liberal system were adopted, “the country will be 
totally broken up and all commerce totally annihilated.”   Bradburn passed Austin’s letter 
on to Terán, recommending that “the whole country lying within ten leagues of the coast” 
be placed “under martial law.”  If local authorities resisted, they would face “exemplary 
punishment.” 387  
The situation came to a head when the schooner Sabine attempted to run the 
blockade at Velasco after its captain was informed he had to pay a fee and receive 
permission from Anáhuac before he could leave port.  A group of disgruntled colonists 
who had recently seized the port assisted Brown in his assault.  Terán was incensed. 
“You want the Government to adopt a more liberal policy,” he wrote in his reply to 
Austin, “You should say what liberality you long for beyond that which you already 
receive.”  The collection of customs duties was a fair and practically universal practice in 
the Americas, he insisted, “Only in Brazoria is it believed that there is a reason for 
rebellion.”  Not only did Terán refuse to ease restrictions or to replace Bradburn and 
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Fisher as Austin had requested, but he dispatched Col. Domingo Ugartechea with over 
one hundred troops to reinforce Velasco.388   
While admitting that the actions of the colonists were wrong, Austin did agree 
with their impulse.  “All the people here who have anything to lose or who have three 
grains of common sense oppose separation from Mexico and all disorder,” he assured the 
general.  In a separate letter to the Supreme Government, Austin specifically asked for 
exemption from the tariff on such items as clothing, tobacco, books, and medicine.   
While he did not defend the rebellion at Anáhuac, he did blame Fisher for it and 
specifically asked that he be removed “and replaced by a Mexican.” Regardless of what 
role Austin himself played in prompting the rebellion at Anáhuac, it no doubt gave him 
some leverage in negotiating with Mexican authorities. 389   
In May of 1832, a meeting was arranged in Anáhuac to discuss the new 
impositions.  When Bradburn caught wind of it he arrested the leaders and threw them in 
jail, just as he had done to Madero.  When the men were finally released, they 
immediately began agitating the colonists to demand the release of other colonists whom 
Bradburn had imprisoned.  In mid-June, news of a recent string of federalist victories in 
the interior under the leadership of General Antonio López de Santa Anna reached Texas.  
The rebels declared their allegiance to the federalist resistance in a preamble in which 
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they declared the “determination of Texas to repel further aggressions by the military, 
and to maintain their rights under the constitution of 1824.”  They complained that the 
present “dynasty” had repeatedly violated the constitution, ignored the law, and replaced 
civil authority with “military despotism.”  They therefore expressed “feelings of deepest 
interest and solicitude” in Santa Anna’s resistance “to the numberless encroachments and 
infractions which have been made by the present administration upon the constitution.”  
They determined to pledge “our lives and fortunes in support of the same and of the 
distinguished leader, who is now so gallantly fighting in defense of civil liberty.”  They 
invited other Texans to join them, and John Austin, nephew of the founder, headed a 
small group of men to proceed to Brazoria to collect reinforcements. 390 On June 20, the 
citizens of Brazoria held a meeting in which they resolved to heed the call to join the 
federalists, asserting that the existing federal authorities had “evinced a total disregard of 
the constitution of the country.”  It was therefore their duty, they claimed, “to declare our 
opposition to the ruling dynasty and to place ourselves in the ranks of the supporters of 
the constitution.”391 
 The colonists then proceeded onto Velasco, one hundred and fifty strong.  Father 
Muldoon made a desperate attempt to avoid bloodshed by first offering himself as a 
hostage in exchange for the liberty of the imprisoned Texans.  When his offer was 
rebuffed, he then tried to negotiate with Ugartachea himself, but the colonel was resolved 
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to sustain himself against the rebels.  “I do not believe that sensible men who have had so 
many advantages in this land would like to lose them in a day,” the colonel stated, “but if 
such should be the case, you would find me determined in everything.” 392 
As tensions flared, local leadership attempted to quell ensuing disaster.  In a 
formal address, Ramón Músquiz reminded citizens to direct their grievances “against 
measures and not men.”393  Yet, the rebellion continued to spread, even into two 
settlements in Austin’s Colony.  This decision would bring the leadership of San Felipe 
into direct confrontation with the more radical elements of its citizenry, as Williams set to 
work counseling calm and obedience, and imploring citizens to appeal to Mexico City 
rather than take up arms.   “We admit wrong has been committed, but what Course does 
our Constitution and our Laws point out for redress of those injuries and wrongs Whether 
felt by an individual or a Community,” he asked.  The answer should be obvious - “An 
appeal to the Supreme Authorities of the State and Nation.”  Just as they had done for the 
Fredonian Rebellion, Williams and others called on the local militia to help Mexican 
troops suppress their “poor, misguided fellow citizens” and ward off the evil “that 
threatens not only those who are unfortunately in arms, but ourselves because if the 
government be convinced that we are all in rebellion, by harvest time the colony will be 
filled with troops.”  Williams reminded colonists of the magnanimity of their adopted 
country – “the sacrifices, bounties and benefits” of a Government “that admitted and 
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encouraged your settlement.”  Finally, he drew on a shared sense of national pride as he 
appealed to longstanding Anglo citizens to convince their newly arrived brethren to lay 
down their arms.   “Are you ready and willing to permit that your Countryman, your 
friends, your kindred, and your brothers shall hurl defiance at that government, and 
destruction on your families,” Williams declared, illustrating the significant rift between 
established settlers and the more restive, new arrivals, who had very different ideas about 
how best to remedy their grievances. “[O]r will unite as one man, and use those exertions 
which honorable and high minded feelings suggest, to cause a return to their home and to 
their duties.” The government “now calls for acts not words,” declared Williams.  And 
while he acknowledged the “pecuniary nature” of the kinds of sacrifice for which he was 
asking, “they should yield to the more grand and important objects of duty and 
obligation.”  Williams concluded his remarks with a gesture to the future 
Let your movements be prompt and rapid, and join and unite with us heart in hand 
to save the colony, and our fellow citizens, from the impending ruin, and let our 
children have the happiness in future ages of counting their forefathers as among 
those who in 1832, Saved the country from the terrible infliction of anarchy and 
confusion. 394  
 
Yet it is clear from their own words, that the rebels did not see their actions as in 
any way in violation of the nation to which they had sworn allegiance. While these men 
did not heed Músquiz’s advice, they nonetheless saw their efforts as in the service of, not 
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opposition to, the Mexican Republic.  Accusing Bradburn of violating the rights “which 
we, as citizens of the Mexican republic, have considered as the rule of our civil conduct,” 
they insisted that “it is with deep regret we hear of the necessity of repelling 
unconstitutional encroachments.”395  
Arriving in Anáhuac on the 23rd of July, the rebels first approached Ugartachea in 
peace.  When asked about their mission, “they answered that they were members of an 
assembly which had been formed in Brazoria,” had declared in favor of Santa Anna and 
his Plan of Vera Cruz, and that they came to invite him to join them.  When the colonel 
refused, they requested passage.  When he asked them if their schooner was armed, they 
said it was but that they only wanted to fight Bradburn not him.  If Ugartachea did not 
consent, however, they had been ordered to “intimidate” him.  The colonel refused again, 
sending the men back to their camp where they prepared for an attack which commenced 
late on the evening of the 27th.  The Colonel reported that the rebels cried “‘Long live the 
republic, the constitution and laws! Long live the supreme government!” as they 
commenced their attack. Once it appeared the Mexican forces had suppressed the rebels 
John Austin sent word that he wished to speak with the colonel.  When the two men met, 
their greeting was respectful, according to Ugartachea. “We saluted each other, and I 
greeted many friends, men of prominence in the colony, whom I had not thought would 
be found among them.  We toasted one another, but we respected one another’s 
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opinions.”  According to the colonel, Austin “praised the bravery of the Mexicans” and 
assured him that “notwithstanding the fact that I had fought them,” he “did not have an 
enemy among all the Americans.”  The rebels even attempted to persuade the colonel to 
join them, offering to place themselves under his command.  Although the Colonel 
refused their offer, he had to surrender due to lack of ammunition.396 
Meanwhile, more citizens renounced the rebels, including the town of Bastrop 
which, on July 2nd, declared “unequivocally that they have ever been, and still continue to 
be loyal subjects of the Mexican Government.”  Furthermore, they were “ready to obey 
any order, command or requisite that may be deemed necessary.” 397   Austin for his part 
attempted to present the rebellion as one declared in the name of Mexico and the 
Mexican Constitution, not in violation of them.  “It has been said that the Colonists have 
insulted the Mexican flag,” he wrote to one Mexican official.  “I dare answer that it is 
false,” he asserted. “[T]hose who have trampled upon the constitution, Laws, and 
guarantees under the authority of that honored flag are the ones to bear the reproach of 
the insult, and not the Mexican citizens who resisted such abuses of power.” Texans did 
not oppose increased governmental presence in the northern frontier, they opposed the 
way in which it was administered. It did seem that the more the government flexed its 
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muscle, the less the colonists seemed to appreciate it.  Yet, while their reaction to the 
increased military presence was mixed, colonists remained generally obedient.398  
On July 18th the rebels set forth their grievances in a formal address to Col. A.J. 
Mexía.  They claimed that “the causes which impelled us to take up arms, have been 
misrepresented, or misunderstood,” and attempted to clarify their complaints. “The 
Colonists of texas have long since been convinced, of the Arbitrary and unconstitutional 
measures, of the Administration of Bustamante,” which included the “fixing and 
establishing” of military posts - the officers of which disregarded “the local civil 
Authorities of the state”; the “interposition of a military force,” the interference of locally 
elected administrators; the military commander of Anáhuac “advising and procuring 
Servants to quit the service of their Masters;” and the “imprisonment of our citizens 
without lawful cause”. 399    
When Col. Piedras finally arrived in Brazoria he was able to establish a truce with 
the colonists that included replacing Bradburn, freeing the imprisoned Texans, and 
reestablishing the ayuntamiento at Liberty.  In his own report he admitted, that “wisdom 
and prudence have not been exercised in that place,” though of Bradburn he stated that “I 
do not find him guilty of as many abuses as are imputed against him.”  
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But events like those which occurred at Anáhuac had a lasting impact on Texas-
Mexican relations.  While the call for Texan independence remained a long way off, it 
did reveal a growing cleavage between colonists willing to embrace armed conflict to 
address their grievances, and those who counseled calm and obedience.  While the rates 
of immigration increased after 1830, the new wave of immigrants expressed far less of 
the optimism towards Mexico’s political future that their forebears had.  “I was not 
deceived in the country, this is certainly a delightful part of the world,” wrote James 
Perry, Austin’s brother-in-law and recent arrival to Texas.  Terming Texas “the Garden 
of all North America,” Perry wrote that “if full reliance could be placed in the stability of 
the government and permission for emigrants to settle here[,] it would soon be one of the 
most pleasing parts of the world.”  Yet Perry observed that “there appears to be a strong 
prejudice entertained by those holding the reigns of government against the people of the 
US of the North,” thereby placing himself and other immigrants from the north “in rather 
an unpleasant situation.”  Despite such complaints, he remained hopeful. “[W]e still hope 
to be able to remove their prejudices,” Perry wrote, and if Santa Anna succeeds it would 
“be a very favorable change for Texas.”  In another letter, Perry wrote that he hoped the 
late revolution in the Mexican interior, would “be greatly to our advantage.  We expect in 
the course of one or two years that Texas will be made into a distinct state and in that 
case we will enjoy many advantages over our present situation.”400 
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Statehood, in fact, was precisely what Austin had in mind.  If there was one thing 
he had learned from the Anáhuac fiasco, it was that Texas needed better representation 
and greater influence at the federal level.  Mexican leaders agreed.  Even Lucas Alamán, 
the leading conservative and author of the Law of April 6th, stated that “Texas cannot 
flourish and grow without separating from Coahuila and becoming a territory of the 
federation until it has acquired enough elements to be a state.” He suggested that Austin 
lobby the state legislature to endorse this idea, pointing out that it was good for Coahuila 
too. Austin concurred, stating that “The truest interest of this country remains that it 
should remain united to Mexico as a State that can legislate for itself in all local and 
internal matters.”  While Austin warned against getting involved in the turmoil of 
Mexican national politics, he wanted to see his colony receive more of the rights and 
responsibilities that came with Mexican affiliation.   Despite legislation like the Law of 
April 6th, it appeared that by 1830 that his aims were coming to fruition.  In March of that 
year, Terán promised greater federal protection to both tejano and Texan settlements, 
something that most of the colonists greeted enthusiastically.401  
Santa Anna’s federalist victory in spring of 1833 emboldened the push for 
statehood.  Mexican leaders had earlier proposed that Texas separate from Coahuila and 
become a territory, but Austin rebuffed this offer. “The truest interest of this country 
remains that it should remain united to Mexico as a State that can legislate for itself in all 
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local and internal matters,” he wrote.   Once again, however, Austin had to be cautious 
lest Mexican officials misinterpret his request.  Separate statehood was what they wanted, 
not separation from Mexico.  “The general basis which they have adopted and will most 
rigidly adhere to, is to form Texas into a state of the Mexican confederation,” he wrote in 
a letter to a correspondent in the north.  “They do not wish to separate from Mexico,” he 
insisted, “and of their own accord never will separate.”  If such an “unfortunate event” 
were to occur “its causes will originate in the mistaken policy of the national Govt.  of 
Mexico in relation to Texas and not in the desire or true interests of the people of that 
country.” 402 
By the middle of 1832, Texans by and large remained committed to Mexico, but 
their status within it was yet to be determined.  “No, sir, the people of Texas do not wish 
to separate,” he reiterated, and it is not and will not be their interest to do so, unless they 
should be kicked off.”  Mexico’s Anglo citizens would “do their duty to” their adopted 
government.   But they were also ever mindful of “the duty which every man in all 
communities, owes to himself.”403 Ultimately, Texans’ loyalty to Mexico depended on 
that country’s ability to deliver on what they understood to be its own promise to its 
citizens.   
But as Terán, Austin and others were beginning to realize, Texans’ commercial 
power and influence could only go so far without political power too.  As Terán noted, 
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“[The colonists] eagerly await the day when they will enter into the full enjoyment of 
their political rights and boast of the major influence they will have in the full 
administration of the state”404  As for Austin, he continued to believe in the ability of 
Mexican leaders to repair relations with the colonists that had been compromised by its 
haphazard efforts to regulate and control the frontier.  Yet, if Mexico’s great appeal to 
prospective immigrants was its system of government, it had to assure them that it was 
secure.   
As Mexico’s experiment in radical federalism seemed more and more tentative, 
Austin began to play a somewhat more active role in repairing Mexico’s chaotic political 
climate.  In one letter he requested that James Perry “send him copies of the constitution 
of Columbia, of Buenos Aires and of Chilli, of Peru and what is called the Bolivian code 
or constitution.”405  What Austin intended to do with these documents is unclear, but one 
might surmise that he hoped to use them as comparative models of governance in his 
efforts to negotiate with Mexican leaders.  Not insignificantly, Austin chose the 
constitutions of other Spanish American countries as his point of reference rather than 
that of the United States.  Likewise, even as he insisted that “prejudices against North 
American are subsiding in Mexico,” he found it necessary to distance himself from 
United States leaders who had demonstrated the acquisitive character that Mexicans like 
Terán most feared, so as to mitigate the “remnants of bitter feeling left among the 
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uniformed who believe that Poinsett was the U.S. government and all north Americans 
were connected with his intrigues.” 
The statehood question lended a new tone of optimism by the end of the summer 
when the citizens of Matagorda held a public dinner in honor of a recent victory over a 
band of local Indians.  At the dinner’s commencement, they made a series of toasts.  The 
first was to “The republic of Mexico – Tho’ not first, may she be the last, in the 
constellation of republics, in the new world.”  The second went to “The United States of 
the North – ‘The land of the free, and the home of the brave.’”  Then a third gentleman 
rose and toasted to Texas’ admission into the Mexican union as a state – “May Congress 
patiently hear, and magnanimously decide her claims,” and to Coahuila “The co-tenant, 
and co-partner of Texas – May the dissolution and division be friendly, and alike 
honorable to both.”  And then to “Our Country” – by which they meant their adopted one 
- where “If there be a part where the institutions have made the men - there is another 
portion where the men have yet to make the institutions.”  And to the cause of “Santa Ana 
- the constitution, and the laws - Our watchword, and textbook.”  Another man lifted his 
glass “to the internal- improvement-fever of the North may it cross the Sabine in a 
steamboat - travel on a railroad to the waters of the Colorado, and by Subscription, raise 
the wind, and sweep the raft into the Bay of Matagorda.”  Then another gentleman took 
the floor and toasted to “The constitution of Mexico, and sovereignty of the states - May 
the laws repugnant to either be obliterated in the blood of their legislators and 
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administrators.”  Finally, Ira Ingram wrapped up the exhaustive succession by toasting to 
the settlers of Texas who “have expelled the savage, subdued and planted the forest” so 
that “The enemies of their country, may read their future history.”406 
As 1832 drew to a close, the relations between Anglo Texan immigrants and their 
federal government might have been strained, but men like Austin remained no less 
committed to their adopted country.  But what to make of the increasing numbers of new 
arrivals – sometimes hundreds a day – who seemed less aware that there even was a 
federal government?  And what to do about the still turbulent political landscape of 
Mexico more generally?  Would the federalist promise survive?  If it did, what would it 
mean for Mexico’s territorial integrity, especially when it came to the United States? If it 
did not, what would this mean for the nation, its citizens and their future in it?  These and 
other questions remained unanswered by the end of 1832, but dramatic changes in the 
nation’s political core were about to determine them. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“A Distinct Member of the Mexican Family” 
 Revolution and Realignment 
1832-36 
 
 
In late 1832, Austin received a letter from an Anglo-Texan colonist named Jonas 
Harrison, describing a recent convention at which fifty-five delegates from all Texan 
municipalities except San Antonio had assembled.  Emboldened by Santa Anna’s 
federalist insurgency, they had decided to petition the state and national government for a 
series of reforms including more liberal tariffs, repeal of the ban on immigration from the 
United States, and separate statehood.  The last point had been a longstanding desire for 
most Texans, and it was an issue that many believed the recent conflicts had made all the 
more urgent. 407   
Harrison complained that there had been several delegates brazen enough to 
suggest Texan independence from Mexico.  He did not hesitate to express his opinion on 
this matter.  “The idea of a separate distinct and independent government I do not believe 
exists in the mind of any man of common sense in the district,” Harrison asserted, “Nor 
do they want to belong to the United States of the North, there are a few exceptions to 
this last opinion, but not many, scarcely one in ten.” The immigrants, after all, had “come 
to the country to participate of the benefits of the Mexican Independence, and of their 
liberal policy in regard to land, and they wish to continue so.” Separation from Mexico 
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would render Texans “the most oppressed people” and only “invite aggression,” 
conceivably from the North or hostile Indian tribes. Harrison insisted that a call for 
greater local representation was not a call for independence. He and others like him 
understood that freedom was only possible where a state presence existed to guarantee it. 
“There is perhaps no person more dangerous in the formation of a new government than a 
mere theorist,” he concluded.408 
 Indeed, throughout the early 1830’s, Texans increasingly complained of the 
Indian raids, banditry, and general lawlessness that plagued the frontier.   From their 
experiences they had concluded that an overly weak state was as dangerous as an 
overbearing one.  “[We] deprecate the idea of being independent of the Mexican 
Republic,” wrote Harrison, “Their sole wish is to be dependent on it, and to afford it all 
the support and protection in their power – to protect all its rights and interests, and in 
return to participate of all its benefits and advantages.” If Mexico could only deliver on 
its promises, not only would current settlers have a reason to renew their fidelity to it, but 
Mexico might see more “Enterprising” immigrants than ever before.409   
*** 
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Few events have dominated scholarly and popular attention more than the Texas 
Revolution.410   For over a century, historians have pointed to it as the inevitable victory 
of one civilization over its opposing and inferior counterpart - of democracy over 
despotism, of Protestantism over Catholicism, of a superior white race over an inferior 
brown one. 411   Beginning in the 1970’s, revisionists complicated the image of elite white 
men spreading American democracy, by highlighting the experiences of Mexican Texans, 
who finally received credit for their contribution to the fight for independence.412 But 
such histories, while important, did little to challenge the presumption of Anglo-
American political dominance.  In fact, they merely confirmed it by showing that, 
ultimately, everyone wanted to be American.    
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Most recently, borderlands historians have cast the Texas Revolution as an 
example of the inherent contingency of early nineteenth century nationalism.  Some have 
pointed to factors like the economic pull of the US or intensifying Indian raids as reasons 
for Mexico’s ultimate loss of the region.413  Andrés Reséndez correctly observes that the 
Texas Revolution started out as part of a much larger Mexican movement to reinstate the 
federalist Constitution of 1824 after Santa Anna’s abrupt turn towards centralism.  In this 
regard, it was little different from the numerous other rebellions then sweeping northern 
Mexico.  Indeed, Anglos entered relatively late into a conflict that had long involved 
tejanos and the citizens of other northern states like Zacatecas.414  Historians have also 
been right to point to the profound lack of unity, consistency and organization that 
characterized the movement.415 
 Yet, while Texans certainly struggled to come to a consensus about what exactly 
they were fighting for, or even if they should be fighting at all, throughout most of the 
conflict the dominant aim was decisively not independence – it was, rather, for a return to 
Mexican federalism.  However, few historians have taken Anglo Texans’ early alliance 
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with Mexican federalists seriously.416  But when one considers Texans’ longstanding 
commitment to federalism, consistent investment in the Mexican nation-building project, 
and sustained opposition to joining the United States, it makes sense.  If we accept 
Texans’ support for Mexican federalism in 1824, then we should not so readily dismiss it 
in 1836.  In this sense, the revolution was hardly revolutionary at all.  Far from the result 
of two irreconcilable political cultures, it was inspired by a profound sense of duty to one 
– Mexico’s.  Loyalism, in fact, remained the primary impulse throughout most of the 
conflict, for Anglos as well as tejanos. Texans’ ultimate decision to declare independence 
came late, reluctantly, and for many, it never came at all.  
So then why did Texans ultimately end up abandoning Mexican federalism and 
making a go of it on their own despite the adamant protests of men like Harrison? 
Independence, as it turns out, was largely the result of two concurrent factors, both 
inspired by Texans’ own inability to fight the Mexican centralists on their own, due to 
their comparatively small population and limited resources.  One factor was the 
unwillingness of private investors in the North to fund an internal Mexican war.  The 
other was the significant numbers of US recruits who flooded into Texas and, in 
accordance with Texans’ long commitment to representative democracy and martial 
citizenship, received the right to vote.  As we shall see, these recruits had a profound 
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impact, not only on the course of the war, but on the direction of Texas politics more 
generally.  These men emboldened a more radical minority largely composed of recent 
immigrants themselves, who had been flirting with the thought of independence at least 
since the Anáhuac crisis.  
Thus, while the Texas Revolution began as a Mexican story, it would end as an 
American one.   Volunteers from the North, along with speculators, slaveholders, and not 
to mention the Jackson administration itself, believed they had a vested interest in an 
independent Texas.  They, as well as the thousands of men who answered the plea to help 
the fight against Santa Anna, often in return for land, were ultimately the ones to 
determine that the Texas rebellion would end very differently from how it began.  Yet its 
outcome was hardly a testament to the enduring strength and superiority of the United 
States, but rather to the power of an increasingly territorially aggressive South and to the 
principles of radical federalism. In this regard, perhaps it is more accurate to say that the 
Texas Revolution began as a Mexican story and ended as a Southern one. 
*** 
The convention of 1832 constituted an illegal assembly under Mexican law, 
leaving Political Chief Ramón Músquiz little choice but to annul its petition.  However, 
just a few months later, Santa Ana and his federalist forces overthrew Bustamante.  The 
Mexican states subsequently elected the hero general to the presidency and the even more 
radical federalist, Valentín Gómez Farís, as his vice president.  Things were beginning to 
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look up for the Texans, who called for another convention to push for their desired 
reforms.  Once again, delegates from the Anglo colonies of Téjas y Coahuila met in San 
Felipe in April of the following year to draft a formal petition requesting the central 
government admit Téjas as a separate and independent state of the Mexican confederation 
under the law of May 7, 1824.417   
In their memorial to the National Congress, the petitioners asked that the union 
between Téjas y Coahuila “be dissolved, abrogated and perpetually cease,” and that they, 
the inhabitants of Texas, be permitted to establish a separate state government “in 
accordance with the federal constitution and the constitutive act,” and that it “be received 
and incorporated into the great confederation of Mexico.” They pointed out that the 
consolidation of the provinces had always been provisional and specifically referenced 
the decree of the 7th of May 1824 which stated that, as soon as Texas had accrued the 
number of inhabitants to constitute a state, it should inform Congress and receive 
recognition as such.418 
Claiming that their relative isolation and lack of integration left many in Béxar 
exposed to the depredations of the “faithless Comanches,” inadequate schools and 
churches, and a general want of “human industry,” they complained “more of the want of 
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all the important attributes of government, than of the abuses of any,” and they made it 
clear that their appeal came from a desire to protect Mexico from lawlessness and 
invasion, most specifically from their own native country. 
Constituting a remote frontier of the republic, and bordering on a powerful nation, 
a portion of whose population, in juxtaposition to hers, is notoriously profligate 
and lawless, she requires, in particular and emphatic sense, the vigorous 
application of such laws as are necessary, not only to the preservation of good 
order, the protection of property, and the redress of personal wrongs, but such also 
as are essential to the prevention of illicit commerce, to the security of the public 
revenues, and to the avoidance of serious collision with the authorities of the 
neighboring republic.  
 
A more direct relationship with the central government, they insisted, would permit 
Texans to better serve and protect their state and, consequently, the nation, thus allowing 
Texas to “‘figure’ as a brilliant star in the Mexican constellation,” and “shed a new 
splendor around the illustrious city of Monteczuma.” 419  In fact, many Anglo Texans 
expressed support for separate statehood only on the condition that it would not result in 
independence.   Harrison himself wrote that he believed the Anglo-Texans would “gladly 
embrace” a provisional government only if Texas remained “a part of the Mexican 
confederation.”  He insisted “that we are all Mexicans and will rigidly protect all the 
rights and interests of Mexico.”420  
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Although most tejanos agreed with Texas statehood in theory, they felt that now 
was not the time to ask.  The nation was plagued by political polarization and crisis, the 
federal government distracted, and such an appeal could be construed as a sign of 
rebellion or secession.  Most tejanos believed that Texans should give the state 
government the opportunity to address their grievances before demanding separation.  
Near the end of 1832, Austin held a meeting with several prominent bexarenos in which 
he “said everything I could to induce them to concur in taking that step [toward separate 
statehood] at once.”  They expressed agreement with his aim, but “thought it precipitate” 
before any “representations of our grievances were made to the Govt.”  He conceded, and 
suggested that Texans accompany their grievances “with a positive declaration that if 
[they] were not fully redressed by the first day of March next, Texas would then proceed 
immediately to organize a local Government.”  The Béxar leadership agreed to this, but 
insisted on April. 421  
 Yet, not even everyone agreed that the state government was deficient enough to 
merit Texas’ separation. “[I]t is our duty as faithful citizens to preserve that govt, which 
affords us protection so long as it is worthy of support,” wrote John A. Williams to 
Austin.  Such a reaction was perhaps unsurprising from the man who had led the 
suppression of the Fredonian rebels.  “Every man of intelligence in this section of 
[the]Country that I have conversed with,” he claimed,” is “much opposed to the 
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Convention and all other innovation upon the established laws of the Country.” Williams 
even went so far as to question Austin’s integrity.  “[Y]ou say that you are a ‘Mexican 
Citizen  . . . Why then advise me to violate my duty, by the performance of an act 
expressly prohibited by law, and which you as a ‘Mexican citizen’ in obedeance to your 
duty as such, could not, and I presume, would not perform.”  He denied that Texans had 
anything to be discontent about, and dismissed the notion that the colonies were growing 
restive or needed a convention to quell their frustrations.  “You say the late ‘convention 
terminated very happily, it tranquilized, harmonized, and united all . . . But there was 
nothing to harmonize and tranquilize.  The people of Texas were at that time, for ought 
that I know, perfectly tranquil.” 422   
The call for statehood came primarily from a small but growing contingent of 
Anglo Texans, most of them newcomers and many of whom had been the ringleaders of 
the Anáhuac rebellion.  Younger, less established, and with far more tenuous ties to their 
adopted country, these men largely rejected the older settlers’ appeals for calm, patience 
and neutrality with regard to the ongoing civil war.  Perhaps the most vocal was William 
H. Wharton, a Virginia native raised in Tennessee.  Wharton’s first trip to Texas in 1827 
resulted in his marriage to the daughter of Jared E. Groce, the largest slaveowner in 
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Texas.  The young couple spent the first few years of their marriage in Tennessee before 
returning to Texas in 1830.423   
Wharton made no secret of his opposition to the old settlers, of whom he had 
complained bitterly during the Anáhuac crisis. “I have received several letters from San 
Felipe, breathing all the same toryish spirit and shewing that we have as much opposition 
to expect from our own countrymen as from the Mexicans,” he declared before a 
Brazoria Committee. Wharton’s frustration with Austin and his allies grew more intense 
during the October meeting when Austin was elected over him as presiding officer.424     
It was this more radical contingent that Austin hoped to quell with the convention, 
but in doing so he sparked the ire of conservatives. “I believe further that if all the people 
of Texas were consulted,” wrote Williams, “and made to understand the subject in its 
proper light[,] then the main Question put, Shall we obey the laws of the Country we 
have adopted, or shall we not obey them, and yeald obedeance to the junto of San Felipe?  
I believe Sir that would find an over whelming majority in the affirmative.” He reminded 
the empresario that the convention’s resolution did not take precedence over any state or 
federal law “yet according to your strange system of reasoning,” it would appear that they 
were “at least equal to a Statute passed in due form by the legislative authority of the 
State.”  He concluded by echoing the very instructions that Austin himself had issued 
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time and again to his colonists - to abandon any and all behavior that might bring them 
into collision with Mexican officials.   “Can it be the interest of Texas to dissolve the 
legal political bonds that unite us as one society?”  Williams warned Austin that he did 
“not know of five men in this Munesepalety favourable to the plan you have so warmly 
espoused” and that if he were to call for an election “it would be disregarded.” Even those 
who supported the Committee’s resolution questioned its popularity and suggested 
delaying action until some kind of unanimity could be achieved.  Frustrated, by the end 
of January 1833 Austin was prepared to give up on Texan politics altogether.425  
As the primary founder of the Anglo colonies and their chief representative to the 
federal government, Austin found himself in a difficult position by 1833.  Ever since his 
colony’s establishment, he had counseled patience, obedience, and loyalty to Mexico.  
But with the governments’ growth and increasing administrative presence in Texas, 
coupled with a flood of new immigrants from the North after 1830 - the majority of 
whom tended to be more politically restive than their predecessors, this position was 
becoming harder to sustain.  The Father of Texas now found himself struggling to find a 
political course that suited Texas’ changing demographic and relationship with the 
federal government.  This was no easy task, and yet statehood was something that Texans 
had long expected and generally supported, even if they did not think it was the right time 
to ask.   
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Despite some opposition, Austin understood that the desire for separate statehood 
was strong even among some of the more established settlers such as Ira Ingram.426  He 
therefore accepted the task of traveling to Mexico City to present the document to 
national leaders, albeit with some trepidation: “I enter upon this mission with great 
anxiety for I am convinced the welfare of Texas depends on success,” he wrote to his 
sister and brother-in-law just before embarking, “We cannot do without a State govt any 
longer.  It is impossible.”  Although concerned that the political turmoil then plaguing the 
nation might hinder his efforts, Austin remained mostly optimistic.  In a letter to his 
cousin he wrote,  “I leave to-morrow for Mexico on the state Government mission – I go 
with considerable – I may say – strong hopes of success – The course taken by the 
convention, is the true one I think.” He could think of “no just reason” why the federal 
government would refuse him.  Regarding separation from Mexico, he wrote that there 
was a “decided opposition” to it. “The people do not desire, and would not agree to it, for 
they could get a State Government.”427    
Yet Austin was apprehensive.  “The consequences of failure will no doubt be 
war,” he confided to his nephew.  Specifically, he worried about how the more radical 
elements of the settler population would react.   But for the time being, he chose to 
remain hopeful and continue to caution obedience and calm.  Austin was most concerned 
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about the well-being of the “old settlers,” as he called them, if conflict ensued, either 
between Texas and the federal government or among the settlers themselves.  “The 
settlers have earned what they have got too hard, and too many years of hard labor and 
privation, to jeapordize all hastily,” he wrote in a letter to one such individual, “a war 
with the nation will be ruinous to them, for they will be destroyed and overwhelmed, 
eaten up by those who come from abroad to aid them in fighting their battles.”  Indeed, 
they had more to fear from the newer elements of their own settler population “than from 
the whole Mexican nation.”  Men like Wharton who had been in Texas for a far shorter 
period of time, had yet to make their fortunes and, in many cases, found themselves cut 
out of political and economic opportunities by Austin’s cohort.  “My policy has 
displeased the ardent spirits in my colony,” Austin wrote, “but I still think it was the 
correct one.”  Many of these men viewed such johnny-come-latelies with heavy suspicion 
and did not look forward to a new government and the significant power shift that it 
would no doubt entail.  Indeed, as the tide of radicalism was slowly gaining steam in 
Texas, Austin and his allies were struggling to hold onto power.  In many ways this 
mission would prove their significance and the relevance of their hereunto cautious and 
deferential approach to Mexican authority. 428 
*** 
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 Austin arrived in Mexico City in July of 1833 and immediately presented 
Congress with a five point petition based on the measure drafted back in Texas. He stated 
that it was “The wish of the people and their declaration that they possessed the necessary 
elements to sustain a State Government,” and that it was “The natural right of Texas to 
occupy its station alongside of its sisters, the other States of the Confederation.”  While 
“[Texas] has always been a distinct member of the Mexican Family,” he insisted that the 
appeal came from “the duty and the interest of Texas to cement and strengthen its union 
with the Mexican confederation.”429  
This was all par for the course for Austin.  But towards the end of the documents 
he dared to state that, if denied, “[S]elf-preservation” would compel Texans to organize a 
local government “with or without the approbation of the General Government.”  Austin 
assured the Committee, “that this measure would not proceed from any hostile views to 
the permanent union of Texas with Mexico,” but rather, “from absolute necessity, to save 
themselves from anarchy and total ruin,” referring, no doubt, to the more restive elements 
of his population.   At the same time, Austin acknowledged the potentially deleterious 
impact that such a move might have on the relationship between Texas and the federal 
government, “How such a measure would affect the union of Texas with Mexico, or 
where it would end, were matters worthy of serious reflection.”  Was this a threat?  
Whatever the case, Austin defended his decision to add this appendage to his appeal, 
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insisting that he had long “pursued conciliation as a system,” but that “my judgment is 
now convinced that Texas, in this question of right to become a State, must be 
uncompromising.”430  
 Yet, even as he advocated forming a separate state government with or without 
federal approval, Austin made it clear that the ladder was in no way a demonstration of 
Texans’ disloyalty to their adopted country, much less an initial stage in their eventual 
separation from it.  In his letter to the Minister of Relations, Austin reiterated his 
enduring belief in “The glory of the federal system” which he argued “consists in the fact 
that no other form of government invented by the wisdom of men, has been able to meet 
the local necessities of each angle of an immense country.”  The petition of Texas was 
clearly in line with this purpose.  He further insisted that “There is no individual in 
[T]exas who is not convinced that the greatest misfortune that could happen to him would 
be the separation of that country from [M]exico.”  However, statehood was so 
indispensable “to the ‘welfare’ and ‘happiness’ of the people” that it could not be 
delayed.  Consequently, if there were no way of obtaining it without “breaking the bonds 
of the union with Mexico, it would then be the interest of Texas to attempt her 
separation.” 431  For the first time, Austin argued that Texans’ loyalty to the principles of 
federalism ought to preempt their loyalty to Mexico, a clear departure from prior 
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unconditional fealty to his adopted country, and conviction that Mexico was the only 
place on earth where such principles stood a chance of becoming reality.   
When Austin dared to repeat his position to Gómez Farías, the Vice President 
interpreted it as a threat and had him thrown in prison.  Tellingly, he did not blame the 
Mexicans for his predicament. “It has been intimated to me that some enemy, I know not 
who, had accused me of designs to unite Texas, with the US of the North.”  Rather, the 
real people responsible for his arrest, according to Austin, were those stirring discontent 
in Texas. He now began to regret proceeding with the appeal. “Ever since I returned from 
Bexar a year ago last December and found the convention called in my absence,” he 
wrote to Williams, “I have considered myself as suspended over the alter of sacrifice.”  
The measure, he believed “compromised me in the highest degree” with both the 
bexarenos and his friends in San Felipe.432  
Even as he sat in his cell in the prison of the Inquisition, Austin remained 
optimistic about the future of Mexican politics and, by implication, Texas’ relationship 
with Mexico.  “The most favorable reforms and changes are taking place in the Mexican 
government and people, and a little time will put all right – there will be toleration of 
religion – Texas will be a state and all will go right.”  Tellingly, Austin saw the real threat 
both to himself and Texas as coming from certain radical elements in the province. “I 
suppose that some of my enemies in the colony will rejoice at what they may think or 
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hope will be my ruin,” he wrote to James Perry.  That being the case, Austin wanted to 
make sure that his current predicament did not sour Texan attitudes towards Mexican 
leaders.  “I do not in any manner blame the government for arresting me, and I 
particularly request that there be no excitement about it.”433 
 On the second day of his imprisonment, Austin heard the funeral honors for the 
slain Vicente Guerrero.  Yet, even as he was reminded of Mexico’s troubled political 
climate and complained of his solitary confinement, “shut up in the dark dungeon,” he 
remained convinced that Texas belonged with Mexico.  His opinions were unchanged 
nearly two months later when he observed the myriad disadvantages of United States 
acquisition of Texas. First, the US would be “receiving within its limits a country which 
is entirely isolated from all the other states, by its geographic situation, & by all the 
interests of agriculture, manufactures and commerce.”  Austin observed that Texas’ 
rivers, as unnavigable as they may have been, linked it to Mexico “and do not enter the 
Territories of the north, so as to form bonds of union, as does the river Mississippi with 
Louisiana & other states adjacent.”  Furthermore, Texas itself gained nothing by 
becoming a part of that country as “There is no market in the North for the produce of 
Texas, & there is in Mexico.” Sheer distance made such a connection undesirable since 
Texas was further from Washington than Mexico City.  Neither was commerce any 
temptation since, in that regard, “the Mexican flag is equal to that of the North.”  Finally, 
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the result of an additional cotton-producing state like Texas “would be to injure all the 
states south of Virginia, whose chief produce & almost the only one which is valuable is 
cotton.”  If Texas, however, remained a part of Mexico, its progress “would promote the 
power of the Mexican Nation to a great degree” and “to the prejudice of the U. States of 
the North.”  “What then is the true interest of Texas?”  Austin asked, “It is to have a local 
government to cement & strengthen its union with Mexico.”434  
*** 
Those in the United States met news of Austin’s arrest with considerable interest.  
But they did not necessarily share his opinion regarding Texas’ future.  Southern planters, 
especially, were beginning to look upon the fledgling cotton producing Mexican province 
of Texas with a wary eye and to embrace the notion that, despite its distance and 
geographic discontinuity, the Union would be best served by absorbing Texas rather than 
letting it remain a part of Mexico.  And as Jackson entered his second term, it looked like 
they might have the chance. 
As 1833 drew to a close, times remained hard for Southern cotton growers.  
“Cotton is low and extremely dull,” wrote one New Orleans trader to Samuel May 
Williams. “Times is very hard in this country and no prospect of their getting any better,” 
wrote another.  Texas annexation would not only supply cotton growers with more land 
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for cotton production, it would facilitate a growing US monopoly of the cotton trade.  
Therefore, many in the South had a vested interest in seeing relations between Texas and 
Mexico worsen.   One Texan trader wrote that, while he sincerely trusted “that nothing 
serious will happen,” nonetheless “should anything grow out of the circumstances of a 
serious nature we shall not lack friends.”435  
While Jackson remained distracted with these and other domestic concerns, his 
foreign secretary, Anthony Butler, continued to scheme of ways to acquire Texas, 
including bribery.  Jackson rebuffed such proposals but left Butler at his post.  In March 
1834, Butler concocted his brashest scheme yet.  He assured the president that, in light of 
Santa Anna’s recent rise to power, there was “no hope of obtaining Texas by amicable 
arrangement unless we first shew our strength.”  He encouraged the President to follow 
through on his earlier threat to establish a boundary without the Mexicans’ approval.  
“[W]e will never obtain even that portion of the country to which we think we have a 
clear title until we occupy it forcibly.”  Butler was correct in believing that there was little 
prospect of a local movement to separate Texas from Mexico and attach it to the United 
States, but not necessarily for the reasons he identified.  Most of the Anglo settlers were 
uninterested in rebellion, much less secession.  This may have been precisely what 
compelled him to push Jackson to take some action himself.  In perhaps his most brazen 
proposition yet, Butler proposed that the President permit him to filibuster Texas, stating 
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he would “pledge my head” to be the one to finally “possess that part of Texas which is 
ours.” Such a proposal was too extreme even for Jackson who wisely decided at that 
point to recall Butler from his post.436 
But for Austin and most other leading Texans at this time, the current discord in 
Texas had little to do with the North.  Instead, they saw it as a product of the unrest then 
sweeping the rest of Mexico: “The past events in Texas necessarily grow out of the 
revolution in Jalappa, which overturned the constitution and produced the counter 
revolution of Vera Cruz,” Austin wrote, insisting that he had done his best to keep Texas 
out of the tumult.  “A current was set in motion,” however, by events related to the civil 
war, and “Texas could not avoid being agitated.”437  
It may have also had something to do with Gómez Farías’ decision to dispatch 
Colonels José María Noreiga and Juan Nepomuceno Almonte to Coahila y Téjas for the 
purpose of reviewing a series of colonization and land transfer contracts.  Colonel 
Almonte was assigned the specific task of ascertaining “the opinions of Anglo-Texan 
colonists concerning separation from Mexico.”  The order was no doubt a result of 
concern ignited by Austin’s recent petition.  He was also ordered to inform slaves of their 
proper status as freed men and women, and to promise land to Native Americans who 
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pledged their loyalty to Mexico.  This “all-out nationalizing blitkreig,” as one historian 
has put it, no doubt ignited the ire of many Texans, especially Anglos.438 
 Yet, it also quieted certain concerns about the absence or ineffectuality of the 
federal government in the region.  By May of that year, many of Austin’s closest friends 
continued to share his optimism and good faith in the Mexican leadership.  In July, 
William H. Jack informed Thomas McKinney that “Col. Almonte is here; he is 
intelligent, agreeable and apparently candid.  He says that Austin will be released soon” 
and that he had found “the report [on the state of affairs in Texas] to be worse than false.” 
The rest of the ayuntamientos seemed to fall in line behind their leader, expressing 
gratitude to both the State and National Government, requesting Austin’s release from 
prison, and acknowledging that most of their grievances had been sufficiently addressed. 
“Since A[ustin] was dispatched to Mexico the most favorable changes have taken place 
in the political affairs of Texas,” wrote the Ayuntamiento of Brazoria to Congress.  The 
National Congress repealed the Law of April 6th and state government has “extended its 
arm of relief and applied the necessary remedy to our wrongs.”  They concluded by 
“tending our most cordial and heartfelt gratitude both to the Federal and State Govts.” 
There remained only one more issue to be resolved: Austin’s release from prison.  They 
assured the government that if it complied “Texas will prove that it is ready and willing 
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to spend its blood and treasure in support of the Mexican Constitution, the Mexican Laws 
and Mexican Territory.”439  
When Santa Anna failed to release him in June, Austin again blamed his 
adversaries in Texas for tarnishing his name to Mexican authorities. “[W]ho those 
persons are I know not – it is said they are North Americans by birth,” he wrote, and 
suggested that W.H. Wharton might have had something to do with it.  Blaming these 
men for his imprisonment may have been a stretch, but the radical elements in Texas 
certainly did take advantage of Austin’s absence to advance their agenda.  On February 
22, John Wharton published an editorial in The People’s Advocate complaining that the 
press in Texas was “muzzled, owned, supported by, and devoted to the interests of a 
few.”  He accused Austin and his allies of being “timid & sycophantic” and of yielding to 
oppression.  While he claimed to wish Austin “no harm,” he nonetheless hoped that the 
Mexicans would keep him in prison, until he “undergoes radical change.”  “But perhaps 
the worst accusation that he leveled at the “Father of Texas” was that of irrelevance.  
Wharton claimed that most Texans were “diametrically opposed to the course 
recommended by him; some do not believe in his sincerity, and others disregard it all 
together.”440  Wharton’s remarks suggested that Austin was out of touch with the current 
direction of Texan politics now being steered by a younger generation composed of men 
like himself.  
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  When Austin heard of Wharton’s editorial, he was incensed.  In his defense, 
Austin insisted that he had “yielded to the popular opinion” and instructed his allies “to 
discountenance in the most unequivocal and efficient manner” anyone who was in 
“contempt or defiance of the mexican people or authorities.”  I do not believe there is 
any anti-Mexican party in Texas” he continued to insist, “but if there be, the adoption of 
the people of the motto and rule above stated, will soon detect and mark it.”  Austin 
concluded his letter by reiterating his hope that the authorities of the colony “will 
recognize and obey” the President Santa Anna, and proclaim “with one unanimous voice 
Fidelity to Mexico, opposition to violent men or measures, and all will be peace, 
harmony, and prosperity.”  He then stated that he hoped the state question was dead and 
would remain so.441 
 Austin’s instructions seemed to take heed.  Samuel May Williams assured his 
friend that his advice was being dutifully executed in Texas where the people have been 
“advised by the committee to have nothing to do with the State question.”  In a letter 
addressed to Perry, McKinney made it clear that the citizens of Brazoria were of a similar 
mind, deeming it their duty to no longer permit “a few aspiring ambitious demagogues to 
use our names or assume our rights.” In so doing, the people of Brazoria not only 
separated themselves from those who continued to push for statehood, but also renounced 
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them as effective usurpers, placing the democratic imperative back in the hands of Austin 
and the Mexican leadership. 442 
Meanwhile, the more radical elements in Texas fought the accusations of Austin 
and his more conservative allies. Terming Austin’s letter “a bloated mass of disgusting 
self conceit – of arrogant dictation and of inconsistent stupidity,” Wharton went on to 
cast aspersions at his critic in terms as harsh – or more so - than those he had received.   
In conclusion I pledge myself when this obeyer of instructions this man of so 
many personal friends, this disinterested benefactor of Texas, this oracular 
weathercock, this political Proteas this innocent victim, this maker of mottos, this 
organizer of parties, this presumptuous dictator returns, to brand him on the 
forehead with a mark that shall outlast his epitaph. 
 
 For the time being, however, Wharton’s threats would go unrealized, as it was becoming 
increasingly clear whose side most Texans were on.  When the agitators for statehood 
attempted to renew their movement by calling for an election of members to a 
Revolutionary Congress, the Citizens of Brazoria took the lead in renouncing the 
“unauthorized call,” stating that they believed it to jeopardize “the security of our 
families and our dearest rights and interests.”  Accordingly, they renounced the “few 
ambitious agitators of revolutionary measures,” whom they accused of an “unwarranted 
assumption of authority to DICTATE to the people.” Perry reported to Austin that 
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Wharton and his allies were “as politically dead as if they were buried” and that the 
people of Texas were not looking forward to any more conventions.443  
 The Texans’ renewed policy of patience and obedience, Austin assured them, was 
having beneficial effects in Mexico City where Santa Anna had “solemnly and officially 
declared that he will sustain the federal republican system.” Even the statehood question 
began to look likely again, despite the fact that Texans had by now formally abandoned 
it.  Almonte himself wrote to Samuel May Williams that “The president agrees with the 
politics conducted by the colonists at this time,” and assured him that  “When Congress 
opens sessions I will let you know regarding petitions of the communities to organize a 
government in Texas independent from that of Coahuila.” But the best evidence of this 
change of mind among Mexico’s political leadership finally came towards the end of 
1834 when Austin was finally released from prison.444  
With calm in Texas restored and his liberation achieved, Austin now turned his 
attention to realizing his longstanding dream of turning Texas into a formidable and 
lucrative member of the Mexican family, specifically through the cotton trade.  “I hope 
that a dead calm will reign all over Texas for many years to come,” he wrote Perry, “and 
that there will be no more excitements of any kind whatever.  Assuring his friend that 
“the dark days had passed,” he insisted that “Calm, a dead calm, is all that Texas needs.”  
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Austin now believed that the best means for Texas to achieve statehood was to simply 
make itself an indispensable part of the Mexican federation, just as it has always 
intended. Instead of wrestling with national politics, Texans’ should focus on their own 
self-improvement. “[I]mmigration – good crops – no party divisions” was the order of the 
day.   He made it clear that establishing stronger commercial ties with the rest of Mexico 
should be chief among these, and once again, he began to dream of his circum-Carribean 
commercial network.445 Texas’ bond with Mexico was stronger and more promising than 
ever. 
*** 
  But change in Mexico City did come.  The same month that Austin directed 
Texans to expect no considerable alteration in the course of Mexican politics, Santa Ana 
unleashed a vigorous centralization program.  The General had spent much of his 
presidency at his home in Velasco, allowing Gómez Farías to effectively run the country 
for him.  The Vice President took the opportunity to push a series of sweeping reforms 
through congress. By spring of 1834, the two most powerful bastions of Mexican politics 
– the church and army – were complaining bitterly of their own alienation.  On May 25th, 
representatives from these two contingents issued the Plan of Cuernavaca which called 
for a reversal of the recent reforms, demanded the removal of those legislators who were 
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responsible for them, and called on President Santa Anna to halt the federalist 
overhaul.446 
   Santa Anna complied.  Not wanting to alienate the two most powerful groups in 
the country.  He promptly replaced Goméz Farías and began aggressively reversing his 
policies.  He dissolved Congress and ordered the election of a new one with whose aid he 
was able to unleash a series of measures that effectively overturned the federalist 
Constitution of 1824.  These included dissolving state legislatures, abolishing almost all 
state militias, and transforming the states into departments with federally appointed 
leadership. Sensing that he had been misled by the general, in July Austin wrote to Perry 
that “Congress is to meet in extra session on the 19 of this month, there seems to be no 
doubt that the system of Govt will be changed from federal to central, tho it probably will 
be some months before the new constitution can be framed and published.”447   
A staunch federalist opposition emerged around peripheral state governments, 
most specifically Zacatecas, Guerrero, Yucatán, and of course, Téjas y Coahuila.  
Reséndez writes that by 1830, “Coahuila and Texas had emerged as the staunchest 
bastion of federalism throughout Mexico, the very province chosen as sanctuary by the 
very highest Mexican officials, a liberal paradise.”  It was therefore no surprise when the 
Governor of Nuevo León, Manuel M. de Llano suggested that federalists in the state 
retrench into Texas, decouple it from Coahuila and then get Anglo-Texan colonists to 
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cooperate in upholding it as a separate state in accordance with their own earlier 
expressed desires.448   
Governor Viesca himself, had conceived of a similar plan, setting up a war 
council in response to the national Congress’ decision to order drastic reductions in the 
size of state militias, which many, especially in Coahuila y Téjas, considered the greatest 
guarantor of state sovereignty.  Anglo Texans were, at first, reluctant to get involved, 
preferring to believe Austin’s claims that Santa Anna’s new government posed no 
considerable threat to federalism.  But Viesca attempted to gain their support by 
reminding them that the party “now in power is the same that prohibited the immigration 
of North American colonists in 1830, has openly declared against all foreigners, and 
secretly favors Spanish policy and Spanish despotism.”  Viesca warned that if they did 
nothing, they would soon see the reversal of a whole series of recent reforms, including a 
reinstatement of the Law of April 30th.449 
Yet, Anglo-Texans continued to dismiss such calls to arms and insisted on calm.  
John Williams issued a circular pleading with Texans to heed Austin’s advice, not 
Viesca’s.  “I fear that the people are now ready to plunge head long into the yawning 
jaws of a hopeless civil war,” he wrote. “[The guardians of peace and order” had 
“forgotten the advice of the worthy Stephen F. Austin, who but the other day told them in 
the most emphatic language not to entangle themselves in the family quarrels of the 
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Republic.” But Williams had little to worry about so long as the frontier remained largely 
unaffected by Santa Ana’s reforms.  One man just returned from a trip to Mexico City, 
informed his fellow colonists that reports of the general’s “unfriendly disposition” 
towards the colonies were false, and that if troops were ordered there, “it is for the 
purpose of counteracting any insurrectionary movements that might be consequent on the 
arrest of the land speculators and corrupt officers of the state government.”450   
Eager to silence the radicals and restore calm, Texan leaders decided to call for a 
convention to silence the rumors, and silence “the ORIGINATORS of the disturbances.” 
The peace party’s dominance had a chastening effect on the radicals.  “The truth is, the 
people are much divided here,” wrote William Travis, a radical who led and would die at 
the Alamo siege.  Yet, he conceded that, at this point, “The peace-party” were “the 
strongest, and make much the most noise.”  Unless the “war party” – those calling on 
Texans to join the federalist resistance - could gain strength, “had we not better be quiet, 
and settle down for a while?”451  
 Thus, town leaders throughout Texas met in the summer of 1835 to confirm their 
loyalty to Mexico and the principles on which it stood.  Furthermore, they flatly denied 
the accusations that Texans “cherish a hostile attitude to Mexicans, or to the Mexican 
government” and confirmed that “they are voluntary citizens of the same republic; have 
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sworn to support the same constitution, and are by inclination and interest, as well as the 
most solemn obligations, bound to cherish and sustain the liberal and free institutions of 
this republic.” The town of Gonzalez went even further, protesting “against any 
provisional government or organization” tending “to estrange the Jurisdiction of Texas, 
from that of Coahuila.”  They promised to challenge any body threatening “to interrupt 
the harmony and good understanding existing between Texas and the Federal 
Government,” stating that any such person deserved “the martial disapprobation and 
contempts of every friend of Constitutional order in the Country.”452  
Indeed, it looked as if revolution was the last thing on most Texans’ minds in the 
summer of 1835. “I discover the Planters are again in good cheer,” observed Asa 
Brigham to Wharton in July of 1835.  Men like Brigham, unaware of what was 
happening in Mexico City, believed their adopted country was merely at a crossroads.  
Yet, he did not doubt that Texans would at some point have to confront the storm that 
was brewing in the interior:  “In my humble opinion, there are questions nearly ripe, and 
will soon be agitated; when once commenced, will flud in upon us in rapid succession.”    
It was clear that Texans had no interest in war.  But they were also fully prepared to 
defend the principles on which their adopted country was founded if it ever came to 
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that.453  While the state question and relations with Mexico remained open, Texas began 
to re-enter a period of cooperation and complacence.   
 
It was not until Lorenzo de Zavala, noted federalist and former Vice President, 
reached Texas in August that the mood began to shift.  In a lengthy address to the 
colonists, Zavala introduced himself as one who had “occupied in the Mexican nation the 
most honorable stations.”  Indeed, his credentials, as one of the leading politicians in the 
nation, and perhaps the most knowledgeable man in Texas when it came to affairs 
concerning the national government, leant him the authority to convince the Anglo-Texan 
population that armed rebellion was necessary.  Mexico, according to Zavala, was now 
effectively a military dictatorship and he warned that, so long as they remained faithful to 
the Constitution of 1824, Texans would soon find federal troops at their doorsteps.  
Certain generals had “destroyed the federal constitution” in order “to be promoted to the 
presidency of the republic,” he explained.  Under such circumstances it was “inevitable 
that all the states of the confederation are left at liberty to act for themselves.”  While 
acknowledging the colonists’ indebtedness to the “Supreme Government of Mexico,” he 
reminded them that “those governments are formed of the same men who are now 
persecuted, among whom I have the honor to count myself as one.”454  
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As information of Santa Anna’s vigorous centralization project began to trickle 
into the frontier, a hands-off approach began to feel increasingly less feasible. 
Significantly, Texans’ ultimate decision was largely the result of their consultations with 
leaders in other northern Mexican states.  For example, Horatio Allsbury addressed the 
people of Texas in late August stating that he had “left the state of New Leon on the 10th 
of this month with a request from our republican friends to say to the citizens of Texas 
that our only hopes of future liberty and security depended upon our immediately taking 
steps to oppose that military in their establishing a Central Government.”  Indeed, Texan 
leaders saw their movement as part of a much larger Mexican federalist revolt against the 
centralists. “War in defense of our rights, and oaths, and our Constitutions is inevitable in 
Texas!” declared one memorandum from San Augustus. 
Information which is relied on has been received from the interior, that the State 
of Zacatecas and Guadalajara have risen and taken up arms in defence of the 
constitution of 1824, and in support of the federal system; also, that there are 
insurrections in the state of Tamaulipas, in favor of the same cause, also that the 
republican general, Juan Alvarez, has gained a victory over the government troops 
in the south of Mexico. 
 
As much as they understood themselves to be continuing the tradition epitomized by their 
forefathers in the American Revolution, Anglo Texans nonetheless saw their action as 
part of a national movement. “I do not view it as Texas battling alone for her liberties,” 
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wrote one newspaper editor, “I view it as the great work of laying the corner stone of 
liberty in the great Mexican republic. 455  
 Yet, it was not until later that month that Austin himself, having just returned 
from Mexico City, joined the call for convention, demonstrating that his time in the 
nation’s capital had profoundly impacted his political outlook for Texas.  “I fully hoped 
to have found Texas in a state of tranquility, but regret to find it in commotion;” he wrote 
in a public statement.  But unlike in the past, this state of affairs had “not been produced 
by any acts of the people of this country,” rather “it is the natural and inevitable 
consequences of the revolution that has spread all over Mexico.”  For Austin, now all too 
familiar with Santa Ana’s determination to transform Mexico’s government, the decision 
to replace the Constitution of 1824 was a game changer.  “Whether the people of Texas 
ought not to agree to this change,” he continued, “and relinquish all or part of their 
constitutional and vested rights under the constitution of 1824, is a question of the most 
vital importance; one that calls for the deliberate consideration of the people, and can 
only be decided by them, fairly convened for the purpose.”456   
Whereas, for years, the Father of Texas had found himself termed a conservative, 
now he was calling on Texans to not only forcibly separate themselves from Coahuila but 
engage in a civil war against the federal government.  According to Austin’s logic, the 
government had betrayed the Mexican constitution, and with it its social contract, not just 
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with Texas, but the rest of Mexico too.  The Constitution of 1824 “gave to Texas a 
specific political existence, and vested in its inhabitants special and defined rights, which 
can only be relinquished by the people of texas,” Austin explained.  The state, therefore, 
could no more forfeit their rights than the government could deprive it of them “unless 
expressly authorized by the people of Texas to do so.”  Austin made it clear that this 
particular set of circumstances called for a change of course.  “These declarations afford 
another and more urgent necessity for a general consultation of all Texas,” he wrote, “in 
order to inform the general government, and especially General Santa Anna, what kind of 
organization will suit the education, habits, and situation of this people.”  His actions 
were greeted with enthusiastic approval by the more radical elements.  “It is different 
now, thank God!” wrote Travis to a friend, “Principle has triumphed over prejudice, 
passion, cowardice, and slavery.  Texas is herself again.” 457 
This is how the Texas Revolution would begin – not as a movement to separate 
from Mexico, nor as a desire to join the United States, but as a result of Texans’ 
perceived duty and obligation as Mexican citizens. In September, the ayuntamiento of 
San Felipe met to discuss the recent crisis.  It ultimately resolved to “support the 
constitution of the Mexican Republic of 1824, to which we have solemnly obligated 
ourselves” and recommended “each jurisdiction to elect five members to meet in San 
Felipe on the 15th of October next,” ostensibly to discuss what collective action they 
                                                          
457Ibid.; Travis to Moore, 31 August 1835, PTR. 
279 
 
 
 
would take to combat the impending federal invasion.  Austin made it clear that whatever 
they decided on, Texans must stay united.  “I have received very favourable news from 
Bexar and think they will send members to the consultation - in short all Texas will go 
together and that makes all safe.” Indeed, the expressed support of Béxar, a place that had 
historically been reluctant to oppose the central government or the state of Coahuila y 
Téjas, was a meaningful accomplishment.458 
Conservatives increasingly found themselves pressed to defend a position that no 
longer seemed feasible.  “[M]any worthy and patriotic citizens have been opposed on 
principles which they deemed sound and correct, to a rupture with the authorities of 
Mexico,” wrote one individual.   Yet, while their position “may have been innocent and 
even praiseworthy in its origin,” he advised them “to reconsider the subject and to 
enquire whether the present situation of the country does not essentially change their 
ground.”  A defense of Mexico now seemed to necessitate joining the war movement.  
“Why halt yea between to opinions?  If the constitution be the object of your allegiance 
then rise up like men and support the constitution.” 459 
However, a letter written by Austin the month prior reveals that independence 
may have already been on his mind.  Just after his release from prison, Austin travelled to 
New Orleans where he undoubtedly discussed the current crisis in Mexico and the fate of 
Texas with people there.  Austin revealed that he was beginning to see Texas as an 
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important contributor to the US national project in the way that he had once envisioned 
for Mexico, “[T]exas must, and ought to become an out work on the west, as Alabama 
and Florida are on the East, to defend the key of the western world – the mouths of the 
Mississippi.”  Although he did not call for it, Austin made it clear what he thought the 
outcome of all this would be.  While Texas’ politics may be more closely aligned with 
Mexico, its economics and culture were bringing it ever closer to the North:  “Can it be 
supposed that the violent political convulsions of Mexico will not shake off Texas so 
soon as it is ripe enough to fall.”  And perhaps more important than anything, was Santa 
Ana’s unpredictable, though rapidly deteriorating, relationship with Texas and the rest of 
the federalist states of the north:  “Gen. Santa Anna told me he should visit Texas next 
month  - as a friend.  His visit is uncertain – his friendship much more so.”  460 
With the current state of Mexican politics, Austin tended to see Texas, at least for 
the time being, as an entity independent from both the US and Mexico.  “We must rely 
on ourselves and prepare for the worst.  A large immigration will prepare us, give us 
strength resources, everything.”  And then Austin wrote the words that seemed to 
contradict everything he had said since settling in Texas fifteen years prior: “If there was 
any way of getting at it, I should like to know what the wise men of the United States 
think the people of Texas ought to do.  The fact is, we must, and ought to become a part 
of the United States.”  With Mexico in chaos and the future of Mexican federalism 
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uncertain, the United States was, finally, beginning to look like the better option.461  
Some have pointed to these words as evidence that Austin always intended to see Texas 
become a part of the US, regardless of the fact that for years he claimed the opposite.  
But it is more helpful to see them as evidence of a change of mind that was a result of 
the no less dramatic shift taking place in Mexican national politics and the realization 
that an alliance with the United States of the North, whatever that might ultimately 
mean, looked like the best option.   
Still, the public’s enthusiasm for war, to say nothing of independence, fell short of 
Austin’s and other Texan leaders’ hopes as evinced by militia leaders’ struggle to muster 
men to the battlefield.  “The orders rec’d here this morning were not agreeable to a large 
number of men;” reported militia commander William H. Jack, “but they almost 
unanimously determined to obey without a murmur.” Similar complaints began to 
emerge from militia commanders throughout Texas.  “When I wrote yesterday it was my 
desire to have urged you to order on immediately because I know Militia could not be 
kept in a post like this long at a time, and in this I was correct,”   wrote Benjamin Fort 
Smith, “[Y]ou are not upon a bed of roses.” 462  
Historian Paul Lack writes that Texan volunteers “demonstrated a militia-like 
tendency to turn out during crises but then dismiss themselves at apparent lull times to 
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care for the needs of farms and families.”463 Whether this signified a lack of investment 
in the cause or old fashioned Texan individualism is unclear.  Regardless, it appears the 
threat of Santa Anna and Mexican centralism was strong enough to bring men to the 
field, but not keep them there.  “[O]f the little band that entered this place on the night of 
the 9th, inst., many have returned home, and others say they will go in a few days,” 
reported Phillip Dimmitt.  R.R. Royall wrote that “the members here are like Volunteers 
in Camp (Very Restless) and much is said about going home.”  The men, “one by one 
each plead their necessities some from the frontier are afraid of Indians on the Brazos 
others to the eastward are not fully into the spirit.”   For many Texans, Mexican political 
affairs were but a remote concern in light of far more pressing threats.464   
Throughout the war, leaders would struggle to enforce obedience and discipline, 
often fighting an uphill battle against a culture of extreme individualism and suspicion 
of authority.  When Austin replaced Demitt with another commander of the Goliad 
forces, the men nearly mutinied.  Claiming that Austin had treated them like “servile 
dependents” and subjected them to “despotic command,” they accused him of violating 
the very principles for which the Texas Revolution had been declared, “It is against this 
that we took to the field,” and against   “the imposition of degredations like this” that 
“we are ready to fight again.” 465  
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But indifference and disobedience were not the only concern facing the Texan 
Army.  Rumors of disloyalty emerged almost immediately, namely among those who had 
always cautioned a more conservative position. In October of 1835 Royall reported that 
John A. Williams was taking “a very active Part against the Acts of the Colonists.”  
Advocating “the measures pursued by the Mexican Government,” he had “arrayed 
himself with 58 followers already enrolled against our military movements.” A similar 
report emerged regarding a Mr. JM Smith who, accordingly, “has always been opposed to 
the cause of Freedom, he has whenever in his power, favored the Mexicans, to the 
prejudice of our citizens” and was now “injur[ing] the cause of Liberty by giving all the 
information possible to enemies.” The truth of these accusations is hard to confirm, but 
the mere fact that they were taken seriously suggests that at least some active loyalism 
existed.466  
It was concerns like these that compelled some Texan leaders to consider recruits 
from the United States.  They found particular enthusiasm, not surprisingly, in the 
southwestern states. “[H]undreds of applications are daily making to join the Rank,” one 
recruiter reported, “This movement of ours here will be followed by similar ones thru’ 
the whole valley of the Mississippi.” The only concern was “that more will be received 
than required.” These men, unlike their Texan counterparts, had little to distract them 
from the fight.  They tended to be young, single and unencumbered by family and 
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property ownership.  They therefore had little to lose in the war and no prior connection 
with Mexico.  Thus, competing loyalties were not a threat among these men the way he 
had been for Texans.  467  
And these recruits, not surprisingly, understood the Texas fight differently from 
how most Texans did, in large part due to how recruiters explained the struggle.  Those 
assigned to attract volunteers were often not Texan, but rather the close associates of 
Texan leaders.  They did not, therefore, articulate a particularly sophisticated 
understanding of the conflict and often drew on racist assumptions about Mexicans then 
poplar in the North.  Convincing men to risk their lives for a people and place they had 
no prior connection to required reminding them of the “fertile sugar and cotton lands” 
that they would receive for their service, thanks to a decision by the newly formed 
Provisional Council.  Although the Jackson administration had adopted a policy of 
neutrality, recruitment officers insisted that this should not stop individual citizens from 
participating in a noble struggle to ensure democracy to their Anglo-American brethren.  
After all, “wherever the rights of man are battled for, against military and religious 
despotism, Americans can never look on with indifference.”  However, in the process of 
drawing on their shared ethnic and political heritage, recruitors characterized Mexicans as 
“a cowardly, treacherous, semi-civilized people, without enterprise, workmanship, or 
discipline,” as opposed to the Anglo settlers, who were “brave, hardy, enterprising” – just 
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like their brethren in the North. Because few of these volunteers had any pressing desire 
to leave the United States, recruitors misrepresented the struggle as one for independence, 
assuring them that “Texas will no doubt become a member of this Union,” and “wave in 
peaceful triumph from the Sabine to the Rio Bravo.”468 
However, when the Texans themselves convened on November 3, they hotly 
debated the independence question for several days before discarding it in favor of “a 
provisional government, upon the principles of the constitution of 1824.”  They 
reasserted their commitment to federalist Mexico and dismissed any suspicions 
otherwise.  They insisted they were “not the aggressor.”  Rather it was their duty “to 
defend our unalienable rights against all who attempt to subvert our liberties, although 
citizens of the same country.”  They were defending, not attacking, Mexico and its 
people, and offered their “support and assistance to such Mexicans of the Mexican 
Confederacy as will take up arms against their military despotism,” once again framing 
their rebellion as part of the national rebellion against Santa Anna.469 
But perhaps most significantly, they made their loyalty to Mexico conditional.  
They stated specifically that they would “continue faithful to the Mexican Government” 
only “so long as that nation is governed by the Constitution and Laws that were formed 
for the government of the political association.”  Although historians have dismissed this 
                                                          
468 Ibid. 
469 Barrett to Consultation, 4 November 1835, PTR. 
286 
 
 
 
move as “disingenuous” or at best “indecisive,” it is perhaps more helpful to see it as 
consistent with the very principles that had compelled many to immigrate to Mexico in 
the first place. According to their own logic, Texans already had the right to secede at 
that moment if they chose to do so, considering that Santa Anna had discarded the 
Constitution of 1824. Yet they chose at this juncture to remain. And while the 
Convention revealed that Texans certainly were not united politically, the one thing they 
could agree on was a commitment to radical federalism. Philip Dimitt even reported that 
he had a flag made “the colours, and their arrangement the same as the old one” with the 
phrase, “Constitution of 1824,” displayed in the center.470 
Their continuing relationship with Mexico, however, depended on the success of 
federalists elsewhere in the country who, at least for the time being, appeared to be on the 
upswing.  “The Commander in chief announces to the Army information of the most 
encouraging nature,” Austin wrote on October 23rd, asserting “that the Cause of the 
Constitution and the Federal System is there, gaining new strength, daily.” Indeed, all of 
Texas seemed to be firmly and demonstrably behind the Federalist cause.  471  
Just as Texans were confirming their loyalty to Mexican federalism, they 
experienced a sudden influx of about “60 or 70 fine young men from New Orleans” to 
assist them in the fight. “Another vessel containing many more is hourly expected,” 
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wrote Royall, “Seventy five men have gone up Red River also from New Orleans, 
intending to come by land from Natchitoches.” Evidently, the news of Santa Anna’s 
intention “to bring the Texians under his immediate subjection excite the general and 
increased interest throughout the U States in your favor with a disposition to render you 
prompt and efficient aid,”  wrote John P. Austin to his uncle.  Accordingly, President 
Jackson had “no disposition to interfere with any present aid given you by Citizens of the 
US provided they do not openly violate the laws of Nations.”  Indeed, Jackson chose to 
turn a blind eye to a movement that he probably hoped would result in achieving his 
long-held dream of Texas becoming a part of the United States of the North.  But the 
sudden influx of volunteers from the north with no prior experience with Mexico or its 
people, many of them full of racist and self-righteous agitation, would have a profound 
impact on the course of the war, beginning with Texas’ relationship with its federalist 
allies.472 
Largely thanks to the efforts of recruiters, most of these volunteers failed to see 
the fight they were about to join as an effort to support Mexican federalism.   “We know 
that you are Bone of our Bone! and Flesh of our Flesh! That none but a Republican 
Government can exist over you!” wrote one northern sympathizer, “You will conduct 
your affairs with the justice and courage which led our Fathers in the revolution to 
establish the equal rights which we now enjoy.”  Many of these men saw the movement 
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in Texas as not only beginning in the same way the American Revolution had, but ending 
in the same way too.473   
Perhaps emboldened by such encouragement from the land of their birth, the 
Texan call for independence became more strident.  William Wharton, the elected leader 
of the November Convention, stated that Texan leaders were being unrealistic in 
expecting to cooperate with Mexican federalists.  “[B]oth parties of the Interior will unite 
against us, whatever be our declaration,” he warned.  Evidently still believing that he 
could change Jackson’s mind, Wharton wrote that, in neglecting to declare independence, 
they would “receive no efficient or permanent aid, or pecuniary assistance, from the 
United States.” Thus, “we encounter all the evils of a declaration of independence, 
without reaping one-tenth of the advantages of such declaration.474 
Indeed, by the beginning of 1836, it had become clear that Texas was becoming 
increasingly divided over the question of independence.  “It is apparent that there are two 
parties in this Country who indulge all the virulence of party spirit,” wrote John Sowers 
Brooks, a recruit from Kentucky.  “One party is strongly in favor of an immediate 
Declaration of Independence and the other desires a non-politic course.  They think that a 
Declaration for the Constitution of 1824 will unite the Liberal party in Mexico with them 
and thus enable them to establish their independence ultimately with greater ease.”   
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The pro-Independence faction gradually grew more vocal and visible, perhaps 
taking advantage of the conservatives’ false sense of security.  “I fear if a stand is not 
taken against self dubed patriots all our labors in Texas are gone to the devil and me with 
it,” warned McKinney in a letter to Austin, after finding several pro-independence 
articles written “by the Same men over different signatures and finding none of our 
Citizens opposing.” He claimed that he had in fact written to the publisher “in order to let 
be known that we were not unanimous in that way of thinking and to get our citizens to 
reflect.”  But after securing his promise that McKinney’s editorial would appear in the 
next day’s issue, Wharton evidently suppressed the publication and “substituted a bag of 
stuff illy comporting with our present condition.”  McKinney feared that Texan 
politicians were “yielding the very right of thought to a wild unthinking faction.” 475 
Due to their small numbers and comparably elite status, many of those in favor of 
preserving the Constitution were soon deemed Tories and dismissed by some, including 
many historians, as merely self-interested elitists.   Most of these men were among the 
wealthiest and most established members of their society.  As much as Texans opposed 
centralism, federalism in the hands of such men did not fare much better.  “Perceived as a 
landed aristocracy with shady connections to the Mexican political elite, peace party 
members lost influence,” writes Reséndez,  “The disrepute of the ‘speculating party’ (as 
the peace party became known) allowed those who favored complete independence from 
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Mexico to gain the upper hand.” 476   Brooks in fact wrote that “the peace party seems to 
be actuated by a different motive than that which they profess,” and that “Their extensive 
speculations in land have acquired them an influence in the mexican councils which it is 
said, they have exerted to their own aggrandisement and to the detriment of the interest of 
the settlers.”  Their influence with prominent Mexican families, he observed, “enables 
them to govern the Colony as they desire.” Indeed, just a few months prior, a handful of 
powerful settlers including Samuel May Williams and Lorenzo de Zavala, had attempted 
to buy up a large portion of land near Moncalva and sell its plots at inflated prices to a 
group of recent immigrants.  The scheme failed, but it served to aggravate pre-existing 
tensions between older and newer settlers, and reinforce the notion that the older 
generation had enjoyed a profound political and economic advantage over the 
newcomers, who consequently greeted their calls for moderation with suspicion.477 
Brooks made it clear where he stood on the question: “I am in favour of pursuing an 
open, bold, and fearless course, such as a Declaration of Independence,” he wrote. Not 
only would it “ensure us the aid of every Liberal in the United States, either in men or 
money,” but it would secure Texas “for the General Good of the bone and Sinew of our 
Country the Actual Settlers.”478 Most recruits stood on the issue, and as their numbers 
increased, so too did the call for independence. 
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As more and more men like Brooks flooded into Texas to join the revolutionary 
forces, they quickly began to outnumber the more longstanding and established Texans 
who had deeper ties to Mexico and more to lose in the war.  Many of the volunteers’ 
experience with Mexico and Mexicans was forged in a time of war and shaped by notions 
that they were fighting a backward and despotic people.  They had nothing to lose and no 
desire to be Mexican.  Such men were rapidly overwhelming the older settlers and the 
tejanos and, if Texas was to extend full rights of citizenship to them, they would soon be 
outvoting them too.  
Such suspicions went both ways.  Austin himself wondered if the independence 
movement had not been designed to dispose of the old settlers.  “I fear that the true secret 
of the efforts to declare independence is that there must then be a considerable standing 
army, which, in the hands of a few, would dispose of the old settlers and their interests as 
they thought proper,” he wrote.  He accused Wharton and others of recruiting volunteers 
from the North for the specific purpose of adding to their pro-independence constituency: 
[W]hat ought the owners of the soil, the old settlers of texas, who have redeemed 
this country from the wilderness and made it what it is, think of men who will 
collect the signatures of persons on their first landing, who had not been here a 
day, or only a few days in the country, and attempt to impose a paper thus signed 
upon the world as the opinion of the people of Texas.479 
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Austin transmitted these sentiments to the Provisional Government, stating unequivocally 
that he was opposed to any measure that would give the central government “any 
foundation to say that the Texan war, is purely a national war against foreigners and 
foreign invaders.”  He confirmed his stated belief “that Texas should rigidly adhere to the 
leading principles of the declaration of the 7th Novr” in “strict conformity with the basis 
on which the federal party are acting.”  Although “the dissolution of the social compact” 
gave Texas “the right of declaring herself an independent community,” it was not in her 
best interest to do so.  It appears that the primary source of Austin’s hesitancy at this 
juncture was that he knew that independence would expose “the old settlers and men of 
property in this country to much risk.”  Furthermore, “it will turn all parties in Mexico 
against us” and “bring back the war to our own doors.” While Austin seemed to think that 
this natural current was in the Federalists’ favor he left no question about what he thought 
Texans should do if the federalists were not successful: “[I]f they fail, Texas at any time 
can resort to her natural rights.” 480  
 Independence remained a last resort dependent on the actions of the Mexican 
government itself.   In his final correspondence with the Provisional Government dated 
November 30th, Austin stated that the declared cause should continue as it was originally, 
for it was in defense of the federalist constitution of 1824 that had prompted them to join 
in the first place.  However, he qualified his remarks by stating that “[S]hould these be 
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destroyed in mexico,” the volunteer army would “do their duty to their country.” Austin 
made it clear that such government actions would leave the people of Texas no choice but 
to call for independence.  Anything else would mean violating “the first law which God 
stamped upon the heart of man, civilized or savage, which is the Law, or the right of self-
preservation.”481 
But a trip to the Brazos Valley would, however briefly, change his mind.  On the 
ride back, after having evidently consulted with several of the older settlers, Austin 
reversed his opinion.  “I am more and more convinced every day,” he wrote, “and 
especially on calm reflection during a solitary ride down here, that the political position 
of Texas, should continue as established by the declaration of the 7th November last.”  
Any change in their position would “injure us abroad by giving an idea that we are 
unstable in our opinions and it would paralyze the efforts of the federal party which are 
now in our favour.”  Rather than threatening independence, Austin insisted that “Texas 
ought therefore to adhere rigidly and firmly to the declaration of 7 Novr,” disregarding 
“the opinions of excited moments, no matter by whom expressed.”  Austin was not ready 
to abandon the Federalists or Mexico just yet. “I think the situation of Texas, may in a 
great degree, depend on adhering to the declaration of 7 Novr and on enlisting the federal 
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party in our favor – I repeat this idea so often, because I am satisfied much depends on 
it.”482 
However, as long as leaders struggled to convince Texans to join the fight for 
longer than a few days or weeks, they would continue to have to rely on northerners like 
Brooks whose political vision differed significantly from their own.  While it continued 
to receive large numbers of recruits from the North throughout the early part of 1836, the 
Provisional Government struggled with enforcing obedience and loyalty to the 
revolutionary movement among Texans themselves, many of whom demonstrated the 
proven Texan tendency to prioritize individual concerns over collective ones.  “[O]ut of 
more than four hundred men at or near this post, I doubt if twenty-five citizens of Texas 
can be mustered in the ranks,” wrote the colonel.   “[N]ay, I am informed, whilst writing 
the above, that there is not half that number.”  Thus, the fight for Texas was by and large 
conducted by US citizens who issued “just complaints and taunting remarks in regard to 
the absence of the old settlers and owners of the soil.”483  Fearing the fate of he and his 
men, Fannin wrote that he hoped that soon “the people have risen and are marching to the 
relief of Bexar and this post.”  But if the worst were to happen,  
on whose head should the burthen of censure fall – not on the heads of those 
brave men who have left their homes in the United States to aid us in our struggle 
for Liberty – but on those whose all is in Texas and who notwithstanding the 
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repeated calls have remained at home without raising finger to keep the enemy 
from their thresholds. 
 
In another letter to a close friend, Fannin confided, “I have not as much confidence in the 
people of Texas as I once had.”  Although he had called on them for weeks to join his 
men “not one yet arrived.”484  
Indeed, as the revolution progressed, Texans showed a greater propensity to avoid 
battle, forcing commanders to rely ever more heavily on recruits who, by the end of the 
Revolution, formed a significant portion of the Texas Army.  Lack observes that, whereas 
at least 1,100 of the 1,300 men who rushed to arms in October and November were 
Texan, about three quarters of the over nine hundred soldiers who defended Texas 
between January and March of 1836 emigrated after October, and only about one-fourth 
as many Texans came out.   “Just as virtually every class and locale in Texas had 
supplied volunteers in the fall,” writes Lack, “so did Texans of varied conditions stay 
away from the army during the winter.”485 
*** 
In addition to manpower, Texas needed finances to participate in a civil war 
against Mexico, and so the Provisional Government decided to send a team north for that 
purpose.  In an attempt to sufficiently represent the various factions in Texas, the 
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Provisional Government decided to send Austin and his chief rival, Wharton. Austin did 
not look forward to it. However, upon arriving in the United States and meeting with 
northern capitalists, he would finally become fully and permanently convinced of 
Wharton’s position.  The reason?  Northern financial support for the Texans was 
premised on one thing:  “independence immediately - it will give us the aid of men of 
capital and high standing and character who wish for a more extensive field, than a mere 
party war in Texas.”  Admitting that “My own feelings and impulses inclined me to this 
course long ago,” Austin made it clear that his visit to the Low Country had compelled 
him to temporarily deviate from his convictions.  Regretting that he had allowed “the 
warm and even violent feelings of some of my friends did at the time to a certain extent 
precipitate me into party feelings,” Austin now made it clear where he stood on the 
independence question, especially now that he understood how essential is was to gaining 
northern aid.  “I go for Independence for I have no doubt we shall get aid, as much as we 
need and perhaps more so.” 486  
Furthermore, the set of reports that Austin was receiving regarding events in 
Mexico, seemed to suggest that casting their lot with the federalists no longer made 
sense.  Relying on reports that “the federal party has united with Santa Ana against us” 
Austin determined that remaining loyal to the Constitution of 1824 “does us no good with 
the Federalists, it was also “doing us harm in this country, by keeping away the kind of 
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men we most need.”  In a letter to his sister, Austin suggested that recent events in 
Mexico left Texas no other option. According to the logic they had laid down in the 
November convention, “The Texans may, therefore, for the future, be considered an 
independent people, entirely separate from Mexico.”  Finally, with federalism all but 
eviscerated, Austin made it clear that Texans would have to look to another power for 
moral and political guidance.  “We are young to set up for ourselves, but we are the sons 
of that great nation which has astonished the world by its deeds, and progress in the cause 
of liberty[,] light[,] and truth.”487 
Indeed, by early 1836 it appeared that Santa Ana had all but crushed federalism in 
every other state of the Mexican republic.  He had turned Zacatecas into a territory and 
outlawed its militia.  For reasons not entirely the fault of Mexican federalists, Texans, for 
the first time in their nation’s history, faced Mexico City alone.488 
Austin, knowing that his change of heart would not be well greeted by a number 
of his closest associates, insisted that Texans had to declare for independence if they 
were to stand any chance against the centralists.  “There is but one sentiment all over the 
US which is in favor of Texas and of an immediate declaration of independence,” he 
explained.  “We have negotiated a loan on the terms of the enclosed contract.  This was 
obtained on the belief that Texas would declare independence in march – it could not 
have been had otherwise.”  As far as the federalists were concerned, “The accounts from 
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Vera Cruz and Tampico are that the federal party have united with Santanna against 
Texas.”  Anticipating McKinney’s opposition, he wrote, “I know what reply you will 
make to this – but my object is the country, our country, it is, or ought to be the 
paramount object of all.”  After having once worked so feverishly to unite Texans against 
independence, Austin now scrambled to gain unanimous agreement to the contrary:  “The 
country ought to go unanimously for independence.  Public opinion all over the U.S. 
expects and earnestly calls for it.” 489  
But McKinney who, like Austin, had dedicated years to developing Texas under 
Mexico and expressing his devotion to Mexican federalism, was simply unwilling to 
accept this change of course.  Over a month would pass before he finally replied to 
Austin’s letter, but when he did, he made it clear how he felt about his friend’s recent 
change of heart and where their relationship stood as a result.  “I have intended answering 
your letter to me from N. Orleans but have really been at a loss,” he wrote.  “[Y]ou and I 
must sever totally in anything of a political character . . . my confidence in you is I think 
forever at an end.”  He was not Austin’s enemy, he assured him, “but at the same time, I 
am now fully convinced that you cannot be anything but an injury to your country.” 
McKinney, in fact, could not even find the words to describe his reaction: “your illusions 
and remarks in that letter to me from N. Orleans are  - - -.”  Not only did McKinney make 
it clear in no uncertain terms that he objected to Austin’s decision to call for 
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independence, but he also suspected that few Texans would support it, concluding that 
“You will very probably find yourself unsustained in your pledges for Texas declaring 
Independence.”490 
 But Austin did not have time to lament the loss of his friendship or, for that 
matter, permit his longtime friend to change his mind.  He made it consistently clear, that 
any and all financial assistance from the North depended unequivocally on independence.  
He and Wharton greeted each day hoping for news that the convention had offered up a 
declaration.  “We are disappointed at not hearing from the convention before now, and 
expect the declaration of independence dayly.”  Texan leaders on both sides of the border 
found themselves in a near desperate situation, as morale in Texas began to flag without 
aid from the North and northern capitalists held their fists tight.491 
As Austin struggled to hold investors’ interest, he continued to remind northerners 
of their kinship with the revolutionaries and of the familiarity of their cause.  In a letter to 
Nicholas Biddle, Austin declared it “the cause of freedom and of mankind, but more 
emphatically of the people of the United States, than any other.” Austin flattered himself 
“that you view it in the same light,” and would therefore “give to it the attention which its 
importance merits.”492  In his remarks to Senator L.F. Linn, he referred to the conflict in 
Texas as “A war of extermination,” no less than a race war “of barbarism and of despotic 
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principles, waged by the mongreal Spanish-Indian and Negro race, against civilization 
and the Anglo-American race.”   
Austin, who had for years presented his efforts to settle the region as part of a 
wish to serve the national interest of Mexico, now reversed course, and insisted that all of 
his work had been in the service of his native country, not his adopted one.   “For fifteen 
years,” he claimed, he had been “laboring like a slave to Americanize Texas” forming “a 
nucleus around which my native countrymen could collect and grow into a solid body 
that would forever be a barrier of safety to the southwestern frontier” and serve as a 
beacon-light to the mexicans in their search after liberty.”  The man who had once argued 
that Mexico was the safe haven of true republicanism and the natural home of all 
freemen, now renounced the country he had adopted and insisted that his settlement was 
exceptional in  a land far less enlightenend than its neighbor to the east.  But now the 
Anglo-American colonies, “this nucleus of republicanism,” were to be destroyed and  
their place “supplied by a population of Indians, Mexicans, and renegades, all mixed 
together, and all the natural enemies of white men and of civilization.”  Terming Mexico 
“a usurper, a base, unprincipled, bloody monster, who sets the laws of civilization and of 
humanity at defiance,” he insisted that Mexico’s “war of extermination” would “crimson 
the waters of the Mississippi, and make it the eastern boundary of Mexico.” 493 
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 Such polarizing language was particularly evident in Austin’s appeal to Andrew 
Jackson. “It Appears that Santa Ana has succeeded in uniting the whole of the Mexicans 
against Texas by making it a national war against heretics,” he told the President.  He 
went on to characterize the conflict in the most simplistic and racialized terms he could.  
It was a war “of barbarism against civilization, of despotism against liberty” and finally, 
although not entirely accurately, “of Mexicans against Americans.”  Austin hoped to give 
his cause a national appeal even as he attempted to play down its evident sectional 
character.  As Austin employed much of the same logic in his efforts to gain US support 
as he had done in his efforts to gain Mexican acceptance a decade and a half prior, he had 
the added benefit of a shared origin and heritage to draw upon. 
Will you, can you turn a deaf ear to the appeals of your fellow citizens in favour 
of your and their countrymen and friends who are massacred, butchered, outraged 
in Texas at your very doors?  Are not we, the Texians obeying the dictates of an 
education received here: from you the American people, from our fathers, from 
the patriots of ‘76 – the Republicans of 1836?494 
 
Austin understandably expected to receive most of his support from slave-state audiences 
where, according to his biographer, he delivered a distinctly southern “paean to Manifest 
Destiny.”  At stake in the Texan struggle for independence was not just liberty but 
protection of the “southern frontier – the weakest and most vulnerable in the nation” from 
“mistaken philanthropists, and wild fanatics” who “might attempt a system of 
intervention in the domestic concerns of the South, which might lead to a servile war, or 
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at least jeopordize the tranquility of Louisiana and the neighboring States.” 495 To ignore 
the conflict in Texas would simply be in direct violation of the best national interests of 
the south.  “[W]hat I have been the means of effecting towards the Americanism of 
Texas, is of more real service to the protection of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, 
than the expenditure of thirty millions of dollars on the fortifications of that frontier.”  
Such language is undoubtedly surprising coming from a man who had for so long 
praised Mexico and its people, and in fact counted Mexicans among some of his closest 
friends and allies.  But by spring of 1836, Austin no doubt understood that if Texas was 
going to gain any support at all from the North, it was going to come from Jacksonian 
Democrats and their southwestern base.  Thus it was their racist language that he 
adopted.496  Austin was willing to admit that he had once held very different feelings 
towards Mexico - “I have, in times past, had more kind and charitable feelings for the 
Mexicans in general, and have been much more faithful to them than they merited.”  But, 
“sad and dear bought” experience had taught him that it was “in vain to hope for any 
good from mexican institutions, or Mexican justice.”497 
Indeed, Austin and Wharton received a remarkably cooler reception in the north, 
where donations were a mere fraction of what they were in the South and West.  The New 
York Herald, even as it expressed sympathy with the Texan cause, lamented to see “the 
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glorious cause deposited in the hands of stock gamblers in Wall Street.” The rough and 
tumble gentlemen often selected for recruitment and funding campaigns “solicited a 
broad laugh” from New York investors, many of whom saw the Texas cause as at best 
futile and at worst destructive to national interests of the United States. 498 
Meanwhile, back in Texas, they prepared for another Convention.  But this time, 
independence was no longer the preferred path of a radical minority.  The primary factor 
determining this shift, was the Provisional Government’s decision to allow volunteers in 
the Texan Army the right to vote, specifically, for delegates in the upcoming convention.   
In February, a group of northern volunteers petitioned the government for this privilege.  
“We consider ourselves as citizen soldiers having a common interest with every citizen of 
Texas,” their petition stated, “We are equally anxious for its prosperity” having “fought 
and aided in repelling the mercenary troops of the enemy from its border.”  Indeed, these 
men had done more to protect Texas than many Texans.  Yet their politics, motivation 
and experience were significantly different.  When their petitions were denied, the 
volunteers often turned to physical intimidation.  In Nacogdoches, a group of forty 
Kentucky volunteers drew their guns and advanced on election quarters, their colonel 
declaring that “he had come to Texas to fight for it and had as soon commence in the 
town of Nacogdoches as elsewhere.” 499    Restive, violent, and with little to lose, these 
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recruits were determined to see that Texas delivered on its promise to them.  But first, 
they had to defeat Mexico.   
The man to do it was a charismatic young commander from Tennessee who 
claimed a personal friendship with Andrew Jackson.  Sam Houston had arrived in Texas 
just two years prior, escaping a failed political career and personal scandal.500  Despite 
devastating defeats at the Alamo and Goliad, the six foot two inches tour de force insisted 
to his soldiers that he could lead the Texans to victory and encouraged them to elect 
representatives who would call for independence.  “It is the duty of the army to send 
several representatives,” Houston stated, “and I hope that my comrades will elect only 
men who will vote for our independence, will fearlessly proclaim our separation from 
Mexico, and what they decide upon, comrades, we will defend with our arms.”501 With 
the politicization of volunteers from the North coupled with the defeat of Mexican 
federalists in the interior, the revolution became, in the words of one historian, “more 
openly anti-Mexican,” although these sentiments had been evident earlier.  For example, 
when Governor Viesca and General Mexía visited a camp of volunteers in mid-
December, Austin admitted that they “scarsely escaped insult.”  Given the current climate 
in the camps and among the Texan volunteers, especially those from the North, Austin 
predicted that Anglo-Mexican relations would only get worse: “These things however are 
not carried to anything like the extreme they will be.  I say, fear they will be, because 
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some outrage upon justice and hospitality may be committed by our excited patriots, as 
they call themselves, that will do no credit to Texas” 502 
 His prediction was correct.  When the hope of an anticentralist uprising in the 
interior failed, Anglos began to express “both open hostility towards tejanos and a belief 
that fundamental cultural-political differences dictated the need for independence.”503  
“My opinion is that Texas ought, at the next convention, unless a great and mighty 
change takes place in the policy of Mexico, to declare itself independent of that nation,” 
wrote Gail Borden,  
It is true, that at the beginning of the present struggle, we aimed not at separation 
from the Mexican people:  in the late battles we cried and fought for the 
constitution of 1824, and, I believe, it was the wish of a majority of our citizens, 
to see the federal party prevail.  But the federal constitution, as we see by the 
decree of the General Congress of the 3rd of October, is dead; centralism is 
established, and we are threatened with annihilation.”   
 
As for the continued reliance on relief from the interior, the only people the Texans could 
rely on at this point was, ironically, the very nation they had abandoned.  The “mass of 
the Mexican people” were deemed, “ignorant, bigoted, and supersticious: they do not, 
neither can they understand the true principles of a republican form of government; and 
consequently a dictatorial form is best suited to their education and habits.”  All ties of 
political affinity between Anglos and the rest of the country were dead, according to 
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Borden.   “[A]s a naion I look upon [all Mexicans] as our enemies.”  Democracy was 
now the purview of the United States, Mexicans had proven themselves incapable of it.  
Appropriately, Borden closed his letter with a quote from John Adams, “Independence 
now, and independence forever!”504 
*** 
But the call for independence did not, in fact, come so readily to tejanos.  Zavala, 
whose appeal was crucial in organizing Anglo resistance to the centralists, advised 
withdrawing from Mexico on tentative terms only, promising to rejoin if and when it 
returned to the social contract defined in the 1824 constitution.  If Mexico failed to do so 
after a defined period, Texas would consider itself permanently independent.  As for the 
Mexican federalists, themselves, they continued to believe that the Anglo colonies were 
their allies as late as December 1835, dismissing rumors to the contrary.505 
On March 2, 1836, a new Convention in every sense commenced in San Felipe.  
Only thirteen of the fifty-nine delegates who attended it had been present the past 
November.  Only seven were veterans of the 1832 and 1833 conventions.  Only eleven 
had held office during the period of Mexican rule.  They tended to be younger (averaging 
37 years), had been in Texas significantly less time, with almost a quarter having 
immigrated in only the past year  and nearly half having been in Texas for two years or 
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less.  They had distinguished themselves through military rather than political experience.  
In a place plagued by a lack of military enthusiasm, forty percent of these men had 
answered the call to take up arms against Mexico.  And only a handful of them were 
ethnic Mexicans, including Zavala and José Antonio Navarro, who, as much as he wanted 
to see Texas free, was said to have “trembled at the thought of having to sanction with his 
signature the eternal separation of Texas from the mother country.” All of these factors, 
according to Lack, “made the delegates aptly qualified to carry the Revolution to its more 
radical conclusion.”506  
Furthermore, much had changed in the political landscape of both Texas and 
Mexico in the past few months.  The federalists in the interior were defeated.  Texans 
stood alone in their fight against the centralists. Austin, who had always councelled 
patience and obedience was now eagerly pushing for independence, insisting that 
northern funds were dependent on it.    Those delegates who had sworn to support the 
Constitution of 1824 sensed that they were in the minority and mostly kept silent.   
The forty-one delegates unanimously voted for independence and drafted the 
Declaration that Austin had been urging for months.   Effectively, the people of Texas 
had no choice but to declare for independence “When a government has ceased to protect 
the lives, liberty and property of the people, from whom its legitimate powers are 
derived, and for the advancement of whose happiness it was instituted.”  The document 
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went on to cite all that the immigrants found most repugnant about the new government – 
the concentration of power in the hands of the military and the Church, the arrests, the 
suspicion.  But they also made clear that their decision rested with a principle that 
transcended national loyalty  
 When, in consequence of such acts of malfeasance and abduction on the part of 
the government, anarchy prevails, and civil society is dissolved into its original 
elements, in such a crisis, the first law of nature, the rights of self-preservation, 
the inherent and inalienable right of the people to appeal to first principles, and 
take their political affairs into their own hands in extreme cases, enjoins it as a 
right towards themselves, and a sacred obligation to their posterity, to abolish 
such government, and create another in its stead. 
 
Mexico had proven incapable of protecting their rights and, consequently the contract 
they had formed with it was null and void.  The “natural” principles of republicanism 
surpassed any and all national loyalties.  This was precisely the logic that had propelled 
these people to leave the United States sixteen years earlier and had compelled their 
fathers and grandfathers to declare independence from Britain sixty years earlier.  Yet, 
one thing made the Texas Revolution different.  Texans did not stop at renouncing 
Mexico, they renounced Mexicans themselves as a people incapable of exercising or 
protecting these principles.  The last lines of the document made this clear.  “We 
appealed to our Mexican brethren for assistance: our appeal has been made in vain; 
though months have elapsed, no sympathetic response has yet been heard from the 
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interior.  We are therefore, forced to the melancholy conclusion, that the Mexican people 
have acquiesced in the destruction of their liberty.” 507  
  Whereas their forefathers had broken away from a people of “kindred blood, 
language, and institutions,” Texans were now separating from “a people one half of 
whom are the most depraved of the different races of Indians, different in color, pursuits 
and character.”   With the federalist defeat in the interior and the failure of most tejanos 
to support independence, Houston now felt comfortable declaring that “the vigor of the 
descendants of the north [will never] mix with the phlegm of the indolent Mexicans, no 
matter how long we may live among them.  Two different tribes on the same hunting 
ground will never get along together.”508  
Texans adopted a Constitution modeled after that of their native country but 
which contained certain elements of the Spanish-Mexican legal traditional.  They 
included a specific Declaration of Rights infused with Jacksonian sentiment that, among 
other things, disallowed monopolies as “contrary to the genius of a free government” and 
prohibited laws of primogeniture or entail.  The document also forbid imprisonment for 
debt.  This right, predictably, did not extend to all men.  Just as those who had founded 
the United States of America sixty years before, the Founding Father of Texas flatly 
denied citizenship to people of African descent and included a slave code designed to 
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ensure that all blacks held in bondage under various contracts maintained their chattel 
status.  The document set forth the “social compact theory of government in which all 
authority derived from the people,” according to Lack.  All citizens retained “equal right” 
and permission to “alter their government,” thereby effectively permitting future 
revolution.  In a decision that would not only determine the military future of Texas, but 
perhaps its political one as well, Article VI, Section 8 stipulated that “All persons who 
shall leave the country for the purpose of evading participation in the present struggle, or 
shall refuse to participate in it, or shall give aid or assistance to the present enemy, shall 
forfeit all rights of citizenship, and such lands as they may hold in the republic.”509  
Texans who had avoided military service up to this point now had a crucial choice to 
make – either join the cause or risk losing everything. 
Indeed, Texan leaders’ first line of order would be to assert control over military 
affairs.   One of the first administrative offices they established was that of commander 
general with authority to subordinate all units of the army.  Declaring that “It is the 
bounden duty of every man who asks of the country protection of his person and property 
to stand forth in such a crisis as its defense,” the Provisional Government conscripted all 
able-bodied men between seventeen and fifty and called for punitive measures against 
anyone who resisted, making it clear that the success of the Revolution took priority over 
individual rights. Officials were appointed to conduct thorough registration in every 
district.  Men would be chosen for service based on a rotating lottery and, if selected, 
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called to duty by the chief executive at any time.  Those who failed to appear or hire a 
substitute would be court-marshalled at risk of losing their citizenship and up to half of 
their personal property.510 
David G. Burnett, a late convert to the independence movement who had been 
absent from the March Convention was appointed interim president.  He would claim 
later that he had merely “consented to be a candidate.”  His opponents had resided in 
Texas for only a few months, making Burnett’s victory, in many people’s eyes, the lesser 
of two evils.  After a rather grandiose inaugural address, Burnett set to work 
implementing the policies of the Convention, the first of which was to declare martial 
law.  He made an appeal to the people of Eastern Texas, a portion of whom “under the 
influence of idle and groundless rumors are leaving their homes and by the circulation of 
false news may prevent others of their countrymen from repairing to the standard of their 
country.”  Thus, a renewed military vigor did not seem to accompany the declaration of 
independence.  “I conjure you my countrymen to repair to the field forthwith to deafen 
your ears to all rumors from whatever quarter they may come,” pleaded Burnett, “to the 
field then my countrymen, to the standard of liberty and defend your rites in a manner 
worthy of your sires and yourselves.”511 
 A couple weeks later, he issued another proclamation, this time to the whole of 
Texas, “Your country demands your aid,” it began, “The enemy is pressing upon us, 
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families and wives and children of your neighbors, are driven from their firesides and 
compelled to take shelter in the woods and forests, while the enemy draws confidence 
and audacity from every disaster we encounter.”  His words reveal that Texas still faced 
many of the military problems that it always had.  Even following a declaration of 
independence and imminent defeat by Santa Anna, “too many citizens are lingering in 
idleness, and lethargy, or ingloriously [fleeing] before the enemy, whom we have 
heretofore effected to despise.”  He went on to invoke a sense of national shame that 
again likened the Texans’ struggle against Mexico to the Anglo-American colonists’ 
struggle against Britain:  “Is it possible that the free citizens of Texas the descendent of 
the heroes of ’76 can take panic at the approach of the paltry minions of a despot, who 
threatens to desolate our beautiful country.”  All else failing, Burnett sought to draw on 
Texans’ sense of self-interest to inspire them to pick up arms, “Let every man able to 
poise a rifle or wield a sabre fly to the army, and soon, very soon, your families will be 
safe.”  Ultimately, Burnett adopted much of the racist rhetoric employed by Houston and 
others of the pro-independence faction, referring to Mexicans as “minions of despotism, 
the panders of priestly ambition” who were “waging a merciless and exterminating war 
upon us.”  There being no more time for waffling or indecisiveness, those who did not 
join the fight for independence would be considered enemies of Texas - “Those who are 
not for us are against us.”  Burnett proclaimed null and void all previous exemptions from 
armed service under the new government and ordered every able-bodied man to the field.  
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“Let no man hope for exemption.  All are interested, all must abide the same fate.  The 
law makes no distinction, none will be made.”512 
 In his Executive Order, Burnett specifically referenced the trouble that he was 
having getting Texans to join the cause.  “Experience has demonstrated that an entire 
unity of action cannot be had from the Law,” he wrote, “that many men are found among 
us who are willing to rest quietly at home.”  He went on to warn of the consequences it 
would render, not just in terms of trouble defeating the Mexicans, but of the wellbeing of 
Texas once it achieved independence.  Texas, according to Burnet, “must be made 
[independent] by the united exertions and the common sacrifices of her citizens.  To 
depend upon volunteers from abroad is no less dangerous than disgraceful.”513 
   Burnett’s appeals mostly fell on deaf ears, however.  Furthermore, the 
government’s threatening and ultimately inconsistent efforts to enforce conscription only 
served to alienate more Texans.  The army failed to militarize on the local level as the 
plans for conscription were somehow never instituted effectively.  A group of 
Nacogdoches leaders wrote on April 11 that “there is no organization of the physical 
force of this community, and we are without a head.”514  Other municipalities simply 
refused to comply.  A few inhabitants were even seen “still daring to express sympathy 
with the cause of Mexico.”  Burnett’s appeals grew increasingly desperate. “Texans, have 
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you no pride?” he pleaded, “Will not the finger of scorn be pointed at you should you 
leave the country without an effort to retain it? What will the world think of your boasted 
declaration of independence when you flee at the sight of the first enemy that makes his 
appearance.  Texans’ reluctance to fight was particularly shameful given the large 
numbers of northern volunteers who arrived daily, ready to take up the call.  
[M]any brave soldiers who has magnanimously left his home and country to aid 
your cause, have been sacrificed through your supineness already.  The time has 
arrived that every man must do his duty.  He must defend the soil that he expects 
to reside on.  He must fight for the privileges if he expects to enjoy them. 
 
Anyone who refused his order would be forced to surrender their citizenship, forfeit their 
land, “and form henceforth treated as an alien and a foreigner.”  515 
As the Battle of San Jacinto approached, military leaders scrambled to muster as 
many men as they could to reverse the course of the war.  In their efforts, they directly 
accused Texans of a shameful indifference, unworthy of their heritage:  “Are you 
Americans? Are you freeman? If you are, prove your blood and birth by rallying at once 
to your country’s standard!”516  As Santa Anna’s front approached, Texas neared 
anarchy.  Help needed to come from somewhere.517  
*** 
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 News of the declaration finally reached New Orleans a few weeks later.  
Publications all over the country quickly filled with praise and support for the brave and 
courageous republicans carrying forth the age-old banner of individual freedom and 
personal liberty. And when news of the bloody siege at the Alamo reached the North, 
sympathies poured forth for the fallen heroes. “They sold their lives dearly, and that 
barbarian, Santa Anna, and his savage hordes, will long remember the terrible fight of 
Bexar, and the voice of fame, when she proclaims in future times, the names of the 
illustrious who died in glory’s arms,” wrote the Cincinnati Daily Gazette. 518 
 Even the New York Herald published an article placing Texans in a republican 
lineage that dated back to the ancient Greeks.  “What Thermopalae was to ancient Greece 
– what Bunker Hill has been to the United States – so will Bexar be to Texas.”  It went on 
to remind the reader of the common heritage shared by Texans and the citizens of the 
North, perpetuating the very notion that the conflict was, effectively, a race war.  The 
Mexicans had massacred “bone and flesh of our flesh.”  The article simply dismissed the 
complex and variegated causes of the conflict.  “It is idle – utterly so – futile – 
completely so, to enter into an examination of miserable technical points in the affairs 
between Mexico and Texas.” Suffice was to say that,  “Under the form of an illegitimate 
war, Santa Ana has perpetrated deeds more atrocious than those of the pirate on the high 
seas – of the wandering houseless Arab of the desert.”  Just as the author expressed 
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solidarity with the Texans based on a common ethnic and national heritage, so it 
castigated the Mexicans as a “race of miscreants” who, it suggested, were not even worth 
negotiating with.  Mexico simply was no match for the proud and just Anglo-American 
family. “The blood of our murdered brethren call to high heaven for instant and 
immediate vengeance.519 
The Grand Gulf Advertiser flatly denied that the Texans were ever really 
Mexican: “‘Tis true they left their country, but they were still American citizens.  They 
only left one confederacy of states for that of another - the protection of the parent for the 
protection of the friend.”    It was merely economic advantage that the immigrants had 
sought.  They had never intended to turn their backs on their country of origin.  
Furthermore, by characterizing the Texans as brothers of the North and one-time friends 
of Mexico, the author invoked a sense of natural belonging ironically just like the one the 
Texans themselves had once employed to describe their relationship with Mexico.  That 
nation had once aspired to be like the US, but aspiration was all it could achieve, as 
republican freedom was a biologically inherited quality.  The article, of course, failed to 
mention that the Mexican Constitution demonstrated a deeper commitment to federalism 
than that of the United States and one grounded in a specifically Hispanic political 
tradition.  Furthermore, it completely ignored the fact that these settlers were in fact 
Mexican citizens and instead represented them as ambassadors of the Anglo world.  
                                                          
519 New York Herald, 14 April 1836, Almonte Papers, Briscoe Center for American History. 
317 
 
 
 
“They were still, however, free, still citizens of a free country – still the sons of the 
heroes of ’76, emigrating to add light to the dawning of liberty in the new world.”  
Publication in the US, particularly the South, rushed to claim Texas and its cause as their 
own in a way that completely erased Texans Mexican identity and status 
 
Resolved, That they are our countrymen and brothers, born to the inheritance of 
liberty, and inspired by the same heaven – born feeling which animated our 
fathers in ’76 – that the blood of those martyred patriots, which crimsons the wall 
of the Alamo, cries aloud for retribution justice, and appeals to every American 
freeman for vengeance.520 
 
Sympathy for the Texans quickly translated into the largest volunteer surge yet.  
One sympathizer offered to bring two regiments from Tennessee, although he wished to 
bring four. The surge of US immigrants eager to earn citizenship in the new country, 
prompted a national debate over the diplomatic propriety and repercussions of thousands 
of US men flooding into a region whose status as an independent republic was still 
debatable, to fight in a conflict in which the US had declared neutrality. “The policy of 
our Government is doubtless not to interfere with foreign nations, or infringe the 
recognized law of nations,” wrote the Cincinnati Republican and Commercial Register, 
“But it is not the policy of government of free and independent people to stifle or 
suppress public sentiment, no matter how manifested or expressed.” The Register deemed 
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it “unnatural” for Americans not to participate in the struggle, treating the fight for liberty 
as if it were a biologically inherited trait.521 
If the United States embodied democracy and freedom, then Mexico embodied its 
antithesis – tyranny, oppression, and greed.  The Register declared that it was the 
Mexican centralists’ aim “to sweep from the nation every vestige of civil liberty, and to 
establish upon the ruins of a Federal Constitution, an absolute military and ecclesiastical 
despotism.”    Liberty was the purview of the United States of the North and something 
that Mexicans hated. 522  Reports of the horrors of Mexican oppression filled the pages of 
northern newspapers. One recruiter reported that he had “seen forty squads of 300 men 
each, impressed against their own protestations, and those of their wives and children into 
the armed services of the country.”  As if oblivious to Texas’ most recent conscription 
laws, he continued, 
 
I have seen 300 men chained with not a rag on to hide their nakedness, up to the 
middle in the common sewers of the city, guarded by half as many soldiers who 
besides their arms, carried large switchen, with which they unmercifully lashed 
the poor prisoners . . . I have seen the doors of private citizens and of public 
officers, and of the National Assembly, guarded by bodies of armed men.  Yet 
this is called a republic” 
 
 
The speaker, of course, made no mention of the obvious similarities to chattel slavery in 
the United States. In a stroke of irony and perhaps blind privilege, US critics of Mexico 
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attacked it for committing many of the very same injustices that characterized their own 
nation.523 
  The fact that volunteers were promised land in exchange for their service did not 
seem to compromise their lofty ideals. Indeed, appeals to prospective volunteers’ material 
desires were often included in solicitations, “It is truly and emphatically the Italy of 
America, combining agricultural and commercial advantages in a most eminent degree, 
with a delightful and healthy climate,” reported “A Voice from Texas.”  The solicitation 
continued, “All then who are desirous of participating in the glorious struggle for 
freedom, and uniting their destinies with this interesting country, would do well to 
embrace the present opportunity.”524  
As news of the atrocities at the Goliad and Alamo streamed into the United States, 
Texas came to represent nothing short of a humanitarian crisis. In response to the Jackson 
administration’s neutrality, the Cincinnati Gazette declared that “It is always noble to 
assist any people who are overwhelmed with calamity”  The paper proceeded to point out 
that “When Greece, of classic renown, was struggling for her liberty” from “the ruthless 
Turk” the United States had rushed to her aid”  Yet it was now a crime to assist Texas – 
“what law, sir, forbids such sympathies; and what law forbids us to emigrate – and what 
law forbids us to aid the distressed, an feed the hungry.”525 
                                                          
523 Daily Cincinnati Republican and Commercial Register, 19 November 1836, Asbury Papers. 
524 “A Voice from Texas,” Daily Cincinnati Republican and Commercial Register, 20 July 1836; 
Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 8 September, 1836, Ibid.   
525 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 8 September 1836, Asbury Papers. 
320 
 
 
 
But not everyone agreed with the sudden rush to join the Texas cause.  “Those 
who undertake to engage soldiers in a foreign country, without permission of the 
sovereign,” declared another contributor, “violates one of the most sacred rights of the 
prince and of the nation” and should be considered a crime of the highest order.   “For 
our citizens then, to commit murders and depredations, on the members of nations at 
peace with us, or to combine to do it” was “as much against the laws of the land as to 
murder or rob, or combine to murder or rob.”  The war in Texas was not about 
democratic principles, it was about opportunism and greed. 526 
Meanwhile, despite their efforts, Texan military leaders largely failed to coerce 
Texans themselves to the field and continued to receive reports of insubordination. One 
such document claimed that “John Durst and many of his disciples had proclaimed 
against independence, on grounds that “the colonists has sworn false by departing from 
the Constitution of 1824.”  Contrary to Eugene Barker’s claim that “it was the ‘old 
settlers’ who did, almost unaided, all the effective fighting,” Lack shows that over 1,800 
of the men who fought at the most decisive battle of the revolution, San Jacinto, arrived 
in Texas after Santa Anna had defeated the federalists.  The median date of emigration 
was 1834 and a significant number had arrived so recently that its was their first Texas 
battle.  Indeed, more than nine hundred men who responded to the initial call to arms in 
1835, simply failed to enroll the following year.  The most significant battle of the Texas 
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Revolution would be fought and won by men with almost no connection to the place for 
which they were fighting.527    
*** 
After months of low morale and consistent defeat by the Mexicans, the war in 
Texas would take a fateful turn at the Battle of San Jacinto in which the Texans would 
not only defeat but capture Santa Anna.   But once they had the general there was no 
clear consensus about what to do with him, introducing one of the first disagreements 
between Texas and its newly declared “parent republic.”  While many in the US believed 
Santa Anna should face extradition to their country, Texan leaders disagreed.  Burnett 
explained that if the federal party ascended to power, recognition of Texan independence 
would become impossible in accordance with the very terms on which the Texans had 
declared independence. “But, the sovereign power, under a Central Constitution would 
find it equally facile and advisable to get rid of the obstreperous republicans, and 
practical federalists of Texas, by severing her from the empire.”  Indeed, Santa Ana’s 
capture and the Texans’ ultimate decision to allow him to return to Mexico City to 
reclaim power, was the nail in the coffin of their alliance with the rest of the federalist 
states, and their relationship with Mexico itself.  As Burnett astutely observed,  
The federalists of Mexico are the enemies of Santa Ana.  By detaining him here, 
we give to them the reins of government, and deny to ourselves all hope of a 
formal recognition.  But letting him depart in time to sustain his authority at 
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home, we assure to ourselves a certainty that our independence can be recognized 
and at least a probability that it will. 
 
The Texans would ultimately release Santa Ana and he would return to Mexico City as 
the national leader.  But Burnett’s prediction was not entirely correct.  Santa Anna and 
the Mexicans would not accept Texan secession, leaving the new republic in a deeply 
vulnerable and precarious position.  Opposition to its recently achieved status as an 
independent republic came from virtually every corner – from Mexico, from opponents in 
the North and, perhaps most importantly, from many Texans themselves. 
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CHAPTER 6 
“Free, Happy and Independent”  
The Imperial Republic of Texas 
1836-1845 
 
Scholars have tended to see the period of Texan independence as a brief, 
unwanted, and ultimately doomed attempt at nation building.  Considered an economic 
and political fiasco, the independent Republic of Texas failed to achieve peace or 
recognition from Mexico, effectively secure and protect its borders, or attain anything 
close to economic self-sufficiency.  As one historian put it, for the full nine years of its 
independence, Texas “was virtually impoverished.  Its internal transportation system still 
was largely primitive.  Many of its plans for achieving rapid economic maturity came to 
nothing.”528  The fact that Texans voted almost unanimously to seek annexation to the 
United States immediately after defeating Santa Anna supports the premise that they 
never really wanted to be independent. Furthermore, the scholarly and popular tendency 
to fixate on Sam Houston as the dominant figure in post-revolutionary Texas has fueled 
this interpretation, since Houston – an unfailing US patriot and unionist - made 
annexation his primary aim during both presidential terms.  “The Lone Star flag flew 
proudly and perilously over Texas for ten years, but not through Texans’ choice,” writes 
T.R. Fehrenbach in his once definitive tome. The reason why Texas remained 
independent for so long? -  “[T]he political situation that had developed within the past 
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half-dozen years inside the United States.”529  In other words, Texas’ fate – and that of 
much of the rest of the continent - had more to do with politics in the north than with 
Texans themselves. 
  Yet, histories that view annexation as a fait accompli of the independence 
period, and one that was ultimately dependent on the political course of the United States, 
overlook the extent to which Texans not only took their independence seriously, but 
earnestly pursued other geopolitical and diplomatic arrangements.  Not only did these 
other options mean rejecting the United States, but they often meant bringing Texas into 
direct competition with it. As annexation began to look less likely, many Texans not only 
began to embrace independence, but to entertain the idea that their young republic might 
one day become a formidable empire of its own, replacing both the US and Mexico as the 
politically and economically dominant nation in the northwestern hemisphere.  The chief 
advocate of this view was Texas’ second president, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar.   
The historiography has largely dismissed Lamar’s presidency as “nothing more 
than a deviation from” Houston’s policies of caution and retrenchment.530  Since it was 
Houston’s early vision of seeing Texas joining the United States that eventually bore 
fruit, it is easy to see why. But the aims of Lamar and his followers, who included a large 
number of both early and newer settlers, were much more consistent with Texas’ “long 
history.”  They envisioned a vibrant and independent Texan empire with closer ties to 
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England, France and federalist Mexico, and imagined Texas extending its dominion all 
the way to the Pacific.  While such a goal may strike us as little more than delusional 
today, it was not all together unimaginable, and much more in line with how Texans 
thought of themselves both before and after independence.  Whatever problems Texas 
faced as an infant nation, its star was rising. 
Texan independence was nearly impossible, however, without the recognition and 
friendship of its southern neighbor.  Indeed, as soon as he came into office, Lamar 
immediately prioritized diplomacy with Mexico over the United States.  While Houston 
directed his diplomatic efforts at the North, recalling the shared heritage of Texas and the 
United States while often speaking disparagingly of Mexico and its people, Lamar often 
highlighted the two countries’ shared commitment to republican democracy.   Lamar 
believed, quite rightly, that the health of Texan independence depended much more on its 
relationship with Mexico than with the United States.  But pursuing a diplomatic course 
with Mexico in the 1840’s was complicated. Sometimes it meant attempting negotiations 
with Mexico City and other times it meant achieving recognition and peace from its 
federalist rebels in the North – some of whom were pursuing independence themselves – 
and could act as a critical buffer between Texas and the Mexican centralists.   
There was also a small but no less influential minority in Texas who questioned 
whether it should not rejoin Mexico, especially when it looked like the federalists might 
return to power.  This group included many tejanos and some members of the first cohort 
of Anglo-American immigrants.  These men actively entertained the idea of returning 
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Texas to Mexico, and, in at least one case, nearly caused it to happen.    Knowing that 
Texas could not realistically exist on its own, and not wanting to see it absorbed by the 
very nation they had turned their backs on years ago, they introduced the possibility of a 
third geopolitical arrangement, one that would undo one of the most pivotal events of the 
early nineteenth century.    
*** 
Texas entered a fragile and precarious independence, lacking formal recognition 
from any nation-state and significantly divided.   Many established Texans had only 
tenuously embraced independence and now found themselves surrounded by recent 
arrivals whose politics, experiences, and worldview differed markedly from their own. 
“Texas has more to fear from internal dissensions, or want of harmony than from the 
Mexicans,” wrote John P Austin.531 John P. Ramage agreed.  Even as he relished that 
“never in my opinion has Texas stood upon the same high ground in the [estimation] of 
civilized nations than she does at this moment,” he had to  confess that he had his “doubts 
and fears” arising “not from your external foes but from your enemies within.”  
Specifically, Ramage worried about the post-independence population’s lack of unity, 
community, or direction.  “[Y]ou have a class of people thrown among you, who when 
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the excitement ceases which collected them, will exhibit the evils attendant on ill 
organized minds and unbridled passions.” 532  
Texan demographics and politics changed dramatically after Santa Anna’s defeat.  
In August of 1836, it had approximately 30,000 Anglo residents up from about 25,000 in 
1834.  Many of these men were recruits from the North who had answered the 
revolution’s call for volunteers, as well as their families and slaves.  Their numbers 
dwarfed the mere 3,470 ethnic Mexicans, and many would end up settling in the western 
sections of the state near or in territory claimed by Mexico, bringing them into regular 
conflict with that country as well as the Kiowa, Comanche and other nomadic Indian 
groups that still dominated it.  The number of slaves from the North also increased 
dramatically from approximately 2,300 in 1834 before the revolution to 5,000 by the end 
of the revolution.  The independence period would see an even more dramatic population 
influx from the North, as Anglo-Americans, as well as a significant number of German 
immigrants, flooded into the republic.  By 1847 Texas had about 102,961 citizens - only 
about 12,000 to 14,000 of whom were Mexican – 38,753 slaves and 295 free blacks. 533  
Indeed, Texas not only became increasingly Americanized over the course of its 
independence, it became increasingly “southernized.”  Most of those who immigrated 
were white southerners and their slaves, strengthening the institution’s presence in the 
young republic.  They brought with them a southern culture, worldview, and political 
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disposition.  Meanwhile, tejanos, many of whom had once served as powerful political 
brokers when Texas was still a part of Mexico, now found themselves marginalized and 
subject to suspicion. 
 But this does not mean that we should see Texas as a mere extension of the South 
or any part of the United States.  While the majority of Anglo-Texans wanted to return to 
the US, a powerful and well established minority opposed annexation and even continued 
to question independence.  This, of course, begged the question of what, exactly, would 
become of Texas.  Would it remain independent?  Would it join the United States or 
would it return to Mexico?  Texans found themselves faced with several geopolitical 
possibilities.  But for the time being, they would have to assert themselves as an 
independent republic. Many countries, not least of which was Mexico, still did not 
recognize Texas independence.  If Texans wanted to annex themselves to the US, they 
would first have to prove that they did not constitute a significant burden or danger to that 
country, specifically, that they were capable of defending themselves against Indian and 
Mexican incursions.  Ironically, Texans would have to prove that they were capable of 
independence in order to achieve annexation.  
Given the profound disunity that plagued Texas at this time, this was no easy task.  
The first formidable nation-building challenge that Texans faced, was picking a 
president.  Austin was ill and declining, wartime disagreements had all but destroyed 
many of his former allegiances.  The Wharton party put forth Sam Houston, the Hero of 
San Jacinto, who, despite his battlefield heroics, was not particularly popular among 
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many of the old settlers, including Austin.  Yet, with the old guarde divided or 
indifferent, there were few other options. Running against an exhausted Austin and 
reluctant David Burnet in a nation now dominated by men like him, Houston won by a 
landslide.  His constituency was composed mostly of men who had been attracted to 
Texas by promises of land in exchange for their military service, had little sense of 
belonging or Texan nationalism, little relationship with the new republic or understanding 
of  its past,  and little interest in engaging in the hard, self-sacrificing work of nation-
building.  And many, including Houston himself, hardly shared the admiration for early 
Mexican politics that many of the original settlers had.  When he first arrived in Texas, he 
wrote in a letter to Andrew Jackson that Mexicans were dishonest and uneducated, and 
predicted that Texas would eventually break away from Mexico and join the United 
States or Great Britain. 534 
This made him an ideal man to lead the campaign for Texas annexation to the 
United States.  Indeed, many believed that the only way that Texas could save itself from 
social strife and anarchy was to join a more powerful protectorate – and for many there 
was only one clear option.   Even the venerable Father of Texas embraced annexation 
because it seemed “the most effectual and speedy mode of procuring for its inhabitants 
that security and civility in civil Govt which alone can compensate them for their past 
sufferings.” 535  Annexation was proposed in the very first election along with the ballot 
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for president.  It passed by an overwhelming majority, thereby becoming the new 
presidents’ chief aim.  Asserting that the people of Texas had, with a “unanimity 
unparalleled, declared that they will be reunited with the great republican family of the 
North,” Houston turned to what he deemed, “A circumstance of the highest import,” 
predicting confidently that the United States would “hail us welcome into the great 
family of free men.” 536 
Upon his inauguration, Houston promptly dispatched a diplomatic mission to the 
United States with a frank letter to his most probable supporter. “My great desire is that 
our country Texas shall be annexed to the U States and on a footing of Justice and 
reciprocity to the parties,” he wrote to Andrew Jackson.  Although the recently elected 
president of an independent republic, Houston confided to his friend, “It is policy to hold 
out the idea (and few there are who Know to the contrary) that we are very able to sustain 
ourselves, against any power, who are not impotent, yet I am free to say to you that we 
cannot do it.”   
But in their formal declaration to Congress, the delegation presented a very 
different explanation for their desire to join their mother country. “[Texas] claims 
annexation by the kindred ties of blood, language, institutions by a common origin, by a 
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common history, and by a common freedom.” 537 This, of course, was a dramatic shift 
from the time when Anglo-Texans attempted to emphasize their political and cultural 
similarities with Mexico, while turning their backs on the nation of their birth. 
 But not all Texan leaders were as eager for annexation as Houston.  “It should be 
borne in mind that Texas makes a great sacrifice by agreeing to the annexation at all,”538  
Austin wrote to John Wharton, then leader of the Texas envoy in the United States.  He 
cautioned Wharton against forfeiting too much, insisting that Texas should only accept 
annexation “on the broad basis of equitable reciprocity.”  He reminded Wharton of the 
rights that Texans had acquired “under the laws of the former and present governments,” 
all of which “must be duly respected and secured beyond the possibility of a doubt.”539  
Austin believed that the near unanimous vote to annex Texas to the US was “more 
the result of attachment to the native government” and “ties of the kindred,” than “of 
mature reflection, on the future glory, interest and prosperity of Texas.”  Unlike the 
newer cohort of immigrants, for Austin and many of the older settlers, annexation carried 
with it the threat of greater loss than gain. These men had consistently imagined a world 
apart from the United States and the thought of returning to it, however pragmatic, did 
not necessarily appeal to them.  Furthermore, as Austin hoped to remind Wharton, they 
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had other options:  “In the event therefore of discovering any such disposition  in the 
government of Congress of the United States, you will have full and free conversations 
with the British, French  and other foreign ministers, on the Texas question.”  For such 
nations, association with a cotton-producing Texas, promised “great commercial 
advantages,” including a market free of the kind of onerous tariffs that northern cotton 
producers faced. If Texas were to enter the United States, Austin insisted that it enter as a 
state “without passing through the intermediate stage of a territorial government,” that 
there be no restriction whatsoever on slavery, and that the land titles of “bona fide 
settlers” be honored “so as to secure them from the heartless grasp and persecution of 
speculators.”540 
Southern cotton growers, however, immediately recognized Texan annexation as 
a political and economic boon.  The annexation of a vast cotton-producing region 
promised an end to the great shortages and fluctuations that had plagued the South.  
Politically, it would fortify the region by adding considerably to its representation and 
population.  As Wharton himself observed, if Texas were admitted to the Union “the 
preponderance of political power will very soon depart from the North and permanently 
reside in the South and West.”541  Not to mention that Jackson had dreamed of acquiring 
Texas for decades.    
                                                          
540 Ibid. 
541 Wharton to SFA, 6 January 1837, DCT, Vol. II, 168-72.   
333 
 
 
 
Yet, it was not to be.  Several formidable obstacles convinced Jackson that 
annexation, as much as he wanted it, was not worth the cost.  First, it would contribute to 
growing sectional rivalry on the eve of a presidential election.  Second, Mexico already 
blamed his administration for the Texas fiasco, and annexation would further damage an 
already fragile relationship between that country and the United States, potentially 
tarnishing the latter’s image abroad.   Finally, and perhaps as a result of Houston’s letter, 
Jackson knew that the cost of defending such a sparsely populated and impoverished 
region would most likely fall on the federal government, thereby making the burden of 
absorbing Texas outweigh the benefit.  According to his biographer, “It was very 
important to Jackson that the rest of the world see any exchange of territory as an 
honorable and proper transaction.”  That being the case, Jackson refused to annex Texas 
and advised Congress to “stand aloof” on the question, at least until “Mexico herself, or 
one of the great foreign powers, should recognize Texas first.”  Doing so, Jackson 
argued, would “secure to us respect and influence abroad and inspire confidence at 
home.” Congress did, however, succumb in part to the vigor of the Texas commissioners, 
and on March 1, 1837 recommend to the president the formal recognition, but not 
annexation, of Texas.542   
To some in Texas, this came as a relief.  Many questioned the United States’ 
claim and investment in Texas.  If the US had, since the signing of the Adams-Onís 
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Treaty, claimed the region as its own, why had it not intervened sooner?  Why had it not 
come to its aid in its war with Mexico?  Mexico, many assumed, would surely have 
consented to sell Texas to the Americans if they had offered the proper price.  “But what 
would the people of Texas be likely to think of such a consummation of their 
revolutionary struggle?” asked the Weekly Houston Telegraph,  “They have already 
purchased the soils at a price more costly than its mines could pay – the blood of those 
who fought and fell at San Jacinto.”  Regarding Texas’ previous desire to attach 
themselves to the US, the Telegraph asserted that “the sentiments of her people are 
believed to have undergone a change since the vote of 1836.”  And for good reason. 
“[T]he United States would be the greater, if not the sole gainers, both politically and 
commercially,” the paper asserted, “We would be subjected to all those financial evils 
from which the United States have labored from first to last” and Texas’  “fertile regions” 
would only serve “to fil the pockets of northern manufacturers and monopolists.”543  Why 
return to the same onerous impositions from which many Texans had fled?  Why become 
the peripheral corner of a vast and extractive empire when you could become one 
yourself?  
Rejected by the Jackson administration and losing its appeal among Texans, 
Houston decided to abandon annexation and put forth a plan to make Texas a viable 
independent nation.  “Recognized as we have been, by the United States, a free, 
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sovereign and independent nation, it becomes our imperious duty, to pursue such a course 
of policy and legislation, as will at once command the policy and respect of other 
nations.”  Of paramount importance was addressing the nation’s embarrassed finances. 
“A boundless revenue to the country will arise from the opening of the land offices,” he 
informed Congress.  Furthermore, Texas needed an organized militia and functional 
Navy. “There can be no doubt but that the enemy will avail themselves of every 
advantage by sea.”  Texans must therefore not only “make preparation to meet them, but 
to maintain active operations by sea and land.”  Yet, despite its financial insolvency, 
insecure borders and woefully underdeveloped infrastructure, there was one thing that 
Houston was certain Texas would never succumb to: “It is vain to suppose that Mexico, 
imbecile as she is, and distracted by internal factions, can ever reconquer the fair region 
of Texas, and maintain her conquest.  The same spirits who have subdued the wilderness 
and have repelled the boasted invincibility of Mexico, yet live.”544  
Consequently, annexation became increasingly less attractive to a president who 
had almost made acquiring Texas his life mission.  But it also began to look less 
appealing to Texans themselves.  “Annexation with respect to ourselves alone is now a 
question of more embarrassment than heretofore,” wrote Texas Secretary of State, Robert 
A. Irion, “From indications evinced by members of the late session of the Texan 
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Congress[,] the people are becoming less anxious for the success of the measure.”545 A 
month later Irion stated that pushing further for Texas annexation was “useless” and 
would be “derogatory to ourselves.  If the United States decided it wanted Texas, “the 
proposition should come from them.”  Texas’ policy from here on out would be “to 
appear indifferent upon the subject.” 546  No matter how fragile their independence might 
be, Texans insisted to themselves and the rest of the world that they could stand alone. 
Indeed, even as Texans complained of their poverty and lack of resources, many 
of them embraced independence as an opportunity to enrich themselves and their new 
republic unhindered by the North’s onerous regulations and tariffs.  “There never has 
been such a universal feeling in favour of raising cotton in texas,” Thomas McKinney 
wrote to Samuel May Williams in February 1838.  Whereas, just six months earlier, he 
had bemoaned “how many disappointments necessarily occur in a country so poorly 
organized [in all] her commercial relations,” McKinney now cheerfully informed his 
friend that he had “received orders for Six Gin stands.” He now believed Texas was in a 
position to produce five times the amount of cotton it had the previous year, and that 
“There are a great many persons now emigrating from the United States to this country” 
who “will doubtless produce a revival of lines and business.” 547 
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Indeed, when Jackson finally decided to kill the annexation bill for fear that it 
would send his nation further into sectionalism and threaten its already delicate 
relationship with Mexico, not a few Texans were relieved.  “How glorious will Texas be 
standing alone, and relying upon her own strength,” wrote Anson Jones, the republic’s 
new minister to the United States.548   And although the South had almost unanimously 
supported annexation, there were a few southern leaders who agreed. McKinney wrote of 
a few “friends” of Texas from Louisiana[,] Mississippi[,] Kentucky[,] etc” who “opposed 
our annexation on the grounds that a brighter destiny now awaits Texas.”  Whereas, if 
Texas were to join the United States,  it would be subject to the same perceived 
oppression that the rest of the South experienced, namely “high Tariffs and other 
Northern measures,” and may even be “driven to nullification, secession etc and be thus 
involved in a worse revolution than we are now engaged in.”  Texas was emerging as a 
beacon of hope for an increasingly disgruntled South, at least some of whose leaders 
encouraged the young nation to “go on as we have commenced conquering and to 
conquer and never pause until we had annexed all or the best portion of Mexico to 
Texas.”  In so doing, Texas might establish “an independent government that would rival 
[the United States] in extent, resources and population.”549 Texans, for the time being, 
were prepared to take their advice. 
*** 
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Houston’s term ran out at the end of 1839 and since the Texas constitution did not 
allow consecutive terms, it is impossible to know if Texans were satisfied enough with 
his presidency to re-elect him.  But the man they did elect was about as far from Houston, 
personally and politically, as one could get. Where Houston was charismatic and 
extroverted, Lamar was bookish and unimposing.  Whereas Houston pursued a policy of 
caution and retrenchment, hoping to see Texas become a US state, Lamar hoped not only 
to preserve independence, but to turn Texas into a formidable empire of its own that 
extended all the way to the Pacific.  In this regard, Lamar’s policies were far more 
consistent with Texan politics up to that point.  Indeed, as early as December 1836, 
shortly after they had organized a formal government, the committee on the state of the 
republic adopted a bill incorporating an entity known as the “Texas Railroad, Navigation, 
and Banking Company.”  Its aim was to establish railroad communication and 
transportation between the Rio Grande and the Sabine.   
But some had even bigger dreams for the project.  Texas Congressman Thomas J. 
Green envisioned a pattern of railroads and canals that connected New Orleans to the 
Gulf of California, thus making Texas a gateway to Asia and India.  Green predicted that 
“a combination of political events must soon happen, which will place Texas no longer in 
a frontier position to the States of the North.”  He envisioned adding a country west of 
Texas “as large as the original thirteen States.”550 But in negotiations with the Jackson 
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administration, Texan officials soon learned that if they wanted to gain recognition, they 
would have to claim far less territory than even their most modest ambitions entailed.  By 
claiming the Rio Grande as their western border, the Texan congress, many believed, 
encroached on Mexican territory, including Santa Fé.  The boundary question never 
really came up, in part because knowledge of the sheer size of Texas would prompt many 
to withhold recognition.   
Yet the failed attempt at annexation had emboldened imperially-minded Texans 
such as Memecum Hunt, Irion’s successor as Texas’ representative to the United States.  
Hunt asserted that Texans would continue to push their western boundary, “pursuing the 
destiny indicated to us by that significant and beautiful emblem of our nationality, the 
evening star,” thereby adding “star after star to our Banner,” just as the United States had 
done. 551  When asked by John Forsythe, secretary of the United States, how far Texas 
aimed to extend its western boundary, Hunt boldly replied “As far as the Pacific Ocean.”   
As an independent republic, Texas would take the mantle of Anglo expansion in the 
Northwestern hemisphere.  But Texans did not simply adopt US expansionism, the notion 
of Texas resting at the heart of a vibrant transnational economy and community was 
something Austin himself had expressed, albeit in the service of Mexico.  In many ways, 
independent Texas attempted to pursue many of the same ambitions that it had expressed 
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under Mexico, placing it at odds with both that country and the United States.  Texas 
went from soliciting the United States to competing with it.  
 Lamar laid out his vision for the young republic in his inaugural speech delivered 
in December 1838.  Of annexation, he claimed “I have never been able myself to 
perceive the policy of the desired connexion, or discover in it any advantage either civil, 
political, or commercial, which could possibly result to Texas.”  On the contrary, 
annexation “would produce a lasting regret, and ultimately prove as disastrous to our 
liberty and hopes, as the triumphant sword of the enemy.”  Lamar made it clear that, 
unlike Houston, who had attempted to rejoin the union at his first opportunity, he was a 
Texan through and through, and would remain so.   Although he claimed “no irreverence 
to the character and institutions of my native country,” he insisted that “the land of my 
adoption must claim the highest allegiance and affection.”552   
Lamar explained that becoming a part of the United States would mean 
surrendering the very freedoms that had attracted so many to Texas in the first place and 
that they had fought so ardently to defend in the recent war with Mexico: 
 
When I reflect upon the invaluable rights which Texas will have to yield up with 
the surrender of her Independence – the right of making either war or peace; the 
right of controlling the Indian tribes within her borders; the right of appropriating 
her public domain to purposes of education and internal improvements; of levying 
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her own taxes, regulating her own commerce and forming her own alliances and 
treaties – when I view her divested of the most essential attributes of free 
government; reduced to the level of an unfelt fraction of a giant empire. . . I 
cannot regard the annexation of texas to the American union in any other light 
than as the grave of all her hopes of happiness and greatness. 
 
Annexation, as far as Lamar saw it, was the worst thing for Texans’ happiness and 
prosperity.  It would place Texas on the periphery of a vast and extractive empire whose 
center of power was located thousands of miles away and controlled by men whose 
interests did not at all coincide with their own.  Lamar emphasized Texans’ natural 
wealth, which included “the most delightful climate and the richest soil in the world,” and 
he insisted that if it remained independent, Texas would “have no rival; with the whole 
world for her market.”  In fact, through various ingenuity and improvement measures, 
Texas might supply an “example in free trade” to other nations, “emancipating it from the 
thralldom of tariff restrictions and placing it upon the high grounds of equitable 
reciprocity.”  
Language like this reminded Texans of precisely the frustrations with US society 
and politics that had initially compelled them to leave that country for Mexico.   While 
Houston and the pro-annexationists had emphasized Texans’ similarities with the North, 
Lamar reminded Texans of their differences.  He referred to Americans as “another 
people,” even “remote and uncongenial.”553   Texans and Americans, despite their 
common heritage, were not the same.  Annexation, Lamar insisted, would return Texans 
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to the same state of poverty and disempowerment that they had fled as citizens of the 
North.  Independence would finally give them the opportunity that they had sought in 
Mexico and defended in the recent revolution.  The by now decades long search for 
political and economic utopia was still within reach, but only if Texans remained 
independent from both the US and Mexico.  Texas would not permit itself to become 
some peripheral part of a vast empire – it would become one itself.554 
 With the failure of annexation, Texas turned to another imperial power for 
assistance and tutelage – Great Britain.  In light of the geopolitical circumstances of the 
1830’s and 1840’s it made perfect sense.  The growing power and influence of the slave 
South had made Britain nervous, and thus they had an interest in bringing Texas within 
their sphere of influence.  For Texans, aligning themselves with Britain permitted them to 
compete with the United States, rather than become beholden to it.  “We are about to 
separate from our fatherland forever,” declared Lamar.  “No longer with light hearts 
swiftly shall we seek the old homestead – we track the broad Atlantic but it is for the 
white cliffs of England.” For men like Lamar, the promise of Texas’ greatness rested in a 
very different kind of relationship with the US. “We become the rivals of the United 
states in the production of her great staple.  [A]nd if we become a commercial people, her 
rivals in everything.” 555 
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Such language did not go unnoticed in the North where, as Jackson himself 
observed, a Texan alliance with Great Britain could mean more than simply the loss of 
the region forever.  All of this was taking place at the same time that Great Britain and its 
former colony were laying competing claims to the Oregon Territory.  The acquisition of 
both Texas and Oregon would permit Great Britain, as Jackson explained, to “form an 
iron hoop around the United States, with her West India islands.”556 In light of these 
concerns, Texan annexation was all the more crucial to US security.    
Indeed, Texas had its own imperial ambitions when it came to the Pacific 
Northwest.  In early 1840, Secretary of the Treasury Richard Dunlap reported that “The 
Congress of the United States have a proposition before it, for the establishment of a 
territorial Govt at the mouth of the Columbia.”  He argued that this constituted a concern 
for the Government of Texas, for “If this port shall pass into the possession of the United 
States, it will be forever out of the reach of Texas, and will certainly circumscribe her 
growing power, and cripple her means for future advancement.557  Texan leaders also 
aspired, just as they had done under Mexico, to divert trade between Santa Fé and the 
Caribbean through Texas.  Texans envisioned replacing the United States as Cuba’s chief 
supplier of   “mules, Horses, cattle, Beef, cotton Etc.” Meanwhile “the coffee, Sugar, 
cigars, Tobasco fruit Etc, of Cuba” could be furnished to Texas at reduced rates.  
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Rendering St. Louis all but obsolete, Texans believed that their ports would provide “a 
cheaper more direct and expeditious route.” 558 
But even as the newly forged nation distanced itself from the United States, it 
served as a source of inspiration for certain of her citizens. “If then infatuated Fanaticks 
ever drive us to separation,” wrote one admiring Southerner to Lamar shortly after his 
inauguration, “I look to Texas as a Country to fall back upon, & whether a new 
Confederation with the Southern States shall be effected, or not, the Southern Country 
will find a powerful ally in that new, & I trust I may soon add powerful 
Commonwealth.”559 As southerners began flirting with the idea of secession, many 
looked to Texas as their inspiration - A group of die-hard agrarian federalists committed 
to regional sovereignty and free trade who had successfully seceded from a centralizing 
republic.  
 
 Yet, before it could become an empire, Texas had to achieve some degree of 
security, one of the most serious threats to which came from the United States or, more 
specifically, its displaced Native Americans.   During the ten years that Texas existed as 
an independent nation, it faced constant incursions by Indian groups who, with little 
regard for national boundaries, often crossed from the United States into Texas and 
northern Mexico to conduct raids.  This prompted reciprocal attacks from Texans. Thus, 
almost as soon as discussions of annexation with the US ended, arguments over whose 
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responsibility it was to police Texas’ borders began. Texas argued that the US still had an 
obligation under an earlier treaty with Mexico to restrain Indian incursions against 
them.560 
Indeed, even as they insisted that Texas was not only a viably independent nation, 
but capable of expansion, Texans complained that their country was too poor and weak to 
police their frontier, pressuring their leaders to appeal for US assistance.561 In a letter to 
the US Secretary of State, AP Upsher, the head of the Texas Legation to Washington DC, 
Isaac Van Zandt formally requested that the US government “aid, and cooperate in every 
measure necessary to control these people,” referring to its recently displaced Indians.562 
 
 As relations with the North cooled, Texans began to turn their attention to 
achieving recognition and amity from their southern neighbor.  While Lamar often 
receives attention for his exclusionist policies regarding Native Americans, it was during 
his administration that Texas made the greatest progress towards improving its 
relationship with Mexico.  It did so by first turning to Britain for assistance in hashing out 
a peace agreement.  Bernard E. Bee, the Texan secretary of state, went to Mexico City in 
a special envoy with only two provisions – sign no treaty that does not recognize the 
unconditional independence of Texas, and sign no treaty that does not place the 
                                                          
560 JS Mayfied to Bee, 17 February 1841, 20 April 1841, DCT, Vol. I, 82-6. 
561 Lamar to Daniel Webster, 2 January 1842, “Notes from the Texas Legation in the US to the Department 
of State, 1836-45,” National Archives, Washington D.C. 
562  Isaac Van Zandt to the Honorable AP Upsher, 16 August 1843, Ibid. 
346 
 
 
 
international border at the Rio Grande.563  Lamar attempted to initiate diplomatic talks by 
highlighting the affinity between the two nations.  In a letter to the vice president, 
Valentín Gómez Farías, Lamar expressed his assurance that “in you are to be found a 
concentration of all those liberal principles and enlightened views which tend to the 
promotion of civil and religious liberty.” Despite the two countries’ current state of 
hostility, Lamar hoped that he would find a sympathetic ear in “one who has so long and 
through so many trying scenes maintained the character of a consistent statesman and 
devoted patriot.”564 
Because of his previous relationship with Mexican leaders, Lamar recruited 
Thomas McKinney to prepare a separate letter introducing Bee to the Bustamante 
administration. However, McKinney, always one for frankness and less effusive than 
Lamar, took the opportunity to remind the Vice President of his true feelings regarding 
Texan independence: 
You well know that I opposed the declaration of independence of Texas and even 
now do not have reason nor motive to change my opinion[,] but the obvious has 
passed and God desires a good result from the trip of Col. Bee and that it 
establishes good relations between Texas and Mexico.565  
 
 Whether or not McKinney’s letter had anything to do with the failure of Bee’s mission 
we will never know.  Suffice is to say that when he arrived in Mexico City, Bee met with 
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an intransigent Mexican leadership that would accept nothing less than Texas’ return to 
Mexico.  Mexican leaders insisted that such was necessary to the continued sovereignty 
and peace of their country.  “General Victoria says that the acknowledgement of our 
Independence is out of the question,” reported Bee, “that Zacatecas, Sonora etc would 
soon be asking the same thing.”  When Bee attempted to sway him by pointing to 
Texans’ racial and cultural distinctiveness, he was dismissed.  Instead, the General urged 
“that Texas should at once propose to be reunited with Mexico,” and that she would “be 
received with open arms.”  When Bee brought up the two nations’ political 
incompatibility because Mexico was a central government and Texas “attached to a 
Federal,” the general replied that Mexico “was a Representative Republic [and] that 
Texas as a Department would have a right to be represented etc etc.”  When Bee brought 
up the issue of slavery, Victoria replied, “that can be got over.”   
For Victoria, Texans’ ethnic, cultural or even institutional differences did not 
make them incompatible with the rest of Mexico.  They were not even unique in their 
decision to secede.  Even slavery could be dealt with.  As for the Texans themselves, they 
pursued a somewhat inconsistent diplomacy that both highlighted their affinity with 
Mexico while at the same time demanding recognition based on this affinity.  Mexican 
leaders must have found this confusing.  Furthermore, Texans seemed to believe that 
ethnic and cultural homogeneity were essential to a functional republic in a way that 
Mexican leaders did not.  Perhaps nothing more eloquently highlighted the difference in 
these two men’s political vision than the general’s closing remarks that would have rung 
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much truer to a Texan of the 1820’s than one of the 1840’s.  As Bee left the meeting, 
Victoria told him to remember that “Mexico is the finest country in the world; avail 
yourself of its advantages, at a future day your son may be at its head.”566 
With the failure of the Texas Republic’s first formal attempt to gain recognition 
from Mexico, Britain intervened in the form of Sir Richard Pakenham, the British 
minister to Mexico, who saw Texas’ offer to purchase its territory from Mexico as means 
to secure Mexican payment of debts owed to Britain.  Lamar appointed James Treat to 
issue a second offer to Mexico, but this one would entail a request for even more 
territory.  Treat was to insist on the same boundary line along the Rio Grande that Bee 
had, but first he was to “feel” out the Mexican authorities regarding their amicability 
towards a line that would extend to Paso del Norte and from there westward “to the Gulf 
of California and along the southern shore of that gulf to the Pacific Ocean.”  Alas, 
Treat’s efforts met with no more success than Bee’s had, so that, in the words of one 
scholar, by the end of 1840, “Texas had secured no definite results on the question of 
extending her jurisdiction to the Rio Grande” - not from the US and not from Mexico.567  
The latter still did not even recognize Texas independence. 
 Some welcomed the failed negotiation as an invitation to war.  “I had liked to 
have said I was glad of it,” wrote one official to Lamar, “We shall be forced to treat the 
recent tyrant in a Manner that will advance us in a National point of view and make us as 
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a nation[,] one of the most powerful in the world eventually.”  To those who shared this 
view, another war with Mexico meant another opportunity for Texans to prove their 
chops as a formidable new power.  “My voice is for war and as Bustamante has 
expressed his determination to invade us the sooner we are ready the better for our 
interests,” declared Hunt. 568  The President, however, understood that his new republic 
was in no condition for such a conflict and strictly forbid any official or unofficial 
invasion of Mexican territory by Texan citizens.569 
Lamar also strove to remind Texans of their affinity and shared history with 
Mexico, advocating peace and cooperation with a nation that many Texans had once 
called home.  “Adverse as I am to our protracted state of affairs with Mexico,” he 
explained, “I have nevertheless thought it due to ourselves, and to the enlightened 
opinions of the world, to show that we have no vindictive feelings to gratify, but are 
willing to meet her in a spirit of forbearance” and “establish a basis for a future 
intercourse which shall be equally beneficial to both nations.” Lamar, however, 
understood the complexity of Mexican politics, and that diplomacy with the country 
might require a dual approach.  While Texas had failed to gain the recognition and 
cooperation of Mexico City, Lamar suspected he would have better luck with the 
Mexican federalists just south of his country, who were in a position to protect Texan 
independence and interest.   Mexico was, as Lamar observed, “divided into two parties”  
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and one of these parties, “chiefly occupying the northern provinces,” had already “made 
overtures to [the Texas] Government, indicating a desire to cultivate friendly relations by 
establishing reciprocal trade and commerce.”570  Lamar intended to take them up on their 
offer. 
Indeed, leaders of the northern states of Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, 
Jalisco, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Durango, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, New Mexico and the 
Californias sought an agreement with Texas in which it would supply two thousand 
troops in exchange for a formal recognition of independence from a successfully 
established Republic of the Rio Grande.571 In fact, Lamar had received a formal 
correspondence from General Canales, leader of the northern federalists, just after his 
election in December 1838.   Canales, reporting that “On the 3rd of last month these 
towns of the North declared for the Federal States.  The movement has progressed very 
rapidly and uninterruptedly, and I doubt not the Republic will follow it in a few days.”  
Canales reported that a recent string of victories in the interior had revived the federalists.  
“The cause of liberty must infallibly triumph,” he assured Lamar, and once it did “those 
towns and yours will again very shortly be united in bonds of former amity.”  Having 
congratulated the president on such a prospect, Canales requested “protection in your 
Republic, which interests (imperiously demand) that we . . . take up arms.”572 
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Texans received another appeal a few months later from one of Canales’ federalist 
allies then in New Orleans.  Pointing to the United States’ failure to either absorb or 
defend Texas against its enemies, the author gestured to the great and necessary benefit 
that Texas would gain from aligning itself with a federalist north – “those states 
containing the greatest mass of the population, of the territorial riches, and of the moral, 
scientific, and political abilities amongst the Mexican people.” The author credited Lamar 
for having “opened a commercial intercourse” between Texas and northern Mexico, but 
pointed out that the two countries “have still a common enemy to reduce.” They must, 
therefore, also establish a “political intercourse” which would “cause the hordes of 
Centralists, now advancing to the stroke of a whip, to fall back terrified and their 
government to be struck with sudden death.”573  
But such alliances, while tempting, threatened to derail Texan negotiations with 
Mexico itself.  As Bee had reported from Mexico City, the recent federalist revolt was the 
primary reason why Mexico refused to acknowledge Texan independence.  In light of 
this, Texan leaders decided that it was not in their best interest to formally align 
themselves with Mexican federalists.  But this was not the preferred policy of many 
Texans themselves.  In April of 1840, a group of citizens of western Texas wrote to the 
President  that they had “Resolved that such terms and conditions be authori[zed] to [be] 
made with the Federal Mexicans as may secure their friendship not compromitting the 
                                                          
573 Weekly Houston Telegraph, 10 April 1839. 
352 
 
 
 
Honour and character of the Texian Government.”574 One gentleman writing from west 
Texas echoed their sentiments, declaring that “The feeling here in regard to the Federalist 
is of the kindest character: - the sympathy displayed in their cause is as warm as it is 
possible for it to be.”  He spoke admiringly of the federalist commander and described a 
dinner that local leaders held in his honor during his recent visit.  Plummer claimed that 
“The crowd was so great that many of them had no room for seats,” and he assured 
Lamar that “The Conduct of the President are those of a gentlemen of the highest order - 
and his talent seems to be of the highest cast.” But Texans, of course, had more than 
simply ideological kinship with Mexican federalists.  In many ways, they understood 
their own national security to depend upon Federalist success.  Texans were as deeply 
invested in the political situation in Mexico as they had always been, and, in some cases, 
pleaded with their president to lift his neutrality and permit them to join their federalist 
allies 
 
Once we join the Federalist and Texas will never stand in need of hereafter 
spending one dollar in fighting Mexicans.- Americans will flock there by 
thousands and join the Federal Cause  - We will get clear of a large number of 
useless population – we can loose no wealth.- We make a warm friend of a 
neighbor & you put down all Centralism in Mexico at the very first advance in the 
Federal cause. 575 
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Regardless, Lamar’s policy did not stop private Texas citizens from cooperating with the 
federalists.  But such behavior often only served to sabotage Texan diplomacy in Mexico 
City, and therefore received heavy criticism from the administration which struggled to 
find a way to compel its citizens to stop violating its own neutrality. “I know not how it is 
that an alliance has been made between the Federals and the Texians,” wrote one member 
of Bee’s envoy, “but let this be as it may, The Government of Mexico seems to be 
convinced that the Government of Texas has an active part in the invasion of Mexico and 
will strain every nerve to retake that colony.”576  
Texan leaders, for their part, often attempted to exploit the Mexican civil war to 
their advantage wherever they could.    Insisting that they explicitly forbid, and in fact 
had done a decent job of prohibiting, cooperation between their citizens and the federalist 
rebels, they nonetheless employed the threat of such cooperation to gain leverage in their 
negotiations with Mexico.577  “You are no doubt aware, that repeated overtures have been 
made by the Federalists of the Northern and Southern provinces of Mexico, accompanied 
by the most alluring offers, to induce the people of Texas to unite with them in a war 
against their Government and to make common cause in forcing an acknowledgement of 
our and their Independence,” wrote one envoy to Packenham, “and you are no doubt 
equally aware that all of these overtures have been rejected on the part of my 
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Government.”   This was done with the understanding that Mexico “would change her 
policy in reference to us.”578 
 Unfortunately, this had little impact on the Mexicans.  Yet, Lamar would continue 
trying to achieve Mexican recognition until, after three failed attempts, he finally gave 
up.  For Lamar, establishing peace and diplomatic relations with Mexico had been “the 
polar star of all my policy” and “the great foundation of our future prosperity, wealth, & 
happiness.”  He termed Mexico “a country of unsurpassed, I may say unequal fertility 
and beauty” and its population “hardy, enterprising and industrious.”579  Despite 
declaring official neutrality in the Mexican conflict, Lamar did take steps to open up 
trade and commerce with Mexico’s northern provinces, and insisted that he remained 
“assured of the acknowledgement of our independence in the event of the success of [the 
Federalists].”  One cabinet member declared that the president, despite his refusal to 
formally declare in their favour, had always considered, “the Northern States of Mexico 
as of immense importance, not only to our entire western frontier, but to the whole 
country at large.”  He especially looked forward to “a safe and friendly commerce with 
that portion of the Mexican territory.”580 Some have pointed to this as evidence of 
Lamar’s efforts to impose Texan authority over northern Mexico.  In fact, some members 
of Lamar’s cabinet unabashedly looked forward to the day when Texas would absorb 
much of northern Mexico.  As Lamar himself put it, with such conditions achieved, the 
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northern Mexican provinces “would easily be brought to form a portion of our nation, in 
sentiment, in feeling, even in interest.”581 Others agreed. “The people on Rio Grande are 
much divided in opinion,” wrote one of Lamar’s advisors, “much of their patriotism is 
lost” and they “think that they would live just as well under the Federal Government or 
Texian as they do now under the Central Government.” 582  Ultimately, however, the 
Lamar administration would determine that they did not have the resources to annex that 
much territory, nor could they afford the diplomatic cost with Mexico. 
The federalists, in fact, did finally manage to establish a provisional government 
they named the Republic of Rio Grande.  And one of their first policy decisions was to 
recognize Texan independence and the Rio Grande as its formal border.  Federalists also 
solicited military advice from the Texans. “Whatever commands you have for our camp I 
will bear with pleasure,” wrote General M.J. Carbajal in July 1840, asserting that his 
“talents and good fortune” had placed the president “in a situation to immortalize your 
name beyond the reach of envious and vindictive enemies, of ensuring at little cost the 
prosperity and happiness of the Country over which you preside, and making to yourself 
millions of admiring and grateful friends in Mexico.”583  These men’s attitude toward 
Texas should not be surprising given their own historical commitment to federalism and 
current relationship with Mexico which did not differ much from Texas’ relationship with 
that country just a few years prior.  It is clear, in fact, from General Canales’ formal 
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address to his troops in February 1840 that Mexican federalists saw their fight as part of a 
much broader hemispheric struggle to preserve federalism, of which Texas was a leader.  
In fact, Mexican federalists specifically referenced the young republic as a source of their 
inspiration.  “Citizens.  The hour has struck, The most extreme of the last colonies 
founded by the Spanish government have thrown down the gauntlet.  The liberty and 
happiness of the republic is already very near.  Let a part of it organize themselves 
promptly, and the others will follow your example.”584 
Given this affinity for Texas, it should not be surprising that when the federalists 
faced a series of military setbacks beginning in mid-1840, they did not hesitate to appeal 
to their allies in Texas for refuge.  In his letter to Lamar, asking that he and his troops be 
allowed to retreat to Texas, Cardenas wrote that “The government of the northern frontier 
of the Mexican republic has always recognized in Texas, because of the generous conduct 
and the philanthropic ideas of that government and all its inhabitants, a land of refuge in 
the event of an unfortunate occurrence.”  But it was not just a place to rest and recuperate 
that Cardenas asked for.  He requested “the establishment of peace and commercial 
relations” between the two countries “in order that this government may rescue the war 
against the government of Mexico.” In so doing, he specifically referenced “the 
sympathies which unite this country and yours,” and “similarity of the cause which both 
sustain.”585  Cardenas’ overtures were warmly welcomed by Lamar and his advisors, one 
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of whom described the general as “a gentleman of high intelligence and character,” 
whose “generous & liberal conduct towards our frontier citizens & traders will entitle 
him to your friendly attention.” 586  At the end of his stay, Cardenas warmly thanked the 
President for his gracious hospitality and warm support, and assured him that the “high 
favours”  he and his men had received “shall never be effaced from the hearts of the 
Mexicans of the Frontier of the North.”587 
*** 
 
The Lower Rio Grande was not the only part of Mexico that the Lamar 
administration had its eyes on.  In February of 1840, the president received a letter from 
his secret envoy in Mexico, James Treat, regarding the federalist movement in the 
southern province of Yucatán.  He reported that “the revolution that has been on foot 
therefore some time is making serious headway, and it is feared the whole department 
may concur in the grito for federation.”  While Treat regretted the news, stating that it 
would only render the Mexican government “more timid” and less willing to recognize 
Texas, Lamar and his administration saw a golden opportunity.588   
A few months later the Morning Star reported on the fall of  Campeche, “the last 
hold of the centralists, in the Yucatan” and stated that the event “may be regarded as the 
first step in a political movement that is destined to revolutionize” the country.  “The 
population in Yucatan are, from all accounts, the proper ingredients to constitute a 
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republic,” the author asserted, “They are a people of simple and laborious habits addicted 
to the pursuits of industry and much better educated and informed on political subjects 
than the great mass of the Mexicans.”  Chief among the province’s most admirable 
qualities, was its dedication to a standing militia.  “The utmost jealousy is manifested 
against military power and sacerdotal influence.  Standing armies are repudiated as 
dangerous to freedom.  Every citizen is required to bear arms.”  It was this, according to 
The Star that “will deliver Yucatan from a power that now holds the rest of Mexico in 
chains.”589  Upon news several months later that Yucatán had joined with Tobasco and 
Compeche to form an independent confederation, Lamar determined that Texas “should 
ascertain the position which they [the newly confederated yucatecanos] intended to 
occupy towards us.”  He assured the Senate that “we have reasons to be gratified with the 
spirit that prevailed among the public authorities of these provinces, as well as among the 
people, in favour of our Independence, which they were ready to acknowledge so soon as 
their own should be established.”590   
Throughout 1840, Texas took proactive steps to establish friendly relations with 
Mexican federalists, even going so far as to appoint an envoy to Yucatán to this end.  In 
July of 1841 Lamar wrote a formal letter to the Governor stating that  
 
It has been my earnest desire to establish with the States of Yucatan, Tobasco and 
such others as may throw off the Yoke of Central Despotism in mexico, relations 
of amity and friendship, and to show the disposition of this Government to 
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reciprocate in the fullest manner, every evidence of good will manifested by the 
Federalists of Mexico towards this country, I hereby have the pleasure of 
declaring to you and of making known to your Citizens, that the Ports of texas are 
open to the vessels and Commerce of Yucatan upon the same terms as we extend 
to the most favoured nations. 591 
 
The governor welcomed Lamar’s overtures and replied that “Yucatan desires to extend its 
relations with the people of texas, and to unite with them to sustain the cause of liberty 
that they have proclaimed in contrast to the oppressive government of Mexico.”592 The 
two nations soon drafted a treaty in which Texas agreed to supply Yucatán with $8,000 to 
fund their continuing fight aginst Mexico City. 
But it was the large swath of unincorporated territory to its west over which Texas 
was most intent on asserting its claims.  New Mexico and its chief town of Santa Fé had 
rested on the very edge of the Spanish Empire and later Mexican Republic for 
generations.  Its inhabitants traded mostly with the United States and often struggled to 
survive amidst Indian incursions.  The Lamar administration knew that Texas could not 
very well embark on a mission of territorial expansion without first successfully 
establishing its jurisdiction over territory already claimed.   It was in his annual message 
of 1839 that Lamar first expressed his interest in establishing “a correspondence and 
intercourse with the people of Santa Fe.”593  In fact, Austin himself had envisioned 
diverting trade from Santa Fé to Galveston as early as 1829, and in 1837 George S. Park, 
                                                          
591 Lamar to the Governor of Yucatán, 20 July 1841, DCT, Vol. I, 792-3. 
592 Miguel Brabachano to Lamar, 24 August 1841, DCT, Vol. I, 793-4.  
593  Lamar, “Second Annual Message to Congress,” 1 November 1839, LP, Vol. III, 159-883. 
360 
 
 
 
a Texan who had been kidnapped by the Comanches before escaping to Santa Fé, wrote 
that if the trade from there would go through Texas it would bring thousands of dollars in 
silver, allowing the young republic to secure “that important position in the interior of 
North America – that key which will unlock that enterprise of North Americans[,] the 
valuable country of California on the shores of the Pacific.”594 
Lamar insisted that the people of Santa Fé were effectively citizens of Texas who 
had not yet had the opportunity to establish an appropriate relationship with their 
government, “and it is believed by those best acquainted with their character and habits, 
that it is only necessary that they should be correctly informed of the nature of our 
government, and of its free and liberal institutions.”  Not only was Santa Fé technically 
part of Texas, argued Lamar, but its chief cultural and commercial ties had always been 
with the North.  “Though Mexican in their origin and language,” they had enjoyed a 
“long intercommunion and trade with the western portions of the United States” and had 
thus “lost many of their natural prejudices against strangers, and if not already prepared 
to identify their fortunes with ours, would, it is thought, readily become so.”  All they had 
to do was educate the nuevomexicanos on the virtues of Texan government.595    
This would be easy, since politically, too, they had more in common with Texas 
than with Mexico City, whose longstanding neglect had rendered their region 
impoverished, underdeveloped and vulnerable.  “That their predilections are not in favour 
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of the present Government of Mexico is certain,” claimed Lamar, “and that they are 
attached to the principles which gave rise to our revolution is equally so.”596  Given the 
current political climate in Mexico and the attempts of adjacent Mexican provinces to 
break away and establish ties with Texas, Lamar was not delusional in expecting that the 
inhabitants of Santa Fé would allow Texas to absorb them.  Furthermore, simple 
geography, Lamar believed, would be inducement enough. “The immense difference in 
the distance between the trading points of the two countries would alone secure to this.”  
Indeed, “the inducements for bringing it here will be too powerful to be resisted by any 
which can be offered elsewhere.”597 
Texas would in fact attempt three times to convince the people of Santa Fé to 
accept their authority.  The first attempt occurred in late 1838, at the peak of Texan 
nationalism.  Reporting on the cavalcade’s departure from San Antonio, The Weekly 
Houston Telegraph described how “[T]he banner of the Single Star was unfurled, and 
spreading its glorious folds to the breeze, seemed to shine forth and the harbinger of 
brighter days.”  A gentleman witness stated that “it was one of the proudest spectacles 
that he had ever beheld” and The Telegraph predicted that “ere long we trust the terrible 
din of their rifles will burst like a thunder bolt upon the terrified earls of Armijo and his 
minions.”598    
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But this was not to be.  The New Mexicans rebuffed the Texans twice.  Despite 
their frustrations with Mexico City, they did not wish to join a young, fragile and 
increasingly Anglo-dominated republic that would almost certainly fare no better than 
Mexico did at protecting its people.  Lamar’s third and final attempt would employ the 
assistance of José Antonio Navarro, the son of a well-established tejano federalist family 
who had fought in the revolution and played a significant role in the establishment of the 
republic.  
Indeed, the expedition provided Mexicans in Texas with a crucial opportunity to 
prove their patriotism and loyalty to a nation that, despite their sacrifice in its war for 
independence, treated them with suspicion and contempt.  The ominous presence of 
Mexican troops just across the Rio Grande, Mexico’s steadfast refusal to acknowledge 
Texan independence, and the fact that most Anglo-Texans by this point had little or no 
prior experience with or relationship to the tejano community, all contributed to growing 
suspicion of their new neighbors.  Tejanos, in some cases, were even suspected of being 
spies for the Mexican government, prompting some frontier residents to advocate a 
“vigilant scrutiny by the citizens [of Texas] into the character and habits of all resident 
and transient Mexicans.” Although the writer admitted that these “disguised Mexicans” 
no doubt enjoyed the cooperation of similarly “disguised Americans,” he wrote that “Of 
the latter I am glad to believe there are but few.” 599 
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Bexarenos, whom the Anglo-Texan community had once trusted and respected as 
their political allies and brokers, now rested in a precarious position.  They found little 
immediate relief in Houston whose answer to their perceived threat was to order San 
Antonio evacuated and destroyed.  This prompted alcalde Nicolás Flores to issue an 
impassioned plea to Juan Seguín in which he declared that “The resulting evil is almost 
the same as taking their lives.”600   The latter swayed the captain who, the following day, 
“determined to totally suspend execution” of the order and ultimately convinced Houston 
to spare the town.601  Established and well connected as they were, Seguín and other 
tejano elites assumed critical roles as “cultural brokers” between tejanos and the Anglo-
dominated government, advocating for their communities and vouching for the character 
and integrity of other tejanos. 602  
But growing language and cultural barriers made this role increasingly difficult. 
As early as September 1836, John A Wharton, then acting Secretary of War, directed 
Seguín, who spoke little English, to begin writing all of his reports in that language 
instead of his native Spanish.603  Language barriers and a lack of familiarity with US-
derived laws posed a formidable problem for tejanos after independence, and scholars 
have observed that this made them the victims of fraud and manipulation, especially 
when it came to land purchases and inheritance.  “My constituents have, as yet, not seen a 
                                                          
600 Nicolas Flores to Seguín, 28 March 1837, A Revolution Remembered: Memoirs and Selected 
Correspondence of Juan N. Seguín, Jesús F. de la Teja, (Austin: Texas State Historical Society, 2002). 
601 Seguín to Flores, 29 March 1837, Ibid. 
602 Seguín to Houston, 21 June 1837, Ibid. 
603 John A. Wharton to Juan Seguín 17 September 1836, Ibid., 144. 
364 
 
 
 
single law translated and printed; neither do we know when we shall receive them,” 
Seguín stated in a formal address to the Senate in 1840.  “[T]he dearest rights of my 
constituents as Mexico-Texans are guaranteed by the Constitution and the Laws of the 
Republic of Texas; and at the formation of the social compact between the Mexicans and 
the Texans, they had rights guaranteed to them.”  He reminded Texan leaders that “The 
Mexico-Texians are among the first who sacrificed their all in our glorious Revolution, 
and the disasters of war weighed heavy upon them, to achieve those blessings which, it 
appears, they are destined to be the last to enjoy.”604 
However, as at least one historian has observed, Lamar, “understood that the 
involvement of tejanos in the [Santa Fé] expedition was crucial, as they would be able to 
identify more readily with nuevomexicanos.”605 To this end, he managed to recruit José 
Antonio Navarro to head the expedition.   Navarro was ordered to read to the citizens of 
Santa Fé a formal address from President Lamar himself:  “[The Texas] Government re-
claims jurisdiction of the territory in which you now live and it offers you the protection 
and advantages that the Government of Mexico can never extend.”  Lamar admitted that 
it was “not so long ago” that Mexico had inspired trust in all those allied to liberty,” 
promising to “evolve brilliantly among the civilized nations.” But “what a deceptive hope 
it turned out to be,” he declared. Meanwhile Texas, “with the innate vigor of a Hercules, 
rose from its very birth, invincible, and you see now how well established it is, secure 
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and impervious.”  Lamar assured his audience that “The day is not far when you will see 
it become the richest, most powerful nation in America.”  His decision to choose a 
Mexican Texan to deliver the address, reinforced his promise that nuevomexicanos had 
nothing to fear in joining a country now dominated by people from another country. 
“Take a look at our Constitution and our laws, under which now live a large number of 
Mexican-Texans, who are your brothers, having blood, language and religion in common 
with you.”606  Lamar of course failed to mention that in joining Texas, the people of 
Santa Fé would be attaching themselves to a government that was even less effectual than 
Mexico’s, he wrote, especially when it came to protecting the rights of ethnic Mexicans.    
Regardless, Navarro never got a chance to deliver his message.  The men were ill 
prepared for the trek, having failed to pack enough food and other provisions, and soon 
succumbed to hunger and exhaustion.  Receiving news ahead of time that the Texans 
were on their way, the Mexican commissioner detached a portion if his army who 
encountered the men unprepared for a fight, arrested them and sent them on a long, 
arduous, and for many, deadly march to Mexico City.  Lamar’s failed effort to extend 
Texan jurisdiction westward might be dismissed as little more than unchecked hubris and 
at worst desperation.  Yet, given what was happening in other parts of Mexico at the 
time, it is easy to see why Lamar and his supporters believed they would be successful.  
The Texans and their revolution had in fact inspired a series of similar secessionist 
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attempts throughout Mexico.  But just because Mexicans admired Texas, and in many 
cases hoped to imitate its success, this did not mean they wished to become a part of it.   
Although a massive administrative failure, the Santa Fé Expedition was premised 
on the notion that Texas could nevertheless become a vibrant, multi-ethnic empire that 
protected and served the interests of Mexicans as well as Anglos.  But its failure, as 
Andrés Reséndez observes, “exoticized Mexicans, hereafter associating their character 
with treachery, cruelty, and servility.”607 This is not to say, however, that Texans were 
prepared to embrace Houston’s vision of a smaller, more homogenous republic.    As 
dismal as the Lamar administration’s expansionist efforts had been, Texans were 
reluctant to let go of the hope that their fledgling republic might one day dominate much 
of North America.  At the very least, Lamar had compelled Texans to take their 
independence seriously.    By the end of his term, Texas was a different place than it had 
been when it first entered independence. Indeed, shortly after the expedition, Congress, in 
reaction to the injustices suffered by the captives of the Santa Fé expedition, attempted to 
pass a bill pushing the boundaries of Texas past its southwestern border with Mexico to 
absorb California, New Mexico, Chihuahua, Sonora and parts of various other northern 
provinces. 
Houston promptly vetoed it, arguing that it would appear curious “that a people 
destitute of means to meet their most pressing wants should assume to govern a country 
possessing a population of more than thirty-one million.”  In addition to refusing to 
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entertain Texans’ imperial ambitions, Houston also withdrew support for Mexican 
federalists.   
Yet, while Houston continued to pursue annexation, he did so in a much more 
strategic way than he had during his first presidency.   If there was one aspect of Lamar’s 
presidency that did carry over to Houston’s second, it was the tendency to take Texan 
independence seriously.  Texans by now had a much better sense of what their national 
interests were and how best to purse them.  Attachment to the United States was only 
desirable if that country could sufficiently serve and protect them.  They also had an 
astute awareness of what would be the cost of failed negotiations.  If Texas forewent 
negotiations with Mexico to pursue annexation to the US to no end, Texas would be left 
in perhaps an even worse posture than it had been originally.  “[I]t would not be politic to 
abandon the expectations which now exist of a speedy settlement of our difficulties with 
Mexico, through the good offices of other powers for the very uncertain prospect of 
annexation to the United States,” wrote Secretary of State, Anson Jones.608 Thus, 
Houston would not pursue annexation until he was certain of the United States’ earnest 
desire to absorb Texas.   
But with the way things were going in the North, he might not have to wait for 
long. By the time the Tyler administration re-opened the question of annexation in 1843, 
Texas was, in the words of one scholar, emerging as “the most critical front in the Anglo-
American cold war over slavery.”  Increasingly internationally-minded Southern leaders, 
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intent on expanding and strengthening their institution abroad, saw in Texas a critical ally 
and one that shared a strategic border with the United States no less.  As such, many 
Southern leaders believed that the young republic required US support and protection, if 
not absorption.   They were particularly concerned about the British influence in Texas.  
If the young republic were forced to turn to England, it might have to abolish slavery, 
placing the institution in a more precarious position internationally.  As Matthew Karp 
explains, Southerners feared an “Anglo-Mexican chain” choking the Mississippi Valley 
and Lower South.609  
Yet annexation no longer held the appeal for Texans themselves that it had in 
1836.  Most Texans may have abandoned their imperial dream, but they had not 
necessarily abandoned the belief that independence, no matter how vulnerable it made 
them, was less preferable to annexation.  Whereas their initial vote might have been 
unanimous, by 1843, the Texans were largely split over the question of annexation. “The 
editors of the Civilian and the Planter differ very much in their opinions relative to the 
desire of the people of Texas for annexation,” reported the Telegraph.  The former 
reporting that the majority opposed annexation and the latter reporting that they 
supported it.610   
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This would remain the case for the next year and half as Houston, following his 
reelection, recommenced negotiations with the North.  Again, the nation’s press reported 
conflicting opinions.  Those in favor of joining the US, pointed to the shared economic 
benefit and the fact that it would fulfill the founders’ hope of a united Anglo confederacy.  
Reflecting the Manifest Destiny notion then gaining prominence in the North, one author 
wrote that “The framers of the Constitution [had] signified their desire that the whole 
Anglo-American settlements and colonies should at some future day become a part of the 
future confederacy.”  In a manner that completely disregarded Texas’ Mexican origins, 
the author continued, “Why then should Texas, which is the offspring of Anglo American 
States, be excluded?”611  Yet eight months later, the same publication seemed content to 
accept permanent independence if Texas was again rebuffed by the US.  “We concur in 
the sentiment expressed in the Times that, on failure of Annexation, our best destiny will 
be to continue as we now are, dependent only on our own resources.”612 
Indeed, as he reopened negotiations with the United States, Houston was 
determined to play his cards differently.  Rather than abandoning talks with Mexico to 
pursue negotiations with the US, he embarked on a policy of dual diplomacy, choosing to 
solicit US protection and annexation, while at the same time attempting to achieve 
Mexican recognition.  In a letter to the US Secretary of State, Houston assured him that 
“Texas can become sovereign and independent, founded upon her own incalculable 
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advantages of situation, and sustained by European influences without the slightest 
compromital to her nationality.”  In fact, Houston claimed, “every day which passes only 
convinces me more clearly that it is the last effort at Annexation that Texas will ever 
make.” 613  And he did not hesitate to remind the United States that Texas had other 
offers.  “Texas alone can well be sustained,” Houston assured Van Zandt, “and no matter 
what sincere desire we may well have entertained for a connection with the Govt, and the 
affectionate enthusiasm that has existed in us towards it, we will be compelled to 
reconcile ourself to our present condition, or to assume such attitude toward other 
countries, as will certainly look to our Independence. 614 
Texas was unwilling to re-open negotiations with the US without further 
assurance that it would be successful.  Furthermore, the United States would need to first 
prove itself capable of protecting Texas. As Jones put it, “The subject of most pressing 
and immediate importance, is that of the aid and protection to be rendered this country by 
the United States in the event of a resumption of active hostilities by Mexico.” If the 
government of the United States was unwilling or unable “to fulfill all of those pledges in 
the most ample manner and to protect us both by sea and land,” it would “of course have 
a very considerable influence in determining the future policy of Texas in reference to 
annexation.”615  
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*** 
In the meantime, Texas continued negotiations with Mexico which, if successful, 
might render the need for annexation obsolete.  Acting on information from the chargé de 
affairs in London that the British were hatching a plan to abolish slavery in Texas, the 
Tyler administration jumped into action.  Andrew Jackson re-entered the debate from his 
home at the Hermitage.  “Great Britain enters into an alliance with Texas - looking 
forward to war with us,” he asserted, hypothecating that the British would use Texas as a 
base from which to launch an invasion of the United States.  He predicted as many as 
twenty or thirty thousands troops who, “when furnished with all supplies, and equit for 
active service” would cross into the US and excite “the negroes to insurrection.”  
Meanwhile, Britain would dispatch “an army from canady along our western frontier to 
cooperate with the army from texas.”  Only US acquisition of Texas could prevent such a 
horror from occurring, he insisted. Texas “Settled to the Rio grande and up to our 
southern boundary and along that to the pacific,” would make the United States, 
according to Jackson, “invulnerable from a combination of the whole European world 
against us.”616 
 As southern leaders scrambled to come up with a scheme to keep Texas out of the 
ominous British sphere of influence, Texans themselves moved forward on all fronts.  In 
January 1844, Houston dispatched Samuel May Williams and George W. Hockley to 
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Mexico to meet with Santa Anna.  Houston chose them, presumably, because of their 
preceding relationship with the Mexican federalist government.  But Houston made it 
clear that he had to formally approve any agreement reached between the Legation and 
the Mexicans before it could be considered legitimate.  They agreed to the mission, but 
only if Houston halted negotiations with the United States first, arguing that it was 
disingenuous to pursue both, and that if Mexico found out it would “at once terminate the 
armistice, halt official negotiations for peace and again threaten or commence.” 617 
But Houston ignored this advice, and as the two attempted to hash out a treaty 
with Mexico that would secure peace for Texas, he continued to court annexationists in 
the North.  In April 1844, Houston assured the US Congress “that should the annexation 
be consummated, the same will receive the hearty and full concurrence of the people of 
Texas.”  Yet, he warned them that this was their last chance, and that “be the decision 
whatever it may,” it would “forever decide the question of annexation – a question, the 
continued agitation of which has prevented [the Texas] government from pursuing 
vigorously any other policy.”  This last part, of course, was not really true since, at that 
very moment, Texan representatives were meeting with Mexican authorities near the 
Sabine.618   
 What exactly happened during the Legation is unknown, but the result was 
something that few in Texas were willing to accept.  Williams and Hockley returned from 
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the Sabine and placed in Houston’s hands a document that effectively re-established 
Texas as a “department” of Mexico.  Not surprisingly, Houston swiftly rejected it.  The 
Texan Democrat, while agreeing that the commissioners “had not authority to 
compromise the integrity of our territorial limits,”  speculated that the Mexican 
authorities, becoming aware of Texas’ negotiations with the US, “withdrew their original 
draft  as proposed,” and substituted it with one “which regards Texas as a Department of 
Mexico.”  But why would Williams and Hockley sign such a document?  The newspaper 
speculated that “Perhaps they preferred independence to annexation.”  It is entirely likely 
that the men, both early settlers who perhaps knew that Texas could not stand on its own, 
would have preferred to see it return to Mexico than the United States.  “[A]nd if they 
did[,] it must have been a matter of sore disappointment to them to see it snatched from 
their grasp” by such “desperate folly” on the part of Congress, wrote the Democrat, in 
reference to the annexation agreement. 619   Williams himself would write years later that 
they were “required to exert themselves to produce a cessation of hostilities with a hope 
that future negotiation” might produce a more favorable agreement.  He criticized 
Houston for at that time entering into negotiations with the United States for annexation, 
stating that “it produced a very hostile feeling in Mexico towards Texas” and “the 
commissioners were looked upon as endeavoring to further the negotiations by 
entrapping Mexico into an armistice.”620 
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But Houston agreed with the Democrat’s conclusion.  In a correspondence with 
Anson Jones, he speculated that theirs was a calculated move intended to sabotage 
negotiations with the US.  Houston explained that “in exceeding their powers and 
acknowledging Texas to be a ‘Department of Mexico,’ they committed a serious and 
double error, which was well calculated to do us great harm.”621Alas, Houston made it 
clear that no such arrangement would ever result.  In his final correspondence with 
Mexican authorities, he wrote that the president’s decision to designate Texas “a 
department of the Mexican Confederacy” was “highly obnoxious” and consequently 
would not receive his approval.622 The only nation that Houston would even consider 
annexing Texas to was the United States, and to this end he had been working even as the 
commissioners were meeting with the Mexicans.   
But the ultimate offer from the United States was not to his or most Texans’ 
liking.   While the language of the treaty emphasized the mutuality of such an 
arrangement by stating that it would provide for Texans’ “security and prosperity,” it 
nonetheless insisted that they enter the US as a territory.623  Such language was 
unpalatable to a people who had dedicated their new republic and, in many cases their 
lives, to securing regional sovereignty.  To return to the United States as a territory felt 
like a precise reversal of all that they had worked so hard to achieve over the past two 
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decades. Furthermore, some Texans who had once supported annexation, were by now 
used to thinking of themselves  as an independent people who might even one day rise to 
hemispheric dominance.  “[A]s to the United States as a government – we had ceased to 
make explication to her and were growing indifferent when she came around to the 
proposition of annexation,” wrote one immigrant.624  If Texas was going to be annexed to 
the US, it was going to have to be that country, not Texas, that did the soliciting – only 
then could Texans be virtually assured of the future success of their negotiations.  This 
attitude even extended to Houston who decided to adopt a much coyer stance to the 
annexation question. “They are too well acquainted with the history of our origin and 
progress,” he said of the United States, 
 
to suppose, for an instant, that we would, under any circumstances, surrender one 
jot or tittle of that liberty and right to self-government which we achieved in the 
sanguinary conflicts of our revolution, or give up a single privilege secured to us 
by our laws and constitution.  They do not ask it – they do not expect it – we 
would not give it.  
 
 Houston reminded his audience that he had similarly rejected the previous year’s treaty 
with Mexico “disregarding as it did every ordinary courtesy, even between beligerance, 
and descending into the vilest and most unmerited abuse of the people of Texas.”  
Houston echoed the sentiments of Lamar and the many Texans who had by now begun to 
question whether or not Texas needed to attach itself to any country at all. “Our Indian 
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affairs are in as good condition as the most sanguine would reasonably have anticipated,” 
he asserted, “completely pacified and in regular friendly intercourse with our friendly 
trading establishments.”  Houston did not deny that disorder still existed on the frontier.  
“[T]here are among the Indians, as among our own people, individuals who will 
disregard all law and commit excesses of the most flagrant character,” but, he insisted, 
they constituted only “a few desperados and renegades.”  Whatever challenges of 
governance Texas was facing, they were hardly unique and might not be remedied by 
annexation to any country.  “Other governments of far superior resources for imposing 
restraints upon the wild men of the forests and prairies, have not been exempt from the 
infraction of treaties and the occasional commission of the acts of rapine and bloodshed.”  
As for the finances of the country, Houston insisted they were “in the most healthy and 
prosperous condition.”625  
He made it clear, that Texas’ policy for the next year would be to move forward 
as if independence was permanent.  If the United States wanted to annex the country, it 
would have to court them.  The sincerity of Houston’s remarks, however, are debatable.  
Some historians have suggested that it was mere coyness on Houston’s part, pointing out 
that, while he might have spoken optimistically about an independent Texas, the fact that 
he continued to negotiate with the US means that he never really took it seriously.  
Campbell’s suggestion that Houston played the United States and Great Britain off each 
other, reminding each nation of the other’s continued interest in Texas was his way of 
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achieving his ultimate goal of annexation to the United States on desirable terms. 626 
Houston’s suggestion of annexing California, New Mexico, and Oregon can also be seen 
as a means of goading United States expansionists by threatening to absorb those regions 
before they could.  Yet, many Texan leaders did in fact oppose annexation.   If nothing 
else, Houston’s seemingly dual diplomacy evinced a growing rift in Texas politics 
between those who supported joining the United States and those who wanted Texas to 
remain an independent republic or even, ultimately, an empire of its own. 
 
*** 
One such individual was Houston’s Secretary of State and fourth president of the 
republic, Anson Jones.  Jones had been an early supporter of independence when he 
served as representative to the United States during its first failed attempt at annexation. 
But by now he was more realistic about his country’s ability to sustain itself as an 
independent nation.  By the time Jones came into office, Texas had attempted for nine 
years to establish a viable domestic economy, secure its borders, and achieve peace with 
its Mexican and Indian neighbors.  Even so, Texan annexation to the United States was 
still not a foregone conclusion.  
Yet, many Texans, especially tejanos, believed that a peaceful treaty with Mexico 
was still well within reach.  Seguín acknowledged the inherent desire to keep Texas 
independent, but he also felt that if Texas was going to be absorbed by another country, 
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better Mexico.  “I know that the true happiness of Texas, according to the general 
direction its question has taken, consists in preserving its independence from any power 
other than Mexico.”  Seguín, having spent some time in Mexico since Houston’s 
rejection of the last treaty, insisted that the country now “understands that it behooves it 
to avoid a war that would bring upon itself great devastation,” and that it had “therefore, 
resolved to recognize the independence of Texas by way of treaties to which (As you 
may know) England and France have offered themselves as guarantors.”  With the treaty 
of annexation to the US now dead, Seguín encouraged Jones to give Mexico another go.  
“So fortunately, if it sends its commissioners with its proposals to this government, I am 
sure that they would be heard, and our difficulties would be over in a manner greatly 
beneficial to both countries.”627  Opposed to annexation himself, but knowing that it was 
popular among Texan voters, Jones was faced with the difficult task of trying to prevent 
annexation without looking like that was what he was doing.628 
He received help from Great Britain which, not wanting to see Texas return to 
Mexico, attempted one last time to draft just such a treaty in May 1845.  The treaty not 
only recognized, but stipulated that Texas remain independent and that she was “not to 
annex herself or become subject to any country whatever” though it also stated that she 
“remit disputed points respecting territory, and other matters, to the arbitration of 
umpires.” It is unclear as to why exactly this treaty was never accepted or enforced.  
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Perhaps Seguín was mistaken and Mexico was not ready to accept Texan independence.  
What is more likely is that Jones, knowing how popular annexation was among Texans, 
felt that it was his duty to at least pursue it one last time before accepting such an offer 
from Mexico. Acknowledging that Texans’ once “fond hope” of annexation to the US 
had been “checked and deferred,” he admitted that such an arrangement, “effected upon a 
proper basis” and ensuring “mutually and reciprocally to the benefit of both countries, 
will ensure to Mr. Tyler the lasting gratitude of the people of Texas.”  However, Jones 
warned that, “Should the present session of the Federal Congress pass by without fixing 
upon some definite, tangible and eligible mode for carrying into effect the projected 
scheme of annexation,” it was “highly probable” that Texans “would feel compelled to 
consider their connexion with the measure dissolved.”629 
The United States would not only agree to annex Texas but it agreed to virtually 
all of its provisions, namely that “the territory properly included within, and rightfully 
belonging to the Republic of Texas, may be erected into a new State,” with all rights and 
privileges as such.  Yet, there was also a peculiar additive.  Texans could either remain a 
part of a single state or break up into smaller states if they chose and had sufficient 
population.  This was an agreement that both appealed to the desires of most Texans’ 
commitment to local autonomy and was designed to appease reluctant anti-slavery 
legislatures who had steadfastly opposed Texan annexation for fear that it would enhance 
the pro-slavery lobby.  The treaty continued that “such states as may be formed” out of 
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the portion of territory lying south of the Missouri Compromise “shall be admitted into 
the Union with or without slavery, as the people of each state asking admission may 
desire.”630  Despite it being a compromise, these were terms that most Texans could 
accept.  Yet, the legation that had helped hash out the agreement, reminded the United 
States Congress that annexation remained not yet a foregone conclusion, for only  the 
people possessed “the right to abolish our form of government and erect another in its 
stead.”  Thus, “Texas maintains her independence and separate attitude, and will continue 
to do so until the final consummation of the measure of annexation.”631 Legislatures were 
sternly reminded that they were still dealing with an independent nation.  Furthermore, 
this was not the only option Texans were entertaining.  They by now had two offers on 
the table - recognition from Mexico on the condition that Texas never annex itself to the 
United States, or annexation to that country on terms that honored Texans’ federalists 
impulses.  Jones decided to submit the decision to Congress, which unanimously 
accepted the latter.  Jones’ biographer, however, insists that the Senate voted this way 
because it was “too afraid of the people.” 632 
Whether this is true or not, we can conclude that Texas joined the US against the 
wishes of Great Britain, Mexico, and many of its own most prominent citizens.  One such 
individual was Guy M. Bryan, the nephew of the late Father of Texas, who later wrote 
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that he and many others wept “at the sad feeling of the death of the republic, to which, for 
so many years, our hearts clung.” 633 
Furthermore, the domestic and foreign fissures that emerged around the 
annexation debate would only get worse.  Indeed, when Tyler ordered Texas to recall its 
foreign minister following the placement of federal troops along the Rio Grande, insisting 
that Texas had by that point “become in fact, if not in form, one of our States,”634 Texans 
swiftly reminded him that “During these proceedings past[,] present and to come, Texas 
maintains here independent and separate attitude and will continue to do so until the final 
consummation of the measure of annexation.” The United States may have “sent a 
portion of its army into that country[,] but it was by invitation of the representatives of 
the owners of the soil[,] the people of Texas.” The annexation of Texas would usher in a 
new era for both that country and the United States, but in many ways, its new 
relationship would be no more seamless than the long road to annexation had been.  
Texan rights, and indeed the sovereignty of all southern rights, would be a source of 
considerable debate in the years to come.  For now, the Texan representative was content 
to remind his new overseer that Texan sovereignty would never be lost, “it will only flow 
in a different channel.” 635 
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CHAPTER 7 
“We Are Not Yet What We Ought To Be”  
Statehood, Secession and America’s “Adopted War” 
 1845-1861 
 
On February 28, 1845 John Quincy Adams recorded in his journal that “the 
heaviest calamity that ever befell myself and my country was this day consummated.”  
He was referring to the passage of a Senate resolution to adopt Texas as a state of the 
Union.  Despite the fact that over forty years prior he had gleefully predicted the day 
when the citizens of his young nation would spread across the entire hemisphere, Adams 
bemoaned the recent acquisition of Texas as “a signal triumph of the slave 
representation” and an “apoplexy of the Constitution.”636 Indeed, by 1840, western 
expansion had taken on a decidedly sectional character as the slave South desperately 
attempted to acquire new territory with which to perpetuate its peculiar institution and 
strengthen its political standing.  Northern Whigs, however, saw western expansion as 
anathema to building national cohesion and authority.  Abolitionists like Adams knew 
that the survival of slavery depended on such expansion.  Almost no issue fueled this 
debate more than the question of whether or not to annex Texas to the United States.  The 
strongest opposition to secession came from the anti-slavery lobby of which Adams was 
a member, and who saw the potential acquisition of such a large slave state as a massive 
setback. But the fear that Texas would align itself with Britain and cut off North 
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American access to the Pacific was real enough to keep the annexation debate alive, and 
fuel a rising tide of sectionalism.637  
David M. Potter has written that the 1840’s represented a high-point of national 
unity, a period when the United States “showed a considerable degree of homogeneity 
and cohesion.”  But this could be illusory when it came to Texas, where a strong tradition 
of localism and hostility to the North seethed under a nationalistic veneer.  The 
absorption of Texas would spark an intense debate in Congress over the appropriate size 
and extent of a republic and whether or not it should permit slavery to extend into newly 
acquired territory.  In fact, the slavery debate often manifested in the question of 
territorial expansion throughout the 1840’s, so much so that, in 1843, Adams even 
threatened northern secession if Texas were annexed.  The following year, John C. 
Calhoun threatened southern secession if it were not.638 
 The debate came to a head in the 1844 presidential campaign between Henry Clay 
and James K. Polk, a die-hard southern expansionist who campaigned on a promise to 
“re-annex” Texas and “re-occupy” Oregon. Polk won in large part due to the fervor of 
pro-expansionist public sentiment then sweeping the nation, and shortly thereafter 
Congress voted to annex Texas.  Sam Houston was one of two gentlemen elected to 
represent Texas in the House, and during his tenure there - which lasted until his seceded 
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from the Union in 1861 - he not only remained a staunch unionist, but he presented a 
biased and often inaccurate perspective of his state, its history and people.   
Houston represented Texas’ “return” to the US as basically inevitable due to the 
two countries’ shared racial and political heritage.  He roundly dismissed early Texans’ 
relationship with Mexico as eternally fraught due to cultural incompatibility and Mexican 
political incompetence.  But Houston also proffered a strong narrative of Texan 
exceptionalism, arguing that his state served a crucial role as the United States’ gateway 
to the West and beacon of unadulterated republicanism.  Houston became one of the 
strongest advocates of US acquisition of Mexican land, effectively transferring Texas’ 
territorial ambitions to the United States.  Having twice served as the president of Texas, 
Houston knew better than anyone that Texas needed a strong central government and 
infrastructure.  However, his pro-annexationist, pro-unionist, anti-Mexican positions were 
not universal, although they may have been popular during the brief time that Texas was 
a US state, just before the Civil War.  In many ways, this period represented more of a 
blip in the long history of Texas where localism and states’ rights almost always trumped 
nationalism and federal consensus.  Texas’ secession from the US, compelled by many of 
the same motivations that had prompted it to secede from Mexico, was far more 
predictable than its annexation.   And at the very moment that the United States appeared 
strongest, it was in fact paving the path for its own destruction.   
*** 
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 Texas annexation and its attendant wave of US expansionism was central to 
Polk’s election, and the ultimate dream of spreading US dominion to the Pacific was a 
capstone of his campaign and presidency.  Polk’s first earnest efforts towards this end 
happened in November 1846 when he dispatched John Slidell on a diplomatic mission to 
renew relations with Mexico, in the words of one historian, “under the assumption that 
the annexation of Texas was a fait accompli.”  The chief aim of Slidell’s mission was to 
convince the Mexicans to sell California and New Mexico to the United States for a price 
to which both nations could agree.  Mexico rebuffed the offer.  Having failed 
diplomatically, Polk determined to succeed militarily.  He ordered US troops to occupy 
several points along the still contested territory of the Rio Grande, setting the stage for 
what many in the United States would call a clear act of provocation.   When a minor 
disagreement with Mexican troops resulted in a skirmish, Polk declared immediate war 
on Mexico. American troops rapidly advanced across a region long weakened by Indian 
raids and political rebellion.  It took American forces only ten months to seize control 
from Matamoros to San Francisco, and as far south as Saltillo.  Assuming that the 
Mexicans could now be convinced to surrender the territory for a “generous” cash 
payment, he offered such.  When Mexican leaders refused, Polk ordered American troops 
to advance all the way to Mexico City.639      
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 David Pletcher has claimed that seizing California was Polk’s primary objective 
in inciting the war with Mexico.640  But it would not have been possible without the 
annexation of Texas, and Texas never could have waged such an assault on Mexico by 
itself.   Thus, as the war progressed, many in the South began to question, as Adams had, 
the wisdom of annexing a region that Mexico still considered theirs.  It was Houston’s 
job to allay such fears.  At a speech at Tammany Hall during the height of the war, he 
assured a skeptical audience that, whatever they thought of the ensuing conflict, the 
benefit to the United States was well worth it.  Annexation had helped the US even more 
than it had Texas.  “[T]he best of the bargain was yours.”  He, in fact, insisted that “you 
ought to be satisfied,” not only “in the extent and richness of soil” but “in the blessings of 
those institutions we possessed.”  Houston claimed Texas as the beacon of unadulterated 
American democracy – more American than America itself and a true testing ground of 
the United States’ most cherished institutions and values.  Texans, according to Houston, 
“had nothing to learn.”641  
 Houston contributed in no small way to the burgeoning “Texas Creation Myth” 
that, as historian Brian DeLay writes, provided “a historical precedent for the belief that 
Anglo-Americans could do what Mexicans could not.”642    This meant not only 
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conquering and subduing their Indian population, as DeLay points out, but protecting and 
extending republican democracy.  Mexico, instead of the political Promised Land that it 
had once been, became, in the eyes of many Americans, a political failure, and the United 
States its savior.  The Texas Revolution, therefore, was re-cast as a conflict between 
noble-minded democrats and a despotic and racist regime: “The object of Mexico, in her 
system of despotism and oppression exercised against us, was, if possible to sweep us 
from the soil, to annihilate the whole race of us, and not to suffer one, of the Saxon blood 
to leave the impress of his foot upon the soil which we inhabited.” Houston portrayed the 
Revolution as basically a race war and, in support of this claim, he effectively dismissed 
the crucial role that Mexican federalists had and still were playing in fighting the 
centralists.  “We continued hoping that the Mexicans themselves would rally to support 
us, and redeem the country from despotism, violence, and oppression,” Houston declared.  
But this was not to be.   
By dismissing Mexican federalism as inept and ineffectual, he highlighted the 
necessity, not only of Texan annexation to the US, but of America’s need to save Mexico 
– all of Mexico - from itself.  Texans’ experience with Mexico became the best 
justification for the rising tide of Manifest Destiny then sweeping the nation. 
 
As surely as to-morrow’s sun will rise and pursue its bright course along the 
firmament of heaven, so certain, it appears to my mind, must the Anglo-Saxon 
race pervade the whole southern extremity of this vast continent, and the people 
whom God has placed here in this land spread, prevail, and pervade throughout 
the whole rich empire of this great hemisphere.  
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The prospect of an independent federalist republic in northern Mexico, had no place in 
Houston’s vision.  Indeed, Mexican federalism itself had no place in Texas history, 
effectively erasing the very thing that had attracted so many Americans to Texas in the 
first place, thereby making their annexation to the US seem all the more inevitable.643  
In a way profoundly different from how Austin and the early settlers had, Houston 
characterized Mexicans as unable to make anything of their territorial riches nor even to 
protect themselves from the ravages of uncivilized Indians.  In fact, the Mexicans were 
little more than Indians themselves.  Therefore there was “no reason why we should not 
go on in the same course now, and take their land.”  The northern part of Mexico would 
benefit the most - the vast desert region “where only a few thousand souls are living in 
such wide dominion - where the wild Indian extends with impunity his ravages, and, 
unchecked he penetrates into the heart of Mexico.” The United States, Houston insisted, 
were the only people who could tame the wild Mexican North, and they would be doing 
it as much for the benefit of the Mexicans as for themselves.  “Let the white man – let the 
American interpose- let him say to the Indian, ‘Stay, savage, we will protect these 
helpless people. We will do it!’” Mexicans had proven themselves “incapable of self-
government.”644 
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But not only was the spread of United States’ dominion across the continent 
inevitable and justified, according to Houston, it was virtually impossible without Texas. 
Indeed, in many ways this was Texas’ war.  The United States’, by declaring war on 
Mexico, had done little more than simply absorb a conflict that Texas had been engaged 
in since its independence. “So, sir, I must say that annexation did not bring about the war. 
In fact, by the annexation, the United States adopted the war.”  Houston effectively 
dismissed the notion, prevalent in the United States, that the war with Mexico was 
essentially a border skirmish blown out of proportion.   In this way, he reclaimed the war 
for Texas, but also, inadvertently for Mexico.  If we follow Houston’s line of reasoning to 
its logical end, and accept that what Mexican leaders were really reacting to was what 
they believed to be US encroachment of their territory, then we must also conclude that 
the United States’ war with Mexico was hardly a coterminous event that lasted eighteen 
months.  Rather, it was the United States’ first intervention into a foreign civil war. 645 
But Texas was perhaps most important as a strategic gateway to not only the rest 
of the continent but the world.  Texas “was the link that coupled the Union with 
California, and connected it with Asia.” Texan annexation enabled the United States to 
become the grand continental empire that many of its Founding Fathers had envisioned – 
“That is the soil of America, the treasure is that of America, and the commerce beyond 
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that is extending to the Pacific, and will give us that of the world is that of America, in 
my opinion, if we remain a united people.”646 
Indeed, all of this was only possible if the republic remained unified.  Ironically, 
the very thing that promised to make the US the greatest nation in the Western 
Hemisphere, also threatened to tear it apart.  Yet, as Houston insisted, the North and the 
South needed each other and only together formed the geographical cohesion necessary 
to properly take advantage of the continent’s riches.  But perhaps the best reasoning that 
Houston put forth for why United States should remain united was, in his mind, because 
its citizens shared a common racial identity:  “Why should we not remain united? Are we 
not homogenous?  There is one language, there is one altar, there is one religion, for 
every man worships God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and there is a 
common Lord and a common Savior.  What is there to distract us?”  But when it came to 
Texas, this of course meant erasing its Hispanic past and prior differences with the 
United States.  As far as Houston was concerned, white Americans were ultimately of the 
same mind and therefore ought to share the same country.    “Have we not unity of 
interest from the North to the South, from Bangor to Point Isabel?  Go from the Atlantic 
to the waves of the Pacific, pass the mountains that have been deemed impassable, and 
that now interpose no barrier, and you will find a unity of interest that is inseparable.” 
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Houston effectively placed Texas at the center of the emerging Manifest Destiny rhetoric.  
Texas was precisely what had made a cohesive Anglo-Saxon continental US possible.647  
  Granted , Houston did acknowledge a few “dissentiate men” in Texas who 
departed from his characterization.  Men “who went about preaching the doctrines of 
fools, and avowing that the country was given away without a recompense.”  Dismissing 
them as “perverse in disposition” and claiming that their “moral ubliquity ought to be 
branded with eternal shame,” these men would dissolve the Union.  But they were not to 
fear, for none had “ever bared his arm to the enemy, or raised a hand to strike for liberty.”  
Thus, loyalty to the Union was the consummation of everything Texan, according to 
Houston.  To betray it would be to betray the precise principles for which the Texas 
Revolution had been fought.  Yet, as the national political discourse would show, many 
disagreed with him.648 
*** 
As US forces stood in the Halls of Monteczuma, United States leaders stood in 
the Halls of Congress debating how much of Mexico they would take.  Some advocated 
claiming all of the country, others insisted that the US should pursue no territorial claims 
west of the Rio Grande.  As one historian writes “No national government had ever faced 
such a range of apparent possibilities for extending its territory and reshaping itself on 
such a scale.” Polk himself wanted to annex both Californias and all of Mexico.  He was 
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supported by a number of pro-expansionist, mostly southern, senators including Houston. 
649  
In addition to his assertion that Mexico’s people were “mad with anarchy and 
misrule,” desperate for political guidance, Houston looked forward to the acquisition of 
Mexico mostly for what it would mean to his state specifically.  If Mexico were 
absorbed, her people civilized, and her commercial intercourse developed, Texas may 
very well replace New York as “the Empire State of the Union.”  Most specifically, he 
foresaw such an acquisition fitting nicely within his aim for a Southern Continental 
Railroad that would run right through Texas: 
 
Situated as we are at present, her trade is of little benefit to us.  Remove the 
present obstacles in its way, and immense benefits must accrue to Texas.  
Accessible now by ocean communication, the wants of trade would demand 
railroads penetrating from our borders into the heart of her territory.  
 
 All of this, according to Houston, presaged the United States’ ultimate dominance on the 
world stage.  With possession of nearly the entire northwestern hemisphere, Houston saw 
his country becoming “a shining light to the nations of the earth, to guide them onward to 
the path which we have chosen.”650 
 But such propositions sparked debate about the proper size and extent of a 
republic. The United States was not a monarchical empire, opponents insisted, and had to 
remain territorially limited if it was to achieve both sufficient regional sovereignty and 
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federal control- indeed, if it was going to remain united at all.  Many believed that a vast 
continental nation, spanning from sea to sea, was simply anathema to a republican form 
of government.  “I would ask, sir, what is the honorable gentlemen’s standard extent for a 
republic?  Does it require a continent . . . Does the Godess of Liberty require a vast 
expanse of impenetrable mountains and inhospitable deserts for her sustenance? . . . Mark 
you, sir, liberty depends upon the qualities of men, not upon expanses of geography.”651 
In a series of predictions that now seem prescient, many argued that the addition 
of such a large expanse of Mexican territory was both unnecessary and potentially 
problematic.  “[W]hat was it wanted for?” inquired Reverby Moorehead, “Have we not 
enough not only for the men of the present day, but for hundreds and hundreds and 
hundreds of millions, that may come into existence hereafter?”  He predicted, not entirely 
inaccurately, of the problems that such an acquisition might render - “civil war with all its 
inconceivable evils, or the disruption of this Union.  The cement which keeps us all 
together, in a union which dispenses to all everything that any contrivance of human 
society can dispense, is to be dissolved.”  As John C Calhoun himself put it, “Let us not 
push the territorial limits of this Government to such an extent as to bring upon us a 
collision of interests and feelings which will shake the very foundations of the 
Government.”  Besides the territory, there was also the added population.  Interestingly, 
anti-Mexican racism offered one of the best arguments against the acquisition of 
Mexican territory – namely the conviction that Mexicans as a people could not be 
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sufficiently integrated into the US republic.  Declaring Mexicans “an ignorant, a fanatic, 
a disorderly people” having “none of the elements of character in common with the 
people of this country,” opponents asked 
 
What are you to do with them?  Are you to govern them as you do your slaves in 
those States which now tolerate the institution of slavery? Are to treat them as 
serfs belonging to the land which you acquire, attached to the soil? Or will you 
put them on a level with the people of this country? Will you give them the 
privileges which your people enjoy, and enable them to regulate and control the 
destinies of your Government? 
   
 
This last option seemed particularly unlikely given that “it is now universally accepted 
that the people of Mexico are entirely destitute of the capacity of self-government.” 652  
For those who opposed annexation, the republic’s functionality depended on its ability to 
sustain a sense of homogeneity and cohesion, both in terms of geography and population. 
Although the inherent inferiority and political ineptitude of the Mexicans seemed one 
thing that both the pro and anti-expansionists could agree on, only those opposed to 
annexation seemed genuinely doubtful about the ability to integrate ethnic Mexicans into 
the national fold.   
While expansionists, and especially Texans, tended to place most of the blame for 
Mexico’s unfortunate state of affairs at the feet of its leaders, anti-expansionists tended to 
blame the Mexican people. “[I]t may be that,” continued the Senator, “in displaying those 
elements of character which render them now the most unstable, unsettled, inefficient 
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population on the face of the globe, you may have the same difficulty in governing them 
that the authorities in Mexico have.” In fact, American leaders would experience the 
same difficulty, but it would not come from its newly acquired Mexican population.  It 
would come, rather, from their own southern white population.653 
The geopolitical composition of the northwestern hemisphere remained a hotly 
contested issue throughout the late 1840’s and into 1850’s.  Even Zachary Taylor, the 
great Mexican War hero, by 1849 informed Polk that he thought “California and Oregon 
were too distant to become members of the Union, and that it would be better for them to 
be an Independent Gov[ern]ment.”654  But by 1850, this view was becoming increasingly 
less popular.655   Dismissing Taylor’s opinion as the “exceedingly ignorant” thoughts of a 
“well-meaning old man,” Polk himself expressed “serious apprehensions” about what 
“would be lost to the union by the establishment of an Independent Government” in the 
Far West.  This is why, once he became president, Polk pushed to make Oregon and later 
California a part of the United States.656   
And Texas was his greatest ally.  Houston took the lead in spearheading the 
Oregon campaign, demanding the United States take an activist role in acquiring the 
region from its continental rival, Great Britain. Speaking from his own experience as the 
former president of a weak republic without the resources or infrastructure to protect its 
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settlers, Houston knew how crucial a strong state was to the vision of Anglo-American 
geopolitical proliferation. Of Oregon, he wrote that “Numbers have already migrated 
there, and numbers more have it in contemplation to follow there.  Until something is 
done as an evidence for our regard for these pioneers, their situation must be exceedingly 
infelicitous, as well as insecure.”  Houston reminded his fellow senators that great 
empires rarely slept, so that the assumption that Anglo-American settlers could slowly 
and quietly take over foreign territory, as many imagined would be the case, was simply 
unrealistic. Houston rejected the Jeffersonian notion of Anglo-American political 
proliferation through settlement alone.  “What sort of policy would it be?” he asked, “It 
has been said that we have induced them to go there.  If so, should not their situation 
claim our peculiar regard?”  In short, Houston understood Anglo westward expansion as 
a specifically state project, “I cannot conceive how the United States can extend to them 
personal protection, and, at the same time, withhold political protection; for without 
political, personal cannot be extended.”657  He suggested that without the presence of a 
strong state, settlers would simply be absorbed by whatever culture and institutions 
already existed, ignoring the fact that, as in the case of Texas, that was precisely what 
they wanted.   
Indeed, what Houston offered was a profoundly shortsighted and incomplete 
understanding of the complex series of events that led to Texas becoming a part of the 
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Union.  He simplified the aims of Texas leaders and its people by failing to acknowledge 
that there were some who preferred independence to annexation and put forth no small 
effort in seeing this actualized.  Annexation failed, according to Houston, because “Texas 
was treated with coldness, reserve, or palpable discouragement.”  It was this reaction 
from the United States, not a desire to preserve its independence or even rejoin Mexico, 
that prompted Texas to turn to Great Britain.   According to Houston, the period of Texan 
independence was nothing more than a bump on the road to the ultimate and inevitable 
end, absorption by the US.  And the ultimate decision to annex was now playing a crucial 
role in the politics and leadership of the United States, where “like Aron’s rod, it 
swallowed the rod’s of all political sourcerors.”658   
Houston’s representation of the situation in Oregon implied a very different 
history for Texas.  At the core of his Oregon speech rested the assumption that Anglo-
American settlers needed and in fact wanted the protection and presence of the US state 
in order to carry out their mission of perpetuating Anglo-American institutions, laws and 
culture.  But it departed from earlier expansionist language advanced by Henry Clay and 
John Adams who saw these individuals as doing most of the imperial work themselves.  
Adams himself stated that he envisioned the pre-ordained push westward as resulting in 
many republics based on Anglo-American political tradition and structure.659   
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But Houston had his affect.  In 1849 the United States annexed Oregon.  Thus, 
between 1846 and 1850, that country grew by approximately 1.2 million square miles.  It 
was impossible not to be impressed, as superintendant of the US Census James DeBow 
certainly was, when he surveyed the changes: 
 
The territorial extent of the Republic is, therefore nearly ten times as large as that 
of Great Britain and France combined; three times as large as the whole of 
France, Britain, Austria, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, and 
Denmark, together, one-and-a half-times  as large as the Russian empire in 
Europe; one-sixth less only than the area covered  by the fifty-nine or sixty 
empires states, and Republics of Europe; of equal extent with the Roman Empire 
or that of Alexander, neither of which is said to have exceeded 3 million square 
miles.660 
 
 
Indeed, the country’s recent acquisition ushered in an era of profound national pride.  
How could it not?  In only a few years the United States had grown by approximately 
64%.  It had replaced Mexico as the politically and geographically dominant region in the 
Western Hemisphere.661   However, the exact form and nature of this republic, was still 
unresolved.  Specifically, the question of who would be considered under this rubric of 
liberty and who would not began to emerge.  And where would federated self-
government end and centralized national government begin?  Despite the contemporary 
mood of national pride and political arrogance, the great accomplishment ushered in a 
period of profound sectional disagreement as the United States began, almost 
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immediately upon the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, to confront the very 
same set of challenges that Mexico had, how to hold together a modern federated 
republican empire.    
*** 
The vision that men like Houston and Polk shared of a strong and unified 
continental republic lasted for about ten years, and it largely ignored the very real 
sectional divide concerning slavery and state’s rights that seethed throughout the 1850’s.  
Houston himself actively denounced the first signs of impending crisis by adamantly 
renouncing John C Calhoun’s 1849 nullification efforts.  In a letter to a close friend he 
bragged that “Rusk and myself smoked Johnny and would not indorse for him.  We are 
not done with him yet – but I think he has nearly done with himself.”  Of all the US 
politicians who had come before him, Houston was the most admiring of Andrew 
Jackson – populist, anticentralist yet unfailingly unionist. He accused the South 
Carolinians of acting out of self-interest and ambition.  “You know that I am as unifier as 
General Jackson was, and cannot look with one grain of allowance upon any fanatical 
project while selfish and unholy ambition is to be gratified at the expense of the Union of 
the Republic.  We are among the last to come into it, and being in, we will be the last to 
get out of it.” He also recognized quite rightly that Texas, the most western state in the 
Union, had far more to lose from secession than wealthier and securer seaboard states 
like South Carolina which, “from her central position, the sea upon one side, and a 
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cordon of slave states between her and danger, has had but little reason for 
apprehension.”662 
When the southern states considered holding a convention in early 1851 to discuss 
secession, Houston roundly denounced them, insisting that it amounted to an admission 
that their rights were not protected under the Constitution.663  Houston believed that 
Texas was far better served by staying in the Union than separating from it.  Despite his 
states’ rights sentiments, Houston believed that federal funding was absolutely crucial to 
Texas’ economic survival and chief among his schemes to develop and enrich the region 
was a transcontinental railroad. 
 But not all Texans were as steadfastly committed to unionism as Houston.  As 
one prominent scholar has argued, during the 1850’s Texans experienced a constant and 
unrelenting tension between their commitment to localism and their sense of loyalty and 
obligation to their newly adopted nation. But localism, if not stronger, was more broadly 
felt and had a much longer tradition in Texas than almost any other part of the Union.  
Walter Buenger writes that “Lincoln’s election and the ascendency of the Republican 
Party made Texans question as nothing had before the ability of the United States to 
function as an American nation should function.”  This, however, overlooks the 
circumstances surrounding the first Anglo settlements of Texas which were founded on 
the belief that the United States had failed as an experiment in democratic republicanism.  
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By the time the Civil War came, Texans’ had been questioning the US efficacy and 
integrity for some time. 664  
Although they constituted a minority, there were strong and vocal proponents of 
Texas secession very early on, not least of which was the former president of the 
Republic of Texas and Houston’s arch-rival, Lamar.  While Houston was calling for a 
larger more expansive Union that stretched across the continent, Lamar was urging 
southerners to consider withdrawing from it.  Indeed, it was the battle cry of many 
Texans who had opposed annexation.  In an 1850 letter to a group of southern leaders in 
the wake of the nullification crisis, Lamar wrote that 
 
The course then, gentlemen, which I would advise the South to pursue in the 
present crisis is plainly this – she should say to her northern brethren – ‘your 
continued aggressions upon our rights, peace, and safety, can no longer be borne – 
the institution of slavery which you seek to destroy is identified with our 
existence; it is to us a matter of life and death; and if you do not forever and 
immediately abandon your purpose of wresting it from us, and reducing us to utter 
ruin and despair, we shall consider the confederacy as resolved by your act, and 
will protect ourselves accordingly.”  
 
 
Just two years after Texas had joined the Union, Lamar was calling for it to separate 
again. “This appears to me the only alternative left to the south,” he declared, “We see 
that the northern states are bent upon our destruction; that all their movements tend that 
way; that they are determined to force us into the abolition of slavery, and of 
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consequence to plunge us into greater horrors than ever befell a civilized people.”  While 
union seemed natural to Houston, it was impossible to Lamar.665   
And where Houston saw it as the key to the industrial and commercial success of 
the South, Lamar saw it as the primary obstacle.   In his address to the Southern 
Commercial Convention, Lamar complained that the southern states had “failed from the 
operation of improper legislative action, or from a culpable neglect of concerned action, 
to keep pace in the great progressive march of the age.  We are not yet what we ought to 
be,” asserted Lamar, “either in thought or act, as members of our great confederacy.” 
Throughout the 1850’s Lamar counted himself among a growing number of southern 
elites who saw in their states the promise of unrivaled commercial and cultural 
dominance – a promise that it appeared was being increasingly sabotaged by a restrictive, 
onerous and northern-dominated federal government. 
 
We want our highways and thoroughfares linking all parts of the country in one 
prosperous whole, expediting commerce and intercourse, with the velocity of 
Steam.  We want our great lines of ocean steamers channeling the sea and making 
it a pathway for direct communion from our own now neglected ports to the 
emporiums of the older world.  We want a full employment and development of 
the vast resources of commerce and commercial grandeur and opulence, that are 
concentrating from every zone and longitude – from the islands of the deeps – 
from Amazonian territories – and from the new found Pacific world, into the 
bosom of our own Gulf of Mexico, and making tit the Mediterranean of the 
West.666 
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Secession offered a perfect remedy to annexation- a chance to return to independence and 
all of the promise that Texas once possessed.  
 Like their leaders, Texans remained split over the question of annexation.  The 
Galveston Weekly, in response to South Carolina’s convention, wrote that, unlike the first 
time that had threatened secession in 1776, “the perils of secession are now greater,” and 
“the causes less urgent.”667  Yet the San Antonio Ledger, in response to Texans’ 
frustrations toward the federal government’s inability to provide sufficient frontier 
protection and deliver on promised internal improvements, wrote that Texas “quietly 
provides for placing herself exterior to the Union” and looked forward “to resuming her 
place once more among the nations.”  If such an act ever became necessary, the Ledger 
asserted, Texans would “rely confidently on the assistance of all that portion of the 
citizens of the other states who contend that secession is a rightful remedy.” 668 
Yet, most Texan leaders fell somewhere between Houston and Lamar.   George 
W. Smythe, who served in the US House of Representatives from 1853 to 1855, while 
sympathizing with states’ rights proponents, cautioned against extreme interpretations of 
the Constitution from both sides. “Two errors almost equally fatal with regard to our 
Constitution have found advocates among us,” Smythe wrote in one of his speeches, 
 
The one represents us as a great national consolidated republic.  The other as a 
mere assemblage of independent, sovereign communities bound together by a 
league, treaty or contract which they or any of them, have a right to abrogate 
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whenever an accession of sufficient importance presents itself, of which, they are 
to be the inclusive judges.  These two errors are equally fatal.  The latter destroys 
our system as completely by attenuation as the former does by consternation.669 
 
Like Houston, Smythe focused most of his energies in office on internal improvements 
such as a national railroad and understood that a state like Texas perhaps had more to lose 
than gain by separating itself from the Union.  And as frustrating and imposing as the 
federal governments’ presence was when it came to such projects, he assured his 
constituents that it was well worth it, for Texas could hardly accomplish them by herself 
or as the member of a southern confederacy. 
Lamar, for his part, knew that his views were “too unpopular and startling to be breathed 
in the lowest.”  Yet, he remained confident “that they will be finally triumphant.” Lamar 
believed he knew Texas better than Houston, indeed better than most Texans knew 
themselves.670 
 
 He might have been right.  As the decade progressed, Texans became increasingly 
frustrated with a federal government that not only proved increasingly hostile to the slave 
South, but failed to deliver on its promises for internal improvements and – particularly 
important to Texans – border security. Leading this growing contingent of Texans was 
Houston’s co-senator, Thomas Jefferson Rusk.  In August 1856 the two men held a 
public debate in Nacogdoches in which Rusk “spoke in a very feeling and eloquent 
                                                          
669 George W. Smythe, “Articles and Speeches,” date unknown, George W. Smythe Papers, Briscoe Center 
for American History, University of Texas at Austin.  
670 Lamar to S. J. Ray and others, 16 August 1850, LP, Vol. VI, 
405 
 
 
 
manner of the feelings that had existed between him and his colleague for the past 20 
years.” But that was the limit of their courtesies.  Rusk adamantly defended the Kansas-
Nebraska Bill which Houston had many times denounced, pointing out that “agitation 
had existed on the slavery question ever since the Passage of the Ordinance of 1787 and 
had never been resolved.” He attacked Houston for not sufficiently enforcing the Fugitive 
Slave Law and allowing potentially hundreds of slaves to escape through Texas to 
Mexico.   Rusk also condemned the Missouri Compromise for granting Congress the 
right to legislate on slavery both in the territories and the states, an objection which 
Houston had repudiated.  Finally, the senator claimed that, while he was “for the Union,” 
he also believed that “if a state of things should ensure that equality which is guaranteed 
to the South by the Constitution will be destroyed, and the rule of a fanatical majority 
usurp its place, he would strike back.”671 
 Throughout his career, Houston remained a steadfast unionist, making every 
effort to keep Texas out of the sectional debates of the 1850’s and reminding Texans that 
they had “entered not into the North nor into the South, but into the Union.”   Whereas 
men like Lamar and Rusk highlighted similarities between Texas and the seperatis South, 
Houston emphasized their differences – differences which made Texas far more 
dependent on the federal government that most other states. 672   
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 Yet, throughout most of the 1850’s the federal government largely failed to 
protect Texas from Mexican and Indian incursions, a fact which even Houston could not 
deny.673  As a result, his popularity, much of which relied on his image as the “Hero of 
San Jacinto,” began to plummet as the decade progressed.  Meanwhile, Texas saw the 
emergence of a group of young radical leaders, who were friendlier to secession.  One of 
these was Guy M. Bryan, the nephew of the late Father of Texas.  The son of Austin’s 
sister, Emily, and his business partner James Bryan, Guy was born on the Missouri 
frontier the same year his grandfather obtained his first colonization contract from Spain.  
His family moved to Texas ten years later, following the death of his father and his 
mother’s remarriage to Stephen Perry.  He was a teenager during the revolution and 
attended Kenyon College in Ohio before returning to Texas.  In 1846 Bryan, on behalf of 
his family, complained in a letter to George Burnett that “The ‘old settlers’ – those who 
founded and they who labored with the founders of our country to bring it into existence 
and build it up” were “being forgot.”  Meanwhile, “the eleventh hour men” - those who 
had arrived with the “‘heat and burden of the day’” - were receiving “all credit and all 
reward.”  Despite his youth, Bryan made it clear where his identity and allegiance rested.   
“[T]o me and to every ‘old settler’ this must be cause of deep regret.”  The entire source 
of his family’s grievances were not made evident, but it is clear that Bryan feared that his 
uncle’s generation were being misrepresented in the public memory, and he appealed to 
Burnet to rectify the wrong.  “It is due to the dead and to the living that a fair and honest 
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statement of the past should be made,” he wrote.  “[Y]ou knew [my uncle], his nature, his 
character his deeds, and devotion to his country.”  In order to correct such misperception, 
Bryan requested that Burnett author a biography of his uncle.  “[O]ur family are anxious 
that you should write his life . . . without which no correct  history of Texas can ever be 
written.”674  Bryan was not specific about what aspects of his uncle’s memory he found 
objectionable, but considering that the letter came soon after Texas’ annexation – an 
event that Bryan opposed - it likely had something to do with how Texans of the 1850’s 
imagined Austin’s hopes for them.  
 Bryan, however, would have his chance to re-direct the course of Texas politics.  
In 1847 he was elected to the State House of Representatives where he served until 1853.  
He then served four years in the Senate until 1857, at which point he was elected to 
represent the Western District of Texas in the United States Congress.  By the time Bryan 
had made it onto the national stage, Texas and the rest of the South were beginning to 
move decisively away from the unionist politics of men like Houston and Smythe.  
Bryan, like many successful politicians at this time, was not shy about taking a more 
explicitly pro-southern line, and this made him popular among his constituency which 
had by now grown tired of a federal government that, over a decade after annexation, still 
failed to deliver on its promises of frontier defense and internal improvement.  Reporting 
on the national congressional election in spring of 1857, the Texas State Gazette reported 
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that Bryan “is well known to the people.”  He is an old Texian” with “considerable 
brilliancy of mind and great industry, and will doubtlessly faithlessly attend to the 
interests of his constituents.” 675 
 Bryan soon became associated with a young and aspiring group of politicians 
who, by the end of the 1850’s, were beginning to vocalize the states’ rights platform.  
One of these was H.R. Runnels, the lieutenant governor who had entered state politics in 
1847 as a representative to the state legislature for Bowie County.  In 1859, Runnels 
made a bid for Governor.  Shortly thereafter, Houston entered as his opponent.  In a 
lengthy address to the Texas House of Representatives that was then published in the 
Gazette, Runnels insisted that the federal government “derived its just powers from the 
consent of the governed, and when it shall have ceased to fulfill the object of its creation, 
and only then, will arise a sufficient cause for its dissolution.”   Runnels concluded, 
“Equality and independence in the Union, or independence outside of it, should be the 
motto of every southern state.” 676  
 But it was the Son of Texas who most eloquently compared the plight of the 
South under the current “Black Republican” administration with that of the Texans under 
Santa Anna.  “Centralization of the power in the hands of the ‘Agent’ caused Texas to 
appeal in 1835 to the state of the Mexican union, on behalf of the violated constitution of 
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1824.”  When the appeal was “disregarded” by their states, Bryan explained, Texas 
declared independence “in the same spirit as that which influenced the declaration made 
on the 4th of July 1776.”  Bryan drew a straight line from the founding of the Union to the 
founding of Texas to what would soon be the founding of the Confederacy, all of which, 
he seemed to insist were motivated by the underlying principle of “state sovereignty.”   
Yet, Bryan also acknowledged Texas’ differing status from the other states “in 
consequence of her position before annexation” and “the contingencies and manner of 
annexation.”677  Texas, according to Bryan, had entered the Union under circumstances 
different from the rest, on a conditional consent that could be revoked at any time.  
Texans found his line convincing and as the state democratic convention drew near, the 
Southern Intelligencer reported that “From indications of public sentiment, not so plainly 
seen as sensibly felt, the Hon. Guy M Bryan will be the nominee of the Houston 
Convention.”  Of Bryan and his friend Matt Ward, another descendent of the early 
settlers, the Intelligencer wrote, “The shades of the uncles . . . must have been gratified at 
the singular phenomenon, exhibited by the overtopping grandeur of these lineal 
desendents of the deceased.”  678 
Bryan, as it turns out, was not elected, although his friend Runnels was.  Upon the 
news, Houston decided to run for state governor on the Know-Nothing ticket.  The Hero 
of San Jacinto received considerably less praise from the press than his opponent.  
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 [W]hen Sam Houston comes around, if he must, to wean the democracy of Texas 
from their allegiance to principles, by reciting the story of his suferings  and 
service in the revolution and by pouring forth the melting strains of his wizard 
voice in depicting the days of ‘auld laude syne,’  there is one hat that will not 
waive and one hat that will not vociferate his cheers.”679    
   
Indeed, in light of Houston’s struggles to compel the federal government to invest more 
of its attention and resources to frontier defense and his accompanying refusal to back the 
rest of the South, his political currency as an old war hero began to wane.  The San 
Antonio Ledger reported that Houston was losing in Nacogdoches, Corpus Christi and 
much of the rest of the east.  “Everywhere Old Sam goes now he loses votes,” the paper 
reported, “Many of his old friends are entirely disgusted with the old toothless lion, and 
even the ass gives him an occasional kick.”680   
In September, Houston and Bryan engaged in a debate in Hempstead where, the 
latter “took issue with General Houston on the Kansas Nebraska Bill, as well as the 
Missouri Compromise, sustaining the action of the Democratic Party and the South.”  
While Houston struggled galliantly through the debate, “It was evident that [Bryan’s] 
sentiments received an endorsement of a large majority of the meeting.”681  When 
Houston failed to muster the votes to return to office, the Gazette cited his position on the 
Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which has “shown us clearly the northern identity of his political 
association.”  The evidence was clear, according to the paper, “and the result shows that 
                                                          
679 “The Democratic Nominees,” Texas State Gazette, 30 May 1857. 
680 “The Canvass,” San Antonio Ledger and Texan, 25 July 1857. 
681 “Gen. Houston at Hempsted, Texas State Gazette, 4 September 1857,.  
411 
 
 
 
the people of Texas repudiate the course pursued by Sam Houston on this Southern 
question.”682  Ultimately, Houston lost the election to Runnels by a vote of 32,552 to 
28,678.683 
 Houston returned to Washington in December to resume his term as Senator.  
Relations with the Indians, however, only worsened as the decade drew to a close.  
“Everyday brings us intelligence of new murders upon the frontier,” Houston wrote in 
March 1860, “[I]f we cannot propitiate the Indians then what shall we do?”  Houston, 
then the governor, continued in vain to call for a treaty clarifying that a violation against 
Texas was a violation against the United States, and eventually he had to admit that 
federal efforts to defend the frontier had failed miserably. “The army is in fact inefficient, 
a few nights since the Cavalry at Camp Cooper amounting to some seventy horses were 
unhorsed by the Indians and the men left with their saddles, spurs, and accoutrements, 
prepared for a spring campaign.  So you see how things work,” he wrote to US official. 
684  Conditions had become almost intolerable.  “Our frontiers are at this time in a truly 
alarming condition,” he wrote.685 
Relations with Mexico had also grown increasingly strained and Houston found 
himself reprimanding a group of Texan militia who had gathered at the border in 
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preparation for a Mexican invasion. He warned them that their expeditions “would not be 
received in the service of the United States and their movements at this time are 
calculated to excite erroneous impressions as to the design of Texas, and thus defeat the 
Call.”  Just as Austin had done before him, Houston struggled to assert his authority over 
increasingly frustrated and rogue citizens whose regard for the federal government was 
conditional.  Despite his own lack of confidence, Houston insisted that the public 
continue to refrain from taking matters into their own hands, assuring them that the 
authorities would deliver on their promise.  Incursions by private citizens only invited 
further aggression.  “The most calamitous disasters that have befallen Texas, have grown 
out of expeditions not sanctioned by Law, and indisobediance to order,” he argued. 
Houston then informed the federal government of what their continued inaction might 
render.  The Texan frontier citizens, “Notwithstanding all his moderation,” may soon “be 
required to resort to the indefeasible right of self-defense to protect his fellow-citizens.”  
Houston’s warning indeed amounted to a threat if matters were not immediately 
addressed. 686 
Eventually, however, Houston had to admit Texans should be allowed to do the 
job instead.  In a letter to the Secretary of War, he wrote that “The misfortunes to which 
we have been subject, since annexation have, I think, demonstrated the fact that it is 
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entirely useless to think of rendering protection to Texas by the regular army.”  He 
proposed instead that the government permit the Texas Rangers to take over.687  
Yet, despite acknowledging the United States’ ultimate failure to defend Texas 
against Indian and Mexican incursions, Houston continued to denounce secession and to 
insist on the inherent superiority of the Anglo-American political system.  Houston stated 
that he had arrived in Texas with the “belief that the Constitution and the Union were to 
be perpetual blessings to the human race,” and “that the success of the experiment of our 
fathers was beyond dispute.” He hoped “that these bright anticipations should be 
realized” and that the US should continue as “not only the proudest nationality the world 
has ever produced, but the freest and most perfect.”  Houston continued to insist   that all 
of Texans’ freedom ultimately depended on remaining a part of the Union.  Not only was 
American politics and society superior, but they were destined to sweep across the rest of 
the continent, encompassing a nation broader and more diverse as any democracy before 
it.  “In its onward march, sweeping the valleys of California, and leaving its pioneer 
waves in the waves of the Pacific,” Houston declared of his rapidly expanding republic, 
“I have seen this might progress and it still remains free and independent.  Power, wealth, 
expansion, victory, have followed in its path, and yet the aegis of the union has been 
broad enough to encompass all.  Is not this worth perpetuating?”  For Houston, the 
United States’ recent expansion was the best proof of its superiority – not martial 
prowess, or violence, or a weak neighbor.  This, if nothing else, justified its cohesion.  If 
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Texans thought they had it bad now, Houston warned them that it would be far worse if 
they ever went their own way. 
 
Will you exchange this for all the hazards, the anarchy and carnage of civil war?  
Do you believe it will be dissevered and no shock felt to society?  You are asked 
to plunge into a revolution; but are you told how to get out of it?  Not so; but it is 
to be a leap in the dark – a leap into the abyss whose horrors would even fright the 
mad spirits of disunion who tempt you on.  
 
 
Yet, for many Texans, secession and independence were far from shots in the dark.  
Houston’s appeals to Anglo solidarity and his insistence on the inherent superiority of the 
United States was, of course, not universal.  688 
  
*** 
As 1860 drew to a close, talk of secession began to sweep the South, including 
Texas, the views of men like Bryan and Runnels echoed in the state newspapers.  “The 
States (each in itself) are sovereign,” wrote the Gazette, “The federal government is the 
creature of the States; it is the agent, and whenever the agent shall usurp power not 
delegated in the agreement, the principals to the compact are released from it, and are no 
longer bound.”689  In December, John Wharton announced for secession.690  That same 
month the Dallas Weekly Herald declared “Let Texas declare her independence, and let 
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her never consent to pass homage to an administration, the chief of which, in days past, 
laughed over the destruction of the lives and property of her citizens.”691   
    As for Houston, his steadfast defense of unionism made him subject to harsh 
condemnation from Texas newspapers and increasing alienation from his constituency. 
Yet he continued to defend his position, insisting that he had Texans’ best interest at 
heart.  The Flag reported on a speech he gave in Nacogdoches during his recent campaign 
in which “he alluded to his history, and stated that it was not disconnected with that of the 
country, and trusted that its future pages would vindicate him.”692 The Flag came to his 
defense.  “There will be many false charges and doubtless a black record manufactured 
and circulated against the Old General.”  Yet, the paper reminded its audience that 
“almost every act of his life notwithstanding has been that of the greatest devotion to his 
country.”  Of Runnels, the paper wrote, “what acts of his life shall we look to as 
designating him as the man for the position to which he aspires?”  Regarding the 
common accusation that Houston “endorses the measures of the present administration 
which we oppose,” the Flag conceded that “we regret it as much as any one.  We expect 
not perfection in this life knowing that it is human to err and will take him for the good 
he has done.”693   
Yet, a contributor to the San Antonio Ledger and Texan had a different opinion.  
“I am one of those who have always been a friend to, and voted for, Gen Houston,” yet, 
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“I have been mistaken in the man.”  Regarding frontier security, his policy was “not 
acceptable,” especially concerning his behavior towards the militia, whose autonomy he 
was accused of imposing upon.  “If General Houston respects the rights of the dear 
people as alleged by him, then how is it that he makes and unmakes companies in 
proportion as they elect officers to suit his dictatorial will?” asked the author, “[I]s not the 
law explicit that the militia have the exclusive right to elect these officers?”694   
Indeed, Texans had an additional reason besides states’ rights compelling them to 
secede. In March of 1861, the Herald reported that “the Confederate Congress already 
stands pledged to give protection to our exposed Frontier.”  Furthermore, it would 
facilitate rather than hinder local efforts to police the frontier.  “If the State will call out a 
permanent force, it will be recognized by the Southern Congress, and liberal 
appropriations made for its support, as soon as Texas joins the Confederacy.”695   
As much as Houston wished otherwise, he had to admit that Texas was heading 
decisively towards a convention and to try and prevent such would be political suicide.  
In December, he clarified his position once again, denying that he “would use my 
executive powers to thwart the will of the people of Texas.”  Houston cautioned against 
reaction to Lincoln’s election and clarified that he in fact supported a Convention 
composed of representatives of the people – how could he not as their governor?  But he 
also expressed confidence that whatever resolution said Convention rendered, it would 
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not be secession.  “Let the people at the ballot-box select men to reflect their sentiments 
in a convention of Southern states, and no one can complain.  As one, I cannot believe 
our troubles are beyond remedy, and am willing therefore to see the wisdom of the entire 
South assembled to devise some means for their settlement.”696   
 On January 28, a group of elected representatives from throughout the state of 
Texas convened in Austin.  Chief among their duties was “to determine what shall be the 
future relations of this State to the Union, and such other matters as are necessarily and 
properly incident thereto.”697  The historical importance of what they were doing was not 
lost on the President who declared that they had convened “to consider and dispose of 
questions equally as momentous and more varied than those that were solved by our 
revolutionary forefathers of ’76!” At stake was “not only the right of self government,” 
but “the immemorial recognition of the institution of slavery wherever it is not locally 
prohibited” and, as had been the case in their earlier conflict with Mexico, “the true 
theory of our general government as an association of sovereignties.” 698 Indeed, the 
legacy of the Texas Revolution loomed heavily over the entire Convention, especially on 
January 30th when it was resolved that veterans of the conflict be invited into the House 
to observe the proceedings “provided they are in favor of another revolution.” 699  
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 That same day the Convention issued a Joint Resolution, the first section of which 
expressed objections eerily similar to the complaints lodged against Santa Anna’s 
government  fifteen years prior.  
 
[W]hereas the action of the Northern States of the Union, and the recent 
development in federal affairs, make it evident that the power of the Federal 
Government is sought to be made a weapon with which to strike down the 
interests and prosperity of the Southern people, instead of permitting it to be as it 
were intended our shield against outrage and aggression.  
 
 The delegates pointed to the federal government’s failure to meet their specific needs 
and interests as justification for their secession.  They declared annexation “hereby 
repealed and annulled” and Texas “absolved for all restraints and obligations incurred by 
said compact” and declared it “a separate sovereign State.”700 
 Frustration over the loss of their imperial dreams also played a role in the 
delegates’ decision.  They attacked the federal government for excluding the southern 
states “from all the immense territory owned in common by all the States on the Pacific 
Ocean, for the avowed purpose of acquiring sufficient power in the common government 
to use it as a means of destroying the institutions of Texas and her sister slave-holding 
states.” This was particularly offensive since they saw themselves as the United States’ 
gateway to the West.701  
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But Texas also had the additional grievance of experiencing the federal 
government’s neglect when it came to its own frontier protection.  The Federal 
Government, they claimed, “while but partially under the control of those our unnatural  
and sectional enemies,” had for years “almost entirely failed to protect the lives and 
property of the people of Texas against the Indian savages on our border, and more 
recently against the murderous forays of banditti from the neighboring territory of 
Mexico.”  Thus, the burden of border security had largely fallen on Texan shoulders, 
pointing out that “when our State government has extended large amounts for such 
purpose, the Federal Government has refused reimbursement therefor.”  Texas, they 
claimed, had been rendered “more insecure and harassing than it was during the existence 
of the Republic of Texas.”702  Meanwhile, the Confederacy had “positively assured that 
their protection would be far more perfect” under its jurisdiction.703  
Even as they highlighted their commonalities, representatives from other southern 
states admitted that the Texans were unique among the Confederate states.  “We are not 
unmindful of your illustrious history when fresh from the fields of victory and glory in 
which you established your own independence,” wrote Confederate leaders in a welcome 
letter to the Texans.   
 
[Y]ou presented a spectacle unexampled in the history of the world. With a 
territory sufficiently extensive for empires, with a soil rich in the production of 
everything necessary for the happiness of man, and with a climate as lovely as can 
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be found on any spot of the habitable globe, without money and without price, 
you united your destiny with  a sisterhood, whose duty it was to foster and protect 
you  
 
 
The Texans were victims of a “common enemy,” but unique in that they suffered 
specifically from “neglect and insult.”704 
The authors concluded by emphasizing the specifically southern heritage of most 
Texans.  “The hearts of Southern fathers and Southern mothers, of Southern brothers, and 
sisters, relatives, and friends have followed you to this distant land, and though saddened 
by the wide interval between you and them,” they looked forward “to the time when all 
will again live under this same form of government, and be protected by its strong arm.” 
Unlike Houston, who denied that Texas shared more in common with the South than with 
the rest of the nation, delegates of the Convention stated that “Their interests, their 
pursuits, their laws, their institutions, their customs are the same and the same destiny 
awaits each and all.”705  
 Indeed, as Texans emphasized their ties to the rest of the slave South, not only  
did they see direct parallels between their secession from Mexico and their secession 
from the United States, but  they now understood their relationship with both countries to 
be effectively the same.  “The Mexican yoke could not have been more galling to ‘the 
army of the heroes’ of ’36 than the Black republican rule would be to the survivors  and 
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sons of that army at the present day,” declared one delegate.706 And they expressed the 
conviction that Texans would be no less willing to pick up arms against their North 
American oppressors than they had against their Mexican ones.  “I trust the guns will 
soon be again upon the soil they so nobly assisted in rescuing from Mexican tyranny,”707 
one delegate confidently predicted, and concluded that “The possibility of settling our 
difficulties by a reconstruction of the Union” would receive “about the same 
encouragement as a proposition to re-annex Texas to the State of Mexico.”708   
 Indeed, the specific principles on which Texans’ based their rights to secede from 
the Union were, almost to the word, those on which they declared their right to withdraw 
from Mexico.   “All political power is inherent in the people, and all free government are 
founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit, and they have at all times the 
inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their form of government in such manner as 
they may think expedient.” Their decision to secede from the United States, just like their 
decision to secede from Mexico, was compelled by their enduring pursuit of extreme 
federalism.  
 
When permanently successful, such a remodeling of government, embracing our 
complicated system of reserved State rights and delegated Confederate authority, 
may give a better guarantee than all history that our people at least are capable of 
instituting and maintaining free government. 
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Finally, in true Texan form, leaders attempted to impose their new system over those 
territories they believed rested under their jurisdiction, recommending “to the citizens of 
the Territory of Santa Fe or New Mexico the propriety of immediately proceeding to 
form a State constitution recognizing the institution of slavery,” and requesting “for 
admission into the confederacy of Southern States.”709 Texans’ territorial and imperial 
ambitions would receive renewed vigor under a new alliance. 
*** 
 The United States was not alone as it faced a rising tide of sectionalism that 
threatened its existence as a unified republic.  As a country that had struggled since its 
inception to achieve some semblance of national cohesion, Mexico continued to find 
itself plagued by civil war throughout the 1850’s.  But the South’s decision to secede 
from the Union, and especially Texas’, had a critical impact on questions that had 
plagued the Mexican nation for decades – specifically the question of northern secession.  
Mexico had an even harder time holding itself together after it lost two-thirds of its 
territory to the United States.  The northern states of Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Durango 
and Coahuila proved particularly problematic, especially with the rise of several 
federalist movements with strong separatist impulses and, not surprisingly, close ties to 
Texas.  In fact, in 1847 Lamar called on the northern Mexican states to do something that 
they had been attempting for a decade - declare themselves an independent republic.  
“The remote and exposed situation of these States has prevented their enjoying equal 
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advantages with the other sections of the union,” he wrote in an editorial for La Bandera, 
a federalist newspaper based in Matamoros.  “On the contrary, they have been wholly 
neglected by the General government.” Lamar promised that “If these States, tired of 
their injuries, which they have suffered for so long a time, should desire to liberate 
themselves from the tyranny of the General Government, to rise from their present 
humiliations and to place themselves on an equality with the other esteemed nations[,] I 
cannot deny my most lively support.”  Just as Lamar would emphasize the cultural, 
economic and political disparity between the northern and southern United States, so he 
made a similar distinction between the Mexican north and the rest of the country. “The 
states of the north of Mexico have no interests in common with those beyond the Sierra 
Madre.  Neither have they any reasons for involving themselves in the present war 
between Mexico and the United States; and even less of submerging themselves in the 
civil disputes that are continually occurring in that nation.”  Lamar imagined the Sierra 
Madre as a border, akin to the Mason-Dixon Line, which “Nature seems to have 
designed” as “a great national boundary” extending all the way to the Pacific, and 
forming “a great republic whose prosperity and illustrious institutions would be the 
admiration and envy of the world.”  But just as he emphasized the differences between 
the northern and southern states of both countries, Lamar highlighted the similarities 
between the southern US and northern Mexico: “It is very natural and right that I, in 
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common with thousands of others, should have a lively interest in the prosperity and 
welfare of these States, considering their proximity to my own country”710 
 Lamar ultimately argued that northern Mexico should follow the course that he 
advocated for the southern US and that, ultimately, that country would follow.  The 
northern Mexican states, declared Lamar, had “the opportunity of erecting a temple of 
liberty that might surpass in firmness, beauty and duration any that have preceded it.” 711  
In Lamar’s opinion, Mexico still held all the promise that the earliest settlers had seen in 
it, but it now rested principally in the northern states and could only be realized with an 
independent northern republic.  Mexican secession, like southern secession, was an 
attempt to return to the founding principles and original promise of the early republic. 
 But Lamar’s claims were not the isolated voice of an arrogant, and perhaps even 
implicitly imperialistic, Anglo-Texan.  The notion of northern secession had been 
circulating since prior to the Texas Revolution, and in the wake of the war with the US it 
reached its zenith, finding expression in the form of the charismatic Santiago Vidaurri.  
Much about Vidaurri’s origin and early life remain a mystery.  But we do know that he 
rose to political prominence in 1837 when he was appointed chief assistant to the 
conservative governor of Nuevo León.  In 1841 he became the secretary to the newly 
appointed liberal Governor Manuel María de Llano.  That same year he became 
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acquainted with Texas when, ironically, he served there as a spy for General Arista on the 
eve of the Santa Fe Expedition.712  
 Despite his service to the centralists, in 1855 Vidaurri joined a group of liberal 
reformers trying to rid their country of what they believed to be a corrupt, inept and 
despotic central government responsible for Mexico’s humiliating defeat by the United 
States.  Most of these men had been born after independence, raised under the 
Constitution of 1824 and aimed to restore many of its liberal principles including 
renewed state’s rights and less church influence. Their aims culminated that spring when 
Vidaurri seized Monterrey and issued the Plan de Restaurador de la Libertad which 
called for the return of full state sovereignty (including locally controlled militias) 
throughout Mexico, as had been established in the 1824 Constitution.713  The official 
organ of Vidaurri’s movement declared that  
 
Nuevo León, Coahuila and Tamalulipas are cooperating to restore the power to 
live under the protection of the law, under rules defined and derived from the will 
of the nation and not under the pressure and influence of armed force as has been 
the case in the last two years. Remember that this is truly Mexican, and that 
enough has been sacrificed to the caprice of a man, the fate of this noble and 
magnanimous nation, as well as the brilliance that comes from the praiseworthy 
army. 
 
 
Vidaurri did not stop there.  In a particularly bold move reminiscent of the Texas 
Revolution, he declared Nuevo León independent until the restoration of federalism. 
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“The State of Nuevo León resumes its sovereignty, liberty and independence,” declared 
El Restaurador, while the national Congress is called in conformity with the Convocation 
of December 10 1841, establishing the system and form of Government that should rule 
the republic.” The paper concluded that “Despotism cannot exist in Mexico.”714 
Not surprisingly, Texans greeted Vidaurri’s victory with glee and encouraged him 
to go a step further, declaring Nuevo León completely independent, thereby creating a 
buffer zone between the US south and Mexico that would protect them from centralist 
incursions and allow them to retrieve escaped slaves.  But Vidaurri was uninterested in 
this and easily repelled Texans who crossed the border.  This gained him favor in the 
eyes of Mexico City liberals who, when they returned to power in 1856, allowed his state 
to absorb Coahuila.  In August of the following year, Vidaurri issued a revised 
constitution for Nuevo León y Coahuila which, among other things, outlawed slavery.  
But he proved an unreliable military chief when he refused to follow the order of 
President Juárez in suppressing conservative forces in the north, after determining that it 
would mean almost certain defeat for his militia.  Before long, Vidaurri found himself 
alienated from national liberals who ultimately believed that he cared more about his own 
power and security than the rest of the nation.715 
Faced with imprisonment or worse, Vidaurri went into exile in Texas where he 
made several important contacts, including José Augustín Quintero.  As for the Texans, 
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they received this “fine looking, intelligent man” with “distinguished consideration,” 
according to the  San Antonio Herald, which reported that “his object is to study our 
government, and to rest from the labors of war.”716 Indeed, Texas had long served as an 
inspiration for the Mexican federalists, and, during his time there, Vidaurri realized, 
according to one biographer, that “his goals and aspirations for Nuevo León y Coahuila 
more nearly resembled those of Texas than southern or central Mexico.”717 As Vidaurri’s 
relationship with the Mexican central government deteriorated, Texas would become 
more important, not only as political inspiration, but as a critical, if not clandestine, 
trading partner. 
When the US Civil War commenced in 1861 the two regions’ economic 
codependence became indispensable as southerners soon found themselves faced with the 
almost certain prospect of a northern blockade of their ports.  Additionally, southerners 
wanted Mexico’s promise that it would not allow the Union to launch an invasion 
through northern Mexico.  After a botched attempt at establishing diplomatic relations 
between the CSA and Mexico by John T. Pickett, who wound up insulting liberal 
officials, the State Department sent Quintero to Monterrey to meet with Vidaurri.  The 
two men had met in Austin during Vidaurri’s exile two years prior, and now convened for 
what they called a “confidential intercourse.” Vidaurri graciously agreed to police and 
secure the border and to allow the CSA desperately needed access to weapons, 
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ammunition, and other wartime necessities.  While he acknowledged that he lacked the 
authority necessary to negotiate on such a subject since he was not a federal authority, he 
pointed out the exceptionality of the case and, convinced that the Supreme Government 
would support an arrangement designed to achieve peace and friendship with foreign 
nations, concluded that he would “constitute [him]self an official organ of the 
Government to assure your Excellency that this sane principle [of non-aggression] is 
being observed by the Mexican Government, its representatives, and its people.”  
Vidaurri concluded his correspondence by assuring “Peace between the two neighboring 
countries and the condemnation of any hostility from every side.”718   In May of 1861, 
The Dallas Weekly Herald reported that a Mexican counterpart “renews the assurances of 
Gov. Vidaurri’s desire to be on good terms with Texas, and his determination to punish 
parties coming into Texas on marauding purposes.719     Vidaurri’s assurances led 
Quintero to state in his letter to Texas Governor Edward Clark that “I have been entirely 
successful in my mission” and that “the Southern Confederacy has made a powerful ally 
on this frontier by securing the friendship of the state of New Leon and Coahuila.”  In 
addition to security and friendship from northern Mexico, Quintero also confirmed that 
“we could buy any quantity of powder and lead we might desire” from their southern 
neighbor. “Should you think proper to send an order it will be immediately filled.”  For 
Vidaurri, the mission was a success because it allowed the northern states a virtual 
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monopoly on the Texas market and opportunity to solidify his position in the North once 
again in the face of the centralizing Juárez government.720 
But Vidaurri’s aims did not end there.  He had also expressed to Quintero the 
possibility of annexing his state to the Confederacy.  In mentioning his reasons for this he 
stated that he had always admired American federalism and the South possessed the 
technology and labor force necessary for the proper exploitation of northern Mexico’s 
limitless resources, namely its mines.  Furthermore, the Confederacy could provide 
northern Mexicans with the protection and security that they had long demanded but 
failed to receive from their federal government. Davis, however, believed that it would be 
an “imprudent and impolitic” move for the South and promptly dismissed the proposal.  
For one, such an act would have almost certainly lead to war with Mexico as well as 
prevent intervention and recognition by Europe.  That point aside, the president of the 
Confederacy believed, quite rightly, that the South already had its work cut out for it.721 
While the CSA’s absorption of Nuevo León never came to fruition, it nonetheless 
demonstrates the enduring power of federalism both north and south of the border, and 
the variety of geopolitical arrangements  still available well into the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, if the South had won the Civil War, the result would have been a Confederate 
States of America that included, not just the slave South, but recently acquired Mexican 
land to its west  and south - a massive republican empire based on forced labor and 
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states’ rights, with a far smaller and less effectual United States to its north and Mexico 
to its south.  The North American continent would have looked very different indeed, and 
the relationship between the United States and Mexico perhaps even more so. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
“If he who, by conquest, wins an empire, (and) receives the world’s applause, 
how much more is due to those who, by unceasing toil, lay in the wilderness the 
foundation for an infant colony, and build there upon a vigorous and happy state!”722  So 
wrote Henderson K. Yoakum in his 1856 tome on the history and early settlement of the 
most recent addition to the United States.  The acquisition of Texas paved the way for the 
US’s imperial rise by the middle of the nineteenth century.  Henderson’s remarks, of 
course, refer to that first generation of early Anglo settlers who, according to many, made 
it all possible.   But not only were these early settlers far from the forbears of US 
westward expansion, but the long road to United States continental domination was 
replete with contingencies, ironies and missed opportunities. 
The United States’ continental empire would collapse just fifteen years after its 
consummation, torn asunder by the very impulses that had compelled Austin and others 
to come to Mexico in the first place.  White American men would make one more 
attempt at a loosely confederated republic, committed to the principles of states’ rights, 
racialized slavery and martial citizenship.   But they would fail.  Just like Mexico and 
Texas had.  The Civil War taught the Confederacy the same lesson that Mexico’s painful 
and protracted civil wars had taught that country – the limits of regional sovereignty and 
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racial exclusion and the necessity of a strong central state to modern republican 
governance.723 While Mexico struggled to condense and rebuild itself, and the 
Confederacy’s political experiment was eviscerated, the United States of the North would 
emerge larger, stronger and more unified than ever, finally able to absorb, contain and 
control its sprawling young empire.     
Yet the story of the United States’ ultimate imperial rise after the Civil War is not 
entirely one of democracy triumphant.  Certainly, the end of the war enabled the Union to 
liberate four million slaves, but it also accelerated the extermination and confinement of 
native groups throughout the West.  In another stroke of historical irony, Texans ended 
up owing their livelihoods to the very government that they had waged war against.  It 
was the post-war US military that finally, in 1867, moved the thousands of southern 
plains Indians, who the Texans had been fighting for decades, out of their state and onto 
reservations.724   
And it was the post-war US government that would manage to deliver the 
numerous internal improvements that Texans craved and needed, namely the long 
dreamed of Southern Pacific Railroad, transforming Texas society and economy, 
solidifying its ties to a country that it had always seemed not quite a part of.  Meanwhile, 
many ethnic Mexicans who had remained in the Southwest after the signing of the Treaty 
                                                          
723 Stephnanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), Chapter 1 and Epilogue. 
724 Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the US-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale, 
2008), 306-10. 
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of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, managing to preserve or carve out a place for themselves among 
the region’s commercial class, now found their once central role significantly undermined 
by the Railroad Company which, as Karl Jacoby explains, “Almost overnight, ruptured 
the long-standing circuits of exchange in the region, shifting the dominant flow of trade 
from its north-south axis to its east-west orientation.”725   
But perhaps nothing served to undermine the once fluid and cooperationist 
relationship between Anglo Americans and Mexicans, and symbolize the strength and 
cohesion of the Reconstructed United States than its southern border.  Beginning with the 
first battles of the Mexican revolution in 1910, the once natural boundary line between 
the United State and Mexico along the Rio Grande became the stark physical barrier that 
we know today, rising up out of a stark desert and bisecting the former direction of trade, 
politics and belonging.  Perhaps ironically, it was the Union victory and subsequent 
federal policies that ended up hardening the racial divide between whites and non-whites 
in the new American Southwest.  As Rachel St. John writes, the US-Mexico border 
became “not just where two nations met, but where two nations were divided.”726  
As the United States began closing its border and transitioning from a territorial 
empire into a political and cultural empire, the popular myth of Texas and its righteous 
revolution as an emblem of Anglo-American democracy triumphing over Mexican 
                                                          
725 Ibid., 209. 
726 Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western US-Mexico Border (Princeton: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), Chapter 5, quote on page 145. 
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despotism and dysfunction would fuel the national and imperial imagination of America 
as an exporter of a universally preferable and transferable system of government.  The 
United States would not only carry the banner of democracy and freedom into the 
Caribbean and the Pacific at the turn of the nineteenth century, but into Southeast Asia in 
the mid-twentieth, and the Middle East in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.  Supporting this national myth of political self-righteousness is the story of 
Texas – a story that, as most understand it, is about a group of freedom-loving Anglo 
frontiersmen defending their political ideals against a corrupt and despotic regime, and 
proudly helping to turn the United States into the most powerful nation in the world.  Yet, 
it is far more complicated.  It is just as much about a small group of white property-
owning US citizens who saw the profound limits of their nation’s political capacity less 
than forty years after its founding. 
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